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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET 30-89

(9)

CHINESE COMMUNIST TACTICS (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON 25, D.C. MARCH 1957

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET 30-89

CHINESE COMMUNIST TACTICS (U)



Large Units (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON 25, D.C. MARCH 1957

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PAMPHLET
No. 30-89DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 7 May 1957HANDBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNIST TACTICS (U)
LARGE UNITS (U)

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PART. ONE THE MILITARY SYSTEM

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL BACKGROUND

a. Before late 1954, the *Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China* consisted of the Central People's Government Council, the highest organ of state, and four separate, but coequal, subordinate agencies of government: The Government Administration Council (executive), the Supreme People's Court (judicial), the People's Procurator General's Office (judicial), and the *People's Revolutionary Military Council* (executive). The latter body functioned as a war ministry and controlled the General Staff of the *People's Liberation Army*. Composed primarily of Ground Force officers, the Council exercised jurisdiction over all components of the Armed Forces and the People's Militia.

b. Subsequent to September 1954, under Communist China's newly adopted Constitution, several new, important bodies were created to carry out many governmental functions (fig. 1). First, the Constitution established the *National People's Congress*, the legislative body of the People's Republic. Second, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (legislative) and the State Council (executive) replaced the old Central People's Government Council and the Government Administration Council. Third, a Council of National Defense was created. Fourth, a Supreme State Conference was established as an advisory body to the head of state. The powers and function of these bodies, and a computation of their Communist membership, reveal the Communist monopoly on government policy despite the fact that lip service is paid to minority groups. MAO Tse-tung, undisputed leader of the Communist Party and present chairman of the Peoples Republic of China, may be in the next several critical years, removing the most

powerful, most unifying personal force in Communist China. To offset a possible power clash among cliques (the top Party leadership, the new bureaucrats, the internationalists, and the Armed Forces) attempting to seize control, the regime, by announcing the new Constitution, has begun to lay the foundations for collective leadership in public doctrine and, possibly, in administrative practice.

c. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is the permanent body of the Congress. The Standing Committee is probably in effective control of the Congress' constitutional functions as the "highest organ of state power". The Congress, consisting of about 1,200 delegates, is likely to follow the Soviet example and do little more than approve measures submitted to its annual meetings. The former counterpart of the Standing Committee, the Central People's Government Council, was under MAO Tse-tung's Chairmanship. Today, however, the head of state does not hold the chair of the Standing Committee. The chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress will be in a position to exercise power second only to MAO's, if he can control the majority of his Committee.

d. Another important change in government structure, after the adoption of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China by the first session of the First National People's Congress on 20 September 1954, was the establishment of the State Council, which is described in the Constitution as the "highest administrative organ of the Central People's Government." This designation gives it a higher rank than the Government Administration Council under the old provisional system. Before that time, MAO Tse-tung himself was Chairman of the Central People's Government and, as Premier of the Government Administration Council, CHOU En-lai was responsible to the Central People's Gov-

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① Chinese Communist infantry on parade in Peiping, October 1954.

Figure 3. Elements of Chinese Communist army, air, and naval forces.

munications. Beside its own internal deficiencies, the Army lacked the support of sea and air forces. It also lacked the formality in tactical organization. The Communists did not employ standard-size units which could be identified by their titles, but preferred to exaggerate their strength by variations in terminology. That policy created as much trouble for today's historians as it did for the Kuomintang; it is next to impossible to fix the size and organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of 1949.

b. Concurrently with the establishment of civil government, Communist China's leaders proclaimed the establishment of the People's Liberation Army, a title developed more for popular appeal than for definitive meaning. The title was applied to the entire military establishment and encompassed not only the army in being, the basis of the present army, but the newly created Chinese Communist People's Air Force and People's Navy. The creation of the People's Liberation Army was coincident with the inception of a long-range program to standardize

organization, modernize equipment, and develop supporting combat arms and services.


3. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

a. The Army, the Air Force, and the Navy are all administered by the Ministry of National Defense (fig. 9). Through its General Staff, its several directorates, its Air Force and Navy headquarters, and its military areas in the field, the Ministry of National Defense bears the principal responsibility for prosecution of the State's military policy. This policy includes the employment of portions of the Armed Forces in national construction works, in agricultural pursuits, in afforestation, and in flood-control projects; the induction of conscripts for all the Armed Forces in time of peace; the management of a reserve program for the Armed Forces; and the mobilization of the Armed Forces and reservists in time of war.

b. The Minister of National Defense is directly responsible to, and reports to, the Premier of the

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② Infantry in the field.

Figure 3. Elements of Chinese Communist army, air, and naval forces—Continued.

State Council. The Premier coordinates the administration and modernization of the Armed Forces with the operations of other ministries and commissions within the State Council. Other functions and powers related to management of military affairs exercised by the Premier of the State Council include preparation of the national budget, implementation of the state economic plan, control of foreign affairs, maintenance of public order, and management of state-controlled heavy industry. Although the State Council is primarily executive in nature, the Constitution of the People's Republic of


China grants it the right of legislative initiative. As a consequence, administrative measures influencing management of the Armed Forces can be drafted and issued by the Premier, and ratified or revised by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee at some subsequent date. The Premier supervises execution of orders and decrees through the members of his State Council, a small and compact body heavily staffed with top-ranking Communist planners, military men, and administrators. The Constitution places the State Council under the National People's Congress, and the Pre-

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③ A medium bomber unit of the Chinese Communist People's Air Force.

Figure 3. Elements of Chinese Communist army, air, and naval forces—Continued.

mier of the Council reports directly to the Standing Committee on routine matters of government.


4. PREDOMINANCE OF THE ARMY

Because of the origin of the People's Liberation Army, the Army—the senior service—dominates the military establishment. No separate command echelon exists for the Army. Command of major Army components is exercised by the Ministry of National Defense. Although distinct headquarters

organizations exist as separate entities for the air and naval forces of the People's Liberation Army (fig. 8), they are by no means coequal members of the military establishment. These headquarters are subordinate to the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, and both the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff are, in fact, composed primarily of Army personnel; even the top command and staff personnel in Air Force and Naval headquarters were originally Army per-

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④ Airborne troops

Figure 3. Elements of Chinese Communist army, air, and naval forces—Continued.


sonnel. Military regulations published subsequent to January 1955 actually appear to relegate the Air Force and Navy to a status equivalent to the principal ground-combat support arms such as armor and artillery.

5. INTERRELATION OF ARMY, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES

Interrelation of Chinese Communist ground, air, and naval forces has resulted not only in the administration of the three services by the same Ministry, but it has caused operational control of air and naval units in the field during time of war to be exercised through senior ground command. A single logistical organization at General Staff level,

known as the General Rear Service Department, coordinates supply, storage, and movement for ground, air, and naval forces. Defense of Communist China against air attack is the responsibility of a separate command at General Staff level, under the Ministry of National Defense. This command probably controls sizable antiaircraft artillery elements, as well as fighter aircraft, which are provided by all three services. The Air Force includes the troop carrier units which are placed in ground commands during time of war. Similarly, the Navy includes a substantial marine-type force and the military establishment's water transportation facilities, which are integrated into ground-command echelons to form joint amphibious task forces. Air and naval

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
© Patrol vessels of the Chinese Communist People's Navy.

Figure 3. Elements of Chinese Communist army, air, and naval forces—Continued.

units and installations within China are grouped under air and naval headquarters echelons in Army military area commands throughout the country. During time of peace, Air Force and Navy affairs are managed through these headquarters from the senior Air Force and Navy headquarters in Peiping. Routine logistical support is provided by military area headquarters. In the event of war and active military operations in any or all of the military areas, operational control reverts to the military area commander or to specially created field commands which are directly subordinate to the Minister of National Defense. Thus the Army, Air, and Navy forces are closely interrelated; each service furnishes resources for certain mixed commands such as air-defense, amphibious, or theater-of-operations missions. They all draw logistical support from a common agency.

6. THE ARMY

a. The Chinese Communist Army, by far the largest element of the military establishment, is the decisive component of the Communist regime's military arm. Military doctrine assigns the Army the primary mission during hostilities of closing with and destroying the regular and paramilitary forces of the enemy; in this mission the Army is supported by elements of both the Air Force and the Navy. The efforts of all components are directed toward insuring the success of the ground operation. During time of peace the primary mission of the Army is building up its components—by organization, equipment, training, and political indoctrination—to perform their wartime functions effectively. Additional missions include maintenance of internal security of the nation and active participation in national construction and economic programs.



© An amphibious tank unit.

Figure 3. Elements of Chinese Communist army, air, and naval forces—Continued.

b. Army units fall into three distinct categories—Conventional ground forces, Public Security forces, and Production and Construction forces.

- (1) *Conventional ground forces* comprise most of the Army's strength and consist basically of armies, separate infantry divisions, armored divisions, cavalry divisions, artillery divisions, railway engineer divisions, engineer regiments, and several other varieties of separate regiments. Field commands for echelons above army level are employed as required by operational necessity.
- (2) *Public Security forces* consist of Public Security divisions and separate regiments organized and equipped as light infantry units. The subordination and control of Public Security forces are discussed in paragraph 357.
- (3) *Production and Construction forces* (par. 364) are either military or paramilitary organizations engaged in both military and nonmilitary production and construction activities. Units consist primarily of agricultural, water conservation, and forestry engineer divisions. Many of the personnel found in these units are reported

to be individuals whose physical limitations render them unfit for service in Regular Army or Public Security units.

c. Conventional ground forces consist of 13 basic components, which can be grouped into the categories of combat arms, technical services, and administrative services. These are:

- (1) *Combat arms:* Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Cavalry forces.
- (2) *Technical services:* Engineer, Signal, Railway, Technical Service, Quartermaster, Medical, and Veterinary Corps.
- (3) *Administrative services:* Judge Advocate and Administrative Corps.

The Technical Service Corps probably performs the functions of the Chemical, Ordnance, and Transportation Corps of the United States Army. The Administrative Corps performs finance, personnel management, and provost functions.

7. THE PEOPLE'S MILITIA

a. The People's Militia is a part-time, paramilitary force which is not a part of the People's Liberation Army. The origin of the People's Militia can be traced to the former Common Program of the People's Republic of China, which stated: "The People's Republic of China will enforce the system

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① An armored unit on parade in Peiping, October 1954.


Figure 4. Components of the army.

of People's Militia to maintain local order, lay the foundation for national mobilization, and prepare for the enforcement of an obligatory military service system at the appropriate moment." Directives and regulations were published in August 1950, in certain areas at least, covering the organization of the People's Militia. The State called for all males between the ages of 18 and 35, other than those in the Armed Forces, to join the Militia. The response to this call, and the degree of volition permitted, no doubt varied throughout the country.

b. The Militia is believed to function almost entirely in rural areas. Although the Communist authorities have announced that eventually five percent of the population will be enlisted in the Militia, some villages have only one or two members. Local authorities probably select only the more politically reliable for the Militia. As members of the Militia

are usually farmers who have little spare time, training for the most part is limited to occasional night meetings. It is believed, however, that in some areas (where Public Security Forces are active) the Militia is called up for a training cycle of two to three months during seasonal lulls in farming activities. After training, they are returned to their homes to continue their civilian pursuits, but they still do part-time soldiering. No uniform is worn by the Militiamen, though special insignia may be displayed by them on the shoulder or back when they are on duty. The armament provided the Militia probably varies with the importance of the area in which they are located. For example, Militiamen in rural areas along the seacoast reportedly are equipped with conventional light infantry weapons and receive training that enables them to reinforce local Public Security elements; in

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② A tractor-drawn heavy artillery unit.

Figure 4. Components of the army—Continued.

more remote and less sensitive areas, spears, swords, clubs, and outmoded rifles are the rule.


c. Communist China's Military Service Law, enacted in 1955, established a reserve and required the People's Militia to preserve local security and to protect production and construction. This law, together with a greater availability of arms, may cause the Militia to develop into a better organization, one that has real military capabilities. An increasing number of its members may be persons who have completed military service. Such an improved organization would, at the least, have the capability of releasing Army units from static duties and of making them available wherever national

interests may require. The Militia, in effect, would act as a "home guard" organization.

8. CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM


a. Since the Chinese Communist Armed Forces throughout their existence have been organized for war, they have been substantially mobilized for their entire history. Ever since the Communists took over China, conscription has been in existence to support the large Armed Forces, although a formal conscription system was publicly denied. The leaders of Communist China had outwardly maintained the myth of a "volunteer" force for years, at the same time applying ruthless press-gang

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③ A mechanized infantry reconnaissance element.



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④ Cavalry units pass Peiping's Tien-an (heaven) Gate reviewing stand.

Figure 4. Components of the army—Continued.

tactics to meet the requirements of the military establishment, until the new Military Service Law—which also "established" an obligatory system of military service—obviated this dissemblance. Formerly, registration of manpower was conducted by local civil administrative authorities, who deter-

mined the number of men available in their locality for military service. The Communists met requirements for military manpower by assigning quotas to local civil officials, who were compelled to fill their individual quotas. No consistent program for local conscription existed; in general, however, each

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⑤ Public security troops on beach patrol duty.

Figure 4. Components of the army—Continued.



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
Figure 5. Construction troops engaged in road building.

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① Militiamen receive individual training from army personnel.

② A field exercise during a militia training cycle.
Figure 6. The People's Militia.

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family was supposed to furnish one male for military service. Boys as young as 15 were taken, but the great majority were between 18 and 35 years of age. There was no announced term of service for Chinese Communist conscripts, and death or serious wounds were the only reasons for separation from the service. The average Chinese soldier was fortunate if he was accorded a furlough once every two years.

b. Usually, the Chinese Communists attempted to veil their conscription activities by using recruiting campaigns, accompanied by pressure of various kinds, to force eligible individuals to "volunteer" their services. Immediately before the adoption of the new Constitution, however, the former Government Administration Council abandoned the fiction of "People's Volunteers" in supplying manpower for the military establishment. On 13 September 1954, the Government announced the outright conscription over a 4-month period of 450,000 males between the ages of 18 and 22, and described this inauguration of formal conscription as the beginning of the transition of the Armed Forces from a "volunteer" to a compulsory service system. That act was, no doubt, executed to test both the efficiency of the conscription apparatus then proposed in a draft Military Service Law, and the reaction of the people to such a program.

c. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China prescribes, in part, that: "It is the sacred duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service according to law" (Article 103). This article, the basis for the Military Service Law, was approved by the People's Congress, on 30 July 1955. This action gave legal status to a formal conscription system.

d. The Military Service Law prescribes that, when a male citizen attains the age of 18, he is liable for military service, irrespective of his racial or tribal origin, occupation, social status, family status, religious faith, or education. *Traitors, counterrevolutionaries, feudal landlords, and bureaucratic capitalists* are not entitled to citizenship status and are thus exempt from the obligations of military service. Exemptions are granted to eligible citizens who are "ill and incapable of entering active service," as well as to the sole supporters or only sons of families. The latter may be deferred in peacetime but are subject to induction at any time within five years

following the date upon which they become eligible. Students at higher educational institutions also are draft-exempt but automatically receive officer training. They are accorded reserve officer status on graduation if not called into service. Students enrolled in senior high schools may be drafted or exempted according to decrees of the State Council. Contrary to previous Chinese Communist practice, women generally will not be drafted to serve; female specialists, however, may be drafted into the peacetime reserve and mobilized in time of war.

e. Military service is classified as *active* and *reserve*. The length of active service for enlisted ranks varies in the three services and is computed from 1 March of the year following conscription. Lengths of active military service are as follows:

- (1) Army and Public Security Forces—3 years.
- (2) Air Force, Coastal Defense (including naval land forces), and Seaborne Public Security Forces—4 years.
- (3) Navy (seaborne forces)—5 years.

The length of active service may be extended, based upon military necessity, provided the extension does not exceed a period of four months. The Ministry of National Defense is authorized to extend an individual's term of active service or transfer him to the reserve list. Article 15 of the Military Service Law states that the annual conscription period starts on 1 March and ends on the last day of February of the next year; all citizens who become 18 years old before 30 June of the conscription year shall be conscripted.

f. The law classifies reserve service into two categories—the first and the second reserves. Personnel who have completed active service are transferred to the first reserve. Males who have not been conscripted for active service, and female doctors, veterinarians, and other technical specialists are placed on the second reserve list and receive periodic training. Enlisted reserve service terminates in the first reserve at age 30 and in the second reserve at age 40. Enlisted personnel may extend their tour of reserve service for at least a year.

g. The Military Service Law also prescribes pre-induction military training for students throughout the nation. Students in senior high schools are given basic military training. Students in universities and colleges receive military training designed

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to qualify them for service as junior officers in the Armed Forces.

h. Administration of the conscription system is the responsibility of the State Council. The Council manages conscription affairs through civil conscription committees and military conscription bureaus, each established at every level of civil government from province down to village.

(1) Conscription committees plan conscription quotas, organize propaganda meetings to popularize military service, consider and approve exemptions in peacetime, and plan civilian resettlement and employment of servicemen placed on reserve or retired lists.

(2) Conscription bureaus are military organs for handling military service registration and statistics, for processing inductees, and for managing the organization and training of reserve servicemen.

In addition, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has delegated the task of enforcement of the conscription system to the Party committees at each level of civil government (par. 381). These committees not only supervise the functioning of local conscription committees throughout the nation, but propagandize the local population to insure support of new moves of the central Government that the Communist leaders fear may be unpopular.

i. The Chinese Communists publicly proclaim that this program will permit the release of over-age personnel and allow a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces in being. But, at the same time, they warn persons on active duty that such a reduction is not immediately foreseen. The Central People's Government probably intends to maintain its standing forces at present levels and run large numbers of persons through the services for training purposes, thus developing a vast military reserve. One of the most significant aspects of the conscription system is the emphasis placed on political indoctrination and organizational and disciplinary training by the Party in the Armed Forces (par. 26). In the space of three to five years (the service requirements), the Chinese Communists will have ample opportunity to thoroughly indoctrinate the youth of the nation. This indoctrination will increase their reliability in the eyes of the Party after their release from active service. Overall supervision of the conscription system was placed under

the Chinese Communist Party probably because the Party represents the only organized body within China capable of propagandizing and supervising large, nationwide undertakings. It will no doubt increase the ruthlessness with which the program is pursued.

9. OFFICER CORPS

a. The sixth Session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, on 8 February 1955, adopted regulations establishing a career officer corps in the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The regulations specify the sources from which officers will be drawn; establish a military rank system with career appointments (app. II); provide for promotion and removal of officers; and enumerate their rights and obligations, reserve service, and retirement.

b. As was also true before this announcement, officers are to be drawn from among graduates of military schools, from noncommissioned officers who pass selective examinations or who have attended special training courses, and from battlefield pro-

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Category of Service	Ground, Air, and Public Security Force OFFICERS			Naval and Naval Public Security Force OFFICERS (Of equivalent Ranks)		
	Active Service	1st Reserve	2d Reserve	Active Service	1st Reserve	2d Reserve
2d Lieutenant	30	40	45	35	40	45
1st Lieutenant	30	40	45	35	40	45
Captain	35	45	50	40	45	50
Senior Captain	35	45	50	40	45	50
Major	40	50	55	45	50	55
Lt Colonel	45	55	60	50	55	60
Colonel	50	55	60	55	55	60
Senior Colonel	50	55	60	55	55	60
Major General	55	60	65	55	60	65
Lieutenant General	60	60	65	60	60	65
Col General & above	Limits Based on Existing Situation					

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Figure 7. Age criteria for active and reserve service for officers.

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motions. In addition, reserve officers will be called on active duty.

c. In the past, the People's Liberation Army did not publicly emphasize differences between officers and enlisted men as do Western armies. Officers held ranks and were accorded positional titles that followed the Army's organizational structure, such as squad grade (squad leader), or assistant regimental grade (regimental chief of staff). The present regulations, however, establish a rigid military hierarchy based on the Soviet model and endow the new officer class of this hierarchy with all the trappings that prevail in other Communist military establishments. Officers are designated by a three-fold classification system: (1) A series of ranks ranging from Supreme Marshal of the People's Republic of China down to second lieutenant has been established, with rank denoted on Soviet-style shoulderboards; (2) officers are classified by major type of military occupational specialty; for example, command officers, political officers, and administrative officers; (3) the traditional organizational

titles have been retained and are assigned according to tables of organization.

d. The conscription law also establishes age criteria which limit active and reserve status for the officer corps, as shown on figure 7. Authority to place officers on reserve lists, and to retire them subsequent to completion of service, is delegated to the Premier of the State Council and the Minister of National Defense (for general officers and field-grade officers, respectively). Authority over company-grade officers rests with senior staff officers, senior field commanders, and branch chiefs. The senior field commanders manage the officer reserve program and direct field training throughout their respective areas.

e. The changeover to the system of nominal ranks indicates that the status of Chinese Communist soldiers and officers has been raised in Communist China's social structure. This move, together with other recent developments, also supports the belief that the People's Liberation Army is becoming a modern and well-administered army.

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CHAPTER 2

THE HIGH COMMAND

10. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

a. Between 1 October 1949 and 20 September 1954, the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China were under the command of the People's Revolutionary Military Council. The Council was nominally on the same level as other top executive and judicial organs of government, all of which were subordinate to the Central People's Government Council. It was a small organization; in 1949, the Council, under the chairmanship of MAO Tse-tung, included 5 vice chairmen and 22 members, most of whom were veteran Communist military leaders. The Council exercised command and administered the Armed Forces through the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army. The General Staff issued orders, directives, and publications in the name of the People's Revolutionary Military Council as frequently as it did in that of the People's Liberation Army. In retrospect, it is believed that a distinct "Headquarters, People's Liberation Army" did not exist. The title was announced principally for popular appeal and applied in a generic sense to the military establishment of Communist China. It also permitted the Communists to reward CHU Te, MAO's comrade in arms, with a purely nominal position, Commander-in-Chief, and make effective use of his prestige as a popular rallying point for loyalty of the Armed Forces. CHU lost this title with the adoption of the new Constitution.

b. Under the new system of government established by the Constitution in late 1954, the military high command was radically altered and now closely approximates the high commands found in other Communist countries. The People's Revolutionary Military Council was abolished, along with other organs of central government, and a new system of command established (fig. 8). The Chairman of the Central People's Government was made, concurrently, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the People's Republic. Normally, this command over the Armed Forces is delegated through the State Council to the Minister of National Defense, who exercises the day-to-day powers of administration and command. The Commander-

in-Chief also has the Council of National Defense to advise and assist him. This Council is a large body, consisting of the Chairman of the People's Republic, concurrently Chairman of the Council of National Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; 15 Council Vice Chairmen; and 81 Council Members.

11. THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

a. Theoretically, the elected legislature—the National People's Congress—has ultimate power over the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China. The same applies to the Standing Committee, the permanent body of the Congress, when the Congress is not in session. In actual fact, the National People's Congress has little influence. The major constitutional powers of the Standing Committee, however, make it a very powerful body. Those powers, together with the fact that the membership of the Standing Committee is heavily loaded with Communist Party leaders, place it in effective control of the Congress. The Chinese Communist Party shapes military policy, and the Standing Committee enacts the policy into law.

b. The Constitution states that the National People's Congress decides questions of war and peace. The Congress also appoints the Vice Chairman and Members of the Council of National Defense, upon their nomination by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China. Constitutionally, insofar as it affects the Armed Forces' high command, the Congress has the authority to remove from office the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the People's Republic, the Premier, the Vice Premiers, and the Ministers of the State Council; and the Vice Chairman and Members of the Council of National Defense. The Standing Committee, when the Congress is not in session, exercises the following functions and powers with respect to the Armed Forces:

- (1) Interprets national laws.
- (2) Enacts decrees.
- (3) Supervises the activities of the State Council.
- (4) Annuls decisions and orders of the State Council if necessary.

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
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Figure 8. The high command.

- (5) Decides upon the appointment or removal of any individual Vice Premier or Minister of the State Council.
- (6) Decides on the ratification or abrogation of treaties with foreign States.
- (7) Establishes military titles and ranks.
- (8) Establishes and decides upon the award of orders and medals.
- (9) Decides on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of armed attack against the State, or in fulfillment of international treaty obligations.
- (10) Decides on general or partial mobilization.
- (11) Decides on the enforcement of martial law throughout the country or in certain areas.
- (12) Approves nominations to the rank of Supreme Marshal and Marshal of the People's Republic of China.

12. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

MAO, as Chairman of the People's Republic of China, is ex-officio commander of the Armed Forces

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of the country. He also presides over the Council of National Defense, and convenes the Supreme State Conference when necessary and presides over its meeting. In accordance with decisions of the Congress, he appoints or removes the Premier, the Vice Premiers, and Ministers of the State Council and the Vice Chairman and Members of the Council of National Defense; confers the rank of Supreme Marshal and Marshal of the People's Republic; awards orders and medals; proclaims martial law; declares a state of war; and orders mobilization. Within the military establishment, the Commander-in-Chief has authority to confer or to remove the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China. He also retains authority, upon the decision of the Standing Committee, to appoint or remove personnel in positions of Chief of the General Staff and Directors of the principal General Staff departments (par. 16).

13. THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

a. No organic law governing functions of the Council of National Defense was proposed at the first session of the National People's Congress in late 1954. The Constitution itself says nothing about the duties of the Council, merely making provision for the appointment and removal of its members. Developments within Communist China subsequent to January 1955, however, cast some light on this newly formed body and indicate that its role, during peacetime at least, is to be primarily that of a policy-making, advisory, and planning body. For example, the regulations governing officer service and the law establishing a formal conscription system were adopted upon the advice of the Council of National Defense. Both proposals were initially presented to the Standing Committee of the Congress by Vice Chairman of the Council.

b. There are two other possible roles, which are suggested by the initial composition of that body, that the Council could assume. A comparison of the membership of the newly formed Council of National Defense and the former People's Revolutionary Military Council reveals that virtually all of the personnel on the old body became Vice Chairmen of the new Council. The new Council is much larger than the old; there were only about 30 persons in the People's Revolutionary Military Council compared to 97 in the Council of National Defense. Of these 97, the Communist Party has more than

a two-thirds majority; it is rather significant that approximately 30 former Kuomintang generals form a substantial minority on the Council. Further examination of the membership of the Council of National Defense reveals that it contains nearly every Member (Minister) of the State Council whose duties and responsibilities have a close relationship with the Armed Forces. It also includes several of the principal members of the General Staff, most of the chiefs of Branch Directorates, and the commanders and deputies of the People's Air Force and People's Navy. These factors create two distinct impressions:

- (1) The Council of National Defense is a convenient office for old Party members who have outlived their usefulness and have been "elevated" to save face (excepting, of course, those Vice Chairmen who have additional jobs of importance). The facts further imply that the Council may have no real power but will serve as a threefold propaganda artifice, demonstrating harmony and loyalty among old Party leaders, bestowing empty honors on deserving but no longer useful personnel, and encouraging defections from opposing parties by demonstrating that there is a place for those who repent and support Communism.
- (2) The other side of the coin is implied by the fact that many of the Communist Vice Chairmen and members hold other significant jobs in the new Government. In effect, the placing of key personnel, some of whom hold ministerial and commissioner ranks in other government agencies that support the Armed Forces, concurrently on the Council of National Defense provides the Commander-in-Chief with the nucleus of a war cabinet which could serve him as the top body for strategic direction of a war at any time he desired. This concept closely parallels that adopted by the Soviets during World War II, when they formed the State Defense Committee to prosecute the war; that Committee was of similar composition and operated directly through the General Staff.

c. In its role as a policy-making, advisory, and planning body, it is believed, the Council of Na-

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tional Defense is divided into about seven formal committees, each of which is charged with developing recommendations bearing on its specific field. These committees reportedly encompass the fields of military operations, organization, military service and law, logistics, intelligence, general research, and economics. *Ad hoc* committees also probably are formed as required to study and make recommendations on nonrecurring subjects. At present, the Council is devoted to development of programs bearing on every aspect of the modernization of the Armed Forces. Since early 1955, the Council has recommended, and the Government has adopted, several important reforms for the Armed Forces. These include the establishment of a new system of rank for officers and enlisted personnel, the institution of a system of formal conscription, the establishment of an organized reserve, a revision of criteria governing military service, and a revised table of pay of all ranks.

14. THE STATE COUNCIL

a. The State Council, "the highest administrative organ of the Central People's Government," is equivalent to the Council of Ministers in other Communist countries. In Communist China the State Council occupies a position with respect to the Armed Forces that is analogous to that of the Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union. (See DA Pam No. 30-50-1.) The principal task of the State Council, insofar as the Armed Forces are concerned, is to coordinate the requirements of the military establishment (Ministry of National Defense) with the capabilities and requirements of other ministries, such as the Public Security Ministry, the Ministry of Heavy Industry, and the Ministry of Railroads. The State Council also formulates administrative decrees bearing on the Armed Forces; submits recommendations relating to the Armed Forces to the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee; guides the buildup of the Armed Forces of the country; and supervises preparation and management of the national economic plan and state budget. It also directs agencies of civil government (military service committees) in their implementation of conscription directives and veterans' resettlement policies. The State Council has the authority to annul the decisions and orders of any Minister.

b. Certain specific functions within the Armed

Forces also are delegated to the State Council. For example, authority to appoint or dismiss personnel in posts of division commanders, division political commissars, and other positions requiring equivalent or higher ranks is a significant power retained by the State Council. The State Council is also the approving authority for promotions of officers of the rank of colonel through colonel general; it also has the authority to confer or to remove general officer ranks. The State Council has similar authority with respect to personnel on reserve lists, as well as authority to transfer senior officers from active duty to reserve duty, and vice versa.

15. THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

a. The Ministry of National Defense (fig. 9) is headed by the Minister who is also a Vice Chairman of the Council of National Defense and a Vice Premier of the State Council. The Minister usually transmits his orders to the major field commands through the General Staff, except in the case of air force and naval units where the chain of command may go direct from the Minister to Air Force and Navy headquarters in Peiping. The Minister is assisted by several Deputy Ministers, all but one of whom are also Members of the Council of National Defense. Most of the Vice Ministers concurrently occupy high staff positions in, or are commanders of components of, the People's Liberation Army.

b. The General Staff of the People's Liberation Army is a part of the Ministry of National Defense; the Chief of the General Staff and the directors of its several departments act as principal military advisors to the Minister of National Defense, the Premier of the State Council, the Council of National Defense, and the Chairman of the People's Republic, and perform such other duties as may be directed or prescribed by law.

c. Most of the routine functions of the Ministry of National Defense are executed by the Chief of the General Staff through the commanders of military areas, the commanders of air and naval forces, and the commanders of the various directorates for arms and services. Many of the latter persons whose duties make them primarily staff officers hold other related, important posts in government. The Ministry of National Defense also includes, within the General Staff, agencies charged with strategic planning and the strategic direction of military forces;

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


Figure 9. The Ministry of National Defense.

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logistical planning; personnel administration; supervision of the induction process; planning and supervision of military training in schools, of reserves, and of the Militia; management of other aspects of the reserve program; and publication of military manuals.

d. The Minister of National Defense is empowered to appoint company-grade officers and to promote officers through field grade. He has authority to appoint or remove deputy division commanders, division chiefs of staff, division political department directors, and other officers of equal rank or below. The Minister also is empowered to fix the term of reserve service for field-grade officers and below, and to detail officers to active service from reserve lists. Other functions with respect to reserve and conscription activities are discussed in paragraphs 8 and 9.

16. THE GENERAL STAFF

The General Staff is the principal military planning, coordinating, and executive body of the Ministry of National Defense. Most of the Minister's business within his Ministry and with the military forces is transacted through the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff and several of his subordinates are also Members of the Council of National Defense. The Chief of the General Staff also is the director of the General Staff Department. The primary agencies of the General Staff, and their functions, are as follows:

a. *The Inspectorate of the Armed Forces* is apparently responsible for monitoring combat readiness throughout the military establishment and for seeing that military training is properly planned and efficiently executed. The activities of the Inspectorate, following the practice of the Soviet Armed Forces, probably do not include inspection of morale, grievances, fiscal matters, and administrative activities. The formal political apparatus and the Party organization in the Armed Forces, as well as the logistical organs, maintain special agencies to watch over such matters.

b. *The Military Training Department*, a newly created agency, is concerned with the modernization of the military establishment. The Department formulates policies for joint training of military forces and for coordinating the military education of personnel of the military establishment. It is also

charged with management of the reserve training program, Militia training, and preinduction training in State-operated schools. The Department exercises staff supervision over national military schools controlled by the Ministry of National Defense and over other training installations subordinate to military area commands throughout China.

c. *The General Staff Department* is the Ministry's principal agency for coordinating combat operations of major subordinate commands during time of war. It is headed by the Chief of the General Staff and one of his Deputies. It also includes divisions that are concerned with operations, military intelligence, organization, mobilization, and communications. This Department, despite its name, does not include the entire General Staff as it is known in Western armies, but concerns itself with the operational aspects of the Armed Forces. The Department prepares strategic plans and prepares for the strategic direction of forces in the field. It determines the organization and training required for contemplated operations; and determines requirements for, and allocates and distributes means to implement, strategic orders and directives. It also determines, in conjunction with other agencies, the resources, combat strength, military capabilities and intentions, and major dispositions of foreign nations.

d. *The General Personnel Department* is, in essence, the Adjutant General and personnel administration agency of the Chinese Communist General Staff. The Department is concerned with routine personnel administration of members of the Armed Forces other than *political personnel*. (See appendix II.) The Director of the Department has authority to promote or demote personnel through company grade. In addition, the Department supervises personnel management of reserves. Its Director has been delegated authority to transfer personnel to reserve lists, to confer reserve promotions up to the grade of captain, and to retire company-grade officers from either reserve or active lists. Authority to promote and demote personnel on active duty, and powers pertaining to reserve matters, are shared with the Chief of the General Staff and the directors of each principal staff department. Each of these individuals is delegated similar authority with respect to his subordinate officers of company grade.

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
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Figure 10. Headquarters, People's Air Force.

e. The General Political Department is concerned with administration of political activities (ch. 4) in the Armed Forces, and personnel management of individuals that fall in the category of political personnel. The Department is also involved in maintaining records of Party members in the military establishment. It contains divisions that are concerned with military law, organization (political), propaganda and education, security (to include counterintelligence), military government, personnel management, and Youth Corps (par. 31) activities.

f. The General Rear Service Department combines functions similar to those of G-4 and technical services in the United States Army. At General Staff level, the Department is concerned principally with preparation of joint logistic plans and with the assignment of logistic responsibilities to subordinate commands in accordance with such plans. It also reviews and reports major materiel requirements; manages the military establishment's procurement

plan; and, in conjunction with the Finance Department, manages the annual budget for the Armed Forces. The Department includes divisions concerned with quartermaster, medical, veterinary, ordnance, transportation, supply, and fuel services.

g. The Finance Department is the General Staff's chief agency for fiscal matters. The Department, acting upon State budget directives, prepares estimates for operation and maintenance of the military establishment. The Finance Department also directs management of the annual military budget, prescribes and supervises accounting procedures, and prepares and supervises execution of policies relating to finance operations.

17. BRANCH DIRECTORATES

While operational control of supporting arms and services in the Army undoubtedly remains with field commanders, the Chinese Communists have established branch directorates (fig. 9) as headquarters elements for some of the conventional components

of the Army. These headquarters are subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense.

a. The commanders of the branch directorates are responsible for development of tactical doctrine and training programs for their respective arms or services. They coordinate with the General Rear Service Department in development and procurement of material peculiar to their respective branches, and with the Military Training Department to insure conduct of specialized training in consonance with a unified policy. Branch commanders and political commissars also have administrative functions with respect to career officers in their respective branches. For example, each has been delegated authority to promote officers in his branch through company grade; each also has authority to place company-grade officers on reserve or retired lists.

b. Each branch directorate consists of a headquarters and a sizable staff to assist its commander and political commissar. Although most branch chiefs are designated commanders, their responsibilities make them in fact special staff officers of the Ministry of Defense, rather than commanders. The branch chiefs do have what amounts to a technical chain of command through similar headquarters echelons at subordinate levels of command. In a sense, these branch chiefs resemble the chiefs of combat arms and technical services in the United States Army.

18. PEOPLE'S AIR FORCE

a. The Air Force Headquarters in Peiping is headed by a commander and by a political commissar of the Air Force (fig. 10). Assisting them are four deputies. The first deputy also serves as Chief of Staff; the other three serve as deputies for rear service, combat training, and political affairs, and they also function as directors of their corresponding staff sections. The Headquarters structure closely resembles that of the Soviet Air Force. There are subordinate Air Force headquarters located in each military area in China.

b. In keeping with the Communist practice of maintaining close control over subordinates, Air Force Headquarters in Peiping exercises a large degree of direct control over the administrative and training activities of subordinate headquarters and units. Air divisions receive orders direct from Peiping rather than from military area headquar-

ters. Too, certain service units performing functions of supply and maintenance are controlled through technical channels emanating from Peiping, although in most cases the service units are operationally responsible to the tactical units they support. Only a small degree of administrative authority has been delegated to the air headquarters of the six military areas. This authority is limited to carrying out administrative instructions received from Peiping with respect to Air Force units and installations in the area, and to routine performance of housekeeping duties required for day-to-day functioning of those units and installations.

19. PEOPLE'S NAVY

a. The greater part of the Chinese Communist Navy is devoted to providing services of a maritime nature to the Army. These services fall into two main categories:

- (1) Assisting major Army components in amphibious training and in forming amphibious task forces.
- (2) Handling similar activities for Public Security.


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Figure 11. Headquarters, People's Navy.

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curity Forces to assist them in maintaining coastal and river security.

This overall supporting role is reflected in the high command structure of the Chinese Communist Navy. Navy Headquarters, located at Peiping, serves as the central authority for all naval administration matters and some operational matters (fig. 11). Most operational affairs are conducted through the commanders of military areas. The headquarters is headed by the commander and by the political commissar of the People's Navy, who have the four typical staff assistants found throughout Army command echelons: A chief of staff and the directors of political affairs, personnel, and rear service.

b. The Navy parallels the Army in its division into military areas and subordinate commands. In each military area in which there is an appreciable amount of navigable water, there is a subordinate military area naval command. The same arrangement prevails at military district level. Within the military areas, the organization is divided into districts corresponding to the provinces of the area. Within each area concerned with naval activities there apparently is a naval staff group connected with the area Army command.

20. CHAIN OF COMMAND

The various staff departments, directorates, and headquarters described in the preceding paragraphs are not in the direct chain of command from the Minister of National Defense to the regional military areas inside China and major headquarters abroad. In practice, the chain of command, especially on operational matters, is normally from the Minister through the General Staff to commanders of military areas and theaters of operations. The staffs and headquarters in Peiping, however, do have important administrative and technical chains of command to their echelons in lower headquarters and commands. The director of the rear service department of a military area, for example, deals directly with the Director of the General Rear Service Department in Peiping. The director of the political department in a theater abroad deals directly with his counterpart on the General Staff. The commander of the Artillery Directorate deals directly with his counterpart on a theater or military area commander's staff. As in the Soviet military establishment, the Chinese Communists make extensive use of this principle, and the technical and administrative channels extend down to regimental level in most cases.

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CHAPTER 3

TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

21. GENERAL

a. During the last several years, the Central People's Government of China had to give preference to the military consolidation of gains effected by the People's Liberation Army. Very little attention could be given to any revision of the civil government administration. To insure military and administrative control by the central Government, China had been divided into six regional and two autonomous areas (Tibet and Inner Mongolia). Each of the six regional areas comprised several provinces and was known as an *administrative area* for civil administration, and as a *military area* for military administration. Each area had a regional civil administration directed by an area administration committee and a regional military administration directed by a military area commander. Each regional area was further subdivided into *military districts* (provinces) governed by similar military and civil administrative agencies.

b. The commander of a military area usually was also the chairman of the civil administration committee of the same area. In other words, the military leaders controlled the area; this control doubtless was necessary under the conditions that existed at the time. The military leaders held the reins of civil government, dispensing favors in return for personal loyalty. Each had a well-equipped, battle-trained, Communist-indoctrinated army to insure retention of control. This situation could, and probably did, result in more power accruing to these individuals.

c. The Chinese Communists' initial success was in gaining *military* control of the nation. The "converting" of the people of the nation was next on the agenda. As judged from recent developments, it appears that the Communist Party, led by MAO Tse-tung as Chairman of the People's Republic of China, has decided that this conversion has been successful, but that changes are necessary in the territorial organization to gain better control, with a consequent gaining of efficiency in government. With the adoption of the Constitution in September 1954, the civil governments of the administrative areas were abolished. The areas of

Tibet and Inner Mongolia retained their former "autonomy." Today, from the standpoint of civil government, each province is subservient to, and reports to, the central Government at Peiping.

d. There were several reasons for the change; the more obvious were a need for economy in government and improved control over the population of China. From a military standpoint, however, it is possible that some of the area commanders, with their interlocking military and civil functions, and with trained troops at their disposal, were growing too powerful and were approaching the status of war lords. If this is the reason, it well explains the recent "promotion" of erstwhile military commanders of prominence to high places in the Central People's Government, where their actions can be observed and controlled, and where they no longer have military forces under their command. The military area system, however, has been continued although modification of boundaries has taken place.

e. Today the military territorial organization in China (fig. 12) provides the administrative machinery through which the high command can exercise control over the Armed Forces despite the great area of the country, its varied demographic composition, and the limited transportation facilities. There are, in theory, two systems of military territorial organizations: The autonomous areas, which are constitutionally authorized to organize their own Public Security Forces; and the military areas, which are directly subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense. Although some autonomous governments may have exercised their right to organize their own Public Security Forces, these forces have but little standing; military matters in fact remain a prerogative of a military area commander appointed from Peiping.

22. MILITARY AREAS

a. The headquarters of a military area (fig. 14) includes a commander and a political commissar, who are usually generals or marshals, and a large staff. The staff is primarily administrative in na-





Figure 13. Tibetan security troops.

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


Figure 14. Military area headquarters.

ture, and includes elements to administer the reserve program, the conscription program, and veterans' affairs in the area. The military area commanders answer directly to the Minister of National Defense. Directives or orders issued to the military area commander in the name of the Minister of National Defense are executed by the military area commander regardless of the category of troop units they affect. Such orders and directives are believed to be operational in nature, since military area Air Force and Navy headquarters retain much administrative control of their respective forces deployed in the area.

In time of war, the military area commander is believed to exercise complete command authority over all forces deployed in his area.

b. Peacetime responsibilities of military areas are fourfold, including operational and training functions with respect to Public Security Forces; administrative functions with respect to elements of Army, Air Force, and Navy elements deployed in the military area; training functions with respect to Army units under area command; and management functions with respect to conscription, reserve, mobilization, and Militia activities. In addition, the area

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command manages paramilitary construction and agricultural programs within its boundaries.

- (1) *Operational and training functions* dealing with Public Security Forces are discussed in chapter 21.
- (2) *Administrative functions* are principally those of accommodation and routine supply of all forces in the military area and personnel management of Army elements therein.
- (3) *Training functions* include support and, in some cases, management of schools located in the area, military training for Army elements and conscripts, and political indoctrination of the troops.
- (4) *Management functions* with respect to conscription, reserve, mobilization, and Militia activities include: Operation of military conscription bureaus throughout the area; direction of the reserve training program and personnel management of reservists of company grade and below; preparation of area mobilization plans; and supply, training, and administration of the Militia elements in the area.

23. MILITARY DISTRICTS

The military areas are subdivided into military districts, which usually coincide with provincial boundaries. Military districts are, in turn, subdivided

into military subdistricts, which usually comprise four or more counties (*Hsien*). The military district command is headed by a commander and by a political commissar, usually of colonel general or general rank, who are assisted by a staff similar to, but smaller than, that of the military area command (fig. 12). These commanders are the military counterparts of the heads of the provincial government, the highest echelon of civil government under Peiping. The functions of the district command are similar to those of its parent military area. The headquarters has direct command of Army elements deployed in the district and carries out administrative functions in support of other elements of the Armed Forces deployed in the district.

24. GARRISON COMMANDS

Garrison commanders are found in several large, important municipalities within China. The commands are headed by a commander and by a political commissar who are directly subordinate to the Minister of National Defense or to the Military District, depending on the municipality's place in the civil government. In a sense, those directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense compare to exempted stations in United States army areas. The primary function of a garrison command is to assist civil authorities to maintain law and order, and to provide guards for important government installations.

CONFIDENTIAL—Modified Handling Authorized**CHAPTER 4****THE PARTY AND THE ARMY****25. GENERAL**

a. The mission of the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China is not limited to defense of China's borders. Since the closing days of the *First Revolutionary Civil War* (1925 to 1927), the Armed Forces have been primarily the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party's enforcer within China, and the means by which the Party's leaders aspire to spread Communist control throughout Asia. These purely political missions, coupled with the varied population of the Armed Forces themselves, caused the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party to institute and maintain over the Armed Forces a rigid system of political control that, in effect, molds the course of military action into any form desired by the holders of power in the Party.

b. The position now enjoyed in China by the Chinese Communist Party did not exist for many years subsequent to the time of the Party's inception in 1921. The Chinese Communist Party held its first Congress on 1 July 1921 in Shanghai; MAO Tse-tung attended as a junior delegate and peasant representative from Hunan Province. This Congress, abetted by a Comintern agent from Moscow, drew up and adopted the first Party constitution, established the central organs of the Party and formally founded the Communist Party of China. Subsequent to the Congress, the first problem the Communists tackled was not how to start a revolution in China, but rather, with typical Communist opportunism, how to capture the Nationalist revolution from within. The first step for the infant Party was to join—in 1923—with the Kuomintang, which was then headed by Dr. SUN Yat-sen. This unhappy alliance coincided with the denial of the Nationalist leader's appeals for aid from the West and his subsequent acceptance of Soviet offers of military aid.

c. In return for this Soviet aid, the Nationalists agreed to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party. It was during this period of cooperation that the Communists initiated their attempts to gain control of a military force to further their aims. A significant step in furthering that end was the

installation of CHOU En-lai as political commissar of the new Whampoa Military Academy, which, upon Soviet recommendation and with Soviet assistance, had been established in 1924 to provide the Nationalist Army with a modern and politically indoctrinated officer corps. The Communists were able, through their connections with the Academy, to arrange the assignments of Communist and pro-Communist graduates and to build up strong cadres of Communist officers in selected Nationalist units commanded by sympathetic generals.

d. Following the death of SUN Yat-sen in early 1925, the Communist Party intensified its overt activities to gain control of the revolution. Strikes were organized throughout China's major cities, in many cases under conditions the Communists hoped would produce coordinated action by sympathetic elements of the *National Revolutionary Army* of that time. Although some of the schemes lasted as long as 16 months, they ended in defeat for the Communist Party, for its early leaders had failed to allow enough time for the Party to gain firm control of the Nationalist Army. Stated in MAO's words, "The Party was without a correct policy for its work inside that Army." The uneasy coalition lasted until July 1927—when CHIANG Kai-shek (the successor of SUN) drove the Communist Party out of the Kuomintang. Thus, the abortive First Revolutionary Civil War met with disaster. The chief success of the Comintern was in creating the Chinese Communist Party. Communist China's leaders ascribed their early failure to the fact that the Party did not recognize the extreme importance of organization and did not have direct control over the revolutionists; they were quick to rectify those mistakes.

e. Following the breakup of the coalition, Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) Army units under command of Communist and pro-Communist officers revolted at Nanchang on 1 August 1927. CHOU En-lai, who from Whampoa had engineered the assignment of these officers, was one of the leaders of the revolt; CHU Teh was another of its leaders. The Central Committee of the Party, which had masterminded the uprising, reacted promptly

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and called an emergency meeting to organize the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, whose birth was to be marked by the date of the Nanchang revolt. MAO and the Party nursed the young Army on Communist dogma and built it ideologically, politically, and organizationally into a model Communist force. The Communists perpetuated the Nationalists' political commissar system (taken from the Russians in the first instance) in their new Army, and added some purely Communist features to insure control of the Army by the Party: (1) A chairman for military affairs was established within the Politburo of the Party Central Committee; (2) unit political officers were accorded coequal status with their military counterparts and given full authority to participate in military decisions (this at a time when the Soviets had abolished their army commissar system); (3) political officers at all echelons of command were provided a political staff section, separate and distinct from the military commander's staff, as the instrument through which the Party and the unit political officer could insure the political faithfulness of the unit; and (4) the Party established a system of supervisory committees, composed of Party members and beginning with each company-size unit in the Army, to insure that the politico-military system worked in harmony. This committee system was extended throughout the Army to its top level of command. By 1930, the Army had grown to a strength of between 60,000 and 70,000 men, and a system of Party participation in military decisions at all command levels was firmly established.

j. The decline and rise of the Chinese Communist Party have been in direct relation to the strength of the military force it controlled. During the height of the coalition period with the Kuomintang, the Party attained a membership of almost 60,000; this strength shrank to a mere 10,000 when the Party was expelled. By 1934, the Party had grown again to approximately 300,000, but its membership melted to approximately 40,000 just before MAO led the Long March of the Communist forces in their retreat to a new base area in Shensi Province near the border of Inner Mongolia. The beginning of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression in 1937 and the period of "coexistence" with the forces of CHIANG allowed the Party to build to a strength of over a million. Most of these members were in the Army, and the Party Line was spread wherever

the Communists were in control. The political departments, under the overall supervision of CHOU En-lai, used any means at their disposal to win new converts for the cause and soldiers for the military forces. At the beginning of the Third Revolutionary Civil War, the Army was almost pure in its Party membership; but with each victory over the Nationalists, the Communist Army grew until Party members were far outnumbered by ex-Nationalist elements absorbed into the Communist ranks. Under these conditions, the role of the Party in the Army took on added significance in the struggle to maintain control over the military. With the Communist regime firmly established in control of China, the Party rolls had grown to approximately five million members in 1949.

g. After the People's Republic of China was proclaimed by the Communists in Peiping on 1 October 1949, the Party began to develop a "unified army . . . which shall have a unified command, unified system, unified formation, and unified discipline." The heterogeneous forces that had placed the Party firmly in power were consolidated under a central command; tables of organization were drawn up; and the Armed Forces' long-range program of standardization was undertaken. The political action system which had served the Communists during the years subsequent to the early 1930's was continued, and political officers and their executive agencies were accorded a formal place on unit tables of organization; the informal Party supervisory system was strengthened; and specific functions and responsibilities for Party committees at all levels were established and enforced by the Central Committee of the Party. At present, the Armed Forces of Communist China, with a Communist Party membership totalling approximately 40 percent of their entire strength, function in effect under three controlling elements: The Communist Party, the military system, and the political system. Each of the last two has its own chain of command (fig. 15), and both are official agencies within the Armed Forces. The third—the Party—is by far the most powerful, and exists in both overt and covert form at all levels from the squad to the highest echelon of military control. The Party exercises its leadership of the Armed Forces through both the military and the political chains of command.

h. Whether the Chinese Communists can contract the rigid Party control they have established

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


Figure 15. Party control in the Army.

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over their military machine is a moot point. MAO has seen fit to perpetuate the system instituted in 1927 about the time of his rise to power in the Party. MAO's principal lieutenants all spent their formative years in either military or political positions—or both—in the Army, and their careers since that time have remained remarkably stable for members of a Communist hierarchy. Today MAO, who has survived since the first Party Congress, is served by four principal, tried aides who assist in various ways in control of the Party, civil government, and the military; these persons, who have survived the pitfalls of Trotskyism, deviationism, internal struggles, and numerous other obstacles in the path of the professional Party member, are:

- (1) *CHU Te*—Member of the Secretariat of the CCP, Member of the Politburo, and Vice Chairman of the People's Republic. CHU and MAO formed the Party's *First Front Army* in the 1930's, with CHU as military commander and MAO as political commissar.
- (2) *LIU Sha'o-chi*—Member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party, member of the Politburo, and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. LIU served in the Communist Army as both a division chief of staff and a political commissar.
- (3) *CHOU En-lai*—Member of the Secretariat of the CCP, Member of the Politburo, and Premier of the State Council. CHOU (called the "Elastic Bolshevik" because of his talent for always landing on his feet when the various cliques he was associated with in the past fell from the grace of the leaders of the time) rose to fame through the episodes of the Whampoa Academy, the Nanchang revolt, and control of political activities in the Army.
- (4) *PENG Te-kuan*—Member of the Politburo and Minister of National Defense under CHOU En-lai. PENG is credited with having been CHU Te's military "brains" when he acted as CHU's deputy.

These men know the importance of retaining firm Party control of the Armed Forces. It is certain that they will continue to maintain such control for the duration of their tenure in power.

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26. THE PARTY MISSION

a. The mission of the Party in the Army is the direction of all activities—both military and political. The Party exercises control over the Army through both the political and military chains of command, and concerns itself with every facet of Army life and activities, whether tactical, technical, or personal in nature. It also directs the Army's participation in agricultural production and general reconstruction. The Chinese Communist Party occupies a position of primacy in the Army, not only in a political and administrative sense, but also operationally, at both strategic and tactical levels.

- (1) *Operationally* it plays a major part in making decisions relating to combat operations. It maintains firm control through Party committees, political officers, and the system of Party meetings, rallies, and assemblies.
- (2) *Politically* it assures that the ideology of MAO Tse-tung is both taught and observed within the Army to maintain Party leadership of the Army. MAO's ideology is the Chinese "bible" of Communist beliefs, doctrines, and techniques.
- (3) *Administratively* it directs activities in the fields of logistics and personnel management. During combat, the Party directs mobilization of resources within an area, and utilization of both available manpower and material resources in support of an operation. It pays special attention to the operation of the Army's rear services and to the conservation of materiel.

b. Control of combat operations is achieved by two principal methods: (1) Supervision of planning and execution by political staffs and unit Party committees; and (2) the formal joint command system found in each unit of company size and larger. Decisions are either arrived at jointly by the unit commander, the political officer and the unit Party committee, or dictated by the committee secretary; both the commander and the political officer, however, are usually members of the committee, and the political officer is usually its secretary. The military commander may not issue written orders on his own authority alone. To be valid, all combat orders must be authenticated by one or more of the political officers. The Party controls execution of com-

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Figure 16. A Party rally of approximately regimental size.

bat operations by precombat indoctrination meetings and subsequent supervision—by picked Party members under the supervision of the unit Party committee—of combat actions. During precombat rallies, the officers and men in a unit are incessantly exposed to the correct military and Party line to be followed in the forthcoming action. By the time a unit is committed, its members are frequently under the influence of ideological hypnosis, with each individual rabid in his desire to be accorded the status of "Model Fighter." Trusted Party members, empowered with authority to kill if necessary, are assigned to watch over the actions of junior officers and the rank and file. Serious deviations from the correct military and Party line frequently are dealt with on the spot; less serious offenses are handled subsequent to the action.

c. Staffs of the unit political officers implement that portion of the Party mission that pertains to the political faithfulness of the Armed Forces and supervise routine activities of the unit Party committee. Principal methods are those practiced by the propaganda and education agencies which disseminate the Party line in the Army. The policies of the Chinese Communist Party and of the government are given the widest possible publicity through a political education program. Political education in the Army consists of almost endless repetition of the Chinese Communist version of the correct social and political order of things. Among the subjects taught by the political section are literacy training; benefits enjoyed by the military; the history of the Chinese Revolution and its relation

to China's "current enemies"; current events; the current military situation; traditions of the Party and the People's Liberation Army; and education in patriotism and internationalism (Communist style). In addition, education for Party members in the Army includes instilling in them a knowledge of the Party mission, prerequisites for membership, rights and duties of members, and the organization and regulations of the Party. All so-called political education is devoted to the development of leadership of the Army by Party members. The much advertised benefits and freedoms of military personnel are enjoyed, however, on a controlled basis and even then are not enjoyed by all military personnel, but are denied those who are "reactionaries." Education, in a Western sense, has been prostituted and has become indoctrination. News and public information have given way to propaganda, and the individual has little freedom of action or self-expression. The Party's program of education emphasizes the ideological and institutional structure of Chinese Communism, which, in short, is totalitarian. It subjects the military to the Party and its elaborate apparatus. Orthodoxy of thought and deed is preserved and enforced through the Party's program of propaganda and education for the Army.

d. The Party does not rely solely on its propaganda and education to insure control of the Army. In addition, certain functions that are purely military in Western armies have been placed within the political system in the Chinese Communist Army. The more important of these include control of all awards; administration of military law; conduct

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of counterintelligence activities; and the conduct of civil affairs and military government. The Party organization in the Army retains complete control of the administration of Party awards and disciplinary measures with respect to members in the Army. It also maintains firm control of admissions to the Party, and monitors closely the activities of both military and political personnel in the Army.

e. HSIAO Hua, Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the General Staff, summarizes the place of the Party in the Army in the following words:

The Party in the Army must strengthen the collective leadership of the Party committees at all levels and thereby further its main role as the nucleus of leadership and unity in the Army. It must pay constant attention to ideological progress; carry on education in MAO Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese Revolution, both inside and outside the Party; and develop methods of integrating theory with practice, of building close links with the troops, of self-criticism, as well as of elimination of nonproletarian ways of thinking. Only in this way can the standard of military, political, and rear service work be raised, and unity in both thought and action within the Armed Forces be guaranteed.

27. POLITICO-MILITARY STRUCTURE

a. When the leaders of the Party created their Army, they established two formal chains of command to assure Party control; these extended from the company as a base to the highest level of command—a military chain of command and a political chain of command (fig. 15). The political officer at each level of command was accorded a grade equal to that of his military counterpart and was, in effect, the co-commander of the unit. The two commanders were held jointly responsible for the performance and condition of their organization, and each reported to his respective superior at the next higher echelon.

b. The system of joint command has served the Communists well since its inception despite its seeming disparity with the principle of unity of command. There are two primary reasons for its success: (1) From the beginning, both commanders usually have been staunch Party members, bound together by a common purpose and discipline; and (2) most im-

portant, the system is made to work by an organization that is not found in official tables of organization—the unit Party committee, which is an integral part of the Party's system of control in the Army. The joint commanders of a unit are not only subordinate to their respective superiors at the next higher echelon, but in theory they are under the immediate supervision of their unit Party committee. The politico-military system has been perpetuated by the Communists in their recent standardization and modernization program for the Armed Forces. On 8 February 1955, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress approved new regulations governing the service of officers in the People's Liberation Army. These regulations prescribe eight categories of officers, two of which are *commanding officers* and *political officers*. (See appendix II.) The regulations accord equal ranks to personnel in these two categories when they are paired as co-commanders of a unit. The politico-military system introduced in the late 1920's has produced personnel that the Party believes are capable of filling either command position; most political officers, however, have usually stayed in their field, as have military commanders.

c. In theory, both the military commander and the political officer must follow—in addition to orders received through their respective chains of command—the resolutions of the Party committee at their particular level, even if they disagree with the resolution. Such a situation is unlikely to occur, however, because:

- (1) Party committee resolutions in practically all cases already have been approved by the next higher Party committee.
- (2) The unit military commander and the political officer are usually the motivating force urging the adoption of a resolution.
- (3) The unit political officer usually heads the unit Party committee, and has participated in discussing and approving the resolution at a next higher unit Party conference. (See par. 28.)

Army regulations, however, require the military commander and his political counterpart to carry out their duties under the collective leadership of their military and political superiors and the unit Party committee. These persons are responsible for carrying out all resolutions of the Party committee. The regulations permit recourse to higher authority

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should the military commander or political officer disagree with their unit Party committee: They are permitted an appeal to the next higher Party committee. In the meantime, however, they must faithfully execute the resolutions of their unit committee. A strong-willed, politically strong military commander may often dominate his political counterpart; so may a strong-willed political officer dominate a weak military commander. Both, however, must adhere to resolutions of the Party committee which, by virtue of its place in the Army, is stronger than either of these men alone.

28. PARTY ORGANIZATION

a. The dogmatic principle of "democratic centralism" of political power practiced by the Chinese Communist Party means that power is actually concentrated at the top. Thus, China and its Armed Forces are controlled not by the simulacrum of government established by the adoption of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China on 20 September 1954, but by the small group of 13 persons who occupy positions in the inner executive committee (the controlling body) of the Chinese Communist Party—the Politburo of the Party Central Committee. This body, headed by MAO Tse-tung, CHU Te, LIU Shao-ch'i, and CHOU En-lai (in order of rank), directs Party activities throughout the Armed Forces.

b. The broad base of the Party's power in the Army is found in the basic organization of the Party—the *Party branch*—which is organized in each company—and equivalent-size unit throughout the Army. A similar organizational system, based upon factories, mines, villages, and enterprises, is found in the Party's system for control of the civilian population. In the Army, the Party branch is a title applied to the organization that embraces the collective group of Communist Party members within a company or equivalent-size unit. In theory alone, a Party branch has certain powers and functions—including those of freedom of assembly and discussion; in practice, the powers and functions of the organization are usurped and executed by the few persons who comprise its *Party branch committee*. The real power lies in the hands of this small group, generally hand-picked men, always "voted" into their positions by their electorate in controlled elections. Thus "democratic centralism" of political power—the course of which runs contrary to

actual power—"begins" when a few preordained individuals at company level exercise over the many the power passed on to them from the top; it extends through supervisory Party committees at intervening levels of command until it again reaches the point from which it emanated: The Politburo of the Party Central Committee.

c. The Party organization found at each command level above the company consists of a unit Party committee, a unit *Party conference*, and a unit *Party congress*.

- (1) A unit *Party conference* is an organization composed of representatives of subordinate Party committees; the unit Party conference meets at specified intervals, or upon call of the unit Party committee, and can be likened to a steering committee for Party activities throughout the unit. When in session, the conference acts as approving authority for the activities of the unit Party committee. The conference has elective powers (limited as discussed in b above): In theory, it has power to remove and elect, in by-elections, one-fourth of the members of the unit Party committee. Actions of a unit conference can take effect only upon ratification by the next higher unit Party committee. The functions of a unit Party conference at battalion and higher levels are similar to a small group leaders' conference at Party branch (company) level.

- (2) A unit *Party congress* is, in theory, the highest Party organ in a given military unit. The congress, consisting of delegates elected by subordinate Party branches, meets at specified intervals, or on call of the unit Party committee secretary, to hear, discuss, and ratify reports submitted by the unit Party committee and Party conference; discuss and decide upon future political activities within the unit; elect the members of the unit Party committee; and elect delegates to a higher Party congress. The decisions of a unit Party congress must be ratified by the next higher unit Party committee before they are effective. The functions of a Party congress at battalion or higher echelons of command are comparable to those of

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the general membership meeting at Party branch (company) level.

d. In accordance with the Party constitution, Party committees at all levels in the Army are established by the elective method whenever possible. The electing body is the unit Party congress; at company level, such a congress consists of a general membership meeting of the Party branch; at higher levels, a Party congress is simply a gathering of delegates from subordinate Party organizations. The constitution provides for appointment of a committee by a higher Party organ when circumstances preclude convening a Party congress. The election of committee members is supervised by representatives from higher committees. For example, regulations governing election at Party branch level state:

When electing a company Party branch committee, the regiment and battalion committees should send representatives to attend the election and direct the proceedings. After the election, the results must be approved by the regimental committee.

In the event an undesirable slate of candidates is presented for approval, the Party constitution provides for its dissolution and the appointment of appropriate candidates by the reviewing authority.

29. THE PARTY BRANCH

The Party branch is the working unit of the Party organization in the Army. It is the bridge between the rank and file in the Army and the controlling organ of the Chinese Communist Party—the political officer system. Members of a Party branch, at a general membership meeting, elect a branch committee which administers the branch's routine functions. The tenure of the branch committee is from six months to a year. The number of committee members is dependent upon the size of the branch membership; the committee varies between a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 11 members. The secretary of the committee, usually the unit political officer, directs branch activities, which are supervised by the staff sections of regimental political departments. These activities include:

a. Conduct of propaganda and organizational work among the rank and file with a view to carrying out the Party line and the decisions of higher Party organs.

b. Maintenance of close surveillance of the rank and file, and submission of reports to higher Party

authority on their aspirations, demands, and political faithfulness.

c. Organization of the rank and file to help insure fulfillment of the unit mission and to combat any obstacle to that end.

d. Recruiting of new members, collection of Party fees, examination of and decision upon admissions to membership, and enforcement of Party discipline.

e. Education of the Party membership, and organization of the rank and file for study of the ideology of MAO Tse-tung.

30. CONTROL

a. The Party committee system operates not only as an adjunct of the political system in the Chinese Communist military establishment, but also as the primary political control mechanism over most of the troops. At company level the committee is known as the Party branch committee; at higher echelons of command the committee takes the name of the unit. (See Figure 15.) At levels higher than company, the size of the committee varies, but probably it does not exceed 15. Members are selected first for their political quality, and second for their military knowledge. Every effort is made to insure that the committee includes representation from the tactical, logistical, administrative, and political fields so that the committee can utilize their skills in its deliberations. It is not only desirable and normal for committee membership to include both the military commander—if he is a Party member—and his political counterpart: The election of these individuals, as well as other critical military specialists, is insured by controlled elections. The unit political officer normally acts as committee secretary.

b. Theoretically, a Party committee is responsible to the members it represents. In practice, the committee is responsible only to the unit political officer. True, the committee's work theoretically is reviewed periodically by a congress of the entire membership or delegates representing the same, but actually such a review is strictly a report by the committee and an opportunity to tell the assembled personnel what is expected of them in the future. A committee that fails in its mission may be turned out by a higher committee and a new one appointed in its place. The Communists go to great lengths to display the trappings of democracy, but Party responsibility

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always runs up and never down, just as authority travels in the opposite direction.

c. The routine activities of a committee are divided into six general areas. These are: Secretariat, Organization, Propaganda and Training, Security, Youth Corps, and Control. Activities in each work area are supervised by a subcommittee which directs the efforts of Party members assigned tasks therein. The subcommittees are, in turn, supervised by the chief of the appropriate staff section in the unit political department (par. 143). Additional subcommittees are formed as required to carry out specific Party programs; examples include such titles as "Resist America—Aid Korea" committee, the "Increase Production Through Thrift" committee, and the "Patriotic Health Movement" committee. Activities of the principal subcommittees are as follows:

(1) *Secretariat.* This is the executive body of the committee, headed by the committee secretary. He is responsible for calling meetings, providing the agenda, assigning work, reporting to higher committees, and coordinating, through other committee members, the activities of all Party members to insure the success of combat missions.

(2) *Organization.* This subcommittee supervises personnel control and informs the committee of the ideological status of Party members, recommends changes in internal assignment of Party personnel, enrolls and transfers Party members, and makes recommendations on awards and punishment.

(3) *Propaganda and education.* One of the most important of the subcommittees, this group is responsible for supervision of indoctrination, education of illiterates, and training materials for group rallies. The subcommittee insures that all Party programs and policies are given the proper publicity.

(4) *Security.* This subcommittee is responsible for seeing that proper counterintelligence measures are in force; it also keeps suspects under surveillance, conducts surveys on the background of all personnel, and effects countermeasures against enemy propaganda. The subcommittee keeps

the secretary informed of the political faithfulness of the unit.

(5) *Youth Corps.* Members of this subcommittee supervise all Youth Corps activities and direct the education of the prospective Party members.

(6) *Control.* Members of this subcommittee are the Party's investigators of alleged breaches of Party discipline; they also investigate recommendations for military and Party awards. Subcommittee findings are made available to the organization subcommittee for final review before they are submitted to the committee secretary.

d. Each Party committee has appropriate directive-making powers with respect to its subordinates—within the confines of the existing Party line. Its directives are subject to review and final approval by a Party committee two levels higher in the Party channel of control. Each committee implements directives which it receives through the political chain of command, and supervises the implementation of directives received by the military commander and the political officer through their respective chains of command.

e. In effecting collective leadership, the Party committee meets whenever time permits to discuss the problems or mission of the unit; decisions are made, and tasks that will further the accomplishment of the unit mission are assigned specific subcommittees. The receipt of orders from higher headquarters always occasions a committee meeting—not to question the order or directive, but to arrive at a decision as to how it will be implemented. The resulting decision is not the opinion of one man, but reflects the decision of the committee as a whole. Plans for carrying out combat orders are normally suggested by the military commander, but are carried out only after being discussed and approved by the Party committee. When time does not permit such procedure, however, the commander may act on his own responsibility, and report his actions to the Party committee after the operation is completed.

f. Since the Party committee is charged with maintaining the troops' fighting spirit and supervising almost every facet of military operations, it is not surprising to find that a Party committee member, instead of the assistant unit commander, may assume command of a military unit in case of an

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emergency. In many instances in Korea, political officers or committee secretaries assumed combat command in the absence or incapacitation of military leaders. A specific replacement normally is chosen from among the committee members before the operation begins. Unless nominated to succeed the commander, the assistant commander acts only in the temporary absence of the commander.

g. The importance of Party committees in the People's Liberation Army must not be underestimated. Military knowledge is, in effect, pooled, and the resulting plans are the product of the combined knowledge of the committee members. While a committee acts as a watchdog over unit troop activities, it is also a powerful tool in building an efficient fighting team and in inflaming the soldier so that he will perform well.

h. To the Western mind, the committee system is entirely alien; on the surface, it appears to be a highly inefficient method of conducting military operations, but it actually increases the fighting strength of the Chinese Communist Forces. Before an operation, the morale and *esprit de corps* of a unit is raised to a fever pitch by endless propaganda efforts on the part of the Party. The individual's physical needs are taken care of and an attempt is made to manage his thoughts. All are made to conform, and any individuality is ruthlessly suppressed. The "system" is always present, and violators, regardless of station, are certain of being detected. Were it not for the common bond of the Party and the opiate of Communism, the structure would crumble. Party members may have differences of opinion, but these are ironed out in committee meetings and a united front is presented to the rank and file. This apparent solidarity is a key factor in Party control.

i. The principal weakness of the system is the suppression of individual action on the part of unit military commanders and political officers. They are reluctant to act on their own authority should a sudden change in the tactical situation require a new course of action. First, they are reluctant because of a fear of reprisal in the event of failure. Second, even in the event of success in a single case, each in-

dividual knows that repetition of independent action—even though consistently successful—will soon label the person a dangerous reactionary. In either case, the individual becomes extremely unreliable in the eyes of the Party, which views with alarm any deviation from established "collective leadership." Individuals either conform or lose their positions. Thus, the tactical commander who elects to conform and consult his unit Party committee during a combat operation may be giving the enemy the priceless advantage of time; at the least, the Chinese commander suffers a temporary loss of the initiative.

31. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ARMY

a. The Chinese Communists do not tolerate organized activities or the formation of cliques in the Armed Forces unless such groups are under tight Party control. The established Party organization in the Army provides for detailed supervision of the daily life of Party members. The Party has instituted one other organization—the *New Democratic Youth Corps*—within the Army to insure detailed supervision and control of most of the remainder of the Army's population; it is a tool of the unit political officer—the means by which the Party carries on its daily activities among young Party aspirants. At company level, this organization is a significant supplement to the Party branch in retaining control over the unit.

b. The Youth Corps serves two general purposes in the Army: It educates and molds young soldiers, and it provides the Party with young, aggressive, well-trained leaders. In the military establishment, the Youth section of a unit political department is charged with administration of Youth Corps activities. Youth Corps membership embraces all potential Party members in the Armed Forces aged 25 and younger. Standards for admission to membership are similar to those for Party membership. In effect, the Youth Corps offers the Party aspirant a prolonged period of apprenticeship during which he must prove his value to the Party. The Youth Corps contains a significant number of "workers," all avid to spread the Party line.

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PART TWO MILITARY DOCTRINE

INTRODUCTION

Although the history of war dates from the earliest known civilization, it is noteworthy—and particularly appropriate in this text—that the first person to compose a set of written principles for the conduct of war was a Chinese, SUN Tzu, whose work, "The Art of War," was written about 500 B. C.

SUN Tzu's principles have survived hundreds of wars, over nearly 25 centuries, and today they are regarded almost universally as truisms.

The obvious conclusion is that grand strategy, while it may assume various forms in execution, does not change in principle. As SUN Tzu wrote his principles, so the Chinese Communists practice them today. It could also be said that the Communists' strategic doctrine parallels that advocated by Napoleon and Clausewitz, for the principles expounded by these strategists did not differ essentially from those written more than two millennia before their time.

Consequently, as the experienced leader studies Part Two of this Handbook, he will note that much Chinese Communist doctrine is common to any army in the world. He will also find, however, that there are important differences between Chinese doctrine and U. S. Army doctrine. Although these differences are of great importance, it is equally important to know what the Chinese Communist leaders think and how they plan; for, as SUN Tzu wrote, that general is successful who "possesses beforehand information regarding the enemy."

Communist China's leaders today have a single overall ambition: The domination of all of Asia, and, eventually—in conspiracy with other Communist dictators—the subjugation of the entire world. Their strategy is directed toward this end,

and MAO Tse-tung, the top Chinese Communist, has written many volumes to guide his cohorts in achieving this goal.

The "uninitiated" will find MAO's works liberally studded with vagaries and inanities. Many "Maoisms" have found their way into Chinese Communist military doctrine, and they are applied with a rigidity that can be generated only in a society where conformance is a prerequisite for survival.

Although these Maoisms—like most Communist harangue—are vague, the intentions of the Chinese Communists are definitely fixed on their goal of absorbing all of Asia into a group of Chinese satellites, as the Soviet Union has already done with numerous European states. These intentions are evident in their policy writings and their day-to-day pronouncements, and new evidence is provided every day by Chinese Communist subversion, encroachment, and infiltration in countries all over Asia.

Despite this evidence, there are those today who contend that Communist China will not go to war because of her economic and military weaknesses. If historical example can serve as proof, this theory is at once dispelled by the example of the Boxer Rebellion when after a long period of treating foreigners with the same contempt the Chinese Communists exhibit today, a much weaker China fought the entire world, though admittedly with little chance of winning.

There can be no doubt that the Chinese Communist hierarchy will strive to achieve its goal in any way possible: Without war if they can; by war if necessary. The following chapters outline the doctrine the Communist leaders probably will follow if they resort to war.

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CHAPTER 5

MILITARY PLANNING

Section 1. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST CONCEPT

A Communist war that lasts 10 years may be surprising to other countries, but for us this is only the preface. The introduction and the preliminary remarks have been written, but there remain many delightful paragraphs for the future. . . .

MAO Tse-tung
*Strategic Problems of China's
Revolutionary War*

32. STRATEGY—DEFENSE VERSUS OFFENSE

a. The Chinese Communists' official pronouncements, highly colored for propaganda effect, allege that the functions of their Armed Forces are purely defensive. Their professed purpose is to safeguard the gains of the people's revolution and the achievements of national construction, and to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the country. It should be borne in mind, however, that international Communism by nature has a creed of offense. Because of their relationship to this creed, the Chinese Communist Armed Forces' basic strategic character is, in point of fact, offensive; their defensive capability is simply an adjunct to their overall resolve.

b. Communist China's deficiencies with respect to an industrial base capable of supporting modern armed forces make her almost completely dependent upon the Soviet Union for the heavy weapons, machines, and fuel necessary for such forces. She has tied herself closely to the U. S. S. R. for the development of her national economy, thus further increasing her indebtedness to the offensive cause of international Communism. To assume, however, that Communist China's Armed Forces are merely an imitation of her ally would be a costly error. The Chinese, including the Communist Chinese, are noted for their individuality, and are not likely, in the long run, to throw away their long years of struggle for the questionable position of a satellite power. True, some of the top leaders of the Armed Forces are Soviet-trained, but most of them have been nurtured on a guerrilla brand of military doctrine unlike that of the U. S. S. R. It is extremely unlikely that these leaders would permit themselves

to become assimilated into the forces of the Soviet Union as have Poland and other satellite nations.

c. A significant feature of MAO's military writings is his continued admonition against the blind adoption of foreign doctrine:

The kind of warfare you wage depends on the kind of weapons you have, the kind of enemy you face, and on time and place.

MAO holds that while the experiences of other nations may be of interest, and in some cases instructive, the peculiarities of China and her military situation make them generally inapplicable. MAO proclaims that there must be a distinctive strategy suitable for the peculiar requirements of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Armed Forces.

d. Communist China today is in the midst of a world arena of power, engaged in a dour cold war. Although the overriding priority of the Chinese Communists is to maintain their base of power in China, the leadership has certain ambitions in Asia and must therefore include in its calculations the possibility of engagement in major war with Western nations. It is aware of the need for an independent industrial base capable of supplying a flow of modern military equipment and spare parts to its Armed Forces. It is not content to contemplate continued military dependency on the Soviet Union in the degree to which such dependence now exists. MAO and the Chinese Communists have never ceased to associate industrialization with military strength and military strength with independence. The top leadership seeks to repeat on the Chinese scene the pattern of internal transformations carried out in the Soviet Union by Stalin in the early 1930's, with a specially urgent emphasis on the

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creation of a Chinese industrial base for the support of its modernized Armed Forces. It seeks simultaneously a related goal: To increase the independent authority of Peiping in Asia. The Chinese Communists, however, will remain bound, for some time to come, to the Soviet Union, both by ideological ties and by the requirements for logistic and technical support.

33. THE COURSE OF WAR

a. China's strategic planners anticipate that a major war would take place in distinct stages, each characterized by a single strategic maneuver. The various stages of such a war, each a deliberate step toward the ultimate goal of annihilation of the enemy, are the bases for campaign plans. These stages are:

- (1) *Strategic retrograde*, occasioned by the inevitable weakness the Chinese will face in waging war against a highly industrialized foe or a militarily superior force.
- (2) *Strategic defense*, in one position, adopted when the balance of power is altered to permit the assumption of measures to halt the enemy's offensive, protect areas of vital interest, and complete concentration of force to assume the counteroffensive.
- (3) *Strategic stalemate*, prolonged in time but short in maneuver, affording time for concentration of forces—a period during which the enemy is fatigued and demoralized by frequent attacks designed to discover his weak points, force him to make mistakes, and soften his forces for the counteroffensive.
- (4) *Strategic counteroffensive*, the culmination of the first three phases of the war, launched after concentration of superior forces, thorough preparedness, and detailed analysis of correct timing for the initiation of the campaign. Success or failure in the first tactical operation of the counteroffensive has, the Communists believe, an all-pervading influence on the balance of the campaign. Correct timing is essential, and the first battle should be joined only when it is certain that superior forces have been concentrated and the situation, the terrain, and the condi-

tion of the populace are favorable to the Chinese and unfavorable to the enemy.

- (5) *Strategic offensive*, a continuation of the fourth phase to its desired conclusion: The annihilation of the enemy in the field. The strategic offensive differs from the counteroffensive only in the timing of its initiation. For example, the strategic counteroffensive is launched while the enemy is on the offensive; the strategic offensive is employed either to initiate a war against an inferior foe, or during a war when the enemy is forced to assume a state of defense.

b. The sequence of the foregoing stages is held to be true only in the case of an initially defensive war against a superior foe. Doctrine teaches that the relative balance of power is the criterion for sequential arrangement of the stages of war. An offensive war, for example, may consist of a single stage: The strategic offensive. If ill-timed, however, it will develop into a 3- or 4-stage war, with the first stage followed by withdrawal, perhaps stalemate, and the strategic counteroffensive.

34. STRATEGY AND GEOGRAPHY

a. Economic, political, and military factors all play an important role in Communist China's military planning, but this trio rests squarely on a single base: The strategic geography of the country. In relation to the Greater Far East orbit, China's strategic position is one of dominance—dominance over all other nations in East Asia. Her continental limits touch the most distant frontiers of the Orient. One of the world's largest countries, China is, geographically speaking, the central East Asian Power. This fact, long recognized by the Chinese themselves, is reflected in their own name for the country—*Chung-kuo*, or Middle Kingdom.


b. Until recent times, China was unable to capitalize upon this geographic dominance. Internally weak and divided, China has a history marked by events that took place entirely within her own borders, and in the past she paid little or no attention to the outside world.

c. China is favored by the two great geographical captains of defense: Space and topography. Her vast land and rugged terrain present formidable problems to any invader. China is in no sense a

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① A comparison of China and the United States.



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② Land forms—Physiographic.

Figure 17. Military geography of China.

"land of passage," and her great depth furnishes her protection which does much to counterbalance her weaknesses in weapons and machines.

d. The strategic geography of China has influenced the strategic military doctrine developed by MAO and his generals who early became accustomed to small-scale, protracted warfare conducted over a large area. The basis of this mobile warfare is the concentration at selected points of superior offensive forces. These forces are based throughout the countryside and provisioned from local produce when necessary.

35. PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING

a. In "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," MAO is blunt in his treatment of the essentials of military planning. Commenting on the causes leading to the virtual defeat which culmi-


nated in the Long March in October 1934, MAO states:

The main error is that we did not plan organically: We had not thought out the campaign. . . . There are three essentials: An assurance of victory, an understanding of the campaign as a whole, and a knowledge of the next strategic move.

Of these three essentials, the "assurance of victory" dogma dominates the military at all levels and is the basis for their reluctance to fight except on their own terms of terrain, time, and relative strength.


b. Chinese Communist military doctrine recognizes three levels of military planning: Strategic, campaign, and tactical. The amount of initiative permitted field commanders in the application of planning techniques to a new course of action is, however, severely limited. MAO Tse-tung's an-

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③ Land forms.



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④ Climatic regions.

Figure 17. Military geography of China—Continued.

nounced concept restricts them to action within rigid sets of dogmatic and material conditions handed down the chain of command. Modifications to military plans are permitted, but only within limits prescribed by the Party, thus assuring control of the military and furtherance of the regime's goals; these limits, again, are political and material in nature. Within these limits, commanders are permitted a versatility in planning that is limited solely by the circumstances, the dexterity of the commander to dispose his troops, the character of his troops, and the topography of the theater of operations.


c. Military doctrine cautions commanders that plans should be developed thoroughly and deliberately, based on consideration of the military, political, economic, and natural conditions of the opposing sides. Military plans should take into consideration everything the enemy can do and pre-

scribe the necessary countermeasures to thwart the enemy. Each plan must be related to a whole military situation which, depending upon the level of command, may cover the entire world, an entire country, a theater of operations, or a campaign. In developing his plan, a commander must consider his whole military situation and, on the basis of existing circumstance, develop the disposition of his forces, the relationship between planned maneuvers, and the effect of the sum-total of the enemy's capabilities to counter the planned maneuvers. A commander's correct dispositions ensue from correct judgments, and his correct judgments ensue from a comprehensive and systematic reconnaissance, as well as a systematic deliberation on the data gathered through such reconnaissance. Commanders employ all possible and necessary methods of reconnaissance and are enjoined to subject various data

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© Transportation—Railroads.

Figure 17. Military geography of China—Continued.

thus gathered to deliberation that will discard the crude and select the refined; eliminate the false and retain the true. Then, in addition, a commander must take into account the conditions of his own forces, study the differences and similarities between the two opposing forces, and map out his plan. This outline, doctrine teaches, is the complete process in which a military commander must engage to know a situation and formulate a strategic plan, a campaign plan, or a tactical plan.

d. The process of knowing the situation goes on not only before, but also after, the formulation of a military plan. The execution of a plan, from its very beginning to the conclusion of an operation, is another process of planning; that is, the process of putting it into practice. In this process, there is the need to examine anew whether the objective plan mapped out in the earlier process corresponds with subjective conditions during its execution. If the plan does not fully correspond with conditions, the commander must, according to fresh knowledge, form new judgments and make new decisions to

modify the original plan to meet the new situation. Plans must be kept up to date by frequent examinations; daily or hourly if necessary. Doctrine recognizes that there will be partial modifications in almost every plan, and sometimes even a complete change, whether it governs a strategic course, a campaign, or a battle.

36. STRATEGIC PLANNING

a. In Chinese Communist military doctrine, strategic planning is the highest level of military planning. It involves mobilization of total national effort and is based on the policy of the Chinese Communist Party, which is also the policy of the state. Strategy is thus an instrument of a political party as well as of a national government. The task of strategy is to study and apply the principles for directing operations that affect a whole military situation—as opposed to campaign or tactical direction, which applies to military operations that are partial in character.

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b. The Chinese Communist General Staff, the operating agency of the Ministry of National Defense, translates overall policies developed by the Communist Party leadership with the probable assistance and advice of the Council of National Defense, the State Council, and other government organs into military decisions, and exercises supervision over their eventual execution on a national level.

37. CAMPAIGN PLANNING

a. Each stage, or phase, of a major war is termed a campaign. Campaigns differ from tactical operations in that they are always designed to further, in a significant manner, a strategic goal through maneuver of large forces.

b. Campaign planning is the next level of military planning and control. It consists of the implementation of strategy in specific theaters or large areas, and the accomplishment of specific major tasks. Responsibility for planning on this level has in the past been vested primarily in field army commanders and in more recent days in the headquarters of the Chinese Communist contingent in Korea. Doctrine indicates that campaign planning is a function of theater, field army, and—in frequently—army group echelons. The last-named unit is the principal element of campaign maneuver in the Armed Forces.

38. TACTICAL PLANNING

a. Tactical planning is the lowest level of military planning and control. It consists of the preparation and direction of combat actions. The

highest-ranking commander involved in a tactical operation is placed in tactical control; he may be the commander of an army group, army, division, or regiment—depending upon the scale of the action involved. Such a commander develops and issues to subordinates detailed tactical plans for the combat action from which little deviation is permitted. This rigidity does not preclude him from making rapid and complete changes of plan when conditions so dictate.

b. The Chinese Communists have reduced the art of tactical planning to perhaps its simplest concept. The current tactical doctrine of the army is a combination of orthodox military tactics and guerrilla tactics. Since the Chinese Communist Army is essentially an infantry army, its leaders lean heavily on tactics designed to exploit the capabilities of their infantry. Supporting arms, such as artillery and armor, are centrally controlled, and general plans for employment of large formations are usually formulated at top levels. As a further aid to simplicity, the military leaders have applied short, descriptive phrases to basic tactical techniques. Military training at all echelons places great stress on memorizing these techniques, or series of techniques. These descriptive terms have become well known and have been applied to tactical operations involving formations ranging from platoon to army. (See Department of the Army Pamphlet 30-87.) Thus, the Chinese Communist concept of tactical planning is reduced to the deliberate preparation and conduct of rigidly prescribed combat actions, easily understood at all levels of command.

Section II. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GENERAL STAFF

39. GENERAL

Strategic plans are the responsibility of the General Staff. The necessary military, intelligence, and political control agencies essential for a careful evaluation of all national situations are concentrated at that level. Correlation of military plans and economic reality is achieved by the State Council which has coordinating authority over both the Armed Forces and national economic plans. The Chinese Communists stress thorough preparedness for protracted war and base their strategic plans on a detailed assessment of the political, economic, military,

and natural resources of both themselves and the probable enemy. General plans that are to be implemented are given in the form of directives to major field commanders, such as theater or field army commanders, for detailed campaign planning and implementation.

40. FACTORS AFFECTING STRATEGIC PLANNING

a. Writings of senior commanders of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces put great emphasis on certain factors which play a decisive role in the employment of large forces. These include the—

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- (1) National resources that can be placed in direct support of the war effort.
- (2) Probable alignment and capabilities of allies.
- (3) Current Party line.
- (4) Character of opposing forces with respect to their equipment, the quality and number of troops and their commanders, and their strategic dispositions.
- (5) Ability to concentrate a preponderance of force.
- (6) Character, density, and political reliability of the people in a contemplated area of operations, and their probable reactions.
- (7) Nature of the terrain in the projected area of operations.
- (8) Transportation facilities, and the quality and location of routes of communications to support the operation.

b. Communist military dogma also stresses complete readiness to meet any strategic situation and puts great emphasis on correct timing to gain and hold the strategic initiative. Strategic thinking is keyed to a philosophy of: *Fight no unprepared engagements. . . . Avoid battles* (as opposed to campaigns) *of attrition*. This philosophy should not, however, be construed to mean that everything must be calculated in advance, and nothing done until all contingencies have been provided for. To plan in that manner would involve loss of time; it would also violate MAO's truism that speed, especially speed in execution, is a prime requisite for success in war. Complete knowledge of the enemy and his intentions is seldom available and, in practice, Chinese Communist planners insist that only a safe majority of the factors be calculated in advance. The others are left to chance, with the probability that some at least will be to their advantage, thus further increasing the factor of safety. The creed of complete preparedness probably stems from the early days of the People's Liberation Army, when, on several occasions, the loss of a campaign might have meant virtual disaster to the regime. It still serves the high command, however, as a check on the recklessness of subordinate commanders.

41. ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS

a. Missions are assigned senior ground commanders by the Chief of the General Staff in the name of the Commander-in-Chief or the Minister

of National Defense. These missions take the form of strategic directives which often cover several stages of a war; they are based on strategic plans developed and kept current by the General Staff in accordance with national military policy. These directives seldom give detailed plans of campaign, but inform the commanders of strategic objectives and the means and time allotted to accomplish them. They are normally issued in sufficient time to permit the development of campaign plans to implement the strategic directives. Air Force and Navy commanders receive their missions in a similar manner.

b. Campaign missions are assigned by senior Army commanders in the field in the form of combat orders and directives. They quite often present detailed schemes of execution; in addition, the orders assign means, specify campaign objectives, and establish timing for the operation. Combat orders or directives are supplemented by logistic directives issued by rear service departments.

c. Tactical missions are also assigned by combat orders which invariably give subordinate commanders explicit instructions for an operation. It is common practice for army combat orders governing tactical operations to assign missions direct to infantry regiments; this detailed guidance occasionally extends to infantry battalions, especially in defensive situations. Tactical orders assign both immediate and subsequent missions to subordinate commanders, a practice adopted to improve control over subordinate units despite limited communications. For example, a unit might be assigned a physical objective to occupy, neutralize, or destroy as its immediate mission and, at the same time, be assigned a support role which it is to assume after completing its immediate mission. The support role is considered the unit's subsequent mission. A portion of each tactical combat order usually is devoted to logistic matters that affect the command as a whole.

42. TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENT

a. The Military Training Department of the General Staff is charged with the development of training directives for all components of the Armed Forces. Supervision of the execution of those directives is carried out by the Inspectorate of the Armed Forces, through Air Force and Navy headquarters, branch directorates, and military area commands. The last of these have primary responsibility for in-

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duction training within their respective areas, as well as responsibility for training management with respect to at least part of the schools, reserve organizations, People's Militia, and units situated in their areas. Joint training exercises are carried out under the immediate supervision of military area commands and subordinate Army echelons, such as a field army or army group. The General Staff Department is responsible for relating strategic objectives to the status of national mobilization, the state of training of the Armed Forces in being, and the standing forces available for commitment in the field. Assistance in evaluating these factors is provided by the Navy and Air Force service chiefs, the chiefs of the various branch directorates, and the commanders of military areas.

b. Units are assigned to military area commands or to theaters of operations by the Chief of the General Staff, in the name of the Minister of National Defense. Commanders of less critical areas may be directed to provide trained Army combat units under their control to other military area commands or to a separate force commander—as was the case in the Korean operation—based upon recommendations of the chiefs of the various branch directorates for the combat arms and senior field commanders. Tactical air units for the immediate and direct support and protection of ground operations, including fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, and ground-attack units, are assigned to senior ground commanders by the Chief of the General Staff as are naval units for joint task forces, such as troop carrier units, amphibious assault units, and marine-type elements. Service support of major forces in the field is controlled by the Director, General Rear Service Department, who allocates service units in accordance with requirements.

43. LOGISTIC PLANNING

a. The modernization of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces has caused an extreme change in their concept of logistic planning. The pattern of logistic support common to the Chinese Civil Revolutionary Wars—wherein armies were supported almost entirely by the resources of the countryside, both human and material—is a thing of the past. The old concept of "take from the enemy" is also largely obsolete. One of the most significant problems facing Communist China's military leaders today is the solution of logistic difficulties involved in the main-

tenance of their position as commanders of the largest offensive military power in Asia.

b. The deficiencies of Communist China's industrial economy, which is incapable of supporting a modern war, have made her almost entirely dependent upon the Soviet Union. The Armed Forces have entered an expensive era, and their needs can no longer be supplied with hand labor alone. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces of today require aircraft, oil, trucks, tanks, and other heavy equipment (as well as spare parts) the preponderance of which must be brought from sources outside China. The Korean venture showed the Chinese the vital need for sound organization in logistic planning and control. At present, Communist China's long-range logistic plans are pointed toward Armed Forces substantially modernized in equipment, staff work, and organization, and supplied increasingly from Chinese resources. That this decision has been taken, i. e., that the size of the regime's Armed Forces be maintained and that its complement of modern equipment be steadily expanded, is reflected in the official—and probably understated—scale of allocations to the Second Ministry of Machine Building Industry (military production). As nearly as can be determined, the regime intends to expand its industrial base and modernize its Armed Forces simultaneously. In the short run these objectives conflict. Imports of military equipment from the Soviet Union are paid for with foodstuffs and raw materials which could be used to buy machine tools either in the Communist bloc or outside. Equipment required by the Second Ministry of Machine Building Industry to equip the Armed Forces could be used advantageously to produce industrial equipment. The military goals of the regime thus conflict with its industrial goals, and pose awkward problems of priority and allocation despite the fact that the industrial targets have been set in initial relation to military targets. These problems, together with the experiences gained in the Korean venture, have shown the Communist high command the vital need for sound organization in logistic planning and control.

c. Long-range logistic plans for modernization of the Armed Forces and plans developed by the General Staff for routine operating expenditures are probably coordinated by the State Council for inclusion in the national budget and in economic plans. In this way the regime determines the por-

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tion of each year's estimated national product—including those resources that will be bartered for Soviet arms and materiel—that can be allocated for support of the military establishment. This total is then apportioned for modernization of the Armed Forces, routine operating expenditures (including stockpiling), weapons development, and military investment (such as outlays to the Second Ministry of Machine Building Industry, which is in charge of arsenal and other types of military construction). Within these broad allocations, the General Staff (Finance and General Rear Service Departments) prepares and submits the budget for the Armed Forces, which is reviewed and approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

d. The annual budget, managed by the Finance

and General Rear Service Departments of the General Staff, serves as a point of departure for logistic planning by subordinate commands. Below General Staff level, logistic planning is the function of rear service departments at each echelon of command from regiment up. Territorial commands within China develop logistic plans which include provisions for transportation of troops and materiel; operation of conscription and reserve programs; operation of schools, depots, and repair facilities; military construction; and support of regular military units, reserve organizations, and People's Militia elements. Other echelons of command plan for their routine operating requirements, for field exercises, and for combat operations requirements, based upon directives received from higher headquarters.

Section III. PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FIELD**44. THEATER OF OPERATIONS**

a. The commander of a Chinese Communist theater of operations is responsible for developing campaign plans. He may, however, delegate a portion of this responsibility to subordinate commanders. The scope of the commander's planning activity is outlined in strategic directives received from the General Staff. Based on these directives, he is responsible for making known his operational and logistical requirements well in advance of anticipated operations. Doctrine governing campaign planning stresses farsightedness on the part of top military commanders; ideally, the commander of a theater of operations is expected to plan objectively, looking ahead through each campaign to the final strategic goal within the framework of a national war plan. Doctrine also warns that it is foolhardy to engage in a campaign out of proportion to the means available; the commander must develop his campaign plans after the most careful calculations, extending to the most minute details. The commander's plan of campaign is most often built about a well-organized and conservative defense where necessary, coupled with a rapid offensive that can be supported to a successful conclusion with the means available.

b. Theater plans are developed to cover several sequential operations and, following Chinese Com-

munist practice, are distributed to subordinate echelons two levels down the chain of command. The plans serve to acquaint subordinate commanders with the theater commander's projected scheme of maneuver, allocation of forces, and program of administrative support. They provide for the coordinated employment of all arms and services, including air and naval components; establish supply standards; announce criteria for evacuation and replacement policies; and establish propaganda themes for internal and hostile consumption. The plans form the basis for development of tactical plans by subordinate commanders. Theater plans are reviewed continuously and altered as required by the changing situation.

c. The theater commander is provided a staff adequate to perform both planning and operational roles simultaneously (ch. 11). Besides the four conventional staff departments (operations, personnel, political, and rear service) the theater staff includes deputies for air and naval components and representatives of branch directorates who assist in planning employment of supporting arms of the Army. The theater rear service department acts both as a logistic planning agency and a command echelon for the theater logistical command. Ground and air reconnaissance forces, and a net of strategically placed informants or agents directly under theater control, comprise the principal sources for

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information concerning the enemy on which the commander and his staff base the details of theater campaign plans.

d. In planning an initial operation, the prime problem which confronts the commander is that of selecting decisive objectives, capture of which will gain the initiative and contribute to the ultimate defeat of the enemy. The selection of objectives is governed by three factors:

- (1) The comparative strength and position of enemy military forces that can influence the campaign.
- (2) The relative value to both combatants of communication centers, supply concentrations, lines of communication, and centers of civil government.
- (3) The value of terrain that, if held, would enhance the conduct of future operations designed to destroy the enemy's forces.

e. If, after a study of these factors, the commander is unable to select an objective that will allow him to seize the initiative, he may designate other initial objectives, the acquisition of which may:

- (1) Further the concentration of his force.
- (2) Cause the enemy to divide his forces to protect critical localities, thus rendering him vulnerable to defeat in detail.
- (3) Secure areas rich in raw materials and foodstuffs to assist in support of his forces, thus denying these items to the enemy.
- (4) Control critical lines of communications, centers of government, or installations essential to future operations.

In the initial stages of a campaign, objectives are always selected with the aim of forcing the enemy into a decisive battle on terms, time, and terrain most favorable to the Chinese Communists. Initial operations are generally planned to discover the enemy's weak points, force him to commit errors, and keep him fatigued and demoralized while the Chinese Communists plan to assume the strategic offensive.

f. Doctrine requires that a theater commander, before initiating either an offensive or counteroffensive campaign, select or develop a number of conditions favorable to his own forces but unfavorable to the enemy. The commander should take steps to develop his control of the local population to a point where they either will lend active support to

the Chinese Communist forces or at least offer no interference with planned operations. He must select terrain favorable to the deployment of his forces but unfavorable to the enemy's deployment, behind which he can complete concentration of his forces in relative security. Although doctrine emphasizes that not all of these conditions need be achieved, most of them must exist if an offensive campaign is to succeed.

g. Failing to obtain the majority of these conditions, the commander must rely on strategic defense, the objective of which is the preservation of his forces while he prepares for the offensive. During the defensive phase, the commander directs continued efforts toward creation of favorable conditions for the offensive.

45. FIELD ARMY

a. The Chinese Communist field army (ch. 12) is a tactical unit organized for strategic and campaign-scale operations. Should one or more field army echelons be deployed in a theater of operations, the theater commander may delegate responsibility for campaign planning, at least for the maneuver of major ground components, to the commanders of those units. In any event, the field army commander prepares plans which include allotment of additional troops and administrative support that have been provided by higher authority; the scheme of maneuver, missions, and objectives for subordinate army groups; announcement of battle area reconnaissance plans; signal operation instructions; and security measures and administrative matters that apply to the command as a whole. The commander's plans also include detailed instructions for the employment of field army troops, whether they are to be employed in field army missions or allotted to subordinate army groups. The field army commander bases his plans either on broad campaign directives or detailed plans of campaign, depending upon how much planning responsibility has been delegated by the senior commander.

b. The field army commander is assisted by a staff (par. 164) that does not differ significantly from that of the theater commander with respect to its planning capabilities. The operations department of the staff assists the commander in developing plans for combat operations; the personnel and political departments assist in planning personnel administration; the political department develops

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plans governing propaganda dissemination and counterintelligence activities; and the rear service department assists the commander in planning logistic support of combat operations. Principal sources of information available to the commander and his staff include ground, air, and technical reconnaissance elements; units in contact with the enemy; and agents.

46. ARMY GROUP

a. Concurrently with the development of campaign plans by higher headquarters, army group commanders discharge certain responsibilities designed to broaden the knowledge of the staff of the theater or field army commander. Commanders of army groups are not likely, however, to engage in preparation of campaign plans as such. Their planning activities are normally restricted to those required for tactical operations in support of campaign plans of the theater or field army commander.

- (1) If in contact with the enemy, commanders of army groups maintain reconnaissance to uncover enemy weaknesses, locate major tactical dispositions and supporting artillery, and acquire knowledge of the terrain. As the plans of higher commanders become known, tactical planning is initiated, and training of troops is intensified to the point of conducting detailed rehearsals on terrain similar to that in the contemplated area of operations to test the soundness of preliminary plans. In response to planning directives from higher headquarters, commanders may be required to estimate their needs as they pertain to troops, supporting arms, logistical requirements, and personnel placements. The theater commander is responsible for providing combat, administrative, and logistical support. He apportions his available combat support and service units to his tactical commanders.
- (2) If not in contact with the enemy, commanders of army groups are responsible for keeping the senior commander continuously advised of administrative and logistical requirements and the combat readiness of their forces.

b. The role of tactical planning is one in which the Chinese Communists excel, and Chinese Com-

munist commanders at army group level are capable planners. They assign missions clearly and precisely, with subordinate units designated in appropriate tactical groupings. The use of detailed reconnaissance, written plans and orders, control over planning and operations, and warning orders to permit concurrent planning at all echelons within the army group are emphasized. What the Chinese Communists call "battles of quick decision" are planned and directed at army group level. Among the prerequisites for these battles are such conditions as thorough preparedness, correct timing, concentration of a preponderance of force, favorable positions, and freedom to maneuver. To bring these conditions into a favorable balance, the army group commander gives detailed consideration to:

- (1) Enemy strength, dispositions, characteristics, and capabilities, by exploiting Chinese Communist capabilities for infiltration and reconnaissance in the hostile depth.
- (2) Terrain, evaluated in terms of features critical to both combatants, routes of communication and approach; obstacles; concealment and cover; and observation and fields of fire.
- (3) Inhabitants in the enemy zone, noting especially their political beliefs and whether they may be expected to assist the enemy.
- (4) Materiel available to the enemy.
- (5) Disposition and quality of his own troops and materiel in contrast to those of the enemy.
- (6) Scheduling the operation to include time essential for troop concentration or other preparations, as well as precise timing of the attack.
- (7) Troops and other resources required to develop advantageous conditions.

47. ARMY

The commander of a Chinese Communist army, the basic maneuver element of the army group, does not engage in military planning above the tactical level. The commander of an army is primarily concerned with implementing the tactical operations planned and directed by the army group. In this role he formulates detailed plans for the employment of his organic and attached supporting forces with particular attention to:

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- a. Assignment of objectives to attain unity of effort.
- b. Reconnaissance and observation.
- c. Security.
- d. Disposition of his forces, to include reserves.
- e. Unity and continuity of command throughout the operation, to include communications control.
- f. Coordination of supporting arms and services.
- g. Precombat political indoctrination of his troops to increase morale, spirit, and combat effectiveness.

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CHAPTER 6

RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY

Section I. RECONNAISSANCE

48. INTRODUCTION

a. Chinese Communist military doctrine places great emphasis on reconnaissance at all levels of command, and stresses that prompt transmittal of information and dissemination of intelligence are the responsibility of all commanders. At echelons of army level and above, commanders are provided both a reconnaissance and an intelligence staff section to assist them in the collection and analysis of essential elements of information. Reconnaissance staff sections frequently exercise what amounts to operational control over both ground and air reconnaissance elements, and planning and direction of their activities are detailed and thorough. At division and regimental levels, reconnaissance and intelligence staff functions are combined in a single intelligence staff section which directs reconnaissance activities throughout the unit.

b. The Chinese Communist commander, however, is hampered by a lack of vehicles and modern signal equipment and is forced to use all the means at his disposal to realize even a minimum amount of information from reconnaissance activities. During the Chinese Revolutionary Civil Wars, while operating over familiar terrain and aided by a friendly populace, the Communists did not need special techniques and equipment. Currently, they recognize that reconnaissance requires specialized training, skills, and equipment. Their doctrine envisions the employment of air, mechanized, cavalry, and motorized units as a commander's principal reconnaissance agencies, and the organization, equipment, and training of these units are being improved. By United States Army standards, however, the Chinese Communist large-unit commanders lack adequate reconnaissance means.

c. In Korea, where the terrain favored small-unit actions, the Communists had excellent close and combat reconnaissance. (See paragraph 52 for Chinese Communist classification of reconnaissance.) This adequacy in reconnaissance was accomplished by a well-coordinated observation post system, supplemented by front-line observers and aggressive pat-

rolling, raids, and ambushes. Reconnaissance activities were normally coordinated by division and higher echelons of command to insure maximum coverage of the enemy and the terrain. Small, special reconnaissance patrols infiltrated the U. N. C. lines under the cover of darkness and remained in position to observe during the daylight hours. Native line-crossers were used, and interrogation of natives who were familiar with the area was a common practice. Because of the shortage of vehicles and signal equipment, organic reconnaissance units were rarely employed in a manner consistent with common United States Army practice. As often as not, they were assigned conventional combat missions, and the infantry bore the brunt of close reconnaissance activities.

d. The Communist field commander urgently requires long-range tactical reconnaissance aircraft, wheeled or tracked vehicles for ground reconnaissance units, and adequate radio-communications facilities at his disposal to improve his reconnaissance elements. The Chinese Communists' reconnaissance techniques are generally good, and the addition of modern equipment will place the large-unit commander in a better position to arrive at decisions concerning future combat actions. Currently, Chinese Communist field commanders are severely limited in any activity but close reconnaissance. The reader should keep this limitation in mind when studying the following paragraphs on current reconnaissance doctrine.

49. DEFINITION

a. The Chinese Communists define reconnaissance as directed effort by military commanders to gather information of the enemy's armed forces, the weather, and terrain in anticipated or actual areas of operations; the resources in those areas that may contribute to the support of operations; and the population in those areas and in the hostile country itself. Reconnaissance is initially classified according to its sphere of activity as aerial reconnaissance,

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Figure 18. Mechanized troops on parade in Peiping, 1954.

ground reconnaissance, and naval reconnaissance. Of these three classes, air and ground reconnaissance are the principal means available to large-unit commanders to implement their intelligence collection plans.

b. The purpose of reconnaissance is to gain information upon which to base strategic, campaign, and tactical plans. These levels of planning are the basis for further classifications of reconnaissance which the Chinese Communists apply to both aerial and ground reconnaissance activities in the field (par. 52).

50. ITEMS OF INFORMATION

a. Information concerning the enemy's armed forces includes his strategic plans and movements,

his dispositions on various fronts or in theaters of operations, his organization, his tactics, and his supply system. It also includes his replacement system, tactical dispositions in a war area, communications system, transportation facilities, strengths, and morale. Hereafter, these items of information are referred to as enemy order of battle. Doctrine emphasizes the importance of evidence of changes in these factors, pointing out that such changes are often indications of enemy capabilities or intentions.

b. Information dealing with weather includes the conventional factors of precipitation, fog, cloud conditions, moon phases, wind, sunrise, and sunset. It also includes collection of air samples to indicate possible hostile employment of chemical, biological, or radiological warfare.

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c. Information concerning the terrain is developed to determine advantages and disadvantages to planned combat operations. It includes such factors as the location of prepared positions; the condition of roads, bridges, and railways; the location and condition of streams and major terrain obstacles; cross-country trafficability; concealment; and observation and fields of fire.

d. Information concerning resources includes the location and condition of sources of raw materials, manufacturing facilities, food stocks, transportation facilities, and similar items. Information on local resources in an area of operations is essential to a commander, since he is expected to obtain partial support of his force in the field by exploitation of local sources of supply.

e. Information bearing on the local population, hostile or otherwise, includes the economic situation, trends in domestic affairs, political affiliations, and identification of dissident groups. The latter are of particular interest, since they are a possible source of support for the Chinese Communist Armed Forces. Within China, however, dissident elements are guarded against because they represent a threat to the regime.

51. METHODS OF OBTAINING INFORMATION

Chinese Communist methods of obtaining information vary widely and include study of maps and map supplements; study of captured documents and equipment; espionage; interrogation of inhabitants, repatriates, prisoners of war, and deserters; and employment of special weather, signal, and CBR reconnaissance devices. Principal methods employed by the ground force commander, however, are the actual observation of the terrain or physical objects by ground and air reconnaissance.

a. *Ground reconnaissance* utilizes observation plus combat operations to obtain detailed information of the enemy and terrain. It permits the commander to maintain constant contact with the enemy, to observe his movements and changes in troop dispositions, and obtain essential information on the terrain in the vicinity of immediate operations. Ground reconnaissance elements consist primarily of infantry elements, dismounted reconnaissance units, cavalry units, and light and balanced armored combat formations. Their methods include patrolling, observation, raids, ambush, and

reconnaissance in force. Close reconnaissance by artillery, engineer, signal, and chemical warfare units supplement the activities of the principal ground reconnaissance forces, whose cavalry and armored elements operate on an extensive front, beyond supporting range of other ground combat units.

b. *Air reconnaissance* supplements ground reconnaissance activities by visual observation and aerial photography over areas not accessible to ground reconnaissance elements. Visual air reconnaissance is employed when it is necessary to observe rapid changes in a combat situation, when it is essential to determine rapidly the general situation in a specific area deep in hostile territory, or when climatic conditions do not favor aerial photography.

52. CLASSIFICATION OF RECONNAISSANCE

The Chinese Communists classify both ground and air reconnaissance as strategic, battle area, or battleground reconnaissance. The Air Force frequently groups the latter two classes under the general term *tactical reconnaissance*. Each class of reconnaissance is directly related to a level of military planning; each is executed by specific levels of command employing appropriate elements of the Armed Forces. The three general classes of reconnaissance are defined as follows:

a. *Strategic reconnaissance* is planned and directed by the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense. Its purpose is to obtain information on which to base strategic plans and decisions. The Chinese Communists' concept is similar to that of the United States doctrine; the scope of their strategic reconnaissance is limited, however, by the inadequacies of the Air Force and Navy of the Chinese Communists.

b. *Battle area reconnaissance* is planned and directed by commanders of army and higher echelons, to include a theater of operations. The purpose of battle area reconnaissance is to gather information on the enemy, weather, terrain, area resources, and the local population which is essential to the planning and conduct of a campaign. This class of reconnaissance is similar to distant reconnaissance in the United States Army. Commanders at army and higher echelons assign battle area reconnaissance missions to appropriate air and ground units under their command.



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Figure 19. A cavalry reconnaissance troop.

c. *Battleground reconnaissance* is planned and directed by commanders of army and lower echelons. The purpose of battleground reconnaissance is to provide the commander with information on which to base tactical plans and decisions. It is similar in scope to close reconnaissance in the United States Army. Battleground reconnaissance is initiated by the tactical commander upon receipt of his mission. This class of reconnaissance is most frequently directed by infantry divisions and regiments.

(1) The initial phase of battleground reconnaissance is called *close-distance* reconnaissance and is conducted over a distance not exceeding one day's march for a battalion. Close-distance reconnaissance provides the tactical commander with information on the terrain where he expects to deploy his force, the general enemy dispositions, unit designations, and the combat effectiveness of the enemy's units within a specific zone of activity. This

form of reconnaissance is similar to battle reconnaissance in the United States Army.

(2) Once combat is joined, the tactical commander decentralizes the execution of most reconnaissance activities to those commanders whose units are in direct contact with the enemy. This form of reconnaissance is known as *direct contact reconnaissance* and is similar to the United States concept of combat reconnaissance.

53. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS

a. Before development of the enemy situation, or during a war movement, armored and cavalry elements are the principal forces used by the commander for execution of battle area reconnaissance. These forces are frequently reinforced with other arms to increase their capability for extended independent operations. Engineer, signal, and chemical warfare parties round out the reconnaissance capabilities of the reconnaissance element. Armored

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reconnaissance elements may be employed on battle area reconnaissance missions over distances of 100 to 200 kilometers ahead of the Chinese Communist main force, each element covering a zone approximately 50 kilometers wide. The range over which cavalry elements are considered capable of conducting battle area reconnaissance missions is considerably less than that of armored elements. Doctrine prescribes a normal depth of 1½ days' march ahead of the forward security elements of the main force, or a distance of approximately 75 to 100 kilometers. When the risk of encountering strong enemy resistance is slight, the range of the operation may be extended. Cavalry reconnaissance elements ordinarily operate over a wider front than do armored elements. Both armored and cavalry reconnaissance elements gain and maintain contact with the enemy; by infiltration through gaps, or movement around the flanks of the hostile counterreconnaissance screen, they attempt to search out the strength, movements, composition, and dispositions of the enemy's main force, and the movements of enemy reinforcements. They avoid sustained combat whenever possible, resorting to combat action only when pressed or when it is essential to develop information of the enemy.

b. Execution of battleground reconnaissance tasks falls primarily upon dismounted reconnaissance units organic to tactical echelons of command and upon the infantry. Once the enemy situation has been developed, and contact between opposing main forces is imminent or has been gained, armored and cavalry elements are redeployed for flank reconnaissance and security missions, and close and intensive reconnaissance by infantry, artillery, engineer, signal, and chemical warfare units assumes special importance. Elements assigned to execute battleground reconnaissance missions secure information chiefly through patrols and battlefield observation. The primary objective of these elements is to ascertain the enemy's flanks, security dispositions, connecting points, weapons, defensive characteristics, conditions of supply lines, and other factors bearing on his detailed deployment and movements. Elements are ordinarily limited in size to not larger than a reinforced battalion containing armored cars, tanks, artillery, signal troops, engineers, or chemical warfare detachments as required. Specific zones of operation are assigned each element and may extend 50 kilometers forward of Chinese

Communist security forces. In addition, each tactical unit, deployed behind security forces, executes a form of battleground reconnaissance within its own zone of action and toward unsupported flanks to gain information and to avoid surprise.


54. AIR RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS

Chinese Communist air reconnaissance elements are of two general types: strategic reconnaissance units and tactical reconnaissance units. Strategic units, equipped with both medium and light bombers, afford the Chinese Communists a limited capability for strategic reconnaissance over most Asiatic land and sea areas. Tactical units employ both light bombers and piston-type or jet fighters, and provide a capability for tactical reconnaissance missions up to a normal operating radius of approximately 1,200 kilometers.


a. Strategic air reconnaissance elements, doctrine contends, are under the direction of the highest-ranking ground and air commanders. Those individuals are responsible for planning and assigning strategic reconnaissance missions as directed by the General Staff. The objective of these missions is to reconnoiter enemy defense industry installations, military supply centers, communications and government centers, air installations, harbors, forces at sea, communication systems, and air defense systems. The purpose of the missions is to provide the high command with information which may forewarn of the enemy's strategic intentions, the extent of his air and air-defense power, and the organization and disposition of his forces on the seas or in extreme rear areas.

b. Tactical air reconnaissance elements supplement the ground force commander's ground reconnaissance elements in the field, and execute both battle area and battleground reconnaissance missions in coordination with, or in lieu of, ground activities. During combat, tactical air reconnaissance elements are under the operational control of senior Army commanders, who plan their employment and allocate air elements to subordinate commanders as required (par. 144). The objective of battle area air reconnaissance missions is to determine disposition of hostile troops and equipment; enemy troop movements; disposition and completeness of enemy field works; and the locations of command posts, lines of communications, and air installations. Battleground reconnaissance missions seek

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① Soviet TU-2 piston engine bombers are employed on battle area reconnaissance missions.



② Light aircraft of the type available for artillery missions.

Figure 20. Tactical air reconnaissance elements.

out the location of the enemy's forward dispositions; movements in his immediate rear; dispositions of reserves; and the locations of forward supply dumps, vehicle concentrations, lines of communications, and command posts. Tactical air reconnaissance elements also perform missions for artillery, reconnoitering targets and adjusting fire.

55. EXECUTION

Control of the execution of battle area and battleground reconnaissance is highly centralized in the Chinese Communist Army.

a. The headquarters of the senior commander in the field develops the master battle area reconnaissance plan, and assigns tasks and zones of reconnaissance to subordinate commands. The plan also specifies essential elements of information and details the system of reporting to higher headquarters. Subordinate commands executing reconnaissance missions are required to maintain liaison and contact with adjacent units, and mutual exchange of information is mandatory. The senior commander retains a reconnaissance reserve adequate to reinforce units engaged in operations or to project reconnaissance in a new direction. Ground units engaged in battle area reconnaissance missions normally secure information through the use of patrols.

b. Battleground reconnaissance usually is controlled at army level. The army reconnaissance directive normally specifies reconnaissance objec-

tives, the reconnaissance elements to be deployed and their relief schedules, the reconnaissance zones, the time-limit for executing the missions, the procedure for making reports, and liaison and contact measures to be maintained. The army may establish a special information collection center to expedite processing of reconnaissance reports from subordinate commands. Reconnaissance performed after contact has been gained is conducted as direct contact reconnaissance. It consists of constant and intense observation, patrols, raids, ambushes, and other information-gathering activities. It sometimes takes the form of infiltration of well-organized infantry elements into, or around, an enemy defense position; members of the unit may remain in hiding for several hours or an entire day, observing hostile activities, then retire to their own lines after essential information has been obtained.

c. Frequently essential information can be obtained only through attack. When the Chinese Communist commander encounters a position that cannot be penetrated or enveloped, he normally directs a reconnaissance in force to achieve his aims. He may also direct such an operation when battle is imminent—and conventional reconnaissance methods are not suitable, as in a meeting engagement, or before the initiation of a general offensive—and when intelligence already obtained is insufficient, or when unreliable information requires confirmation. Doctrine mentions four principal methods of executing a reconnaissance in force—

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- (1) Through an assault by a strong, balanced force before a general offensive, when the enemy's actual position and distribution of strength is not completely known; when the enemy is deploying or taking up position as in a meeting engagement; or when essential information on the enemy is lacking and there is no possibility of conventional reconnaissance.
- (2) By small infantry units or tank-infantry-artillery task forces, which, when the hostile position possesses strong covering forces, assault the enemy's security detachments to simulate an attack on the hostile position. The feint attack, it is hoped, may compel the enemy to disclose his dispositions.
- (3) By employing reconnaissance elements—in conjunction with artillery fires—to break through or infiltrate enemy security positions when there is evidence of enemy movement (reinforcements, reserves, or relief during defense). While the artillery harasses the enemy, the reconnaissance elements observe from the enemy flanks and rear areas and report on hostile reactions.
- (4) By small-scale, surprise attacks on the enemy (primarily on enemy security elements) to capture prisoners and documents. Small-scale attacks are most often employed during stalemate conditions to seek out specific details of the hostile defense.

56. COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

a. Counterreconnaissance in the People's Liberation Army is a function of high command echelons. For example, in a movement to contact, or when a defensive position is to be established, the army or army group may assign a subordinate command the mission of establishing a counterreconnaissance screen forward of the areas in which it expects to deploy. Every effort is made to prevent the penetration of this screen by hostile reconnaissance units. In the initial stage of their Korean operations, the Chinese Communists successfully prevented detection of their major forces by moving behind screening forces under cover of darkness.

b. Although the techniques are discussed under the heading of security, counterreconnaissance missions are normal assignments at lower levels. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance measures complement each other and cannot be readily separated. Each provides a certain amount of security, and both provide a certain amount of information. The major difference between them is the mission, which focuses reconnaissance on the enemy but bases counterreconnaissance on the protected force.

c. Any measure which prevents observation by the enemy is basically a counterreconnaissance measure. Such measures may be divided into active measures, which include posting direct security detachments (par. 66) and dispatching patrols; and passive measures, which include camouflage, concealment, warning systems, and conduct of troop movements at night.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE**57. INTRODUCTION**

a. The Chinese Communists consider intelligence any evaluated information concerning the enemy or prospective enemy, or an anticipated area of operations. Intelligence is grouped into four general interest areas, both during periods of hostilities or peace, which apply to both domestic and foreign situations, of either a tactical or strategic nature. These areas are: (1) Social (which to the Chinese is inclusive of scientific, subversive, and technological areas); (2) military; (3) political; and (4) economic (par. 58). Information is collected by five

general methods: Diplomatic activities, espionage, military reconnaissance, technical intelligence activities, and interrogations. Once hostilities are opened, most combat intelligence is produced through reconnaissance, technical intelligence activities, and interrogations. The Communists can be expected to exploit to the fullest extent any sources of military information that fall into their hands. Their maltreatment of prisoners of war and of foreign nationals during and subsequent to the Korean war reveals the extent to which the Chinese Communists are prepared to go in their quest for information that will further their designs.

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b. Intelligence responsibility and control are vested in the senior commander in a theater of operations. Collection efforts of subordinate commands are directed by the senior headquarters. At regimental level and above, the commander is provided a military intelligence staff section as his principal agency for development of combat intelligence. The chief of section, in addition to his routine duties, is the commander's coordinating and liaison agent for all activities of a military intelligence nature even though they are controlled by other staff departments. He performs the same functions with respect to technical intelligence activities engaged in by the various arms and services.

c. The Chinese Communist intelligence officer employs a collection plan to secure information relating to the commander's essential elements of information. Missions are based upon the information desired and are assigned to special agencies and subordinate units. As information is gathered, it is evaluated and interpreted; the resulting intelligence is presented to the commander, together with evaluated conclusions and the reasons supporting such deductions. In the field, most intelligence data are contained in several intelligence reports published by the various command headquarters. These include:

- (1) Periodic intelligence summaries.
- (2) Daily intelligence reports.
- (3) Intelligence estimates.
- (4) Intelligence plans and annexes.
- (5) Terrain evaluations.

These reports are normally disseminated to superior, subordinate, and adjacent units. Special reports may be prepared on pending operations or on special-interest items.

d. According to Communist doctrine, combat intelligence must furnish an estimate of the enemy capabilities and intentions that will permit the commander to adopt appropriate countermeasures. To provide a basis for the estimate, the various intelligence agencies collect detailed information of the enemy, the local population, and terrain. Higher headquarters maintain detailed records of enemy order of battle, such as individual personalities, unit subordination, and unit designations. Most of the order of battle information is gleaned from prisoners of war, documents, and local inhabitants. In Korea, little current tactical interrogation was ac-

complished owing to the lack of qualified interrogators at tactical command levels.

58. CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE

Chinese Communist doctrine classifies intelligence into four types as military, political, economic, and social intelligence. The scope of each of these categories is as follows:

a. *Military intelligence* includes all information bearing on the military capabilities and intentions of actual or prospective enemies. Collection of this information is a continuing process that is initiated during time of peace and intensified with the outbreak of hostilities. Many of the general areas of interest border on strategic intelligence as defined in United States doctrine. They include organization, doctrine, disposition, and armament of the enemy's armed forces; their education and training; special inherent historical characteristics; background of military leaders; national defense preparations; mobilization plans and activities; preparations for combat operations; intelligence organizations; and military topography. These areas of interest remain the same in both war and peace; combat intelligence in the theater of operations is a continuation of the peacetime intelligence cycle and deals with specific items of information relating to both future combat operations and those in progress.

b. *Political intelligence*, as the Communists apply the term, is a strategic area of interest in United States doctrine. The Chinese Communists devote much time and effort to the production of political intelligence, which is divided into five general areas of interest with respect to possible enemy nations: Organization and prestige of governments, special characteristics of government leaders, various political factions and the class they represent, popular sentiments and public opinions, and foreign policy and national aspirations. In the field, political intelligence is produced primarily through interrogation of prisoners of war and local inhabitants. Political intelligence is used to gauge enemy morale and his willingness to fight and as a basis for psychological warfare operations.

c. *Economic intelligence*, the Chinese Communists believe, determines a nation's ability to wage war and sustain wartime operations. Areas of interest included in this category cover general economic conditions, industrial capabilities, mineral and petroleum resources, agricultural production,

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international and domestic commerce, financial conditions, and transportation facilities of possible hostile countries. Attention is also paid to the economic conditions of any minority groups or the populace of outlying possessions of the countries being studied. The latter information is also exploited for propaganda purposes.

d. *Social intelligence* is produced through the study of the internal domestic affairs of a foreign country. Information of a social nature is gathered only when it is closely related to military, economic, or political affairs. It includes general social conditions, the presence of any dissident elements, status of foreign residents, relationships between the military and civil populace, and scientific and technological progress. This class of intelligence also provides grist for the Chinese Communist propaganda mill.

59. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

a. No single top agency for direction of intelligence activities in Communist China has been firmly identified and it appears that a number of agencies have intelligence functions. The General Staff Department of the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, however, probably coordinates and directs the collection and dissemination of all purely military intelligence of both a strategic and tactical nature. Essential elements of information are determined according to national defense requirements, and the resulting directives are sent as required to the various headquarters of the Armed Forces or government agencies charged with assisting in the collection of information. Tactical information is collected principally through the Armed Forces. The collection of strategic information, which is also a responsibility of the staff, is accomplished primarily through the Air Force and Navy, espionage, and various agencies of the Chinese Communist government. Principal areas of strategic interest studied by this agency include:

- (1) Strategic intentions and movements of the enemy.
- (2) Hostile mobilization activities.
- (3) Hostile order of battle in each theater and within the enemy country.

The staff receives periodic intelligence reports from subordinate units, processes information, disseminates intelligence, and acts as the final repository for important military intelligence. In addition to disseminating military intelligence, the

agency is charged with convening periodic intelligence conferences that include the various Directors of the General Staff and top field commanders.

b. The intelligence section of a theater headquarters is the highest headquarters directing combat intelligence in the field during periods of hostilities (par. 144). Intelligence requirements are formulated and sent to lower echelons based on the requirements of the theater commander and the General Staff. The intelligence section is also responsible for coordinating the work of various field intelligence agencies within the theater. At theater level, the intelligence chief is concerned primarily with enemy order of battle, hostile capabilities and intentions, enemy reinforcements, enemy tactics and training, and an accurate analysis of enemy routes of communications and movements thereon. Primary sources are: Aerial reconnaissance activities; agents or line crossers; prisoners of war; enemy documents; radio intercept; and reports from higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.

c. A field army or army group intelligence section plans and executes intelligence missions of its own besides complying with the directives of higher headquarters and directing the activities of subordinate intelligence agencies and tactical commands. The section is responsible for operational control of the special intelligence units attached to the headquarters, and assigns special missions to these units based upon current essential elements of information. The section maintains close liaison with the reconnaissance and communication sections and the political department to expedite intelligence missions. Communist doctrine calls for an intelligence conference to be held by a field army or army group before and after each campaign to discuss intelligence operations and the methods employed. The intelligence effort at field army or army group is directed primarily toward obtaining the following information of the enemy force in their zone of operations:

- (1) Hostile order of battle.
- (2) Enemy capabilities and intentions.
- (3) Hostile air capabilities.
- (4) Health and morale of the enemy troops and local populace.
- (5) Terrain and weather in the combat zone.

This information is normally secured from the reconnaissance units attached to the headquarters;

subordinate commands; interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, and civilians; translation and study of captured documents; radio intercept; agents; photo interpretation; periodic reports from superior, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters; and civil censorship. Under certain conditions, the intelligence section may set up a special information collection center in forward areas to facilitate the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence.

d. The intelligence section of an army headquarters directs its effort toward obtaining detailed information of the enemy and the terrain. The intelligence officer draws up a flexible collection plan to meet the intelligence requirements of the command and the changing combat situation. Frequent conferences with subordinate agencies are called to discuss current and future operations. Like higher echelons, the army intelligence section may also set up special information collection centers. The army intelligence officer formulates his collection plan to determine:

- (1) Hostile order of battle.
- (2) Enemy capabilities.
- (3) Condition of the populace in the area of operations.
- (4) Terrain and weather in the army's combat zone.

The intelligence officer employs organic, attached, and subordinate reconnaissance units and infantry elements to accomplish his mission.

e. The infantry division and its subordinate units perform most of the intelligence collection effort in the Chinese Communist Army during time of war. As it is in contact with the enemy, the division is responsible for compiling and forwarding the numerous reports required by high headquarters. In addition, the division intelligence officer must formulate collection plans based both upon his own requirements and those of higher headquarters. Chinese doctrine designates the division as the principal coordinator of intelligence activities of the various arms and services in forward areas. Divisions and regiments have small intelligence staffs which function more as collection agencies than evaluation and dissemination agencies. Information collected at division level includes:

- (1) Hostile order of battle.
- (2) Condition of the terrain, weather, and

populace in the division's zone of operations.

- (3) Enemy capabilities.

60. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Chinese Communist doctrine teaches that collection of information during combat operations is to be accomplished by both direct and indirect methods. Direct methods include the various types of reconnaissance and hasty analysis of objects collected from the enemy by units in contact. Indirect methods comprise such activities as prisoner-of-war interrogations, detailed study of enemy documents, espionage, radio traffic analysis, and technical intelligence activities. In general, the Communist commander places the same requirements on his intelligence agencies as does his United States Army counterpart. Orders issued to subordinate commands that deal with collection of information normally designate the unit that is to accomplish the mission, the objective and scope of the mission, and the principal methods and techniques to be employed. Information on the friendly and enemy situation is included in the order, as are reporting procedures and methods of signal communication.

a. During an advance to contact, when anticipating a meeting engagement, the commander seeks to determine the strength, unit designations, weapons, and combat zone of the opposing forces; the combat intentions and capabilities of the enemy commander; the width of the hostile front; the direction, means, and speed of advance of the hostile force; location, composition, and movement of hostile reserves; and information on weather and terrain in the expected area of deployment. Air and mobile ground reconnaissance elements are the commander's principal collection agencies during a move to contact. Their efforts are supplemented by agent reports, interrogation of the local population, and reconnaissance in force when necessary to develop essential information.

b. Before attacking a defending enemy, the commander strives to obtain information on the enemy order of battle, construction and extent of enemy fortification, and enemy capabilities. The commander's intelligence officer employs air reconnaissance, observation posts, major ground reconnaissance elements, infantry patrols, and special reconnaissance teams to secure pertinent information. Special efforts will invariably be made to

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capture prisoners of war and apprehend local inhabitants for interrogation purposes.

c. In a defensive operation, the commander looks for indications of the enemy's offensive intentions and capabilities. The intelligence officer emphasizes collection of information on the following items of hostile order of battle:

- (1) Strength and troop disposition of the enemy.
- (2) Forward positions of the enemy.
- (3) Position and strength of enemy reserves.
- (4) Locations of enemy artillery and other supporting weapons.
- (5) Presence of any special attack forces.
- (6) Enemy activities in the forward area.
- (7) Volume and subject of enemy radio traffic.

In a defensive situation, the primary collection agencies are air reconnaissance units, agents, and units in contact with the enemy. During darkness or adverse weather conditions, patrol activities of units in contact are increased in frequency, and numerous observer teams attempt to infiltrate enemy lines.

d. Much care is given to the collection of intelligence information to be employed in planning pursuit of a withdrawing enemy, since this type of operation permits the Communists to hit an enemy on the move when he is most vulnerable. Success in this type of operation is measured by the accuracy of available information. The intelligence officer focuses his collection effort on the following items of hostile order of battle:

- (1) Organization of the enemy withdrawal.
- (2) Primary route of withdrawal and any parallel routes.
- (3) Location of enemy reserve units.
- (4) Construction of new defensive lines in the enemy's rear.
- (5) Actions of enemy adjacent units.
- (6) Trafficability of the enemy road net, and the location of critical points along the withdrawal route.

Communist doctrine indicates that air reconnaissance and mobile ground reconnaissance forces, including cavalry, are best suited for the pursuit phase. Intelligence personnel also inspect abandoned enemy positions to gauge the enemy's morale, combat capabilities, and probable future actions.

e. During a withdrawal of his own force, the intelligence officer is responsible for anticipating the

enemy's reaction. At the same time, he is hampered by the tactical situation in employing his collection agencies. Whenever possible, the intelligence officer will direct his collection efforts to determine order of battle information to include:

- (1) Strength and dispositions of pursuing enemy forces.
- (2) Actions of adjacent enemy forces.
- (3) Locations of enemy reserves and supporting weapons.
- (4) Mobility and capabilities of the enemy forces.

During a withdrawal, the Communists are forced to rely upon air reconnaissance, agents left behind, and information collected by the covering force.

61. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Counterintelligence measures applied by the Chinese Communists are twofold. They are designed:

- (1) To neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of hostile intelligence activities, thus preserving the element of surprise for the commander; and (2) to eliminate subversive efforts. Measures taken to preserve secrecy are a function of military command; those taken to negate subversive activities are a function of the political system, supervised by the Party organization in the Army (par. 30).

a. Measures taken by the military commander include camouflage; use of cover and concealment; deceptive measures, such as feints, demonstrations, and ruses; restrictions on the preparation and handling of documents; communications security; and control of the movement of personnel within and about sensitive installations. Antiguerilla measures are also a form of counterintelligence activity, as are such direct security measures as interior guard, systems of road blocks for control of movement, and counterreconnaissance activities.

b. Counterintelligence activities controlled by the political system include establishment and enforcement of criteria for individual security discipline; security training activities; counterpsychological warfare measures; censorship of mail and news media; control of the civil populace; counterespionage measures; and countersubversive measures. The latter measures are applied not only to the enemy, but to anyone—ranging from Chinese personnel who are loath to participate in self-criticism meetings to elements of the local populace display-

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ing improper tendencies in their attitude towards the Chinese Communist forces. Personnel who implement the political aspects of counterintelligence are trusted Party members who function under the

direct supervision of the Party committee at each echelon of command; they not only have investigative authority, but are also empowered with punitive authority.

Section III. SECURITY**62. GENERAL**

Security in the Chinese Communist Armed Forces embraces all measures taken to guard against observation and surprise, to insure against effective hostile interference with operations, and to gain and maintain the power of freedom of action. Doctrine categorizes these measures according to their nature into battle safeguards, political safeguards, and material safeguards.

a. *Battle safeguards* are those designed to afford a knowledge of the situation and of the characteristics of the enemy's weapons and equipment, the enemy's tactical doctrine and techniques, the terrain, local inhabitants, and local resources; to protect a command against surprise ground, air, or CBR attack; to deny the enemy the ability to conduct close observation and reconnaissance missions; and to warn of the approach of large hostile forces so that friendly forces are permitted to maintain freedom of maneuver by gaining time and space required for secure deployment for combat. These objectives are achieved by the execution of reconnaissance and security measures in the field which mutually supplement each other. Reconnaissance provides the commander with information on which to base security measures to be taken for the protection of his command. These security measures are divided according to their functions into security during movement and at a halt; combat security; direct security; and security against armored, air or airborne attack, or CBR attack.


b. *Political safeguards* are measures intended to protect both the Party and the Armed Forces from deviationism and sabotage from within; determine the political inclinations of the local inhabitants; maintain battlefield discipline; maintain leadership of the Armed Forces by the Party; and counter hostile psychological warfare activities. These objectives are achieved by the activities of the Party's informal organization in the Armed Forces (ch. 4) and the political staff departments at each echelon of command (par. 143).

c. *Material safeguards* are those measures devoted to insuring adequate and timely logistic support of combat operations. They include planning, reconnaissance, and security measures to afford protection of national resources essential to the prosecution of a war; insure regular, punctual supply of materiel to combat units; and establish and protect evacuation systems for both personnel and materiel not essential to combat operations. These measures are discussed in subsequent paragraphs dealing with logistic operations in the field.

63. SECURITY DURING MOVEMENT

a. Military doctrine governing security measures during tactical movements prescribes a system composed of two belts disposed about the main force: one to warn of the enemy's preparation for attack, and one to meet and ward off the hostile attack. A Chinese Communist force in movement is secured by air and ground reconnaissance elements which operate in front and on the flanks of the force, and by advance, flank, and rear guards as required by the situation. Tactical air reconnaissance elements under control of the force commander range the area out to several hundred kilometers ahead of the advance guard. Ground reconnaissance elements supplement air reconnaissance and operate at a distance of approximately 50 to 200 kilometers ahead of the forward elements of the advance guard. Similar reconnaissance activities are carried out on the flanks and rear of the main force as required. Reconnaissance elements report on the possible zones of movement and actual movements of hostile columns therein; dispositions on the hostile flanks; the strength, organization, and unit dispositions in each column; and the concentration and deployment areas of the hostile force.

b. The strength and the composition of a force's security organization vary according to the situation at the time of the march; that is, with terrain and the possibility of hostile contact. Establishment of direct security measures (par. 66) is always re-



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quired; these measures include the employment of the sentinels and scouts assigned individually by the commanders of separate columns and the security detachments that protect those columns. The force commander always establishes an advance guard and a rear guard. Flank guards (except direct security elements) are used only when there is a possibility of a threat to the flanks of the force. The missions of the combined security elements of the force are to—

- (1) Give early warning of the enemy's approach to the projected area of movement of the main force.
- (2) Prevent an enemy attack on friendly columns.
- (3) Deny the enemy the opportunity for effective observed fire on the friendly force.
- (4) Guarantee that column commanders have freedom of movement during the approach of a strong enemy force so that the columns may deploy for combat under the most favorable conditions.

c. During a forward move, the advance guard covers the front of the entire force. The strength and composition of the advance guard may include as much as one-third of the infantry component of the entire force; one-half of its artillery; plus the necessary armored, engineer, and chemical-warfare detachments. An advance guard of a major force is divided into the point, the advance party (which is one-third of the infantry component of the advance guard, reinforced), and the advance guard proper, whose reinforcements vary with the possibility of a conflict with the main body of the enemy (fig. 21). The advance guard proper dispatches the point (advance and flank points); the point, in turn, dispatches frontal and flank reconnaissance elements. This kind of formation, the Chinese believe, assures the combat independence of the advance guard. It not only secures the advance of the main force and assures the accomplishment of the scheme of maneuver, but makes it possible to deploy superior strength ahead of the enemy in a meeting engagement or in a chance encounter. A large, well-balanced advance guard facilitates seizing the initiative and creates favorable conditions for the main force of the column to deploy for combat. The Chinese, therefore, consider an advance guard not only a security element during the march, but also the first tactical echelon of the main force. Its operations have a significant effect upon the development of the following stages of combat.

d. The composition and the scheme of deployment of an advance guard assure that each component possesses the necessary mobility and mutual support capabilities during an engagement with the enemy. It also avoids piecemeal commitment of the units that follow and permits the main force to continue its march at normal speed. The distance between the various detachments of the advance guard, and that between the advance guard and the main force, depend upon the requirement for freedom of mobility and upon the possible requirement for direct fire support by the advance detachments of the columns that follow. During a withdrawal, the commander usually dispatches only a small, reinforced infantry element, divided into a point and a support, whose size varies with the size of the main force and the possible threat to the head of the column.

e. Security on the flanks is intended to prevent the ground reconnaissance elements of the enemy from infiltrating the spaces between the columns of the main force, or observing the marching column from the flanks. It should also prevent hostile units from carrying out surprise attacks on the marching force. During an attack by a strong enemy, the flank security elements destroy the enemy's attacking force by mobile combat or obstruct it temporarily until the main force has either passed through the danger area or has deployed to the flanks and is ready for combat. Flank guards are either mobile elements (when there are parallel advance roads, or the terrain permits movement) or fixed detachments. The latter are assigned to threatened areas at the beginning or during the course of a march. During a movement along the enemy's flank, or when under the threat of a powerful surprise attack from the flanks, the main force is secured by a strong flank guard. When possible, the flank guard moves along parallel routes at approximately 5 to 7 kilometers from the main body to prevent hostile observed flanking fire on the main force. Factors determining the composition of the flank guard and its tactical deployment are identical with those that determine that of an advance guard when a frontal encounter with the enemy is anticipated.

f. The rear guard during an advance move is responsible for preventing an attack on the rear of the force and for preservation of order in the

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rear. During the advance, the rear guard requires the least strength and normally consists of a small infantry element. During a withdrawal, the rear guard must assure disengagement of the main force from the enemy, and its subsequent orderly withdrawal. In this case, the rear guard approximates the strength and composition of an advance guard when movement is toward the enemy and contact is imminent. Under these conditions, the rear guard fights in complete independence of any support from the main force.

64. SECURITY AT A HALT

a. A Chinese Communist force at rest protects itself by disposing security detachments, consisting of portions of the command, about its perimeter (fig. 22). The greater proportion of the security force is deployed in the direction of the anticipated hostile threat. The mission of the security force is similar to that in United States Army doctrine; the force:

- (1) Insures the rest and security of the main body during a halt.
- (2) Delays an attacking enemy to gain time for the main force to deploy for combat.
- (3) Prevents hostile reconnaissance elements from approaching the main force.
- (4) Safeguards the main force by giving timely warning of the approach of hostile aircraft or armor, and warns of chemical attack.

b. The strength of the security force depends upon the possible enemy threat, the proximity of the resting force to the enemy, the size of the force being protected, the terrain, and the weather. Chinese Communist doctrine cautions against posting so large a force that rest will be impaired. The force posted must be mobile, and it must be adequately reinforced with artillery, armor, engineers, signal troops, and chemical warfare elements. As in Western practice, the several security detachments about the resting force are divided from front to rear into sentinels, outguards, supports, and reserves. The practice of establishing detached posts at critical points outside the limits of a security sector is also followed. Reconnaissance elements, under the control of the security force commander, range the area forward of the sentinel line. Units within the rest area dispatch other security detachments which

complete the perimeter security organization. When a halt is made during an advance, the security detachment established in the direction of the principal enemy threat usually is posted by the advance guard; after the advance is resumed, the detachment joins its parent unit when the new advance guard passes the detachment's defense area. During a retrograde movement, the security detachment posted in the direction of the enemy comprises the force's rear guard when movement is resumed.

c. The Chinese Communists establish a double security system within the bivouac area of the main force. Each unit commander is responsible for the security of his own unit, and he alerts a unit to support a guard detail, sentinels, and a security patrol, all of which are established within the main force commander's area of responsibility. In addition, units disposed about the perimeter of the bivouac area are assigned sectors of responsibility within which they are required to post direct security elements. These elements establish road blocks and outpost positions about the immediate bivouac area, and post antitank, chemical, and antiaircraft sentinels at appropriate locations. Patrols from these direct security elements cover both the gaps between direct security elements and the area between direct security elements and the supports of security detachments. Passive measures, such as dispersion, concealment and cover, and camouflage complement direct security measures within the bivouac area.

65. COMBAT SECURITY

Combat security measures are those taken by a command to protect itself during offensive or defensive operations. During the offensive, they ordinarily take the form of mobile security forces, supplemented by reconnaissance elements. In defensive situations, combat security measures are based on fixed security detachments.

a. *Offensive operations.* The Chinese Communists believe that aggressive employment of air and ground reconnaissance elements is the principal means of achieving security during offensive operations. Before the outset of an offensive, reconnaissance activities provide information of hostile movements and enemy defensive efforts and dispositions, defense equipment, and morale. By their actions, reconnaissance elements distract the enemy's atten-


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Figure 22. Security at a halt.

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tion and frequently can cause destruction of his security dispositions. As the offensive progresses, reconnaissance elements continue to press forward and seek out information on shifts of defensive forces, movement of reserve units, occupation of secondary defense positions, and similar items. Combat security detachments of balanced, mobile tank-infantry-artillery elements, utilizing reconnaissance information, protect the main body from surprise attack. During an approach march, these detachments cover avenues of approach from assembly areas to attack positions and protect the flanks of offensive formations. During the course of preparing for the attack, combat security detachments screen operations in attack positions and other forward assembly areas. During the attack, combat in the enemy's depth, and pursuit, combat security detachments protect the flanks of advancing forces. If, during the course of an offensive operation, it becomes necessary to assume the defensive, roving combat security detachments quickly establish fixed outpost positions in the direction of the enemy and protect forces establishing defensive positions.

b. Defensive operations. The security plan for a defensive operation (fig. 23) provides for the establishment of a general outpost by army group or army commanders, and for fixed security positions before the main battle position by divisions on line, in a manner similar to the combat outpost in United States Army doctrine. It also provides for establishment of flank combat security positions; warning systems to alert the command in the event of air, airborne, armor, or CBR attack; and criteria to be observed by subordinate commands in establishing direct security of their portions of the defense zone. The general outpost, when established, consists of balanced forces disposed some distance from the main force to protect that body from observation and surprise by the enemy, and to keep the enemy under observation. The general outpost is normally composed of elements of army group or army reserves. Fixed security positions before the battle positions are composed of tank-infantry-artillery elements of divisions on line, reinforced with signal, engineer, and chemical warfare elements as required. Division commanders employ reserves of subordinate commands to establish a minimum of three belts of security detachments before a defense zone. Division reconnaissance elements patrol between forward security positions and the general outpost force.

66. DIRECT SECURITY

Direct security measures are those taken by each unit to afford close-in and internal protection; they are applicable to any situation and supplement other measures taken when a command moves, rests, or engages in combat. Direct security measures consist of interior guard systems; detailed posts placed along critical roads; area patrols to guard against guerrilla activities; traffic control systems; straggler control systems; and close-in defense for march columns, command posts, supply installations, and communications facilities. They also include measures taken to safeguard classified information, such as control of classified documents, message-handling procedures, and standing operating procedures for radio stations.

67. SECURITY AGAINST ARMORED ATTACK

a. Since the beginning of the Korean operation, the subject of antitank defense has received a great deal of attention in Chinese Communist military writings. Doctrine emphasizes that a combination of active and passive antitank defensive measures should be employed. Maximum advantage is taken of natural and artificial obstacles by covering them with antitank and antipersonnel weapons to stop attacks by armored units or control their direction of movement.

b. Active defensive means include employment of all types of artillery, antitank mines and grenades, and special use of existing antipersonnel weapons in a coordinated defense. Besides, the Chinese use a wide variety of improvised demolition charges and incendiaries, which are employed by special antitank teams organized within each tactical unit. Chinese doctrine does not advocate the use of light or medium tanks as antitank weapons except as a last resort; it does consider heavy tanks capable of combating enemy tanks. In Korea, however, medium tanks were frequently employed in an antitank role in defensive situations.

c. In defense, antitank weapons are disposed in width and depth both within and forward of the battle position, usually in pairs, and their fires are coordinated with those of conventional artillery to insure coverage of obstacles, minefields, and likely routes of tank approach. Alternate positions are constructed for each antitank weapon employed in

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


Figure 23. Combat security in defense.

the defense, and weapons are shifted after each engagement to avoid detection. The commander retains centralized control of adequate reserve antitank weapons with which he may influence the conduct of the defense. Air reconnaissance elements provide early warning of the approach of hostile armor.

d. During offensive operations, most of a force's antitank units and weapons are deployed well forward with attacking echelons. The commander

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disposes other elements to protect his flanks, and maintains control of an antitank reserve. Air elements under control of the force commander are employed to seek out and destroy hostile armored formations or warn of their movements. Tactical commanders at all echelons are responsible for coordinating the antitank means at their disposal with the overall plan of the force commander.

e. While on the march, warning of impending armored attack is the responsibility of air and ground reconnaissance elements under the control of the force commander. The commander distributes a portion of his antitank weapons to ground reconnaissance elements, to his advance and flank guards, and to each column in the force. Each column commander organizes his own antitank defense in coordination with the force commander's plan. An antitank reserve advances just ahead of or with the main body of the force. If the situation dictates, engineers may be required to precede the main force and erect obstacles and lay minefields at critical points along the flanks of the zone of advance.

f. Passive antitank measures employed by the Communists consist of utilization of natural and artificial obstacles to impede, canalize, and disrupt the maneuver of opposing armor, thus reducing its battle efficiency and increasing its vulnerability to attack. Artificial antitank obstacles are constructed by altering natural configurations of the ground. These measures include increasing angles of slopes, widening existing ditches, and diverting streams to flood approach areas. In addition, extensive use is made of artificial tank traps constructed in many different shapes and obstacles built from trees, iron rails, and other stake-like objects. Minefields usually are employed in conjunction with all types of obstacles—areas through which tanks must pass, such as defiles, gorges, and narrow paths, are generally mined.

68. SECURITY AGAINST AIR ATTACK

At no time during the Korean operation did the Chinese Communists have air superiority. Their tactical units were under almost constant U. N. C. air attack. As a consequence, military doctrine includes specific active and passive procedures for defense against air attack. Every possible means is used, and detailed attention is given to air security in all combat orders, as well as during marches and bivouacs.

a. Active measures employed by tactical units in the field during offensive and defensive operations include organized antiaircraft fires by both organic antiaircraft units and conventional infantry weapons, supported by medium antiaircraft weapons and air elements under the force commander. Contending that coordinated fire against hostile aircraft is essential to deter low-level bombing and strafing attacks and to decrease bombing accuracy, the Chinese Communists construct gun positions and organize antiaircraft fire of all types under the direction of a single commander for air defense. Infantry troops are taught to conquer their fear of leaving shelters to fire at hostile aircraft. To lure enemy planes to the vicinity of an air-defense position, dummy targets are constructed and exposed. Antiaircraft firing positions are dispersed, well-covered, and concealed, and their lines of fire are adjusted to permit effective crossfire over dummy installations. Active measures carried out by ground elements are supplemented by Air Force air defense measures over the battlefield.

b. Security against air attack during movement is planned and organized to cover troops as they are assembling for the move, to deny the enemy freedom of reconnaissance and attack of moving columns, to cover major rest areas, and to insure freedom of action when a force deploys for combat. Ground air defense observers are posted throughout each column and with elements of advance, flank, and rear guards. Additional early warning is provided by other observers stationed with advance-ground reconnaissance elements and by air reconnaissance units. Organic antiaircraft machine-gun units are the bases of the internal defenses of each column. Units precede each column's advance in leapfrog fashion, occupying firing positions at critical points along the route of march. Light automatic weapons also precede the column and take up similar positions farther to the flanks of the route. Medium antiaircraft guns, under control of the force commander, take up positions at important defiles, bridges, and ferries well in advance of the main force, and remain in position, covering the move of several successive columns. Under critical conditions, air elements fly column-cover over the main force to assure its forward movement.

c. Passive air defense measures are adopted by troops not assigned antiaircraft missions during an attack. Personnel assigned to active air defense

measures also adopt passive measures when hostile aircraft are beyond the effective range of their weapons. Individual shelters are constructed whenever possible, and extensive camouflage of installations is carried out in accordance with the surrounding terrain. Air defense supervisory teams are organized throughout each tactical unit to enforce strict air-defense discipline. These teams insure observance of regulations dealing with control of fires and smoke, dispersion of troops, construction and use of shelters, camouflage discipline, blackout, and control of the civilian population. Air guard teams also are organized as sentinels to warn of approaching hostile aircraft. The warning system established by tactical units is supplemented by both electronic warning systems and ground controlled intercept installations in rear areas (par. 157).

69. SECURITY AGAINST AIRBORNE ATTACK

a. Subsequent to the initiation of airborne operations in Korea by the U. N. C. Forces in early 1951, the Chinese Communists promulgated many directives designed to afford guidance to tactical elements in defense against airborne attack. Doctrine evidenced by these directives is general in nature and includes instruction in both passive and active measures. Tactical elements are made responsible for their own security. In the combat zone, defense against airborne attack is a responsibility of the tactical commander. In rear administrative areas, it is the responsibility of the rear security or security element having area responsibility.

b. The Chinese Communists consider an effective warning system the primary passive measure in defense against an airborne attack. Supplementing this system, the Communists employ camouflage, dummy positions, dispersion of troops and installations, and concealment. Obstacles to deny landing zones to hostile forces are also constructed.

c. The Communists realize the demoralizing effect inherent in an attack by airborne forces, and stress prior planning, organization, and political indoctrination as essential to prevention of panic or confusion during defense against such an attack. Commanders are enjoined to plan a 3-phase active defense, each phase keyed to a phase of the airborne attack itself. The defense is conducted as follows:

- (1) As hostile troop-carrying aircraft appear over the defended area, all available anti-

aircraft artillery is brought to bear in an attempt to force the aircraft out of predetermined formations and prevent them from dropping concentrated groups of paratroops and equipment.

- (2) As enemy paratroops are drifting in mid-air, the defending forces concentrate anti-aircraft, heavy machine-gun, light machine-gun, and rifle fire in an effort to kill all or most of the paratroops before they reach the ground. The Communists reason that hostile close-support aircraft will not bomb or strafe drop zones during the attack; thus, this period affords the Chinese relative security and offers an excellent opportunity for defense. During this phase, every possible effort is made to capture or destroy rations and equipment dropped to support the attack. In the event personnel and equipment are dropped simultaneously, priority is given to destruction of hostile paratroops.
- (3) If hostile paratroops succeed in landing, the Chinese attempt to organize immediate assaults by defending elements. Employing hand grenades and bayonets, they strive to take advantage of the unprepared condition of the enemy immediately subsequent to the landing. Doctrine cautions that it is essential to destroy the enemy before he can regroup. During this period, all antiaircraft weapons engage hostile close-support aircraft and planes and men involved in the second paratroop assault wave.

If enemy aircraft succeed in landing to deliver troops during any phase of the attack, the defenders attempt to approach each aircraft from all sides, firing to block doorways and other means of egress and to damage the aircraft's engines. Attempts are made to immobilize the aircraft in the landing zone, thus creating an obstacle to subsequent landings.

70. SECURITY AGAINST CBR ATTACK

Protection against chemical attack and attack by mass destruction weapons is achieved primarily through specialized reconnaissance activities and passive measures designed to safeguard personnel, yet preserve freedom of action.

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


Figure 24. A Chinese training poster showing the effects of an atomic bomb.

a. Security against chemical attack is obtained by establishing a warning system, taking steps to prevent or minimize the effectiveness of a hostile chemical attack, providing timely protective measures for the troops, and prompt rehabilitation measures subsequent to a chemical attack.

(1) The Chinese Communists' warning system consists of a system of gas sentinels, supplemented by special chemical corps reconnaissance detachments. The chemical corps detachments conduct chemical reconnaissance activities to determine the types of weapons available to the enemy, and the effect of weather and terrain on both friendly and hostile chemical operations.

(2) Measures to prevent or minimize the effectiveness of hostile chemical attack include the employment of air forces and artillery to destroy enemy chemical warfare preparations and installations; decontamination of contaminated areas; withdrawal from nonessential contaminated areas; relief of troops in essential contaminated areas by fresh reserves; and measures to

insure accurate fire control when under hostile smoke attack.

(3) Protective measures for troops consist of individual protective equipment, and collective protective activities and installations. The latter measures include training in defense against chemical attack; gas proof shelters; and decontaminating units, equipment, and supplies.

(4) Rehabilitation measures are those carried out by the medical services and decontamination units. Gas casualties are accorded prompt, specialized medical treatment, and chemical warfare units help troop units decontaminate troops, individual and unit equipment, installations, food, and water.


b. Security measures against biological attack are carried out by specialized medical and veterinary reconnaissance detachments which strive to determine the extent of hostile employment of agents to contaminate water supplies, food stocks, grazing pastures, and the like. These reconnaissance activities are supplemented by preventive medicine activities and adherence to sanitation standards established and supervised by the medical service.

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① Soldiers don gas masks and raincoats to ride tanks through a contaminated area.



② Soldiers are taught to hide behind tanks or self-propelled guns to protect themselves.

Figure 25. Passive defense measures against the effects of atomic weapons.

The political staff departments at all levels of command conduct propaganda and education activities designed to acquaint the troops with measures to assist in protection against biological attack.

c. Security against hostile radiological warfare is achieved principally through passive measures in the field, such as dispersion of critical facilities and construction of troop shelters, supplemented by troop education in the heat, blast, and radiological effects of mass-destruction weapons. Protection against radiologically contaminated areas is provided by reconnaissance activities employing radiological survey instruments. Film badge devices are available to afford individual warning and protection

against overabsorption of radioactivity. In Chinese Communist units these protective measures are a function of chemical warfare personnel.

Literature available for troop training consists of translations of Soviet atomic warfare manuals and posters (fig. 24). In general, enlisted men and company-grade officers receive only sufficient information to permit them to take essential unit and individual protective measures, to carry out the directions of their immediate superiors, and to assist them in the conduct of offensive and defensive operations of their own units under the conditions of atomic warfare. Training material available to the troops is largely devoted to explaining atomic weapons

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ons and their main characteristics, and to principles of passive defense measures against the effects of atomic weapons (fig. 25). Senior commanders are

taught that in the event of hostile employment of nuclear weapons, the best course of action is to close rapidly on the enemy's positions.

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CHAPTER 7

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION

Section I. THE CONCENTRATION

71. GENERAL

a. Chinese Communist military texts place great stress on the principle of mass. The Communists' victory over the Chinese Nationalists was largely owing to the fact that they recognized this fundamental doctrine and applied it at times and places that were decisive. But never in their almost 20 years of continuous warfare did their adherence to the principle of reaching the battlefield first with an overwhelming force achieve such impact as when, on 3 November 1950, 180,000 of their elite troops hit advance U. N. C. elements south of the Yalu River in North Korea. This Chinese force—plus another 120,000 troops that reinforced it within a month—had been gathered from all over China in a strategic concentration on a scale never before executed by the Chinese Communist top command (fig. 26).

b. The strategic concentration permits the Chinese Communist commander to develop mass, or combat power, for employment in a main effort at the proper time and place for the accomplishment of a definite purpose. It is the first stage of an offensive or counteroffensive campaign, the preliminary to large-scale warfare in which the Chinese commander seeks to destroy the enemy's ability to continue to give battle. The plan of the concentration is most often based primarily on the commander's knowledge of the situation before contact between opposing main forces, and whenever possible should result in development of combat with superiority in numbers, weapons, tactical skill, fighting ability, discipline, morale, and leadership all favorable to the Chinese Communists and unfavorable to the enemy.

c. The planning of a campaign is based not only on the situation before active combat but also on the foresight and ability of the commander and his staff to predict developments that are likely to occur during the campaign's progress. Understanding and evaluating the mission, the objective, and the means available are as fundamental to Chinese

Communist commanders as it is to those in Western armies. After an analytical study of the situation, the commander selects final objectives for his forces, decides upon his attack maneuver, and then plans for a development of the enemy's forces that will favor employment of a predetermined formation upon contact. Emphasis is also placed on proper planning to insure the continuity of combat development. The basis for coordinated action once combat is developed must be determined well ahead of the advance from concentration.

72. DEFINITION AND CONCEPT

a. The stress placed on the ability to achieve mass through concentration is evidenced in MAO's military concepts. Although the concepts were written in 1936, the soundness of his concept of the requirement for concentration of force still prevails:

No matter how complicated, severe, and hard the circumstances may be, the military leader must have the ability, first and foremost, independently to constitute and use his forces. . . . Taking the initiative is not imaginary, but practical and material. It is of the greatest importance in this connection to . . . concentrate the largest and most powerful armies.

b. A strategic concentration is defined by the Chinese Communists as the movement and assembly of large forces and essential logistical support into one or more designated areas from which future operations will be carried out. This concept closely parallels that of United States doctrine. A degree of difference is found in the limited means available to the Chinese Communists with which to execute such concentrations; consequently, the Chinese Communists require a longer period to assemble forces. The purpose of strategic concentration is to permit the commander to assemble his forces before actual operations so that they will be in a favorable position to initiate a campaign. Doctrine emphasizes that the initiative can be seized and victory assured only through strategic concentration.

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


Figure 26. Concentration and advance to contact.

of forces at a decisive place and time, and through their employment in a decisive direction.

c. The Chinese Communists cite four occasions for directing a strategic concentration of force, each bearing directly on seizure or exchange of initiative on the battlefield:

- (1) To initiate an offensive war.
- (2) To end a strategic withdrawal and initiate strategic counteroffensive.
- (3) To change a period of strategic defense into one of strategic offense.
- (4) To alter operations from those on interior lines to those on exterior lines (pars 91 and 92).

d. Establishment of a sound logistical base in the concentration area figures prominently in the Chinese concept of strategic concentration. This logistical base is especially important to an armed force which still habitually relies on large masses of civil-

ian labor to supplement logistical support elements. Within China, such bases are largely in being, and are operated by the various military areas and districts into which the country has been divided. The Northeast Military Area, for example, served the Communists as the logistical base during the concentration for the Korean venture.

73. FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONCENTRATION

The location of concentration areas, and their position with respect to the enemy, are influenced by the—

- a. Expected employment of the force.
- b. Anticipated reaction of the populace, and its capability to contribute to the logistical support of the force through conscripted manpower.
- c. Security of the force with respect to interference with the concentration by hostile forces.

d. Terrain, with particular attention to defensibility, natural cover, concealment, and bivouac facilities.

e. Ability of the area and its inhabitants to contribute to the provisioning of the force.

f. Capacity of transportation systems—including road, rail, and water—to support the concentration of troops and materiel, and supply material for the establishment of the logistical base.

g. Time required to complete the concentration. Chinese Communist doctrine advocates a timely concentration, better initiated early than late, to find the force "leisurely awaiting" a tired, overextended, or overconfident enemy.

74. SECURITY

a. The early China Civil Wars taught the Communists little about the security measures required for successful concentration of major forces in modern war. Owing to the spaciousness of China, and their possession of greater mobility than the Nationalists, the Communists were able to break contact whenever they thought it necessary, then deliberately concentrate their forces at other locations which better suited their plans. Both the war against the Japanese and the Korean venture posed increasingly difficult problems of protection for strategic concentrations. Although the international border, the Yalu River, afforded the Communist forces a maximum degree of security in the concentration for their initial operation in Korea, the security of subsequent concentrations was jeopardized by their proximity to U. N. ground forces and the far-ranging U. N. aerial reconnaissance and air attack effort. After initial setbacks, the Chinese top command took positive steps to protect troop concentrations.

b. Chinese Communist plans for troop concentrations now provide for effective protection against observation and air, ground, or airborne attack. Protective measures in the past were largely limited to those that could be implemented by the Army; the present capabilities of the Chinese Air Force, however, now permit planners to include provisions for active air defense over large troop concentrations. Doctrine dealing with air-ground coordination indicates the Chinese Communists plan for aerial security of concentration areas to keep them free from hostile air attack and aerial reconnaissance. The importance of aerial protection for

vital lines of communications in rear areas is also recognized. Active ground measures for protection of the concentration against observation and attack by hostile ground and airborne forces during combat operations include:

- (1) Constant and intense reconnaissance into the expected areas of operations.
- (2) Establishment of an effective counter-reconnaissance screen about the concentration areas.
- (3) Employment of smoke to conceal activity in concentration areas during daylight.
- (4) Complete evacuation of civilians from within the concentration areas if the populace is hostile.
- (5) Establishment of perimeter defenses about the concentration areas. Such measures include means for defense against airborne attack and antitank and antichemical warfare defense.

c. Passive measures adopted to insure security of concentration areas include such items as:

- (1) Careful selection of areas to afford maximum natural protection against artillery and air attack. In Korea, the Chinese Communists habitually sought out narrow, deep defiles for troop concentration areas. Such areas were usually located close to lines of communications and were literally honeycombed with artificial shelters to supplement natural cover.
- (2) Camouflage of personnel, materiel, and installations in concentration areas. As the Korean War progressed, the Chinese Communists showed increasing ingenuity in the techniques of concealment and deception.
- (3) Widespread dispersal of units throughout concentration areas.
- (3) Strict adherence to movement by night of troops, materiel, and supplies.
- (5) Movement into the areas by infiltration.
- (6) Political indoctrination of the troops and civilian population to insure secrecy and cooperation.

d. Defense against air attack has assumed major significance in Communist Chinese doctrine for protection of major concentrations. Their early Korean experiences demonstrated to them the highly disruptive effects of strong air attacks on

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efforts to concentrate troops, materiel, and supplies. Lacking air superiority and an effective, modern, air-ground defense system, the Chinese employ anti-aircraft artillery lavishly—by their standards—to protect concentration areas. Passive measures, such as air-defense sentries, shelters for personnel and equipment, camouflage, control of smoke and fires, and blackout precautions are utilized, and passive defense regulations are rigidly enforced. The civilian population, if any remains in the area, is kept under strict control. The growth of the Chinese Communist Air Force under Soviet sponsorship, coupled with the partial development of a seemingly modern air-ground defense warning net in the closing days of the Korean War, indicates that future plans for concentrations may be expected to include integrated air and ground defense systems for the protection of vital areas.

e. Little is known about Chinese Communist training and doctrine dealing with protection against mass destruction weapons employed in radiological, biological, or chemical warfare (par. 70). The Armed Forces do operate a chemical warfare school. In Korea they issued crude Chinese gas masks consisting of cloth sacks containing charcoal, as well as Soviet, Japanese, and United States masks. Units conducted some training in defense against chemical and biological agents and radiological weapons, but this training was crude in the extreme and it was designed largely to improve morale of the troops and foster hate for the enemy. The Communists' natural tendency toward dispersion of troop units in concentration areas affords—intentionally or not—a measure of protection against mass destruction weapons.

f. All of the foregoing security measures were practiced by the Chinese Communists in Korea. As the period of defense in one position lengthened, the Communists' security measures became progressively tighter. Large-scale troop movements both into and within Korea, in connection with concentrations, were repeatedly accomplished without compromise. As Chinese counterreconnaissance activities became more efficient, concentration areas were effectively closed, before offensive operations, to both civilians and to enemy patrols seeking to penetrate. Close civilian controls were established and smoke screens were used whenever possible. Closely supervised restrictions on daylight movement of personnel and vehicles, in conjunction with

maximum use of natural materials for camouflage, and utilization of natural and artificial cover, served to reduce considerably the effectiveness of the U. N. C. air and artillery effort.

75. CONTROL OF THE CONCENTRATION

Control of the concentration is provided by:

- Advance establishment of the operations groups of major headquarters. Communist doctrine stresses establishment of these groups convenient to existing means and lines of communications.
- Early organization of effective traffic control organizations for road and rail movement, all subordinate to the commander of the major force involved.
- Preparation and dissemination of coordinated movement plans for troops, materiel, and supplies.
- Preparation and dissemination of plans governing the activities and movement of reconnaissance and security elements.
- Establishment of an adequate communications net to insure that demands for swift liaison will be met.
- Use of liaison teams composed of members of the operations staff section to insure that the execution of the concentration reflects the commander's decision. These teams also establish liaison with agencies outside the command that may be involved in furthering the success of the concentration.

76. MOVEMENT TO THE CONCENTRATION AREA

a. Methods employed to move troops into concentration areas will vary with each situation depending upon the—

- Capacity of existing transportation systems.
- Location of the troops to be concentrated.
- Time by which the concentration must be completed.
- Ability of the enemy to interfere with the operation.

b. Within China, the Communists depend heavily on their limited rail network for the movement of troops, materiel, and supplies to concentration areas (sec. I, ch. 10). The vastness of the country and—by Western standards—the still limited motor transportation organic to the Armed Forces make this dependence mandatory if tedious foot marches are

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Figure 27. Mixed motor and foot march.

to be avoided and a semblance of speed in concentration achieved. In Korea, the rail network was centrally controlled by the Chinese and North Korean allies; it was utilized primarily for movement of troops, materiel, and supplies and supplemented by motor, horse cart, and foot movements. This fact does not mean, however, that the Chinese Communists underestimate the importance of motor movement. As more and more vehicles are made available, their employment will become a significant complement to the Communists' ability to mass forces strategically (par. 126).

c. Today, however, in tactical situations the great prime movers of the Chinese Communist infantryman are his two feet. Mobility is still measured by foot miles and not by truck or rail miles; for while the Army uses trucks and rail to move supplies and, on occasion, troop units, its infantry divisions are not fully motorized. Chapter 10 discusses troop movement capabilities and limitations as they affect movement or reinforcements and reserves. The same factors apply to moves to concentration areas.

77. ARRIVAL IN THE CONCENTRATION AREA

a. Concentration of troops within China poses fewer problems to the military commander than would a similar operation outside of China's borders. The military installations and communications already maintained on an area basis within China obviate the need for detailed planning to afford adequate facilities of this nature. The Communists show a keen appreciation, however, in areas outside of China of the necessity for correct phasing of security, command, communications, and logistical elements into a major troop concentration area.

b. Chinese Communist doctrine stresses the following considerations in determining the sequence in which elements should arrive in a concentration area; the weight given each element is dependent upon the conditions existing in each specific operation:

- (1) *Unity of Command and Control.* Early arrival of command and control echelons is essential in all cases.

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- (2) *Security.* Adequate security of the area is fundamental. Reconnaissance, counterintelligence, and other security elements must be among the first units to arrive in the area if adequate security is not assured by an existing military organization and a friendly populace.
 - (3) *Establishment of a Supply Base.* Support of the force to be concentrated is established in adequate time for all service elements to administer to the combat echelons in an effective manner.
 - (4) *Coordination of Combat Arms.* The Chinese Communists have become increasingly aware of the need for proper planning in joint operations. Combat units and combat support units are phased into the area in accordance with the probable scheme of commitment in the initial engagement.
- c.* An important presage of a concentration of force within supporting distance of Chinese front lines is furnished by intense activity in rear areas incident to the establishment of a logistical base. Because of limited transportation and communications facilities, the Chinese Communists make every effort to stockpile supplies in forward areas. Such stockpiles not only support forces in concentration areas, but are intended for the continued support of the forces during the impending offensive operation. In most cases supplies are brought to rear area supply points by rail. From there they are transported to forward supply dumps by truck and horse cart. These forward supply dumps are from 8 to 40 kilometers behind Chinese lines. Under these circumstances, the use of vehicles of all types increases sharply in rear areas, indicating concentrated efforts by the Communists to build stocks of material and supplies in support of a major concentration of force.

Section II. ADVANCE FROM CONCENTRATION**78. GENERAL**

a. The purpose of the advance from concentration is to achieve contact with the enemy and then destroy him. In Chinese Communist military doctrine, the advance from concentration is the foundation of future combat movements; consequently, it must fulfill certain requirements. These requirements—concealment and speed in execution, proper organization of the force for combat, and surprise—are the most important guarantees for military victory.

b. In organizing his forces for the development of combat, the Chinese commander considers the following factors which influence his ultimate decision:

- (1) Combat mission.
- (2) Enemy situation, including disposition, strength, composition, and location of reinforcements, as well as where and how contact may be expected.
- (3) Terrain, to include geographic and topographic peculiarities that might be of benefit to the advancing forces or the enemy.
- (4) Extent and location of lines of communications and important communications

centers, including the condition of roads, and the possibility of cross-country movement in the area of the advance.

- (5) Extent of man-made fortifications in the area of the advance.
- (6) Weather, including atmospheric conditions, and its possible effects on movement of personnel and vehicles.
- (7) Attitude of the inhabitants of the area through which the advance will be conducted.
- (8) Efficiency of the commander's troops, their combat capability, and morale.
- (9) Time and space.
- (10) Logistical means available to support the force.
- (11) Requirements for security of the force during the advance.

c. As distances increase and the possibility of enemy contact becomes remote, time and space factors, logistical factors, and lines of communications assume greater importance in an advance of a large force from concentration.

79. THE ENEMY SITUATION

Basically, the Chinese Communist commander, when analyzing a given enemy situation to deter-

mine the combat organization for the advance, considers the distance to the enemy, the composition of the enemy forces, the enemy's dispositions, his fighting potential, the location of possible reinforcements, his past activities, and probable future activities. He determines the probable time of a clash with the opposing force; the nature of such a clash; and the possibility of enemy air, airborne, or armored attack, as well as methods of repulsing such attacks. He organizes reconnaissance, both ground and air, so that the latest data on the enemy and terrain may be available. During this reconnaissance, detailed attention is given to the condition of roads and the extent of the enemy's attempts to impede the advance by the creation of obstacles through demolitions, control of the civilian population, and acts of sabotage.

80. TERRAIN

a. The terrain of China has long influenced the thinking of the Chinese Communist military. They are well aware of the retarding or canalizing effect on ground movements of mountain, desert, jungle, arctic, and subarctic areas, as well as that of large rivers, marshes, lakes, and forests. Planning doctrine dictates that these factors must be considered in the initial arrangement of large forces in an advance from concentration. In his study of the terrain, the commander also seeks topographic features which may be of benefit to his forces. Terrain study in the Chinese Communist Army is conducted through the use of maps and special topographic reconnaissance. In his study of the terrain the commander:

- (1) Makes a preliminary survey of the roads in the zone through which the march is to take place, and selects the route of advance.
- (2) Determines concealment possibilities afforded by the terrain, and ascertains all spots where movement may be difficult.
- (3) Attempts to select specific points that, because of their location, can guarantee the safety of the marching force as it passes them.
- (4) Selects alternate routes which units may be required to use if a change in disposition takes place during the march.
- (5) Conducts terrain reconnaissance to determine the extent to which roads are sub-

ject to air and surface threats and how these threats can be circumvented. In the area of contemplated deployment, areas of tactical significance and roads parallel to the expected battle line are studied carefully to prepare for any change in disposition that may be necessitated during development of combat.

b. The commander considers the effect of the terrain on flank security during the advance from concentration. He selects locations for flank security forces that will permit effective blocking of arteries over which large hostile forces may move to assault the flanks, and forms and dispatches suitable task forces to effect the blocking mission. Locations are chosen with a view toward maximum use of natural and man-made obstacles, and a resulting economy in security forces. Favored locations for security forces are at bridges across major rivers paralleling the route of advance, in defiles along highways that intercept the route of advance, and about major communications centers situated on the flanks of the advancing force.

c. Operations in mountains, inhabited areas, extreme cold zones, deserts, and forested areas, as well as those over large bodies of water, all affect the commander's initial plans from a training, organization for combat, and equipment standpoint. Doctrine governing these special operations is discussed in Part Four of this Handbook. In general, any of these operations tends to prolong the period of the concentration to permit assembly of the special equipment required, and to permit training to acquaint troops with the special equipment and the natural hazards imposed by the nature of the area. As to organization for combat, in areas offering close terrain the commander plans for the aggressive, coordinated employment of small units, heavily supported by artillery and engineers, and backed by powerful reserves; air support is of secondary importance, and provisions are made for mobility to overcome the terrain. When terrain in the area of operations is open and permits maneuver of large forces, the commander plans for a powerful, mobile striking force, supported by sufficient tactical air to gain and maintain air superiority in the area of operations. Amphibious operations require lengthy planning and intense training of the joint force, which may be composed of conventional field forces; marine elements; and naval landing, combat, and

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transport craft. The commander also plans for strong tactical air support, and may supplement his amphibious task force with airborne operations to disrupt hostile defenses in the vicinity of a proposed beachhead.

81. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

a. The plan of advance of large forces is influenced by lines of communications in the area under consideration. As the Chinese have progressed in development of their army toward modern standards, they have added heavy weapons, material, and supplies which now make their forces relatively road-bound and deny them the freedom of movement they possessed in the early days of the Korean War. The growth and modernization of the Chinese Communist Army has thus made its commanders conscious of the significance and importance of rail and highway networks, once disdained by Chinese guerrilla leaders as not worth the trouble to hold or control.

b. The foot march is still considered the most reliable method for tactical troop movements by the Chinese, who cite the following advantages of this means of organizing the advance:

- (1) Simplicity and speed of organization.
- (2) Exertion of very little influence on the advance by road, weather, and seasonal conditions.
- (3) Speed of deployment upon contact.
- (4) Increased security from air attack—concealment is simplified.
- (5) Simplified command problem.

While pointing out these advantages, doctrine also recognizes that the foot march has two significant shortcomings: (1) Progress is slow; and (2) the troops tire easily, thus reducing their effectiveness in combat once contact is made.

c. For distances in excess of 100 kilometers, rail is the standard means by which large troop movements are conducted whenever conditions permit. The recent addition of truck units to the Army has given the Chinese Communists a new appreciation of the speed with which infantry troops can be moved. They acknowledge, however, the necessity for good roads, favorable weather, and the ability to utilize daylight hours to realize the optimum advantage of truck transport. Water transportation is considered in planning for the advance from concentration, particularly with respect to movement

of supplies and material. Chinese shipping is crude and limited, however, and this method does not offer a significant means of furthering the success of the advance. Military air transport capabilities of the Air Force are extremely limited, being barely adequate to support the normal requirements of the Air Force alone if it were committed to combat in China proper.

d. In the opening stages of the campaign in Korea, Chinese Communist operations reflected recognition of the influence that lines of communication play upon the successful advance from concentration (fig. 26). While movement was made by foot, the Communists moved main forces along the main axes of communication in North Korea as they advanced to contact with U. N. C. forces. Throughout the Korean conflict, despite continued aerial bombardment by the U. N. C. forces, the Chinese Communists and North Koreans were indefatigable in their maintenance efforts, and lines of communication were kept open. During the latter stages of the conflict, both rail and highway systems were improved significantly through such efforts. The Communist military system of transportation in Korea, although far from comparing with the integrated system employed by the U. S. Army (railroad, pipeline, water, and air), was studied and evaluated in terms of the requirements to be met. Priorities for movements were established at the highest level; a joint Chinese Communist-North Korean control board controlled all rail movements.

82. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE PLAN OF ADVANCE

a. *Time and Space.* Time and space play an important part in planning the advance from concentration. The shorter the distance to the enemy, the greater the possibility of a clash; therefore more thorough combat preparations must be made, and security intensified, before initiating the march. Doctrine dictates that the length of the marching column should gradually decrease as the distance from the enemy lessens; to accomplish this, the Chinese increase the number of roads used by marching units, and move on both sides of the roads. During the march, the disposition of each marching column is corrected in accordance with current intelligence in order that units may assume combat dispositions rapidly when a clash with the enemy occurs. The

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Figure 28. Aerial resupply operations.

Chinese Communists realize fully that the speed of movement, the number of columns, and makeup of each column are frequently determined by topographical peculiarities.

b. *Weather.* Weather affects the speed of advance from concentration. Fogs, heavy rains, blizzards, or darkness can hinder the movement of troops and slow down the rate of progress. On the other hand, the Chinese believe that such conditions afford excellent concealment from enemy reconnaissance, particularly aerial reconnaissance, and are guarantees that there will be no enemy air or armored attacks.

c. *Fortified Areas.* The commander, in determining his direction of advance, gives detailed attention to the location and extent of hostile fortified areas and their possible effect upon the success of his advance from concentration. He may consider it to his advantage to contain certain fortified areas with minor forces and continue the advance with most of his force. The Chinese Communists sel-

dom contemplate siege warfare for the sake of simply seizing an isolated fortified area. Containment and harassment are more often employed to wear down an entrenched enemy. Commanders are cautioned that diversion of force to reduce fortified areas not directly pertaining to the accomplishment of their mission is foolhardy; texts point out that such a practice results in:

- (1) Loss of the initiative.
- (2) A change in time and space factors.
- (3) Loss of freedom of movement.

The Communists resort to deliberate reduction of an area only if the fortified area is a key communications center or exceptionally critical terrain, failure to capture which will affect the entire advance. Continuous bands of fortifications with flanks anchored on geographic barriers had rarely been encountered by the Chinese Communist Army before the Korean venture. Their experiences in attacks against the U. N. C. line permitted them to refine their tactics for assault of fortified positions

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to a point where they are exceptionally effective. Doctrine now teaches the commander to employ basic assault group tactics to breach a continuous barrier, then follow up with a powerful mobile striking force to drive through the breach and divide and destroy the enemy in zone. Assaults of fortified areas require powerful tactical air support for both the assault and the exploitation forces. Airborne forces are also considered effective when employed to disrupt conditions in the hostile rear in coordination with a frontal assault on a fortified area.

d. *Deception.* The use of deception to force the enemy to commit his forces incorrectly is an integral part of the planning for an advance from concentration. The Chinese hope to deceive enemy commanders into making mistaken decisions and miscalculating time and space factors. Methods of deception include spreading rumors, deliberate planting of false information, feints, and demonstrations.

83. DISPOSITION OF FORCES

a. Both direction of movement and disposition of forces in the advance to contact are determined by the mission and situation. The disposition of forces is of prime importance. Doctrine warns that faulty disposition in the advance will inevitably result in loss of initiative upon development of combat, permit an alert enemy to make effective use of reserves, and possibly result in defeat in detail of the main force.

b. The number of columns in the advance is largely determined by the number of usable roads in the prescribed sector and the possibility of cross-country movement. The commander considers the deployment of infantry in the columns, then allocates supporting reconnaissance, artillery, armor, chemical, and engineer elements to each column. Adequate reserves are also retained under the commander's control.

c. To confuse the enemy and deceive him as to the commander's intentions, some or all of the main force may initially be disposed in a false direction; then, at a suitable moment, it may take on a new disposition in the actual direction of advance.

d. The location of armor in the advance is determined by its contemplated use. If pursuit of a retreating enemy is expected, armor is located in the force's van. If a meeting engagement is expected,

it is distributed on the flanks to preserve freedom of movement. Approaching a fixed defense, armor is usually disposed in the rear.

84. RECONNAISSANCE

a. During the concentration and the advance, the commander employs all possible means to augment existing information of the enemy and the terrain. Ground, air, and naval reconnaissance elements operate aggressively in the direction of the enemy under the control of the commander's intelligence staff. Their activities are supplemented by close-distance reconnaissance performed by subordinate commanders as the advance progresses. The commander frequently requires his intelligence and operations staffs to form an advance command post to direct reconnaissance activities; the post moves with the leading elements of the main force. From this point of vantage the commander can speedily assess the situation and refine his scheme for development of combat.

b. The commander employs mechanized, cavalry, and armored forces for battle area reconnaissance activities deep in hostile territory, where they seek out fresh information of the enemy and supplement or confirm information reported by air units. The commander maintains control of his reconnaissance effort by prescribing missions, assigning reconnaissance zones to subordinate commanders, and designating the time and method of reporting information. He retains a reconnaissance reserve to deal with unexpected situations or reinforce activities in critical areas. Should reconnaissance in force become necessary to develop the hostile situation, the commander forms and dispatches a balanced armored-infantry-artillery force of appropriate size; the force is supported by tactical air. To avoid disclosing the commander's basic scheme of maneuver, deception in execution of reconnaissance in force is essential. The commander frequently directs feints in less critical areas in coordination with the attack of the unit executing the reconnaissance in force.

85. AIR FORCES

a. Doctrine advocates aggressive employment of air forces during the concentration and advance, and assigns general missions to the Air Force that are related to the Chinese Communist levels of military planning (par. 35).

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- (1) *The strategic mission* includes gaining and maintaining air superiority by attacking hostile aircraft and installations essential to their operation; reconnaissance of the hostile rear; and attack of hostile reinforcements, supply concentrations, manufacturing complexes, and communications centers.
- (2) *The campaign mission* includes isolation of the battlefield by attack on the enemy's supply lines, depots, and transportation facilities; attack on the enemy's main body to hinder his deployment for combat; and reconnaissance over the anticipated area of deployment of friendly ground forces.
- (3) *The tactical mission* includes battleground reconnaissance; movement of air-transported troops and supplies, as well as airborne troops; liaison missions between ground reconnaissance units and the main force; and close support of ground reconnaissance units and the main force as it deploys for combat.

b. Air reconnaissance missions are controlled by the intelligence staff section of the force commander which designates primary and secondary targets, debriefs returning pilots, and processes air reconnaissance information. Through air reconnaissance the commander seeks to determine enemy dispositions,

movements, strengths, and installations. He also gains valuable information of the terrain in the expected area of deployment by means of aerial photography.

86. MOBILE FORCES

While the Korean conflict offered little in the way of examples of employment of Chinese Communist mobile and armored forces, training texts afforded an insight into doctrine governing the roles of such forces in the Chinese Communist Army. Mobile forces, especially armored forces, may be employed to further the advance from concentration either on the flanks as security elements, in advance of the main force to insure seizure of key objectives, or on special missions. The Chinese teach that armor is the weapon of quick decision on the battlefield, and advocate its use in the advance from concentration to seize the initiative. The employment of airborne troops to seize important objectives in front of advancing surface elements is also a part of this doctrine. The Chinese Communists have an airborne force of limited capability in being and are continuing to expand it. Although the present military air transport capability is small, the probability that it will be expanded to accomplish small-scale airborne operations in conjunction with ground force offensives must not be overlooked.

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CHAPTER 8

OFFENSIVE MANEUVER

Section I. THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

87. GENERAL

a. Aside from the conventional political objectives of a war, the Chinese Communists teach that a war involves the politics of human blood. Their military leaders warn against a war of attrition in which there occurs prolonged mutual killing by both forces. Instead, the Chinese Communists believe the military objective of a war to be "the preservation of our own forces and the extermination of the enemy." The strategic offensive is considered the principal means of exterminating the enemy. Doctrine defines the strategic offensive as a massive operation designed to achieve the neutralization or destruction of the power of the opposing military forces to give battle. This concept usually implies the defeat of the enemy's main forces as decisively as the available means will permit. The possession of localities which will achieve the national objective, or contribute thereto, is a corollary to the decisive defeat of the enemy's forces through the strategic offensive.

b. Chinese doctrine teaches that the strategic offensive is the only means by which a decision is gained. The offensive increases the effectiveness of a force since it raises morale, allows application of mass, and gains freedom of action. All efforts of the offensive must be integrated toward a common strategic objective. There must be no division of effort, either as to time or place. MAO urges his commanders to apply three fundamental rules to the execution of the offensive: Move rapidly, mass forces, and strike immediately. On the other hand, should the enemy fail to observe these rules, Chinese commanders are quick to take advantage of his error to defeat separate portions of his main force in detail. The War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression (1937-1945) and the Third Revolutionary Civil War (1946-1950) abound in examples of this technique. In every case the Chinese Communists maneuvered with a view to inducing the enemy to divide, so that they could destroy his separate columns and further the Communists' chances for victory. This technique is simply an application of

MAO's principle of concentration of forces in the face of a superior enemy, which the Communists commonly refer to as maneuvering on *interior lines* (par. 91).

88. PURPOSE

a. The Chinese Communists employ the strategic offensive either to initiate a war against an inferior enemy or to terminate a prolonged war in which the balance of power has shifted in their favor and the enemy has been placed on the defensive. The offensive serves to gain and maintain the initiative in war. This concept does not differ from that held by Western military doctrine. In an offensive campaign, the Chinese commander directs the movement and employment of his forces in a decisive effort against the principal objective—invariably the enemy's main force—in consonance with the national war plan. Following destruction of the enemy's main force, secondary objectives are dealt with as required. The Chinese Communists recognize the psychological and propaganda advantages inherent in a strategic offensive and their influence on the successful mobilization of civilian and military war efforts throughout the nation. Its propaganda value is of prime importance in mobilizing and organizing the Chinese people in support of the regime's strategic goals.

b. The strategic principles developed by MAO point out that offensive warfare does not preclude defense. In his writings, the concept of the strategic offensive is often linked with one or both of the two tactical concepts: The tactical offensive and the tactical defensive. Subsequent to the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the Communists entered into a strategic offensive to control North China and Manchuria. From that time until the summer of 1947, the Communists' strategic offensive was a combination of tactical defensive and tactical offensive operations on interior lines which subjected the Nationalist forces to severe attrition. During the summer of 1947, the Communists seized the strategic initiative, an advantage they never again lost.

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In September 1948, MAO began an all-out offensive with the aim of complete destruction of the Nationalist forces, attacking them wherever they were found (fig. 67). This action was the decisive offensive operation in the Communists' long struggle for control of China.

c. Chinese doctrine holds that strategic initiative can be taken and held only through offensive action. If the initiative cannot be maintained, a war will, at best, reach its final stage with neither contestant able to achieve a decisive victory. In such a case compromise and continued antagonism will exist, and no clear decision will be gained. It is essential that the strategic initiative be maintained into a war's final stage if the national objectives are to be achieved. MAO holds that deception and surprise are essential to seizure of the strategic initiative at the outset of an offensive campaign. Deception and surprise may take the form of direction, time, place, tactics, or force; main factors are secrecy, rapidity of movement, and thorough preparation. The strategic initiative is maintained throughout an offensive campaign by the application of the principles of surprise, mobility, flexibility, and economy of force, as well as bold, aggressive employment of superior forces and means; determined leadership; and strict ideological indoctrination of Chinese forces.

89. REQUIREMENTS

Chinese Communist doctrine teaches that the strategic offensive should be initiated suddenly and with great violence. Superiority in manpower and materiel, and retention of the tactical initiative are essential if the offensive's momentum is to be maintained. The Communists are well aware of the importance of gaining air superiority and of achieving isolation of the battlefield in critical areas of operations. General Staff directives have assigned these tasks to the Chinese Communist Air Force as strategic and campaign missions, respectively. Other military writings emphasize:

a. *Impetus*. The Chinese state that rapid forward motion conjoined with great force characterizes a successful strategic offensive. Initial impetus, when correlated with deception and surprise, insures seizure of the initiative and promotes decisive results. Maintenance of momentum throughout the strategic offensive is attained by the provision of adequate reserves, retention of freedom of maneu-

ver, and appropriate, flexible disposition of troop units. In practice, the Communist commanders have been unable to maintain prolonged offensives because of inadequate transportation and communication facilities, and failure to control the air over the battlefield. Their inability to meet the supply requirements of a major offensive as a sustained operation has caused such operations to be planned as a series of impulses, each followed by a period of resupply and reorganization. These impulses may be 10 days or less in duration.

b. *Retention of the Initiative*. Every effort is made to retain the initiative once the offensive is launched. Although Chinese strategic war plans and campaign plans remain relatively fixed during a specific stage of a war, tactical commanders of Chinese Communist units are taught to demonstrate speed and flexibility in weighing the factors of time, space, and opposing forces, and to revise tactical and even campaign plans when necessary to take advantage of a hostile weakness or exploit success. Through agile shifts of tactical plans and freedom of maneuver, the Chinese strive to maintain a war of movement, force the enemy to divide his forces and defend himself against any one of many threats, thus weakening hostile defensive forces in areas of critical strategic value.

c. *Reserves*. Superior manpower and materiel must be concentrated in a single direction to guarantee the success of a strategic offensive. General reserves of all types must be sufficient to sustain the initial impetus of the offensive. Throughout the Korean War major offensives launched by the Chinese were characterized by obvious preattack periods during which supplies were stockpiled to support the offensive. Rarely did the Communists commit over half of their available forces in the initial stages of any major offensive. Substantial reserves were retained at both army group and theater levels to insure the continuation of the offensive and otherwise afford the commander a powerful means of influencing future operations. In Korea, however, the Communists' inadequate transportation and communications facilities limited the effective employment of reserves.

90. FACTORS AFFECTING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

a. *Security*. Security of rear areas, and the lines of communications therein, are of vital concern to

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the Chinese commander in an offensive launched into hostile territory. It is essential that the vast amounts of munitions, equipment, and other supplies be kept moving forward if the initial impetus of the offensive is to be maintained. The forward flow of personnel replacements is also a critical problem. The troops required to insure security of lines of communications must be kept to a minimum in order not to diminish the offensive power of the commander's force. The commander establishes a widespread air warning system. He also designates air defense areas at critical points along lines of communications and about supply concentrations; these are heavily defended by antiaircraft artillery units. A portion of the air force under his control is assigned the mission of air defense of rear areas to supplement ground antiaircraft defenses. The mission of protecting lines of communications and other rear area installations from ground or airborne attack, sabotage, or guerrilla activities is usually assigned to rear service units, which operate on an area responsibility basis. Service units are augmented by combat elements from theater reserves as required. In addition, to insure the security of rear areas with a minimum of his combat force, the commander:

- (1) Effects strict control of the hostile population through military control of local government.
- (2) Recruits politically sympathetic members of the enemy's population to assist in government and help minimize the effects of sabotage, guerrilla operations, and espionage.
- (3) Assigns the minimum essential security force to supplement civilian control measures and maintain integrity of the supporting lines of communications.

b. Reinforcements. Reinforcements for theater forces, as differentiated from theater reserves, are an important factor in considering the initiation of a strategic offensive. Doctrine dictates consideration of a single strategic offensive at any given time, conducted in a decisive direction. Secondary theaters are relegated to a defensive role which concedes temporary and local loss of ground. This tenet—assumption of the tactical defensive in secondary theaters—is held to force the enemy to divide his forces, thus increasing the possibility that the offensive in the main area of operations may result in

overwhelming success in all areas. MAO enjoins strategic planners to link economy of force in secondary areas with a strategic offensive in a single decisive direction to assure availability of adequate reinforcements for the main force.

91. OPERATIONS ON INTERIOR LINES

a. Experiences in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and the Third Revolutionary Civil War gave Chinese Communist military leaders a keen appreciation of the advantages that can accrue to an inferior force from offensive operations conducted on interior lines. Strategically encircled by Japanese or Nationalist forces, they became adept at weighing the critical factors of time and space. After a series of deceptive maneuvers, they would concentrate sufficient strength, then strike advancing enemy columns swiftly, defeating them in detail in coordination with guerrilla forces operating on exterior lines. Through a series of such offensive operations, the enemy's strategic encirclement was broken and the Chinese Communists seized the strategic initiative.

b. The Communists realize that the advantages of operations on interior lines increase in direct proportion to the distances separating opposing forces. Thus, they make a practice of employing relatively small forces to ambush and delay converging larger hostile forces. The time gained is utilized to concentrate superior strength for a decisive stroke against the weakest of the enemy's forces.

c. MAO's teachings, however, warn against interior line operations as a war policy. He points out that a war plan devised entirely about an "inner line protracted war" would neither take advantage of China's strength nor achieve her strategic objectives, but lead to inevitable destruction. Offensive operations on interior lines are held to be of temporary usefulness—a means by which counterencirclement may be established and the way opened to decisive offensive warfare on exterior lines.

92. FORMS OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER; OPERATIONS ON INTERIOR LINES

Maneuvers employed by the Chinese Communists in the conduct of the strategic offensive consist of envelopments and penetrations. Favoring a war of movement, Chinese Communist doctrine emphasizes the importance of the envelopment to the success of a campaign. The envelopment permits the com-

mander to place large, decisive forces deep in the enemy's rear; effectively seal off a major portion of his main force; and hasten the ultimate destruction of his ability to continue resistance. In keeping with their dictum of striking the enemy while he is on the move, the Chinese believe that the envelopment is the most effective means of forcing disorganized movement upon an opposing commander. When forced into a war of position, the Communists

employ the penetration to divide and destroy enemy defensive zones, thereby disrupting the organized nature of his defense. More often than not the strategic penetration takes the form of multiple thrusts into the enemy's positions. As the penetration progresses, successful thrusts are developed into envelopments and encirclements which assure isolation of groups of the enemy and lead to their subsequent destruction.

Section II. THE ENVELOPMENT

93. DEFINITION

Chinese Communist manuals define the *envelopment* as a maneuver employed by large units executing simultaneous attacks against the front and flanks or rear of the principal body of the enemy. The objective of the envelopment is the isolation and destruction of the enemy's forces. It is employed whenever exposed enemy flanks are discovered or created. The Chinese recognize three types of enveloping maneuver, each somewhat similar to those common to United States doctrine—single and double envelopments, and the turning movement. In all types of envelopment, the Communists emphasize the requirement for superior strength in the forces executing the flanking maneuver.

a. Single and double envelopments are coordinated actions which direct the main effort at one or both of the enemy's flanks, employing *flank attack forces* which maintain fire coordination with the *frontal attack force*. The various forces maneuver within supporting distance of one another. If local superiority in the area of operations is overwhelmingly in favor of the Chinese Communists, the double envelopment is extended to effect complete encirclement of the hostile main body.

b. The turning movement is a form of envelopment executed by proceeding around the enemy's flanks to a point deep in hostile territory, without directly attacking the principal enemy forces, then attacking the rear of his main force in coordination with other forces executing a frontal attack. The turning force and the frontal attack force usually do not operate within supporting distance of each other. Coordination is limited to the timing of the two attacks. Small-scale holding attacks along the enemy's front, employing an appropriate force, are often initiated first to fix the enemy's attention and

gain freedom of maneuver and surprise for the turning force. A powerful frontal attack is usually initiated in coordination with the attack of the turning force.

94. ISOLATION FORCES

a. In conjunction with enveloping forces, the Chinese Communists habitually employ units assigned the specific mission of blocking reinforcements for, and preventing the withdrawal of, the hostile force. Isolation forces preferably are deployed to predetermined positions on the enemy's flanks and rear by infiltration. If the situation dictates, however, they may become a part of the enveloping force, moving with its forward elements to appointed objectives along the route of advance. The mission of each unit assigned the task of isolation is to seize, occupy, and defend a critical point






Figure 29. Forms of envelopment.

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② Double envelopment.



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③ Turning movement.

Figure 29. Forms of envelopment—Continued.

in the enemy's rear along his axis of communications to sever his retreat route and block forward movement of reinforcements. If the enemy force initiates a general withdrawal before completion of the envelopment, isolation forces are diverted from their objectives to execute large-scale ambushes along known withdrawal routes.

b. Units assigned isolation roles are normally of division, regimental, or battalion size, sometimes heavily reinforced with supporting arms and services essential to the success of the mission. As often as not, however, units are not reinforced. Historical examples exist in which isolation forces were stripped of much of their heavy weapons and all of their impedimenta before initiating an operation. Upon arrival at their objectives, isolation units construct fortified positions from which further operations are conducted. If sufficient strength is available to these units, small forces will be dispatched from the strong points to establish ambushes along routes likely to be employed by hostile reinforcements or withdrawing elements of the main enemy force. Sufficient mobility is retained by isolation units to enable them to engage in rapid pursuit of the retreating enemy should it become necessary.

95. EXECUTION OF ENVELOPMENTS

a. The envelopment is the preferred form of offensive maneuver. Chinese Communist military writings stress four basic and immutable principles, in addition to MAO's dictum of mass, which commanders must apply to the planning of an envelopment on a strategic scale. Commanders are cautioned that their application varies with the situation, the factors of which are time, space, the mission, weather, terrain, and relative strength. Proper application of these principles assures a successful operation. These principles—also common to Western doctrine—are:

- (1) *Surprise.* Secret preparations and swift materialization of the main attack will render the enemy incapable—at least temporarily—of taking effective countermeasures. Surprise also permits the Chinese Communist commander to obtain the maximum effect with the minimum loss. Deception, secrecy of movement, and rapidity and power in execution of the attack assure surprise.

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


Figure 30. Employment of isolation forces.

- (2) *Simplicity.* Plans for the organization of combat formations and their subsequent maneuvers during the attack must be as simple and direct as the seizure of the objective will permit. Frequent changes of the campaign plan are to be avoided, and unity of command is to be observed.
- (3) *Flexibility.* The organization of combat formations employed in the attack must be kept flexible to permit the commander to effect rapid changes in tactical disposition as dictated by the development of the situation.

- (4) *Security.* Necessary measures to insure against surprise by hostile forces and assure protection of maneuver elements are stringently adhered to by the Chinese commanders to gain and maintain freedom of action. Such measures include local ground security, reconnaissance, antiaircraft and antitank defense, and adequate mobile reserves.

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b. The Chinese Communist commander is enjoined to initiate an offensive campaign by an envelopment, before contact whenever possible. Doctrine points out that an envelopment on a campaign scale is difficult to execute subsequent to gaining contact because surprise—essential to a successful envelopment—is difficult to achieve in the face of the enemy. Execution of an envelopment subsequent to contact is carried out, however, whenever Communist superiority and enemy dispositions permit. The advance from concentration is preceded by intense strategic reconnaissance organized and directed by the senior ground and air force commanders of the theater. The objective of these reconnaissance activities is to provide the theater commander and his staff with information of the enemy's strategic intentions, the extent of his air capability, and the organization and disposition of his forces in extreme rear areas. Strategic reconnaissance missions are supplemented by tactical aerial reconnaissance missions over the area in which it is anticipated combat will be developed. These tactical missions, operating 300 to 500 kilometers forward of the concentration area, provide information on the disposition of hostile troops and equipment in forward areas, as well as of any hostile movements. Tactical air reconnaissance also develops information on hostile defensive works and the nature of the terrain in the expected battle area through aerial photography. Based on the results of these and other reconnaissance activities, the campaign commander considers certain factors influencing his decision to initiate an envelopment before contact. These factors include the relative strength of the opposing forces, the enemy's disposition, terrain, and the commander's mission. Terrain is held to be the least important of these factors. Commanders are taught that adverse terrain should not deter them from selecting a course of action that, in itself, will accomplish envelopment of the enemy in great depth. The situation being favorable, the commander organizes his advance from concentration over a broad front to insure a frontage extending—preferably—beyond both flanks of the known hostile dispositions. Strong forces are placed on the flanks of the advancing force to permit envelopment of one or both of the enemy's flanks prior to contact with his main force. Advancing columns are preceded by strong armored, cavalry, or motor-

ized ground reconnaissance elements which—in coordination with continued aerial reconnaissance activities—reconnoiter the entire campaign force's zone of advance to develop current information on troop dispositions and hostile movement.

c. The success of an enveloping maneuver executed after contact has been gained and the hostile dispositions developed is dependent upon the condition of the enemy's flanks, the breadth of deployment of Chinese forces, and a favorable balance of strength. Commanders normally follow the practice of employing reserves not in contact with the enemy as the forces making main enveloping attacks. Freedom of action is permitted subordinate commanders engaged in executing the envelopment. They are encouraged to take immediate advantage, on their own initiative, of enemy weaknesses which may develop during the progress of the operation and promptly to counter those measures taken by the opposing commander to disrupt the planned maneuver.

d. Rapid movement of the forces making the enveloping attack(s), coupled with determined action by secondary attack units to fix and destroy the enemy's advance forces, are essential to success of the envelopment. Regardless of whether the envelopment is initiated before or after contact, the Chinese commander applies the principle of mass—or concentration of combat power—to the organization of his flanking forces. The armored division spearheads flank attack forces when terrain permits. Flank attack forces are supported by air force elements, whose strategic and campaign missions are to gain and maintain air superiority over the area of deployment, and to strike at the enemy's supply lines, depots, and transportation facilities, thus interdicting movement of reinforcements and supplies to the battle area, hindering hostile deployment, and covering the maneuver of Communist flanking forces.

96. EXECUTION OF TURNING MOVEMENTS

a. Chinese doctrine teaches that a preponderance of force—on the order of 3 to 5 times that of the enemy—and freedom of maneuver are prerequisites to the success of a large-scale turning movement. The depth to be achieved by the turning force varies from the 200 to 300 kilometers in open terrain such as is found in North China to 30 to 50 kilometers in close terrain similar to that of Korea. In the past

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turning forces were primarily infantry columns, reinforced with cavalry and light artillery. Current military writings advise the formation of strong, mobile turning forces of army or army-group scale, reinforced with armor, heavy artillery, and engineers. Doctrine cautions that tactical air support is essential to preservation of both freedom of maneuver of the turning force and its ultimate success in destroying the hostile main force. Since the Chinese are now capable of attaining these modern conditions to a certain degree, it is probable that the range of operations of their turning forces can be increased considerably.

b. As is the case with other forms of the envelopment, initiation of the turning movement is preceded by intense strategic and tactical aerial reconnaissance activities, which continue subsequent to the deployment of the campaign force, in coordination with ground reconnaissance elements moving before the columns of the turning force. Movement of the turning force to its initial objective is covered both by air force elements and by small-scale probing and harassing attacks and feints by ground elements along the hostile front to fix the hostile commander's attention and deceive him as to the true location of the main Chinese striking force. Every effort is made to execute the main attack upon the enemy's rear simultaneously with a powerful secondary attack along his front. If the enemy reacts prematurely to the movement of the turning force, the secondary frontal attack is initiated first to further fix and confuse the enemy and attempt to gain uninterrupted passage for the turning force to its initial objective. The commander of the turning force is cautioned to avoid turning too early, regardless of enemy reaction. Isolation forces dropped off along the route of advance are considered adequate to counter hostile reaction and gain time for successful completion of the initial stage of the maneuver.

c. Composition of the turning force is dependent upon the terrain and the anticipated type and degree of enemy resistance in the area of operations. Open terrain, good lines of communications, and comparative weakness of hostile armor will cause the Chinese commander to spearhead his turning movement with armor. In close terrain, or when other factors adversely affect the mobility and striking power of armor, the advance guard is composed of

motorized infantry reinforced with armor and artillery components; most of the armor moves with the main body of the turning force, prepared for either centralized or decentralized employment in the final attack against the hostile rear. The commander of the advance guard does not become decisively engaged with hostile forces whose defeat appears to offer only limited tactical success. The advance is all-important.

d. In logistical planning for a turning movement, the Chinese Communists place emphasis on sustaining the combat power of the main striking force. Ammunition and fuel for armored and motorized forces are given first priority, food second priority; other items, such as operating spares for equipment and other impedimenta, are left behind. The turning force should be capable of self-support for a minimum period of 7 to 10 days. Hostile rear area supply concentrations are prime targets for raiding parties dispatched en route by the turning force commander. Aerial resupply of turning forces is cited as an important tactical mission in current Chinese Communist Air Force doctrine.

97. EMPLOYMENT OF AIRBORNE FORCES

Chinese Communist strategic doctrine advocates the tactical employment of airborne forces in conjunction with the envelopment if their use will have a decisive influence on the outcome of the campaign. In this role, airborne operations are carried out in coordination with flanking operations by large-scale ground elements of army or army-group size. Airborne units may land in strength directly on the objective of the flanking forces or at several points in the hostile rear area to sever lines of communications, destroy vital command installations, and seize or destroy supply concentrations. Doctrine does not appear to limit the depth of airborne operations of this nature; it does, however, establish the optimum time of link-up of airborne forces and ground forces at three days' combat march for the ground force making the main effort. Thus, in extremely deep operations, such as the turning movement, the airborne attack must be made with precise timing subsequent to the initiation of the ground operation. Provisions for aerial resupply of air-landed forces are a part of Air Force doctrine and training, as well as of the campaign plan.

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won. The Chinese high command expected the U. N. C. forces to redeploy to meet the attack; as the redeployment progressed, the XIX and XX Army Groups were to initiate attacks through Yonchon and Kumhwa, respectively. While the U. N. C.'s attention was firmly fixed on the three massive attacks on its center, a fourth Communist attack was to be initiated on the west flank to seize Inchon. This latter attack force was to be comprised of one Chinese Communist army, supported by North Korean elements in a diversionary attack across the Han estuary. Truce talks precluded the initiation of this plan.

101. IMPULSES

The Chinese Communist concept of the strategic penetration is somewhat similar to that of Soviet doctrine. The penetration consists of four impulses. First, creation of corridors through the hostile defenses; second, widening those corridors and fixing hostile forces in the main battle position by envelopments of limited depth; third, isolation of elements in main and secondary battle positions and the destruction of tactical reserves and artillery by deep envelopments or turning movements; and fourth, continued deep penetration by armored and motorized forces through the entire hostile defense zone. The first three impulses of the penetration take place without an appreciable time interval between their successive initiation; mobile forces to be employed in the fourth impulse are not committed until the width of the corridor through the hostile defenses has been extended sufficiently to insure freedom of maneuver through the defense zone.

102. REQUIREMENTS

The Chinese Communists consider the penetration the most difficult combat maneuver to execute successfully, and stress that adequate preparation is the key to victory. Time is essential to the commander—it permits him to fulfill certain indispensable requirements for the skillful execution of the penetration. These are:

a. *Thorough reconnaissance* to determine the enemy's strength, firepower, and principal defensive dispositions; the type, extent, and vulnerability of his fortifications; the location and possible avenues of approach of hostile reserves and reinforcements; the extent of the enemy's combat security dispositions; the logistical capability of the enemy, as well

as the locations of supply concentrations, command installations, and lines of communications in the hostile rear; and the political temper of the populace in the area of operations. The commander employs both ground and aerial reconnaissance techniques to gather information of the enemy. Provision is made for aerial photographic and visual coverage of the area of operations. Ground reconnaissance includes activities of reconnaissance units, observation of the enemy from fixed posts, reconnaissance in force by mobile forces, and clandestine activities within the enemy's armed forces and in population centers in his rear.

b. *Detailed planning* activities, which are initiated concurrently with reconnaissance measures. The key to the campaign plan is the selection of the areas in which gaps are to be created. These selections will be influenced—in order—by weak points in the enemy's dispositions through which corridors can be driven; the objective of the attacking force; the location of hostile reserves and routes of approach they may use to counterattack; the forces available to effect the penetration; and the time necessary to assemble Chinese forces and train them on terrain similar to that over which the operation will be conducted. All other conditions being favorable, the Chinese Communists will rarely allow the nature of the terrain leading to suitable areas of operations to influence their course of action. In Korea, the Chinese Communists frequently selected rugged mountainous terrain as the main axis of attack. The prime consideration in selecting terrain over which a penetration is to be conducted is: "Does it lead to a weak point in the enemy's dispositions?" Points to be attacked are most often selected at one or more of the following locations:

- (1) A location where the enemy's fortifications, firepower, or troop dispositions are weak.
- (2) Major unit boundaries; in particular, when applicable, boundaries between the forces of allied nations.
- (3) The flanks of salients in the hostile defense zone.

Locations selected should permit facile division of enemy forces, be advantageous for development in the hostile depth, and allow secure concentration of the Chinese Communist force. Doctrine states that while all three of these conditions are desirable, the latter two are essential.

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c. *Training* of individuals and units in both the specialized techniques of assaulting fortified positions and the overall scheme of the maneuver. Specialized individual training includes mine detecting and clearing techniques, demolition methods, pill-box attack tactics, and antitank activities of infantry. Unit training emphasizes tank-infantry-artillery teamwork, and air-ground coordination with supporting air force elements.

d. *Adequate logistical preparations* to deal with the problems of ammunition, food, and equipment supply; evacuation of casualties; and transportation. Materiel sufficient to sustain the force for the estimated duration of the operation is stockpiled well ahead of time. Units carry into battle sufficient food to sustain themselves for five to seven days; conventional unit ammunition loads are multiplied by three for infantry weapons and by five for artillery. Operations and rear service staffs conduct joint planning to forecast main supply routes and project the future locations of service installations.

e. *Surprise* in the execution of the operation. Plans are prepared secretly and executed swiftly to attack the enemy where and when he least expects, and render him temporarily incapable of taking countermeasures. The Chinese believe that even a brief period in which the hostile commander does not react promptly will suffice to permit a buildup of impetus that will be impossible to stem. Chinese commanders are adept at the use of deception to lull the enemy commander into a false sense of security. They are also extremely proficient at deceiving the enemy as to the precise location of their main effort before it is developed in full. Doctrine dictates that feints should be staged at the place where the main effort is believed to be expected by the enemy. Further deception is provided by the planting of rumors by prisoners of war and by spies in the enemy's rear area, as well as by phasing the times of initiating the series of impulses. To enjoy success in the latter method of deception, the Chinese commander is warned that he must so place his reserves that they can rapidly reinforce the success of any one of the series of penetrations. Movements to attack areas frequently are made at night to further the achievement of surprise; attack areas are often occupied by a force during the succeeding day, and the main effort launched during the following night. Night attacks may be initiated without prior artillery preparation, and both supporting

artillery and attacking echelons hold their fire until the last possible minute, thus contributing to the initial shock action of the penetration group. The Chinese Communists feel that such tactics, often conducted over the most difficult terrain, inevitably will pay off in surprise and success.

f. *Security* for the combat forces engaged in the operation and for rear service activities supporting the maneuver. The commander achieves security against ground attack by reconnaissance activities, employment of security forces, establishment of antitank measures, and appropriate deployment of his combat forces. An integrated air defense plan is developed to protect both combat forces and supporting services. Further measures to insure security for rear service activities include establishment and maintenance of order in rear areas by military control of civil government, and by deployment of adequate security forces to protect lines of communications, supply concentrations, and communications centers.

g. *Appropriate political indoctrination* of the troops prior to the launching of the penetration. Chinese commanders and their troops are indoctrinated with the idea that during the conduct of the penetration they will be deep in the enemy's territory, often isolated from their own supporting forces. They are taught that this should be no deterrent to their offensive spirit, however, and that they are to be adept in taking advantage of local successes on their own initiative to further the general strategic plan.

h. *Air superiority* over the battle area. According to recent military writings, air superiority is essential to the success of the penetration. In addition to carrying out strategic bombing of hostile industry, communications, and centers of government, the air force must gain and maintain air superiority in the area of deployment; provide air cover for troop concentrations; conduct reconnaissance missions; furnish air defense for rear areas; participate in the preparation in coordination with ground forces; isolate the battlefield throughout the operation; execute tactical combat missions in direct support of ground forces; and transport personnel, weapons, ammunition, and other supplies to support the operation. Although Chinese Communist doctrine teaches employment of air power in support of the strategic penetration, Chinese commanders in the past have not deferred execution of the pen-

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tration because of lack of air superiority—on the contrary, massive penetrations were initiated in Korea in the face of the U. N. C.'s total control of the air.

103. CONDUCT OF THE PENETRATION

a. The penetration usually is preceded by an intense preparation by both artillery and air force elements. The depth of the artillery preparation normally extends from five to seven kilometers; the principal air force effort is directed towards neutralizing targets which cannot be reached or neutralized by artillery. The attack is initiated as the preparation lifts; if terrain permits, tank-infantry groups assault selected points in the hostile defense zone. As the first echelon of the assault force establishes corridors into the enemy's defense zone, infantry elements in the second echelon widen the corridors by shallow envelopments of the flanks of the divided enemy. The air force, in coordination with artillery, attacks the enemy's tactical reserves; heavy bombers attack hostile strategic reserves; and fighter-bombers coordinate with the assault force to insure an uninterrupted advance through the enemy's defenses.

b. As the corridors are widened by the assault force, motorized infantry elements are poured through the gaps to deepen the penetration. These forces execute deep envelopments or turning movements, strike at the enemy's tactical reserves and artillery positions, and complete the isolation of the enemy in the forward portion of the defense zone. During this critical stage of the penetration, air force operations are directed against hostile air force installations, air defense over the battlefield, and continued support of the advance of the ground forces. If the enemy is observed attempting to disengage from battle, fighter-bombers attempt to block his orderly withdrawal by striking at river crossing sites, defiles along routes of communications, combat columns, and supply convoys.

c. The Chinese Communist commander achieves two ends by the actions of the forces executing deep envelopments of the divided portions of the hostile defense zone; he completes isolation of most of the enemy's defensive force, and by that action further increases the width of the corridors to a point where armored and other motorized forces can maneuver and extend the corridors through the entire defense zone. These latter forces drive to the enemy rear, then spread out and assist in the destruction of the

enemy in the defense zone section by section. Subsequent to the completion of their mission, these mobile forces move to assembly areas and reorganize for future employment in an exploitation role deep in enemy territory. The air force provides air support for mobile forces operating in the enemy's depth, and continues support of forces executing battles of annihilation. Chinese Communist air force doctrine teaches employment of air-borne or air-landed forces during final stages of the penetration in coordination with the maneuver of armor and motorized infantry elements. Airborne forces are held to be especially useful in a blocking role if the enemy succeeds in breaking out of the encirclement established by the ground forces. In this case they are employed to occupy major road intersections, river crossing sites, and defiles along the enemy's axis of retreat.

104. EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOR

a. In addition to the universally accepted, classic role of exploitation, the Chinese Communists recommend and practice several other types of employment of armor in the penetration. These are:

- (1) *In a reconnaissance in force*, to determine the strength and disposition of the enemy's security echelon and his forces in the main battle position.
- (2) *To reinforce infantry elements* in the assault echelon of the force making the penetration.
- (3) *To extend the depth* of the initial breakthrough of the hostile defense zone by dividing and surrounding a major portion of the enemy's force.
- (4) *To effect a penetration* of a hastily occupied or weakly held hostile defense zone.
- (5) *As a reserve force*, under the direct control of the force commander, for the purpose of repelling enemy counterattacks or to exploit success.

b. Commanders are cautioned, however, that successful employment of armor can be achieved in each case only when terrain is favorable for maneuver, hostile antitank weapons are inferior, armored superiority rests with the Chinese, air superiority has been attained, and enemy field works, such as obstacles and minefields, are passable after destruction. In the past, whenever most of these factors favored the enemy, the Chinese com-

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mander held his armor in reserve and awaited a favorable shift in the situation caused by the development of combat. This cautious attitude toward employment of armor in the penetration can be attributed to two factors—a paucity of equipment and a lack of familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of armor.

c. Soviet tutelage is providing the modern knowledge of command and employment of large armored forces. The U. S. S. R. also is continuing to supply and build up Communist China's armored and air arms. These two facts will no doubt tend to overcome the present Chinese reticence in employment of large armored forces.

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CHAPTER 9

DEFENSIVE MANEUVER

Section I. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

105. DEFINITION

The Chinese Communists define the strategic defensive as a condition under which military measures are adopted to protect the integrity of the state by denying vital areas to the enemy while wearing down the enemy's forces through attrition, preserving China's Armed Forces, and preparing the resources of the state for the initiation of a strategic offensive. The strategic defensive is based upon three principal phases, or forms of maneuver: defense in one position, strategic retrograde, and strategic counteroffensive. Of the three, defense in one position is held to be the least favorable form of large-scale defensive action. When space is available to trade for time, and other strategic considerations permit, the Chinese Communists prefer to employ strategic retrograde, followed by strategic counteroffensive. Other defensive measures practiced by the Chinese Communists include the outright abandonment, often accompanied by drastic scorched-earth activities, of areas of little importance; concentration of defensive strength in critical areas; employment of the tactical offensive, in conjunction with the strategic retrograde, to deceive and exact attrition from the enemy; conduct of extensive guerrilla activities in the hostile rear; and implementation of psychological warfare programs designed to strengthen popular support within China or promote dissent and unrest among the population of the hostile nation.

106. FACTORS INFLUENCING ADOPTION OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

It is the nature of any Communist regime to be continually at war in either a political sense, a military sense, or both. Communist China is no exception, and its leaders teach that open hostilities are a continuation of power politics. For this reason, when the decision is made to adopt the strategic defensive at the initiation of overt military hostilities, it is closely related to the current Party line, as well as to conventional military considerations.

Military doctrine cites the political, military, economic, and natural conditions affecting the two opposing sides as primary factors influencing the decision to adopt the strategic defensive.

a. *Political factors* include the commitments of international agreements; the ability to retain total political control of China's Armed Forces and, conversely, the possibility of creating dissent in the enemy's military forces; the political stability of the people of China; the possibility of obtaining aid from the people of the enemy nation; the possibility of maintaining unity among top members of the Communist regime; and the ability to continue Communist political aggression while preserving, from a military standpoint, the regime's base of power. From the standpoint of political factors, China's leaders advocate the adoption of strategic defense when other conditions will permit continuation of political aggression to further the strategic goals of the regime; the military situation is but a temporary expedient, in lieu of overt aggression.

b. *Military considerations*, in light of the hard facts of military power in the modern world, are accorded equal weight with political factors. Chief among these military factors are the relative states of readiness of the opposing forces; the relative effectiveness of armament possessed by each force; the degree of superiority possessed by each force in the anticipated area of operations; the ability of one or the other of the opposing forces to seize and maintain the initiative; and the military capabilities of allies of both contestants. An unfavorable balance in any one of these factors, the Chinese Communists believe, places them, militarily, in an inferior strategic position and may engender adoption of the strategic defensive. The Chinese also consider the advisability of employing deception by adopting the strategic defensive temporarily, thereby inducing the enemy to commit his forces and perhaps make mistakes.

c. *Economic conditions*, as they affect friendly and hostile civilian populations, and as they bear upon support of military efforts, are given emphasis

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by Chinese Communist strategic planners when considering the adoption of a strategic course of action. Internally, economic factors have a direct bearing on maintaining popular support and control of both the civilian population and the Armed Forces. While the leaders of Communist China believe their system can maintain control of the civilian population despite considerable economic chaos, they are concerned over the degree of starvation they could impose, and how long they could sustain it, before they cracked the morale of their Party cadres and peasant-born Army. Economic conditions among the people of the hostile nation are weighed to estimate the enemy's susceptibility to subversion from within. The continued ability of both sides to support large forces in the field, should the war become prolonged, as well as such capabilities of each side's allies are also considered. In this respect, China's leaders find themselves in a tactically strong position, but without the strategic economic underpinnings for prolonged, major warfare against a major power.

d. *Natural factors* are those of terrain and weather, and include the locations of national frontiers. Their effect on determination of the strategic posture of the nation is usually limited to determination of specific areas which, by their nature, lend themselves to defensive operations. These factors have a direct bearing on the abandonment of certain areas, the reinforcement of others, and the selection of favorable areas for the employment of tactical offensive operations to inflict attrition on the enemy. Natural factors are often decisive in determining distribution of forces in the total war effort.

107. ADVANTAGES

The Chinese Communists contend that assumption of the strategic defensive gains certain important advantages when the nation is confronted by an equal or superior foe. The defensive affords a means of preserving Chinese forces, weakening the enemy, and gaining time to prepare for the strategic offensive. The condition of strategic defense also affords a popular rallying point for civilian support; Communist leaders believe that if they are backed by a correctly oriented population, the task of directing civilian efforts toward support of the regime's goals is simplified. With such support added to China's land mass, which lends itself to strategic defensive

maneuver on a grand scale, the Communists hope to gain time to complete general mobilization of the nation's total war effort, secure the support of allies, and draw out the hostile commander. The latter advantage is held to be of extreme importance, and Chinese Communist commanders are taught to employ a wide variety of deceptive tactics which, when coupled with aggressive tactical offensive actions, are designed to cause the enemy commander to commit mistakes, exhaust hostile forces, and set the enemy up for the decisive phase of the strategic defensive—the counteroffensive. In short, the strategic defensive permits establishment of conditions favorable to the Chinese Communists and unfavorable to the enemy. To seize all the advantages of the strategic defensive, Communist China's leaders eschew a passive defense and advocate an *active defense*; that is, mobile warfare which takes full advantage of the regime's principal assets—China's vast land mass, and the numerical superiority of the Chinese Communist ground strength.

108. DISADVANTAGES

A prolonged defensive war, in which conditions preclude initiation of the counteroffensive, saps civilian and military morale, increases problems related to control of the Armed Forces and the civilian population, drains the state's resources, and endangers the security of the regime. Thus the sole purpose of the strategic defensive is to prepare to switch to the strategic offensive; the decisive link in the entire strategy of defense is whether success can be achieved in the counteroffensive phase. The Chinese Communists are well aware that offensive military successes can be an effective political substitute for domestic performance.

109. EXECUTION

a. Chinese Communist strategic doctrine holds that mobile warfare is the basic form of warfare for an inferior force that seeks to preserve itself and ultimately seize the initiative through the strategic defensive. Thus, the strategic retrograde—employed in close coordination with the tactical offensive, skillful organization of fire, and adept utilization of terrain—most often characterizes the Chinese Communist strategic defensive at its outset. Advantages are that mobile warfare permits wide-scale movement in field operations, permits concentration

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of forces to execute offensive operations that place the enemy at a temporary disadvantage, keeps the enemy constantly on the move, and increases the enemy's logistic difficulties. On the negative side, this type of warfare causes temporary loss of territory, and, if not skillfully executed, may drive Chinese Communist forces into an untenable position. While holding mobile warfare to be the basic form of the strategic defensive, the Chinese Communists do not rule out position warfare. Doctrine grants the necessity for stubborn defense in one position when it is essential to deny the enemy a key area, or when Chinese forces find themselves confronted with an isolated and unsupported, though powerful hostile force whose containment is necessary. The defense in one position may also be employed to secure and consolidate a political gain, as in Korea. The employment of position warfare as a basic form of the strategic defensive is not favored, however, since it is believed that that form of warfare exacts attrition equally from both opposing sides; rather, defense in one position is held to be an important ancillary to mobile warfare. It is resorted to most frequently to gain time, contain an enemy force, and obtain safe conditions for the withdrawal and concentration of main forces for a decisive stroke against an over-extended enemy.

b. As in Western doctrine, the ultimate objective of the Chinese Communist strategic defensive is to turn to the offensive and achieve the total destruction of the enemy; it is necessary to engage the enemy in a decisive operation to turn the possibility of victory into an actuality. Mobile warfare alters the balance of power in the field and sets the stage for the strategic counteroffensive phase, which is in the nature of a decisive engagement. Favorable conditions and situations are created not only during the phase of strategic retrograde, but continue to be created during the phase of the strategic counteroffensive; the enemy becomes even more fatigued, and further reduced in number. At the appropriate time, the high commander assumes the strategic offensive.

c. Chinese Communist strategic defensive doctrine advocates the coordinated employment of the tactical offensive with the strategic retrograde to exact attrition on the enemy, secure local superiority and initiative in an area, block hostile progress, harass enemy troop concentrations, threaten supply concentrations and lines of communications, and

gain further time for defending forces. The tactical offensive by regular troop units is frequently employed in conjunction with guerrilla operations throughout the hostile rear. All efforts of the active defense are concentrated toward keeping the enemy on the move, wearing down his fighting strength and spirit, and creating a favorable change in the balance of power in the field. The tactical offensive is also often employed during a prolonged defensive war to achieve campaign-scale victories as a means of raising troop and civilian morale and promoting continued popular support of the Armed Forces. MAO counsels, however, that commanders must weigh carefully a decision to enter into a tactical offensive during a period of strategic defense. Certain preliminary considerations are essential. First, commanders should gain victory in the opening battle by all means; commanders should strike only when it is certain that the situation, the terrain, the local population, and other conditions are favorable. Failure might adversely affect the entire defense effort. Second, commanders should not fight without a complete campaign plan; unnecessary and needless expenditure of men and materiel in a minor tactical operation that will not contribute to the success of an entire campaign is forbidden. Third, the operation must be considered with respect to the net strategic phase of the war. Doctrine teaches that failure to observe these three conditions will result in hesitation, thereby actually serving the enemy's strategic ends and placing Chinese Communist forces in a passive position, ripe for destruction. The high-ranking commander must give his attention to the whole military situation prevalent on his operational front.

d. Chinese Communist defensive doctrine, developed during China's Revolutionary Civil Wars and refined in Korea, cites the following general occasions which necessitate assumption of the tactical defense during a period of strategic defense:

- (1) *When it is necessary to prevent or hinder enemy use of an area or route whose security is essential to the success of the maneuver of the main force.* The basic characteristic of such a defense is mobility.
- (2) *When it is necessary to cover the assembly or withdrawal of the main force.* Mobility is again the essential characteristic of the defense.
- (3) *When it is necessary to consolidate a newly*

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gained position or critical point to facilitate a continuation of the advance and the destruction of the enemy. This course of action is often adopted during the counteroffensive phase and employs a form of temporary position defense; hasty field fortifications are generally employed.

- (4) *When it is necessary to occupy essential points in enemy lines of communications in order to divide him, intercept his reinforcements, or prevent his withdrawal.* This action is most frequently occasioned by a successful envelopment or penetration of the enemy force during the coun-

teroffensive phase; it increases the likelihood of defeat in detail of the hostile force once critical points along rear area lines of communications are occupied. In such a situation, the tactical concept of the defense requires a position defense similar to a perimeter defense in United States Army doctrine.

- (5) *When it is necessary to hold critical areas to contain the enemy in coordination with the maneuver of a major force.* Position defense is the basic characteristic of this situation, wherein it is necessary to deny the enemy time and freedom of maneuver.

Section II. STRATEGIC RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS**110. PURPOSE**

Chinese Communist doctrine teaches that in strategic defensive operations any unfavorable battle of decision is usually to be avoided at the outset of hostilities. A decisive battle is to be sought only when conditions are favorable. A better choice than a decisive battle under unfavorable conditions is the adoption of a strategic retrograde movement, a planned strategic step which an inferior force adopts to avoid combat, conserve its strength, and prepare for the counteroffensive.

111. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES


a. The principal advantage accruing to a commander who adopts the strategic retrograde is the preservation of most of his fighting strength. The commander also shortens his lines of communications; gains limited initiative, in that he can select at will the location at which he again chooses to give battle; and, through familiarity with the terrain over which he operates, can exploit hostile mistakes and weak points well outside the former enemy sphere of domination. The strategic retrograde also permits full play for the Chinese Communist commander's penchant for operations on interior lines (par. 91) and affords opportunities for battles of quick decision against the weaker of the enemy's advancing columns. Problems of concentration are simplified, as delays inflicted upon the enemy by energetic rear guard actions gain time for

the commander to accumulate new troops and new equipment, and prepare plans for either limited tactical offensives on interior lines or assumption of the counteroffensive.

b. There are many disadvantages inherent in strategic retrograde movements. The most serious are the loss of land, population, economic stamina, and military prestige, and the attendant drop in popular support of the Armed Forces. Another disadvantage is the difficulty of accurate timing of the initiation of the retrograde movement. Either premature or belated initiation of movement to the rear may result in serious losses, whereas timely retreat restores partial initiative to the commander. Finally, and directly related to timing, an army in retreat is at a disadvantage with an enemy too close on its heels. If such a situation should occur, the enemy may force a decisive battle, inflicting disastrous losses on the retreating forces. Further, a closely pursued main force cannot stop to defend a river or mountain line, before reaching the *terminus of retreat* (par. 112), unless such action offers good possibilities for an offensive return.

112. DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT

a. The principal factor influencing the ultimate direction of movement to be taken by subordinate elements in executing a strategic retrograde movement is the terminus of retreat. This location, or concentration area, is selected in light of the commander's estimate of the time required to establish



① Initial movement straight to the rear; subsequent employment of converging routes.


Figure 32. Courses of action for retrograde movements.

superiority, the planned operations subsequent to the initiation of the counteroffensive, and the location of vital strategic areas that must be defended at all costs. Three conditions are essential in selecting a concentration area on which most of the Chinese Communist forces will close:

- (1) The people in the area must give active support to the Chinese forces.
- (2) The terrain must be favorable for the protection of the concentration and for future counteroffensive operations.
- (3) The location selected must permit concentration

of the main force, in superior strength, in time to engage the advancing enemy in decisive battle.

b. The general situation before initiation of the retrograde movement exerts the most influence on the initial direction of movement of subordinate elements. Specific factors include: The distance between the opposing main bodies, their strength, and their composition; the topographical features of the region through which the move is to be conducted; the condition of lines of communications, and the extent to which cross-country movement is



② Movement straight to the rear.

Figure 32. Courses of action for retrograde movements—Continued.


possible; the weather; and the condition of the inhabitants in the area through which Chinese Communist forces must move. The latter factor is of considerable importance, since the Chinese commander makes extensive use of the civilian population whenever possible to maintain fortifications; build and repair military roads; act as guides for subordinate elements; and provide supply transport, tools, and provisions to the troops.

c. The Chinese Communist commander prefers, whenever possible, to direct subordinate elements to move straight to the rear in the initial stage of a retrograde movement (fig. 32). These movements are followed, after a successful withdrawal from

action, by converging movements on a preselected concentration area after imminent danger of hostile pursuit is past. Doctrine holds that this course of action makes maximum use of existing lines of communications, provides flank protection against hostile envelopment, permits flexibility in employment of reserves to counter local hostile success, and avoids concentration of strength at a location too near the hostile main force. This course of action, however, must be protected by powerful rear guard forces employing the tactics of mobile defense to prevent hostile concentrations and rapid advances.

d. Other courses of action open to the commander are: To execute the entire retrograde move-

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© Employment of converging route.

Figure 32. Courses of action for retrograde movements—Continued.

ment straight to the rear, or to initiate the movement with all subordinate elements employing converging routes (fig. 32). The former course of action is held to prolong unnecessarily and increase the difficulties of concentration of forces before assuming the counteroffensive. The latter course of action increases the difficulties of the initial withdrawal from action by restricting freedom of maneuver, provides the enemy with an opportunity to strike most of the Chinese Communist forces before concentration is complete, and increases the possibility of envelop-

ment or encirclement of large portions of the defending forces.

113. MANNER OF WITHDRAWAL

a. Every retrograde movement from hostile contact is initiated by a withdrawal from action. Chinese Communist military writers decry the daylight withdrawal, pointing out that a powerful enemy can most easily take advantage of his mobility and fire power to wipe out covering forces and cut off withdrawal routes during daylight hours. A

night withdrawal from action, doctrine teaches, is the desirable form of action in that it involves less risk of a decisive engagement with a well-equipped enemy. During the night, reconnaissance elements and small combat formations can effectively carry out aggressive offensive actions and other deceptive operations to confuse the enemy and provide cover. Under cover of darkness, and protected by aggressive, small-unit actions, the main force can withdraw to the rear with relative impunity. The Chinese Communists also advocate the employment of mobile tank-infantry-artillery task forces to launch counterattacks when a main force is effecting a withdrawal from action. This type of offensive action is held to be essential if the enemy perceives the withdrawal and initiates powerful offensive action against the withdrawing units. Under such conditions, the withdrawal is halted temporarily, and defensive positions are maintained while these mobile task forces launch counterattacks to check the enemy offensive.

b. The commander assigns zones of withdrawal, principal routes, and the order of withdrawal to subordinate army groups or armies. Zones vary with the situation, the size and composition of subordinate elements, and the location of the various subordinate units and their command posts with respect to the final concentration area. The width of a zone for an army group may vary from 75 to 150 kilometers; a zone for an army varies from 10 to 25 kilometers. The commander also assigns zones, routes of withdrawal, and times and order of withdrawal to rear administrative installations. Troops and supplies in the rear are often moved out several days ahead of the main force to insure that routes will be clear for combat elements. Major subordinate commands are required to establish covering forces to protect the initial withdrawal of the main body, and designate appropriate rear and flank guards for the subsequent movement of their several columns. The senior commander announces the locations in each zone where covering forces or rear guards are to interdict the enemy, and specifies how long each position will offer resistance. In addition, the commander prescribes active measures for defense against air, airborne, chemical, and armored attack. Massing of troops, materiel, and supplies in open areas is prohibited during the operation. Plans for repairing bridges and routes of with-

drawal, and for their demolition subsequent to the passage of the main force, are announced to the command, as are plans for erection of obstacles and demolition of defensive works.

c. The Chinese Communists are particularly circumspect regarding the flanks of their force when executing a withdrawal from action. They realize that hostile flank attacks and enveloping tactics endanger withdrawing forces and covering forces. Every effort is made to prevent the enemy from seizing one flank from which he would be in a position to employ mobile units to carry out a parallel pursuit and threaten routes of withdrawal. Flank security units are reinforced by antitank guns and supported by powerful artillery elements. It is also practice to place a sizable armored unit on or near exposed flanks. After the withdrawing units have passed through the rear boundary of the force's reserves, they rapidly assemble in designated areas and regroup into columns. There, with the protection of the rear guards, the withdrawal is resumed. The rear guards basically are formed from units in reserve. Both flanks of each withdrawing column are protected by light, mobile flank guard units. The flank guards move parallel to the roads, or the moving columns, and are prepared to warn of and meet pursuit and attack by the enemy.

d. After the rear guards of each column have passed, the flank guards of the force are charged with demolishing bridges and destroying roads, then employing mobile defense tactics in suitable sectors to engage and tie down the pressing enemy units. If the enemy's pressure continues, and the main force cannot continue to withdraw from action under cover of rear and flank guards, the main force assumes the defense until counterattack elements have stopped the hostile advance.

e. If reserve elements have been committed to action in a stubborn defense before the withdrawal from action, the withdrawal is more complicated. Under these conditions the commander first pulls out the former reserve troops and directs them to move on to the alternate positions deep in the rear. Other defending troops then fall back through those forces. From then on, all movements to the rear are performed in this manner until contact between main forces is effectively broken. Before the withdrawal a thorough reconnaissance is conducted, especially in the direction the withdrawal is to be made, and on both flanks.

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Section III. DEFENSE IN ONE POSITION

114. TYPES

The Chinese Communists recognize two types of position defense: Defense on a normal front, and defense on a wide front. A decision to elect one or the other course of action is based on the commander's mission, the existing situation, and the natural defensive strength of the terrain. Either type of position defense is employed primarily to hold a superior enemy in place and gain time pending the development of more favorable conditions for the strategic counteroffensive, or for local tactical offensives in other areas. Defense on a wide front (fig. 33) finds Chinese units deployed in width and depth in a series of individual defensive positions spaced relatively far apart; each position is capable of self-sustained action, and the series of positions is backed by a much larger force of mobile reserves than is employed during position defense on a normal front. Defense on a normal front (fig. 34) consists of one or more mutually supporting systems of defense zones arranged in depth. The depth of each system is governed by the depth of the zones of the armies deployed therein. Each system of defense zones presents a line with only minor breaks. Either type of position defense, to be effective, must halt the enemy's offensive before a given area; inflict significant losses on hostile manpower and materiel; and, during its course, gain the time needed by the higher commander to mass forces in relative security for future offensive actions.

115. SELECTION OF POSITION

Regardless of the size of the force to be deployed in the defense of one position, the Chinese commander must choose a defensive location that fulfills several distinct strategic and tactical requirements.

a. *Strategic requirements* dictate that the position's location prevents the enemy from by-passing it in any general advance. The position must also be suitable for use as a base for launching a counter-offensive. It is imperative that the commander avoid selection of a position that will permit his forces to be contained in place by minor hostile forces while the remainder of the hostile force progresses to vital objectives in the rear.

b. *Tactical requirements* oblige the commander

to select a position whose terrain will protect the defense's flanks, and also offer river lines or mountains on which to base the defense. The position should also provide good, secure lines of communications serving the area; adequate fields of fire; observation deep into hostile territory, and protection for concentrations of mobile reserves. Whenever possible, terrain should be selected which hinders the maneuver of hostile armored elements before, within, and on the flanks of the defense zone.

116. FLEXIBILITY

a. Chinese Communist military writings teach that retention of freedom of movement is the life of an army; the commander who loses freedom of movement brings his force one step closer to defeat and destruction. Thus flexibility is of primary concern to the commander who takes up a defense in one position. Under any condition, it is essential that the commander maintain the capability to avoid or parry a hostile blow, or to place mass where it can counterattack to advantage.

b. On the basis of these precepts, the Chinese Communist commander is taught to organize an *elastic defense*. This simply means that he applies the principle of elasticity to the organization and conduct of his defense. In so doing, the commander insures freedom of maneuver by consideration of time, distance, and the force to be moved; the effective employment of fire power; the disposition of both troop strength and defensive positions in great depth; preparation of alternate, supplementary, and switch positions; construction of covered routes which link defense areas; and the retention of powerful reserves in covered assembly areas and blocking positions at critical locations throughout the defense zone.

117. FACTORS FAVORING ADOPTION OF DEFENSE IN ONE POSITION

The principal factor that leads to defense in one position is the necessity for defending a vital strategic area. Such an area may consist of essential supply or troop concentrations; essential industries or sources of raw materials; a seat of government; essential agricultural resources; or even territory gained outside the confines of China, the loss of

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


Figure 33. Simplified diagram of a defense zone on a wide front.

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


Figure 34. Simplified diagram of a defense zone on a normal front.

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which would result in political disaster to the regime. A defense in one position is also considered favorably when:

- The opposing forces are at near parity in total combat strength, and imminent arrival of Chinese Communist reinforcements indicates a major tactical victory is probable if the engagement is continued.
- The natural defensive nature of the terrain permits a stubborn defense, with attendant serious losses to the enemy.

c. A defense in a specific position will cause the enemy to change his plan of maneuver, thus placing him in an unfavorable position to counter a planned, coordinated Chinese Communist counteroffensive action.

d. A firm stand against hostile successes is essential to continued popular support of the state's war effort.

118. ALTERNATE PLANS

a. The senior Chinese commander is cautioned that it is inadvisable to continue an engagement in which victory is not in sight. Even though a defense in one position has been adopted, the commander must be prepared to execute a retrograde movement to conserve his strength and select a more opportune moment for engaging the enemy. For this reason, the commander develops plans for withdrawal to new defense positions, or even safe assembly areas, well behind the area occupied by his reserves. Rear positions are reconnoitered and prepared in great depth; switch positions are developed between reserve positions in the defense zone and the alternate positions deep in the rear. Switch positions are oriented perpendicular or diagonal to the front of each defense zone (fig. 34), and are designed to canalize the enemy's movement subsequent to breakthrough; in effect, switch positions put the

enemy at a disadvantage by forcing him to cross difficult terrain as he approaches alternate positions, and subject his forces to the annihilating effects of intense crossfire.

b. In addition to basic plans for retrograde movements, the commander plans for defense against hostile forces that may seek to outflank his position or penetrate his rear area by land, sea, or air, as well as against guerrilla operations directed at lines of communications and administrative installations. Primary auxiliary defense plans include those to protect against armored, air, or airborne assault. If a portion of the defended area rests on a sea frontier, ground force security elements establish beach defenses and maintain security against assault by sea. Appropriate naval elements, under the ground force commander, extend the range of early warning, and assist in countering hostile seaborne attacks or raids.

c. Control of the civilian population throughout the commander's assigned area of operations is essential from three standpoints. First, the necessity for control of dissident elements to prevent their aiding the enemy by sabotage, civil disturbance, or passing information to the enemy. Second, the fact that the Armed Forces rely to a great extent on conscripted civilian labor for numerous defensive engineering tasks. And third, the population is required to provide material support in the form of food, forage, animals, carts, and the like at the demand of the military. Plans for control of the civilian population, to include their evacuation from the defense zone when necessary, are prepared and implemented by the command's political staff. Every effort is made to retain active, popular support for the Communist forces. If this fails, plans call for strict military government and ruthless suppression of the population; combat elements are diverted to this mission as required.

Section IV. THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE

119. GENERAL DOCTRINE

a. The strategic counteroffensive is most commonly employed after a successful strategic retrograde movement during which the enemy has been weakened through attrition and placed in an unfavorable, over-extended position. The counteroffensive may also be resorted to subsequent to a local reverse or stalemate during an offensive campaign; in this case the counteroffensive is executed

after a limited withdrawal and regrouping of forces. In either case, the combining of the counteroffensive with either a strategic retrograde on a large scale or a limited withdrawal on a tactical scale takes the form of the planned defensive-offensive of Western doctrine.

b. The Communists prefer to strike with the counteroffensive when the enemy is on the move or has not yet consolidated gains in a particular locale.

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This positive defensive measure makes use of concentrated military force in violent and swift destruction of the enemy's strength in battles of quick decision. Offensive tactics employed in the counteroffensive are primarily those of the envelopment, employed on interior lines. By a determined series of tactical offensive operations, the Chinese Communists strive further to alter the balance of power in their favor. A successful counteroffensive campaign that substantially shifts superiority to the Chinese Communists presages the assumption of the strategic offensive along the entire front.

120. PURPOSE

The counteroffensive is the principal means of altering the course of a defensive war. On a smaller scale, it is the sole means of turning local reverses, or a situation of stalemate, into success. On either a strategic or tactical level the counteroffensive serves to gain and maintain the initiative, and permits annihilation of large portions of the enemy's fighting potential through operations on interior lines. A successful maneuver transforms a defensive situation into offensive operations on exterior lines, menacing positions vital to the enemy and challenging him to decisive engagements on terms chosen by the Chinese Communists.

121. REQUIREMENTS

Chinese Communist doctrine for a successful counteroffensive establishes several specified requirements that are applicable to that operation in either a strategic or a tactical sense. Prime among these requirements are:

a. Thorough Preparation. Plans for the counteroffensive must be directed toward victory in the first engagement, must take into consideration the course of the entire campaign, and must be related to the strategic phase that is to follow. Plans provide initially for a highly mobile striking force backed by adequate reserves of combat units and materiel to maintain the momentum of the counteroffensive to its conclusion. Provision is made for alternate courses of action to meet unexpected enemy reactions. All engagements are to be entered into solely on the initiative of the Chinese Communist commander.

b. Correct Timing. The commander should initiate the counteroffensive only when his estimate

indicates that the enemy situation, the terrain, the condition of Chinese Communist forces, the temper of the people, and other conditions are favorable to him or unfavorable to the enemy. Otherwise, the commander should continue active defense measures and cautiously bide his time. Chinese Communist commanders are enjoined to avoid rashly accepting battle at the outset of the counteroffensive if by so doing they will lose the initiative on the first move.

c. Concentration of a Preponderance of Force. The concentration of force advocated for the counteroffensive by Chinese Communist military writings is based on the principle of guaranteeing either an absolute or a relative superiority for operations on a given battlefield. To cope with a strong enemy or to conduct offensive operations on a front of vital importance, absolute superiority is required—a ratio of 5 to 1, or better. In dealing with a weak foe, or operating on a front of secondary importance, only a relatively superior force is required—a ratio of 3 to 1, for example. Parity, and sometimes even inferiority, is tolerated, but only in holding or frontal attacks executed in conjunction with powerful enveloping forces.

d. Scheme of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuver prior to the execution of the counteroffensive must be such that it permits rapid, facile concentration of force unknown to the enemy. The aggressive actions of covering forces and rear guards are employed to fix the enemy's attention on the situation on his immediate front in an area whose capture is considered important to the hostile commander. The preliminary scheme of maneuver is thus designed to lure the enemy into penetrating to a depth where he is overextended, exhausted, and ripe for the striking power of the Chinese Communist counteroffensive. The scheme of maneuver for the counteroffensive stage is built about the envelopment, the favorite offensive maneuver, executed in conjunction with aggressive frontal attacks to isolate the opposing forces and destroy or capture them.

e. Favorable Positions. Terrain in the vicinity of the concentration area, which the Chinese also call the terminus of retreat, must both protect the process of concentration and be favorable for future operations. Terrain on both sides of the covering or rear guard forces should permit the flanks of the withdrawing elements and the assembling force to

be held and protected. The terrain must also permit powerful counteroffensive forces to be launched with surprise and speed towards areas essential to the enemy's continued ability to resist.

122. EXECUTION OF THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

a. The fundamental principle of the counteroffensive is to destroy the enemy's forces by large-scale envelopment and encirclement operations. Armored forces and motorized infantry elements are favored by the Chinese Communists for this phase of the operation, and may be used in conjunction with airborne units if the situation permits. Forces for coordinated frontal attacks or holding actions are normally those in contact with the enemy's advancing columns.

b. It is essential that forces necessary to accom-

plish the envelopment or encirclement of the enemy be moved to the areas of principal effort in utmost secrecy. These moves are normally made during darkness in conjunction with stiffening resistance, or outright offensive actions, on the part of covering forces in contact with the forward elements of the enemy. When the main attacks are launched, a frontal attack is combined with the attack of the enveloping or encircling forces. Both attacks are supported by combat aviation functioning in close support and reconnaissance roles. Main attack forces strike deep into the enemy's rear, seizing bridges, communications centers, and defiles along the hostile lines of communications; subsequent to that action a portion of this force turns back and joins in assaults on exposed enemy flanks being conducted by isolation forces, which are dispatched as the envelopment progresses.

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CHAPTER 10

EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES

Section I. MOVEMENT OF RESERVES

123. GENERAL

a. The period since early 1950 has been one of evolution for the Chinese fighting forces. During this time, modernization and standardization have been stressed in a continuing program to build a modern Army. Organization and equipment changes have been characterized by a general increase in unit strengths, together with substantial additions of heavy support-type materiel. These improvements have resulted in a marked decrease in cross-country mobility, making the Chinese Communist Army of today far more roadbound than their revolutionary antecedents. Concurrently, rapid expansion of China's internal road and rail networks and the experience gained in the Korean operation have materially encouraged the growing dependency of the army upon motorized forms of transportation. Problems attendant to moving large ground units have consequently magnified in complexity, and demand thorough assessment to determine maximum capability.

b. The Chinese Communists rely largely upon rail, motor, and foot movements to move troop units, both within China and in a theater of operations in situations that do not require tactical march formations. In Korea, reserves and reinforcements were moved as far forward as possible by rail or motor vehicles, often assuming tactical march formations as they detrained or detrucked. In the closing days of the operation, motor marches were common in forward areas, some extending into the rear areas of divisions on line. Truck regiments available to higher commanders (par. 363) were used extensively to supplement organic transportation means, and reserves could be shifted rapidly to meet unexpected situations, or concentrate troops for an offensive.

c. The Chinese Communist army is the basis for the movement factors presented in paragraphs 124-128. The army was selected because it represents the maneuver element of the large unit commander. Too, it is the largest self-contained tactical echelon

commonly encountered in the Chinese Communist Army. Paragraphs 124-128 deal briefly with some of the more fundamental aspects of troop movements as they influence movement of large unit reserves or reinforcements; they apply equally to movement of other troops. The organization and equipment of the army used herein is that shown in figure 97.

124. TYPES OF TROOP MOVEMENTS

a. The Chinese Communists move units by one of two general methods, depending upon the existing situation.

(1) *By transportation means.* Transportation means are used to move units from one place to another under conditions of little or no threat of ground attack. When being transported, units—including men, weapons, artillery pieces, and even trucks and tanks—are moved by rail or water transportation or by vehicles other than those organic to the organization. In a theater of operations, this type of movement is commonly carried out in army group rear areas in the combat zone or the theater rear administrative area, and is the Chinese Communist equivalent of an administrative march in the U. S. Army doctrine. Its purpose is to conserve the strength of the troops and expedite the movement.

(2) *By marches.* A march is a movement in which infantry elements (normally the battalion) move on foot and other elements move by motor or animal-drawn carts employing their organic equipment. The purpose of a march is to move a unit to a designated area within a prescribed time. It is performed in such a manner as to conserve the troops' strength and protect their weapons, yet maintain tactical integrity of the unit. Marches are most often conducted in the forward part of a theater combat zone.

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Figure 35. Chinese Communist rail movement in Korea.

b. Although the Chinese do not classify movements in a theater of operations as administrative or tactical, they do recognize the conditions involved. They adapt their formations to, and take normal actions in accordance with, those two general situations. In the case of movement under tactical conditions, the Chinese commander initiates his march employing a close column protected by minimum essential reconnaissance and security elements (contact remote); as the danger of hostile ground contact increases, he extends his formation and increases reconnaissance and security measures (contact improbable); where development of the enemy is impending, reconnaissance and security measures are intensified and formations are adopted that will allow a continuation of the movement but facilitate entry into combat (contact imminent). Tactical movements within the combat zone are classified, according to their purpose, as:

(1) *Advance march.* The purpose of an advance march is to move troops into advantageous positions to engage the

enemy. Such a march might include movement to contact, a shift of reserves from one part of the line to another, exploitation, pursuit, or a forward movement of reserves from assembly areas to engage the enemy.

(2) *Withdrawal march.* The purpose of a withdrawal march is to refuse, combat. The Chinese term has the connotation of recede or decline and should be compared to the U. S. Army concept of a tactical movement away from the enemy rather than the United States withdrawal.

125. RAIL MOVEMENTS

Troops traveling by rail for the most part are carried in common 30-ton freight cars, with the platoon serving as the basic unit of car loading. Platoons differ in size depending upon type and function; however, an average of 48 men and officers, their personal weapons and impedimenta, and

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INFANTRY DIVISION		ROLLING STOCK		
ITEM	LOADING FACTOR	BOX	FLAT	GONDOLA
12 75-mm GUNS (HOWITZER)	3 PER FLAT		4	
12 76.2-mm FIELD GUNS	3 PER FLAT		4	
12 122-mm HOWITZERS	2 PER FLAT		6	
12 120-mm MORTARS	6 PER GONDOLA		12	2
12 37-mm AA AW	1 PER FLAT		368	
368 TRUCKS, CARGO/PMVR, LOADED	3 PER FLAT		1	
3 CARS, ARMORED	1 PER FLAT		36	
36 TANKS, MEDIUM	9 PER GONDOLA			95
852 ANIMALS	48 PER BOX	396	431	97
18,976 OFFICERS AND MEN		396		
TOTAL				

NOTE
Loading factors are based on rolling stock of the following dimensions:

	CAPACITY	LENGTH	WIDTH
BOX	30 S/T	32' 0"	9' 4"
FLAT	30 S/T	34' 0"	8' 6"
GONDOLA	30 S/T	30' 0"	9' 4"

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Figure 36. Table of rail transportation requirements, division and army.

the platoon's organizational equipment are loaded in a single boxcar. The resultant crowding and inconvenience are obvious, but the average soldier accepts the situation with oriental resignation. The heavier or more bulky items of material, such as artillery, tanks, and trucks, are hauled on 30- or 50-ton flatcars, whereas horses and mules travel in high-sided gondolas. A typical mixed train containing both troop and equipment cars will average about 30 cars in length and carry the equivalent of 1 infantry battalion. Train requirements for a TO&E army are shown in figure 37, whereas a detailed breakdown of car requirements is listed in figure 36.

126. MOTOR MOVEMENTS

a. The characteristics of flexibility and speed of concentration offered by motor transportation are becoming increasingly apparent to the Chinese Communists. This awareness has been a natural corollary to the growing number of vehicles available throughout the Army. In turn, the motor movement of troops has become more and more frequent. Most of the reported moves have involved battalion- and regimental-size units, but there are known instances wherein entire armies have been transported long distances. For the most part, however, the Chinese Communists lack experience in large-scale motor marches and their overall

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PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	NUMBER OF TRAINS REQUIRED		
		25-CAR	30-CAR	40-CAR
100%	100%	120.9	100.7	75.5

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Figure 37. Table of train requirements per army.

motor efficiency falls considerably below accepted United States Army standards. When operating over typical road nets within China, military convoys currently cover about 24 kilometers per hour during daylight and average 195 kilometers per day. The night rate is reportedly about 16 kilometers per hour. Road performance has definitely progressed since 1950, and the trend indicates still greater improvement in the future. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that under ideal march conditions the Chinese Communists can attain an average rate of 250 kilometers per day on motor marches. On the basis of similar reasoning, it may be assumed that distances of 400 kilometers or less may be negotiated by forced march in 1 traveling day under ideal conditions.

b. The 2½-ton trucks (fig. 62) are the principal cargo vehicle and prime mover in use by Communist China's Army. During motor movements, the average 4 x 2 and 4 x 4 trucks are loaded with 13 men, their personal gear, and a proportionate share of organizational equipment. The average 6 x 6 similarly carries 16 men. Artillery and anti-aircraft weapons usually are towed by troop-carry-

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ITEM	DIVISION	ARMY
NUMBER OF ORGANIC VEHICLES (INCLUDING ARMOR)	438	1,494
PERSONNEL CAPACITY OF VEHICLES	5,830	20,948
TOTAL PERSONNEL	18,976	60,616
PERSONNEL REQUIRING VEHICLES	13,156	39,468
NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL VEHICLES REQUIRED (TRUCKS, 6 x 6)	822	2,479
TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES REQUIRED (INCLUDING ARMOR)	1,260	3,973

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Figure 38. Table of vehicle and rail car requirements, Chinese Communist army.

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ing vehicles. Tank units move with their parent unit in movements covering short distances; on long moves, tank units are moved by rail as far forward as possible, then they join their parent unit in its assembly area by executing a road march to the final destination. The only serious complications to motor-movement planning are caused by the horses and carts normally assigned to each division's rear service department. Movement of these elements by truck is ordinarily impractical. However, where

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UNIT	TRUCKS PER UNIT (1)	ROAD SPACE PER UNIT (2)	TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN UNITS (3)	DISTANCE BETWEEN UNITS (4)	TOTAL ROAD ALLOWANCE (5)	TIME LENGTH (6)
REGIMENT	286	16.3 km (5)	6 min	2.4 km	18.7 km	47 min
DIVISION	1180	76.9 km (6)	15 min	6.0 km	82.9 km	3hrs28min
ARMY	3733	259.7 km (7)	90 min	36.0 km	295.7 km	12hrs19min

NOTES:

- (1) Includes ½-ton trucks.
- (2) Close column (50 meters between vehicles), average vehicle length is 7 meters. Road space also includes distance between subordinate units.
- (3) Based on 24 km per hour.
- (4) Excludes tank regiments; add 5.7 km per tank regiment participating in the move.
- (5) Includes 4 battalion series, 3-minute interval between series.
- (6) Includes 5 series, 3 infantry regiments, division troops, division trains.
- (7) Includes 4 series, 3 infantry divisions, army troops.

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Figure 39. Table of road space requirements for motor movement of a regiment, division, and army.

a parallel route such as a rail line or waterway exists, it becomes feasible to haul the animals and carts to the destination, where they rejoin the main column. In cases where no alternative is offered, the horses and carts must necessarily march. Since this would reduce the speed of the entire unit to the rate of a forced foot march, and since sound doctrine would prohibit commitment of the fighting echelons without adequate logistical followup, the animal-drawn field train is often dispatched to forward assembly

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areas before the move of the main body. This situation is being overcome, however, by the increased number of motor vehicles in tactical echelons; divisions now have a limited capability for sustained operations without the immediate support of their animal-drawn field train. The combined rail and motor requirements for an army are given in figure 38, and the vehicular road space allowance and time length in figure 39.

127. FOOT MOVEMENTS

a. Until quite recently the Chinese Communists considered the foot march the most reliable method for large-scale troop movements. Indeed, great emphasis still is placed on march conditioning during training, and the troops are constantly imbued with its vital importance. Nevertheless, experience has taught Chinese leaders that the foot march has two distinct shortcomings: progress is slow, and troops tire easily. Thus, in the Chinese Communist Army today the foot march, at least insofar as administrative marches are concerned, is becoming more of a supplementary method of travel, serving where needed to augment, or to overcome lack of, more efficient transportation means.

b. The Chinese Communists accept a marching day of 7 to 8 hours as normal; when the move is increased to 10 or 12 hours, the march is said to be a forced march. The maximum marching time for forced marches is 16 hours per day. Speed of movement during daylight hours is normally about 5 kilometers per hour over average roads, or about 35 to 40 kilometers per day, while forced marches are normally at a rate of 50 to 60 kilometers per day. Night marches are conducted at a speed of about 3 kilometers per hour over a 6- to 7-hour period. If a march is to be made cross-country, or over bad roads, the rate of march may be reduced to as little as 1 to 1½ kilometers per hour. The calculated road space requirements for an army marching in columns of twos on one or both sides of the road under normal daylight and night conditions are given in figure 40.

c. The capabilities of Chinese Communist units listed above should be modified, however, for marches in excess of 120 kilometers. For example, large units in Korea conducted extended marches (320 to 480 kilometers) at an average rate of only 32 kilometers per day—probably owing to the length of the march and the requirement that the troops are

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ITEM	UNIT	REGIMENT	DIVISION (1)	ARMY (2)
OFFICERS AND MEN		4,838	18,976	60,616
ORGANIC VEHICLES (ALL TYPES)		131	730	2,370
VEHICLES IN FIELD TRAINS (CARTS)		75	292	876
VEHICLES IN MARCH COLUMN		56	438	1,496
MEN ON FOOT (3)		4,050	13,156	40,844
ROAD SPACE (KILOMETERS)				
MEN ON FOOT (4)				
SINGLE COLUMN OF TWOS				
DAY (5)		7.75	29.27	99.19
NIGHT (6)		5.68	14.64	48.60
DOUBLE COLUMN OF TWOS				
DAY		5.73	22.68	78.73
NIGHT		2.92	11.35	39.37
VEHICLES IN MARCH COLUMN				
DAY (50 METERS BETWEEN VEHICLES)		3.19	25.00	100.89
NIGHT (10 METERS BETWEEN VEHICLES)		0.95	7.45	30.09
TIME LENGTH (MINUTES)				
MEN ON FOOT				
SINGLE COLUMN OF TWOS				
DAY (5 km/hr)		93	351	1,190
NIGHT (3 km/hr)		77	293	992
DOUBLE COLUMN OF TWOS				
DAY (5 km/hr)		69	272	944
NIGHT (3 km/hr)		58	227	787
VEHICLES IN MARCH COLUMN				
DAY (26 km/hr)		8	62	252
NIGHT (16 km/hr)		4	28	113

NOTES:

- (1) Includes tank regiment.
- (2) Includes artillery regiment.
- (3) Infantry battalions move on foot in five march units (one for each rifle company and one for all remaining troops); all others move by vehicle.
- (4) Day time distances, between battalions, regiments and divisions are respectively 1.25 km, 2.5 km and 5.0 km. These distances are halved at night.
- (5) 2 meters between men, 100 meters between rifle companies.
- (6) 1 meter between men, 50 meters between rifle companies.

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Figure 40. Table of road spaces and time lengths—regiment, division, and army.

rive at the line of contact fit for combat. Thus, Chinese Communist reserve forces in a theater may be said to have a march capability generally as follows:

- (1) Those reserves in the immediate rear areas that are within 120 kilometers of the line of contact are capable of marching up to approximately 50 to 60 kilometers per day.
- (2) Those reserves in more distant rear areas

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(more than 120 kilometers from the line of contact) are capable of marching up to 32 kilometers per day over an extended period of time.

128. THE TRANSPORTATION EQUATION

a. Preceding paragraphs have dealt with methods of troop movement and with the equipment used to conduct movements by transportation means. It is now appropriate to ascertain the rate at which Chinese Communist armies can be moved over lines of communications in a typical theater. This calculation is most readily accomplished with the aid of an empirical formula that is a linear expression, quantitatively relating movement capacity to time. The basic equation in its simplest form is: $mX + L = A$, wherein:

- m = A constant for a given route equal to the number of days required to close one army.
- X = Number of armies to be moved over the route.
- L = A constant for the route equal to the number of days required to travel its length, using the most appropriate combinations of transportation.
- A = Total number of days to complete the movement.

b. It is apparent that once the number of armies to be moved has been specified, the formula may be solved for the total number of days required to move over a route and to close them at the destination. On the other hand, if a finite amount of time is assumed, it is possible to calculate the maximum number of armies that can be moved and closed. The former postulate is illustrated by the following example:

A certain main supply route can accept the equivalent of one-half of an army per day. Four days are required to travel from the starting point to the terminus. How long will it take to close three armies at the destination?

Solution: $m = 2$ (Since the route capacity is one-half of an army per day, it would take 2 days to close one army)

$X = 3$ (number of armies)

$L = 4$ (number of days to make a journey over the route)

$A = \text{Unknown (number of days)}$

$mX + L = A$

$2 \times 3 + 4 = A$

$A = 10$ days (time required to move and close the three armies)

Section II. RESERVES IN THE OFFENSIVE

129. GENERAL

a. Chinese Communist tactical doctrine holds that in an offensive operation a reserve is a portion of a force withheld from combat pending commitment in a decisive direction to clinch victory, to exploit success, or to counter a hostile threat to the success of the operation. In general, a reserve should not exceed one-ninth of the total strength of a force; it should be a balanced force composed of components of all available combat arms, and should be highly mobile. The reserve is disposed in depth, prepared for commitment on order of the force commander. Doctrine does not specify the lowest command echelon that should retain a reserve, but applies the one-ninth factor to all tactical echelons, apparently with equal weight.

b. In practice, however, the Chinese Communists depart widely from established teaching. The reserve at a given echelon of command ranges from none to as much as one-half of the total force. An army, for example, is often committed in its entirety, and backed by reserve armies available to a higher commander. On the other hand, an army may be

committed in three echelons of relatively equal strength; the echelons are assigned attack, support, and reserve roles, respectively. In other cases, tactical commanders frequently have limited retention of reserves to units of regimental-size or higher, contending that a reserve at lower levels of command results in too few troops participating in the attack. At the close of the Korean War the portion of a force a commander initially held in reserve in offensive operations, at least at division through army group command echelons, appeared to be stabilized at one-third of his total strength.

c. The total proportion of a large unit initially withheld from action is usually much more than that fraction retained as an actual reserve under the immediate control of the commander. When planning his scheme of offensive maneuver, the large unit commander normally divides his command into three basic forces (sometimes called echelons): a main attack force, a secondary attack force, and a reserve force (fig. 41). In turn, he usually requires the commander of the main attack force to deploy in three echelons comprised of an attack, a support, and a reserve echelon. The commander

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


Figure 41. Reserves in the offensive.

of the secondary attack force usually is required to deploy his force in two echelons: An attack echelon and a reserve echelon. The large unit commander exercises indirect control over the support and reserve echelons of the main and secondary attack forces by assigning general immediate and subsequent missions for those echelons to perform. At the outset of an offensive, the large unit commander actually has either direct or indirect control of between one-half to two-thirds of his total strength.

130. COMPOSITION

When determining the strength and composition of his reserve, the Chinese Communist commander evaluates, in relation to one another, his mission;

the composition and situation of his own force and the hostile force he is to attack; the terrain; the situation of adjacent friendly forces; the composition and location of hostile reserves; and the routes over which they are likely to move; and the strength of the hostile defenses.

a. At army and army group levels, the commander's objective is to retain balanced components of infantry, armor, engineer, signal, chemical, and cavalry troops which can be quickly dispatched to exploit success or counter hostile threats. When the hostile armored capability is limited, tank-infantry components may be held under a single reserve commander, with a portion of the force's artillery prepared to support their point maneuver.

Engineer, signal, and chemical elements are added as required to breach obstacles, maintain communications, and employ smoke or other chemical agents. In the event of an extensive hostile armored capability, however, the commander usually will form a separate armored reserve command. Such a reserve command is also formed when the terrain or hostile defenses do not favor the initial employment of armor, or when it is believed there will be a requirement for a highly mobile force to pursue a retreating enemy or otherwise exploit success. Troop units for the armored reserve command usually comprise not more than one-third of the armor available to the force commander, both under his immediate control and in subordinate commands. The presence of a hostile armored capability also induces the commander to retain a reserve of anti-tank artillery, under central control, readily available to reinforce attack echelons or defend against surprise flank counterattacks by enemy tanks. Artillery rarely is held in reserve at tactical echelons of command. Artillery liaison teams, however, as well as air-ground liaison teams, are provided the reserve commander.

b. Theater or field army general reserves consist primarily of reserve armies, grouped under army groups, deployed in strategic locations within a theater from which they can rapidly reinforce success in an offensive campaign, relieve units in contact, or block and destroy a hostile counteroffensive. At the outset of an offensive campaign, the commander strives to maintain a balance of three general reserve armies to each two committed in the offensive. Other general reserve forces may include armored, cavalry, airborne, air, artillery (in particular, heavy, high-power, and antitank artillery), reconnaissance, engineer, signal, chemical, and service forces. These general reserve forces are employed to form independent joint task forces for offensive operations, to reinforce units in contact, or to exploit success in the hostile depth. Besides ground and air combat elements and service forces, Chinese Communist doctrine considers materiel, such as weapons, munitions, fuel, and ration stock piles, to be a part of the reserve force at higher echelons of command. In some cases the commander also is obliged to consider civilian resources, both human and material, as a part of his reserve to be committed as required by the situation.

c. From the standpoint of the high command in

Peiping, the Armed Forces' strategic reserve for an offensive war consists primarily of those conventional Army elements within China that are not committed to an active theater or another essential military mission. Other components contributing to the strategic reserve force are national Public Security Forces, Railway Corps Forces, personnel and units in training installations, and personnel on reserve lists. Better trained elements of the People's Militia may also be considered part of the strategic reserve. Such reserves also can be bolstered by personnel from State-operated transportation and communications systems. The rank and file of the population have been in the past, and no doubt will be again, mobilized as a labor force to release military components for offensive operations.

131. LOCATION

a. The initial location of a reserve will vary with the type of offensive maneuver, the probable mission of the reserve, the terrain, the commander's knowledge of the situation, and the anticipated hostile reaction. Since the principal purpose of a reserve in an offensive is to exploit success, other factors being favorable, the Chinese Communist commander places his reserve where it can maneuver behind his main attack force, prepared to widen a successful breach in the hostile line during a penetration; follow rapidly in the wake of an enveloping force to execute attacks on the hostile rear; or destroy enemy reinforcements. In the event an exposed flank or a hostile threat exists, the commander disposed his reserve in that direction, prepared to block a hostile counterattack or provide flank security. When the situation is obscure, the commander disposes his reserve in a central location where it is prepared to move rapidly to the front or either flank. As an offensive operation progresses, the commander strives to maintain a uniform rate of advance for his reserve. Division reserves follow behind attack or support echelons at approximately 3 to 5 kilometers; those of an army remain within 15 kilometers of the main attack force; and army group reserves attempt to stay within 40 kilometers of the rear of the subordinate command in the main effort, or a distance that does not exceed one night's motor march.

b. The location selected for the reserve should afford a degree of security against surprise attack, yet not limit the security of the entire force by re-

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stricting the reserve's mobility. The commander selects initial and subsequent locations for his reserve that provide natural defile whenever possible. Natural protection is supplemented by construction of shelters and camouflaged measures, and conventional warning systems to warn against air, armor, and CBR attack. Dispersion in forward reserve assembly areas is also practiced, with forces of approximately battalion-size grouped in individual ravines off large valleys.

c. Locations occupied by the reserve during the course of an operation are usually along, or near, convenient routes of communication. This preserves mobility—especially in the case of armored or motorized elements—and vehicles frequently are pooled to facilitate forward displacement of elements whose organic transportation is insufficient. The force commander maintains communication with reserve command posts, and extends facilities to projected locations for the reserve as the situation permits. Radio is the principal means of control of his reserve during movement. As the offensive progresses, the commander requires repair of essential roads and bridges in the wake of attack and support echelons to insure the mobility of his reserve units; he is prepared if necessary to cede priority of roads and other routes of advance to his reserve troops in preference to the forward movement of artillery and supplies.

132. EMPLOYMENT

a. Although doctrine teaches that authority to commit his reserve in an offensive operation rests with the commander of a force, Chinese Communist commanders are, in practice, often restrained by the combat plans and orders of higher echelons. It is common practice, for example, for a commander to specify the general conditions under which subordinate commanders, through two echelons down the chain of command, may commit their reserves. In only two cases are they permitted complete license: In the event of a direct, immediate enemy threat to their force; or in the case of pursuit of a retreating enemy. In other situations, deviation from the senior commander's plans must have prior approval.

b. The Chinese Communists contend that successful employment of reserves in an offensive operation is dependent upon an initial plan of maneuver

for reserves that favors the general offensive scheme; superior command control during the operation; appropriate timing; and an accurate, continuing estimate of the combat situation. Initial plans for employment of reserves prescribe their composition, location, and maneuver with intent to increase the attacking power of the force to a maximum degree while limiting the conditions under which they may be committed. These plans are the basis for initial orders assigning general missions to reserve commanders. Specific missions are assigned only during the progress of the operation. Plans of senior commanders also include provisions governing communications during the operation; provide for prompt air and artillery support for reserves as they are committed; assign movement and supply priorities for reserve forces; and prescribe training to be carried out before the operation.

c. The commander achieves correct timing of his decision to commit reserves under his control by a continuous analysis of the general situation; he places principal reliance on his evaluation of the character of the hostile resistance encountered by attack echelons.

- (1) In an envelopment, when both his enveloping and frontal attack forces have progressed satisfactorily, he will commit his reserve in an attack against the hostile rear to prevent a successful withdrawal.
- (2) In a penetration, subsequent to a successful breach in the hostile defense, the commander will commit his reserve in attacks on the created flanks to widen the breach and make possible the secure passage of reserves of higher commanders.
- (3) In the event of a general enemy withdrawal, he will maneuver his reserve around the flanks of his attack forces to strike at the hostile flanks, cut withdrawal routes, and disrupt the hostile maneuver.
- (4) Should the hostile force show intention to retreat, the commander rapidly commits his reserve to move on routes parallel to those employed by the enemy, move deep into his rear, then turn and strike at the head of hostile columns.
- (5) Should a powerful hostile counterattack that cannot be dealt with by reserves of subordinate commanders threaten the suc-

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cess of the operation, the commander commits his reserve in an attack on the advancing force, preferable at a time when the hostile force is about to deploy, or is in the process of deploying, for combat. The engagement is planned to take place in a location where the reserve can receive fire support from rear echelon components of friendly attack forces.

- (6) Should an element of the main attack force falter, or meet insuperable resistance in a critical direction, the commander will

commit his reserve to reinforce the power of the offensive in its main direction.

Doctrine warns against piecemeal commitment of a reserve, and advocates a rapid, decisive attack in a single direction against the critical portion of the hostile force. A reserve must be reconstituted once the original reserve has been committed; the commander forms a new reserve from units that have become available through relief from combat, or by weakening his forces deployed in directions that are no longer critical. Failing in this, he appeals to higher authority for additional forces.

Section III. RESERVES IN DEFENSE**133. GENERAL**

a. In defensive combat, the reserve is that portion of a force disposed to support troops in the main defense zone by fire and maneuver, provide security forces before the main defense zone, and protect the flanks and rear against hostile threat. As a rule, the commander of a force on the defensive initially withholds from one-third to two-thirds of his strength as a reserve under his immediate control, depending upon the type of tactical defense adopted. If position defense is elected, the commander disposes his forces "heavy in front, light in rear." In the case of mobile defense, the opposite is true. In both types of defense, mobility of the reserve within the defense zone is held to be the key to a successful operation. Security, and the ability to shift the reserve rapidly within the defense zone, are maintained by deploying portions of its strength in the depths of the defense zone close to covered routes of approach leading to possible points of hostile penetration. Doctrine teaches, and practice confirms, that reserves are retained at all levels of command above the rifle squad.

b. As in the offense, the tactical commander follows the practice of designating the proportion of his subordinate commands, through two lower command echelons, that is to be retained initially in reserve, and the general conditions under which it may be committed. Through this practice the army commander, for example, retains initial control of the reserves of his subordinate divisions and regiments in the main defense zone as well as his army reserve (fig. 42). The army reserve is initially split

into two components; one deployed in the secondary defense zone from which it supports the action of forces in the main defense zone by fire and maneuver, the other held in mobile reserve to counter hostile threats to the main defense zone, the flanks, and rear. The latter reserve force also initially may provide troops to be employed as general outpost forces before the main defense zone. Thus, of a large unit deployed in defense, the total proportion that is initially held in a direct or indirect reserve status may approach three-fourths of its total strength.

134. COMPOSITION

a. Factors affecting composition of the reserve of tactical units disposed in defensive zones include the unit's mission, the terrain, the condition of adjacent units, the composition of the opposing forces, the reinforcements available to higher commands, the probability of passing to the counteroffensive, and the estimated enemy offensive capabilities and intentions. Based upon his evaluation of these factors, the commander builds his reserve around an infantry component; the infantry is reinforced with armor, cavalry, antitank artillery, engineer, signal, chemical, and reconnaissance troops as required by the situation. Artillery and air liaison teams are a normal attachment. Artillery, other than antitank, is normally not retained in reserve, but is employed in support of forces in the main defense zone. The commander, however, designates a portion of his artillery to render prompt support for his reserves as they are committed in a counterattack, blocking, or security role.

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


Figure 42. Reserves in defense.

b. The reserves of higher commanders in defensive campaigns consist of basically the same type of troop units as are retained during the offensive. The proportion of armies in contact and in reserve differs, however. The desirable ratio for defense in one position is two general reserve armies to each one committed to a defense zone; mobile defensive warfare find the desirable ratio, initially at least, varying between three and four to one. The size of the armored general reserve is also increased. Reserves of materiel, especially munitions and rations, are also increased during defensive operations. The higher commander disposes materiel resources well forward; in Korea, the Chinese Communists frequently stockpiled large amounts in forward defense zones.

c. Principal strategic reserves available to the high command to rapidly reinforce defensive operations consist of conventional ground units not assigned to active theaters. While no precedents exist, it is logical to assume that Public Security forces and elements of the People's Militia should not be discounted. During a defensive war, the high command would probably employ those forces to effect economy of regular forces in inactive areas, to control the population of China, and to safeguard mobilization of the nation's reserve components and conscription activities. Materiel resources are also a part of the strategic reserve, and include not only stockpiles of military goods and nationalized industries, but the content of national granaries and other State-owned commodities.

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135. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

a. Factors affecting the initial location of reserves in the defense include the commander's mission, the terrain, the location and condition of roads and bridges, the defensive strength of the force disposed in the main battle position, and the nature of the expected hostile threat. The commander of a large unit assigned a defensive mission disposes his force in as many as four zones: the advance zone (general outpost), the combat security zone (combat outpost), the main defense zone (main and second battle positions), and the secondary defense zone (fig. 34). In general, the commander disposes a portion of his reserve in prepared positions in the secondary defense zone, from which it can support the defensive effort of the main defense zone by fire and limited maneuver. The force also serves as a base of fire for the maneuver of the balance of his reserve. His reserve maneuver element is retained in covered assembly areas near routes of approach to possible points of hostile threat, either in the secondary defense zone, or between it and the main defense zone. A portion or all of the mobile reserve force of a large unit initially may be disposed as a general outpost force in the advance zone.

b. Security of reserves in a defensive operation is obtained by both active and passive means. The commander organizes his antiaircraft defenses to protect reserves against air attack, and prescribes direct security measures, patrol activities, and steps to be taken by reserve commanders to defend against airborne or armored attack. The reserve commander establishes observation posts, patrols, and outposts to provide observation of the flanks and rear and prevent surprise by the enemy. Small patrols also cover the area behind the main defense zone. Sentinels are posted to give the alarm in case of armored, CBR, or air attack, and antitank weapons are located in positions along likely avenues of armored approach. Passive measures are based on deception, dispersion, and concealment. Troops are dispersed, usually in groups not larger than battalion size, and are required to prepare and camouflage shelters for personnel, animals, and materiel. Camouflage discipline is observed as in front-line units. Weapons emplacements and other installations are quickly and deftly concealed or camouflaged. Most troop activity is carried out at night.

Dummy positions are located throughout the rear areas in positions designed to deceive the enemy and draw the fires of his artillery and air support.

c. The commander assures the mobility of his reserve by allocating adequate motor transportation to its infantry components, reinforcing infantry with armored elements, providing for location of the reserve near suitable lines of communication or prepared military roads leading toward anticipated areas of employment. Engineers construct roads where necessary, establish clear lanes through obstacles within the defended area, and accompany the force when it is committed to insure its advance. Chemical warfare units lay smoke to protect friendly troops when necessary. Provision is also made for prompt artillery support for forward movement to attack positions and for maneuver subsequent to initiating the counterattack. Plans for employment of reserves give consideration to movement priorities throughout the defended area.

136. EMPLOYMENT

a. As in offensive operations, Chinese Communist defensive doctrine teaches that authority to commit his reserve rests with the commander of a force. In practice, however, commanders actually limit the authority of subordinate commanders in this respect by prescribing that portion of their reserve they may commit without prior approval from higher authority, and the general conditions under which their entire reserve must be committed. For example, an army commander may limit the discretion of his front-line regimental commanders by prescribing the only situations under which they may commit their reserves on their own initiative. These limitations are usually announced in the commander's counter-attack plan, and consist of situations wherein:

- (1) Hostile forces have been stopped in front of the main defense zone by the fires of units on line, have suffered casualties, and are in disorder.
- (2) The enemy has approached the forward edge of the defense zone, is occupying positions from which it is difficult to dislodge him, and is utilizing his advantage to prepare his forces for the final assault.
- (3) The enemy has seized a battalion area (par. 247) or a corridor within the main defense zone, and is about to consolidate his position.

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b. The force commander seldom commits his reserve in its entirety until it has become apparent that all attempts by subordinate commanders to dislodge or destroy the enemy have failed. These lesser attempts include counterattacks by fire power by battalions on line, and limited counterattacks by the maneuver elements of subordinate battalions, regiments, and divisions occupying defense positions in the main defense zone. The force commander most frequently commits his reserve against an enemy force that has overrun a significant portion of his main defense zone. Subordinate commanders effect timely, coordinated, and aggressive counterattacks with forces within their immediate battle zone to destroy; drive off; or harass, weaken, and disorganize the enemy in his attack. The reserve of the large unit commander is withheld until the decisive moment, then committed in a surprise attack against the enemy when he is considered most vulnerable; i. e., before he has consolidated his gains and completed reorganization of his forces.

c. Large unit plans for employment of reserves in the defensive are broad in scope and include general conditions governing the actions and locations of reserves of the next two subordinate commands, as well as several alternate plans for employment of the force reserve. The large unit commander plans for the employment of his reserve in a wide variety of tactical missions, as well as some that are purely administrative in nature. Normal missions assigned the reserve of a large unit in defense include:

- (1) *Counterattacks.* The counterattack is rarely executed by the entire reserve strength. The reserve commander prepares plans for battalion-, regimental-, or division-size counterattacks against possible penetrations of the defense zone that cannot be overcome by elements occupying main defense zone positions. Such counterattacks are usually designed to cut off and destroy a penetrating enemy force and restore the position in the main defense zone. They are usually executed during darkness or other periods of limited visibility. Plans for counterattacks in strength before the main defense zone are normally limited to mobile defense operations.
- (2) *Providing Reinforcements.* The force commander frequently requires the reserve commander to provide one or more of his subordinate units to reinforce units in the main defense zone.
- (3) *Limiting Hostile Penetrations.* The commander often disposes a portion of his reserve strength and fire power in organized blocking positions to limit penetrations and provide protection against ground attack for critical installations in the rear. In selecting locations for these positions, particular attention is paid to areas in the rear of boundaries between units in the main defense zone.
- (4) *Effecting Flank Security.* Elements of the reserve are disposed to cover likely avenues of hostile approach if the flanks of the defense zone are exposed or lightly held.
- (5) *Relief.* The reserve commander makes plans to effect relief of one or more of the units in the main defense zone during prolonged periods of defense or subsequent to a heavy defensive action.
- (6) *Antiairborne Defense.* The reserve commander is responsible for observation and control of possible drop zones and landing areas in the rear favorable for use by hostile airborne troops, transport aircraft, or helicopters. The commander keeps a portion of his force readily available to counter the threat of a hostile airborne attack.
- (7) *Direct Security.* The reserve commander is required to provide direct security throughout the rear for such installations as artillery positions, tank assembly areas, lines of communications, and supply points. In addition, patrols are maintained to search isolated areas for hostile agents and reconnaissance parties which may have infiltrated or been air transported to points in the friendly rear area.
- (8) *Counteroffensive.* Should higher headquarters direct assumption of the counteroffensive, the reserve commander plans for the employment of his force as the spearhead of the large unit commander's attack.
- (9) *Administrative Roles.* In defensive operations, portions of the reserve may be employed to implement administrative

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details, such as traffic control measures, movement of supplies, and evacuation of casualties.

d. Training of the reserve, carried out concurrently with organization of the defense, includes combined arms training exercises to improve proficiency in one or more of the foregoing missions. The reserve commander selects terrain similar to that over which his planned operation is to be conducted and directs regimental- and battalion-size field exercises under both day and night conditions. Subordinate commanders and their key personnel are required to make detailed reconnaissance of the areas in which operations are anticipated, develop plans for coordinated action with units in the main defense zone, and rehearse troop movements over routes between covered assembly areas and reserve attack positions. Reserve units also rehearse occupation of switch positions between main and secondary defense zones and defensive positions in the secondary defense zone, which they may occupy in the event of a major penetration of, or withdrawal from, the main defense zone. Before effecting relief of a unit occupying the main defense zone, commanders of reserve units, together with key personnel, inspect the unit's defense position and routes leading thereto, then return to their units to conduct march and combat training before effecting the relief.

e. During defensive combat, commitment of reserves is carried out according to the following principles:

- (1) If the enemy has already broken into the main defense zone and his penetration has a local significance, unit commanders on line (battalion or regimental commanders) order the concentration of all fire power to contain his breakthrough. At the same time, the reserves of divisions on line counterattack to destroy the enemy. Higher commanders concentrate artillery fire to assist the counterattack of units in the main defense zone.
- (2) If local breakthroughs have been expanded to threaten a sector, and the enemy has committed large quantities of tanks and infantrymen in this sector, but the general situation of the whole defensive front is still stable, the higher commander counterattacks with his own re-

serve to destroy the enemy and restore the main defense zone.

The counterattack of the large unit commander's reserve is not considered complete until it has destroyed the enemy penetration; this destruction is considered the most important operation of defensive combat. Any delay in the counterattack will enable the enemy to stand firm and pour his reserve units in through the breach; a premature counterattack will waste strength and undermine success. Doctrine teaches, therefore, that organization and application of the counterattack should be especially deliberate and in complete accordance with plans based on anticipated situations. The commander must use all means to determine the area of the enemy's main attack, and must also promptly initiate concentration of the reserve in attack positions. At the same time, he must direct units in the main defense position, as well as artillery and air, to support the reserve. Each commander must reconstitute his reserve after the counterattack.

f. The commander of the reserve carries out the counterattack on order of the unit commander. The counterattack usually is directed against the flanks of the enemy to insure his destruction. A frontal surprise attack, the Chinese contend, will, at most, oust the enemy, whereas the desired result is to destroy him. Simultaneously, reserves of the holding force in the main defense zone that have not taken part in combat also join in the counterattack on the enemy; they may either reinforce the reserve of the higher commander, or carry out an auxiliary surprise attack on the other flank of the enemy. The artillery that supports the reserve cuts off contact between the enemy that has broken into the defense zone and his reserve units. Armor is either employed with the reserve, or may be drawn from the reserve to attack in coordination with infantry already in contact. Air elements are employed to strike the enemy's tactical reserve units advancing to the breach. Chemical warfare units coordinate with the reserve to prohibit the entrance of fresh hostile strength by setting up obstacles to impede their advance and by laying smoke screens to cover the maneuver of the Chinese reserve. Antitank artillery is employed separately or with the reserve to destroy enemy tanks. All possible measures are taken to isolate the enemy who has broken through, then encircle and annihilate him. The counterattack is carried out resolutely until the

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original situation is restored. A successful counter-attack may develop into a counteroffensive (the decision rests with the army group commander).

The success of the counterattack depends upon continuous and closely coordinated action with adjacent units; mutual assistance plays a decisive role.

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PART THREE LARGER COMMANDS

CHAPTER 11

THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Section I. BACKGROUND

137. GENERAL

a. The Chinese Communist territorial organization of the Armed Forces within China (fig. 12) is similar to that of the Soviet Union, a logical development when Soviet aid and advice to China are considered. The territorial organization was developed to provide the Communist high command with the necessary administrative machinery to control both the Armed Forces and the nation. Both military and civil control were in the hands of military commanders immediately after the seizure of China from the Nationalists, but in ensuing years a civil administration was established which has gradually assumed appropriate responsibilities. It is conceivable, too, that a second aim was considered—that of providing command echelons that could become operational on an area basis in the event of an invasion of the country. The nucleus of an appropriate command echelon for a theater of war exists in each military area within China.

b. The command and administrative structure of military areas in China is, in effect, a joint structure. Overall direction and coordination of Army, and administrative support of Navy and Air Force units deployed therein, are exercised in peacetime by the military area commander, who is usually a ground officer. During wartime, he commands all components of the Armed Forces deployed in his area. Doctrine defines the role of the Air Force and Navy as one of support of the operations of Army combat forces. Administrative and technical service forces within the military area are not organized unilaterally, but are controlled by a single rear service department. The basic structure of the military

area (fig. 14) provides the commander with a staff that is adequate for conventional military command and administrative functions during peacetime. The headquarters also contains agencies to enforce political education of the forces deployed in the area, to manage reserve and conscription activities, and to direct farming, industrial, and construction activities peculiar to Communist China's Armed Forces. The command and administrative structure of the military area could—with little augmentation—provide both unified direction of strategic or campaign-scale operations, and exercise supervision of logistical and administrative support of all forces in the military area in the event of war.

c. The headquarters of an expeditionary force is generally developed to fit each specific situation, and its title chosen as much for propaganda purposes as for its military significance. The commander of an expeditionary force—such as the *Chinese People's Volunteer Army* in Korea—bases his organization of the command and administrative structure of the theater headquarters on the structure of the military area command, modified as required by the exigencies of the situation. The command organization for control of units employed during the Korean War offers an excellent example of Chinese Communist command and staff development. With that example as an indication of the Chinese Communist's development of command and staff organization at theater level, it can be expected that any such headquarters encountered in the future will be similar in nature. For that reason, considerable reliance is placed on examples from that operation to illustrate the Chinese Communists' version of command echelons at theater level.

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138. COMMUNIST COMMAND STRUCTURE IN KOREA

a. With the entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean conflict in November 1950, a high command headquarters made its appearance. This agency, called "Headquarters, Chinese People's Volunteers," is believed to have initially controlled both the Chinese armies and the remnants of the defeated North Korean forces.

b. As the war progressed and the North Korean forces were being rebuilt, a new headquarters was established and designated the "North Korean Army—Chinese People's Volunteers Combined Headquarters." This headquarters—headed by the North Korean Commander in Chief, KIM Il Sung—was publicly announced, for propaganda purposes, as the supreme authority in Korea. In fact, this organization merely added another echelon to the North Korean Army chain of command. It was established apparently to alleviate any friction arising from the subordinate role in which the North Korean Army found itself. Both the Chinese Communist top command in Korea and the combined headquarters teamed with Soviet advisors.

c. The North Korean Army was soon reestablished as an effective fighting force, and more and more authority passed from the hands of the Chinese Communists. Both forces were stabilized eventually on an equal and comparable command basis. It is believed that, owing to the prolongation of the conflict and the increase in military and logistic

effort required for its prosecution, the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists, and the Soviets then formed a combined staff for Korea. The purpose of this group, which was called the *Combined Advisory Group*, was to translate national policies and general strategic plans into military actions, and command directly the forces of each nation involved. Figure 44 represents the probable organization of the Communist command structure in Korea at the close of the war. The headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army was the Communist's version of a theater command.

d. Each nation undoubtedly retained control of its forces in the field, and the supply of arms and equipment was rigidly controlled from Moscow. The exercise of command was direct, from the Advisory Group to the field headquarters of both the Chinese and the North Korean forces, thence to their respective combat and supporting elements. The combined Chinese Communist-North Korean headquarters was retained as a coordinating agency in the field between the Chinese and the North Korean operational headquarters, and such Soviet forces as were involved.

e. The U. S. S. R. bore the major burden for the logistical support of the Korean War and carefully controlled expenditures in the field through the Chinese Communist and North Korean Governments. Inasmuch as the North Korean forces in the field constituted that nation's total military force, there was a direct relationship between the headquarters of the North Korean Army and the Supply Ministry. The Chinese Communist force, on the other hand, was provided supplies and equipment through an established military area within China—the Northeast Military Area.

139. CHINESE COMMUNIST THEATER ORGANIZATION—KOREA

a. The headquarters of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea affords an excellent example of the Communists' organization for strategic, tactical, and administrative control of a major contingent operating outside the confines of China. Figure 45 portrays the prime elements in that headquarters as it probably existed at the close of the Korean War. This type of organization combined the command echelons of the theater and theater army commander found in the United States concept of a theater of

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


Figure 44. Probable Communist command structure in Korea.

operations. The Chinese chain of command was direct from the theater commander to the operational army groups and reserve armies. A command echelon similar to the United States Army theater logistical command was found in the rear service department of the theater headquarters. The familiar basic staff structure, common in all Chinese Communist units at regimental level and above, was present in an expanded form and included sizable special staff sections to control combat support units assigned to the theater.


b. The Chinese Communists organized their top Korean headquarters with an eye toward unity of command, compatible with their peculiar military-political system. All major ground tactical elements were placed directly under the theater commander. Air Force and air defense command agencies were

also subordinated to the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. Special troops supporting the theater headquarters' activities included a regiment of security troops, a transportation regiment, a provost unit, Railway Corps elements, a reconnaissance and a communications regiment, a sanitation control unit, various ordnance units, and the equivalent—in numbers—of a regiment of cultural workers. A liaison agency was maintained in Antung, Manchuria, to maintain contact with logistical and administrative activities in the Northeast Military Area, act as a reception and processing center for officer replacements, and serve as a training center for Manchurian-born Koreans who were subsequently utilized as interpreters. The liaison agency also operated the military post office for the Chinese Communist forces.

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Figure 45. Chinese Communist Army command structure in Korea.

140. THEATER CONTROL—KOREA

a. Territorial control exercised by the commander of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea was initially almost absolute within areas under his control. Following the collapse of the North Korean forces, the headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army controlled all major ports of entry, rail and road facilities, and much of the existing telecommunications system. Domination of the population was complete, and levies for food and essential materials were placed directly on the people. As the North Korean forces regained the status of an effective fighting force, and civil government was stabilized, the Chinese Communists turned over administrative control of areas and activities not essential to the Chinese People's Volunteer Army to the Korean Government. An agreement was reached on combined control and use of communications facilities of all types; procurement of goods from the North Korean economy was systematized, and carried out through North Korean Communist Party committees at village, county, and provincial levels.

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b. Subsequent to the stabilization of the battle front, the Chinese Communists organized their forces and area for both combat and administration into a combat zone and a rear administrative area. These divisions can be likened to the combat zone and communications zone of a United States theater of operations. Composition of these areas was as follows:

- (1) *The combat zone* comprised that area required for the conduct of operations by army groups. It was divided for tactical control into army group, army, and division areas, each controlled by the commander of the corresponding unit.
- (2) *The rear administrative area* was that territory to the rear of the combat zone in which the Chinese Communists located their major administrative installations and units, and units required for the security of the rear area itself. There were at least five rear service branch headquarters—which operated on an area responsibility basis—subordinate to the Rear Service Department of the headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. They remained relatively unaffected by shifts of major tactical units in the combat zone.

141. EVALUATION

a. At the outset of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the command structure and the composition of the staff of the high command of the "volunteer" forces was probably little different from that of a military area in the interior of China. As the war progressed and operations were expanded, the Chinese Communist strength increased to a substantial proportion of their total ground forces. The staff soon came to approximate the magnitude of that of the General Staff in Peiping.

b. By mid-1953, the Chinese Communist high command had assembled a staff in Korea that was well-versed in military tactics, and in techniques requisite to successful conduct of the sort of action in which they were engaged. Key staff officers were carefully selected on the basis of military ability and political background. Communist ideology was made a sinister motivating force in military operations throughout the command. Staff proficiency was further demonstrated by the positive steps taken by the high command to eliminate de-

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


Figure 46. Typical rear administrative area, Korean theater.

ficiencies, as evidenced by the improved logistical techniques and improved employment of artillery

and other supporting arms apparent in the last year of the war.

Section II. THE THEATER STAFF

142. GENERAL

a. The headquarters of a Chinese Communist theater of operations serves the commander in two principal fields—that of military operations and that of political activities. The theater commander, guided by the Chinese Communist concept of the principles of simplicity and unity of command, as well as his estimate of the situation, organizes his headquarters around the four basic staff agencies (fig. 47) found in all Chinese Communist echelons of command from regimental to General Staff level. These agencies consist of a political department, an operations department, a personnel department, and a rear service department. The basic staff structure is augmented by deputy commanders for air

and naval forces, who are responsible to the theater commander for the conduct of operations and internal administration of this respective arms through their own staffs. The theater commander normally retains the role of commander of theater Army forces, and exercises command and supervision of major field elements through field army, army group, and army commanders (par. 153). Control of combat support elements such as artillery, armored, engineer, and ground air defense forces is exercised through branch directorates. These branch directorates are, in effect, special staff sections; within the theater staff structure these directorates are usually subordinate to the operations department.

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
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Figure 47. The theater staff.

b. The general principles of staff organization and procedure practiced by the Chinese Communists differ widely from those of the United States Army. The principal difference is caused by the peculiar joint command system the Communists have imposed on their Armed Forces. Other differences are based on long-standing Chinese practice and the influence of their Soviet advisers. The more significant differences are:

- (1) The theater political department is normally not subject to the direct control of the theater commander, but is the executive agency of the commander's counterpart—the theater political commissar. At theater level the political commissar reports directly to the General Political Department of the General Staff in Peking. Exceptions to this practice are found infrequently, and can occur only when the commander is of sufficient standing in the Party, and strong in a military sense, to be accorded the privilege of assuming the posts of both military commander and political commissar concurrently. PENG Te-huai, former commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and now Minister of Defense, is one outstanding

example of an exception to the Communist system of command; he was both commander and political commissar for the Korean theater.

- (2) The chief of staff does not act as the principal coordinating agent and general adviser. Rather, his responsibilities are confined to directing and coordinating the activities of the operations and personnel departments. His counterparts on the theater staff are the directors of the political, personnel, and rear service departments; all four report either to the theater commander or to the political commissar, or to both.
- (3) The rear service department of the theater staff is, in effect, both a logistical staff agency and a logistical command. The director of the department is the command's principal coordinating agent and adviser for logistics; he also commands theater service forces. The director of the rear service department coordinates

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Figure 48. Marshal PENG Te-huai, Chinese Communist commander in Korea surveying the battlefield. (A Chinese Communist propaganda photograph.)

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
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Figure 49. The theater political department.

logistical plans with the operational requirements developed by the theater chief of staff, but is directly responsible to the theater commander. Rear service activities at theater level are usually under the close supervision of the theater political commissar.

143. THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

The political department (fig. 49) is the executive agency of the theater political commissar. The director of the political department assists the political commissar in the coordination of functions pertaining to supervision, apportionment, and administration of Party and Youth Corps members throughout the command; educational advancement—both in a literal and political sense—of personnel in the theater; political security; indoctrina-

tion of dissident elements; maintenance of morale—Communist style; psychological and counterpsychological warfare activities; dissemination of propaganda within the command; counterintelligence activities; civil affairs and military government; discipline and military law; training of spies and interrogators; special service activities; and interrogation and management of prisoners of war. A deputy director and a secretariat assist the director in the execution of his duties and responsibilities, and coordinate the varied activities of some nine political staff sections. Figure 49 portrays the composition of a political department at theater level. This composition is not fixed, but can be varied to fit the existing situation. For example, the functions of military law and security may be combined in a single section; cultural activities may be combined with those devoted to propaganda and education.

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Both combinations are found frequently at lower levels of command. Each of the following political staff sections, however, will normally be found in a theater political department:

a. The Organization Section. One of the Chinese Communist Party's most important tools for the control of forces deployed in the theater is the organization section of the political department. The chief of the section is responsible to the director of the political department for personnel management of Party members of the command; for the Party's recruiting program; for the allocation of Party members to subordinate commands, in coordination with the chief of the Youth section; and for the planning and supervision of training programs for political officers and cultural instructors throughout the command. The chief of section is also charged with compiling casualty reports for the command on both Party and non-Party members in coordination with the surgeon of the theater rear service department. This report, together with a monthly political statistics report which shows the percentage of Party and Youth Corps members in each subordinate command, assists in maintaining a desirable ratio of Party and non-Party members in each unit in the theater. The theater casualty report also serves as a basis for recommendations on compensation to families of battlefield casualties, or to the wounded themselves. Compensation is controlled by the General Political Department, and varies with degree of loyalty to the Party.

b. The Youth Section. The New Democratic Youth Corps, a Communist Party organization charged with training, supervision, and indoctrination of Party aspirants under 25 years of age, has official status in the Armed Forces. The Youth Corps in the Army strives to educate and mould young soldiers to provide the Party with young, aggressive, and able leaders. The chief of the Youth section assists the director of the political department in affairs pertaining to the ideological and cultural training and indoctrination of young soldiers; maintenance of records of Youth Corps members; Youth Corps recruiting program; and selection of individual Corps members for Party membership. The chief of section, in coordination with the chief of the organization section, allocates Youth Corps members to major subordinate commands.

c. Military Law Section. Placing the function of judge advocate in the field of political activities

provides the Communist Party with a further means of control over the military. The chief of the military law section advises the director of the political department on matters bearing on military law, supervises the administration of military justice throughout the command, directs the activities of the theater military tribunal, and reviews and announces decisions of military tribunals of subordinate commands. As the title of the section indicates, only cases involving infractions of military law are within its purview. Incidents of breaches of Party discipline are referred to the Party disciplinary and investigating committee (of the theater Party committee) for appropriate action. Should an offense involve both a breach of military law and Party regulations, the offender frequently finds himself subjected to double punishment. The chief of section carries out his duties and responsibilities in close coordination with the chief of the department's security section who is the principal investigating agent of the theater.

d. Liaison Section. Operations outside the borders of Communist China give rise to requirements for language specialists, both overt and covert operations with local Communist Party agencies and sympathizers, and liaison activities with any allied forces engaged in field operations. The chief of the liaison section procures, investigates, and trains personnel for employment throughout the command as interpreters, translators, and interrogators; advises the director of the political department on local Communist Party activities, as well as those of other groups of the local population sympathetic to the Communist cause; maintains liaison with his counterpart in the headquarters of allied forces; and supervises the conduct of liaison activities throughout the command. During operations within China, most of the functions of the liaison section are probably performed by the civil affairs section of the department, since the local government is, in effect, the Communist Party.

e. Security Section. Implementation of political security measures to protect both the Party and the Armed Forces from dissident elements—both within and outside the military—sabotage, espionage, or the development of cliques is an important function of the theater political department's director. The chief of the security section is the director's principal adviser for political security affairs. His duties include planning, coordination, and super-

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Figure 50. Culture workers present soldier entertainment.

vision, within the theater, of such security activities as counterintelligence, censorship, counterpsychological warfare, criminal investigation, and captured materiel control. Political security measures are closely supervised by the security committee of the theater Party committee. Additional duties and responsibilities assigned to the chief of the security section usually include:

- (1) The collection, interrogation, safeguarding, processing, and utilizing of prisoners of war. Interrogations are coordinated with the chiefs of the propaganda and education and the psychological warfare sections, and the operations department of the theater staff. At subordinate levels this function is assigned to the *enemy affairs* section of unit political departments.

- (2) The training and employment of agents in operations deep in hostile territory. Agents under the control of the political department collect both political and military information for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes; establish liaison links with guerrilla forces; and infiltrate prisoner-of-war camps where, as prisoners, they strive to reestablish Party control over captured Chinese troops.

f. Cultural Section. Troop recreation and information activities are an important medium for furthering indoctrination in the Party line. The chief of the cultural section is charged with staff supervision and direction of troop entertainment teams within the theater to insure that all theatricals, musical performances, and literature meet Party

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standards; with the development and dissemination of soldier songs and slogans designed to glorify the "new order," in coordination with the propaganda and education section; and with the preparation of articles bearing on cultural activities to be disseminated through political channels and published in unit newspapers. Cultural works personnel under the control of the chief of section also assist subordinate commands by acting as instructors for troop education courses, conduct meetings to discuss editorialized news stories, and function as motion picture projectionists.

g. *Civil Affairs Section.* Chinese Communist doctrine emphasizes the importance of active support of the army by the population in a theater of war. To obtain this active support, a strict system of military government is imposed on the local populace in hostile territory, or wherever else support is not assured. Doctrine also assigns to the Armed Forces the mission of spreading Communist dogma wherever they go. The chief of the civil affairs section is responsible to the director of the political department for directing and supervising activities which are designed to result in maximum active support from local populations and which attract the native masses to the Chinese Communist cause. Specific responsibilities of the civil affairs officer include developing and maintaining good relations between the military and the civilian population in the theater; implementing military government measures when necessary; developing and disseminating, in coordination with the chief of the propaganda and education section, propaganda material that is designed to create and maintain good will in the civilian masses; and insuring that military demands for food, transportation, housing, and labor are met expeditiously. The theater civil affairs officer is also responsible for planning and supervising the employment of troop units in reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in friendly rear areas. During operations within China the chief of section carries out covert activities and establishes liaison with local Communist groups which monitor and control civil government activities.

h. *Psychological Warfare Section.* The Chinese Communists employ psychological warfare operations to disseminate strategic and combat propaganda to influence military operations and to spread the doctrine of Communism. At theater level, the chief of the psychological warfare section imple-

ments strategic psychological warfare policies emanating from the General Staff and advises the director of the political department on all matters pertaining to theater psychological warfare and combat propaganda activities. He also exercises operational control over combat propaganda units not assigned to subordinate units. The chief of section is further charged with planning and executing propaganda activities directed at prisoners of war, as well as developing and disseminating policy on treatment of prisoners; these activities are coordinated with the chiefs of the security and propaganda and education sections of the political department.

i. *Propaganda and Education Section.* The theater political commissar is the official spokesman of the Party line. Most of the machinery for disseminating the written word on Party policies and directives is found in the propaganda and education section of the theater political department. The chief of section assists the director of the political department in the coordination of functions pertaining to propaganda and education activities in general. He implements policies dealing with literacy and political education and exercises operational control of field printing plants and the theater news agency. In the field of literary education, he promulgates directives and disseminates training materials designed to elevate the soldiers' level of literacy to a point where they can understand official papers, news bulletins, and army training tracts, as well as write the official national language. In the field of political education, he prepares and disseminates training materials designed to indoctrinate all personnel with a devotion to the goals of Communism; publishes a newspaper devoted to current events, governmental (Party) policies, and Communist propaganda against the enemy; and issues training publications containing both the correct military and Party line, and instruction techniques to be observed by political officers throughout the command.

144. THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

The operations department of the theater staff is the commander's agency for planning, supervising, and coordinating combat operations throughout the theater. The director of the department assists the chief of staff and the theater command in coordinating functions pertaining to organization, military training, combat operations, and military intelligence. A secretariat coordinates subordinate sec-

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Figure 51. Literacy training is an important function of the political department.

tion activities. The composition of the section is flexible, and subordinate staff sections are added or dissolved as the situation demands. Typical organization of the operations department at theater level is shown in figure 52; the functions of the various section chiefs are as follows:

a. *The Plans and Operations Section.* The chief of the plans and operations section assists the director of the operations department and the chief of staff by continuous planning, coordination, and supervision of combat operations; by making con-


tinuing estimates of the situation as it influences combat operations in the theater; and by translating plans and the commander's decisions into combat orders. Theater operational plans extend over several campaigns and include estimates of both forces and logistic support necessary for their execution. The section coordinates closely with the combat support force branch directorates, the political department (troop morale and casualty estimates), the personnel department (replacements), and the rear service department (logistics), all of which are

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Figure 52. The theater operations department.

also engaged in continuous, long-range planning. Planning and executing a campaign-scale operation involves four related steps: collection of information, the estimate of the situation, preparation and dissemination of plans implementing the command decision, and supervision and critique of the operation. Information is collected which bears on the theater mission and includes the situation of friendly and enemy forces, the hostile political and economic situations, factors of terrain and climate, and possible hostile intentions and capabilities. Developing the estimate of the situation includes consideration of all possible courses of action and the possible effect of the enemy's capabilities on each course. Following the command decision, plans are prepared and action is taken to inform subordinate commands of the decision and to supervise their

preparatory measures to insure that the intentions of the theater commander are realized. Supervision of the execution of the command's order includes assistance to subordinate commands as required by the situation; the final event in the conduct of a campaign is the preparation of a critique of the operation for the commander's information.

b. The Military Training Section. The chief of the military training section formulates training policy, disseminates training directives, and supervises the implementation of training programs throughout the command. He also is charged with review of after-action reports to select appropriate examples of combat actions for use in training material; with preparation of training manuals; and with advising the chief of staff on the state of combat readiness of units in subordinate commands. Theater troop schools come under his purview, as does the selection of personnel to be trained in military schools in the zone of the interior. The chief of the military training section coordinates his activities with the chief of the propaganda and education section of the theater political department.

c. The Reconnaissance Section. The chief of the reconnaissance section is responsible for implementation of most of the theater intelligence collection plan (fig. 53). In carrying out this function, the chief of section develops the theater reconnaissance plan, transforms the essential elements of information into orders or requests to collection agencies, establishes criteria governing reconnaissance reports, allocates reconnaissance forces to subordinate commands, and exercises general supervision of reconnaissance activities throughout the command. He is also charged with planning what the Chinese refer to as strategic aerial reconnaissance activities within the theater, in coordination with the staff of the theater air force commander. Strategic aerial reconnaissance missions are those that require operations in excess of 300 kilometers from the Communist lines. Such missions supply information to the theater staff on the enemy's strategic intentions, the extent of his air power, and the organization and disposition of his forces in extreme rear areas. Tactical aerial reconnaissance activities over a radius of up to 300 kilometers from the front lines are under the control of army group commanders whose units are in contact with the enemy. The functions of the chief of the reconnaissance section with respect to tactical aerial reconnaissance activities are

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limited to allocation of air forces, dissemination of orders or requests for information, and general supervision of the employment of aerial reconnaissance forces allocated to subordinate commands.

d. The Communications Section. The chief of the communications section is, in effect, the theater signal officer. He advises the director of the operations department and the chief of staff on all signal matters, including the locations of major headquarters and command posts throughout the theater. Signal units not assigned to subordinate commands are under his operational control. In the course of planning and supervising signal operations, the chief of section—working closely with the chief of the plans and operations section—makes recommendations on the employment and allocation of signal units, prepares and supervises signal training programs within the theater, develops and disseminates signal operation instructions to subordinate commands, and establishes signal security measures for the command. Signal supply is a function of the rear service department; the chief of the communications section advises rear service personnel of theater signal requirements, recommends stock levels, establishes replacement criteria, and recommends locations of signal supply installations. He also makes available qualified signal personnel for duty with rear service signal supply installations.

e. The Cipher Section. The chief of the cipher section, in conjunction with the theater signal officer, establishes various code systems for use within the command; plans and supervises training of personnel for cryptographic duties; operates the cryptographic center for the operations department; and exercises control of classified documents of all types within the department. He is also responsible for establishing and supervising cryptographic security measures within the command. This latter activity is coordinated with the chief of the security section, theater political department. The section chief is supervised closely by the security committee of the theater Party committee.

f. The Survey and Map Section. The chief of section is charged with estimating theater requirements for maps and map substitutes, and their procurement, reproduction, and distribution within the theater. He also plans and supervises field surveys and mapping projects. The chief of section, in conjunction with operations and reconnaissance section personnel, directs the preparation of terrain

analyses and assists in the preparation of overlays and military sketches that accompany combat orders and other operational publications.

g. The Military Intelligence Section. The chief of the military intelligence section assists the director of the operations department and the chief of staff in the coordination of matters pertaining to military intelligence. His primary responsibility is to keep the command informed of the order of battle of the enemy's forces; the enemy's strategic and tactical doctrine, as well as his training techniques; the enemy's strategic intentions and capabilities; and the political, economic, and diplomatic situations within the hostile nation. The theater military intelligence officer has limited operational responsibilities with respect to agencies concerned with the collection of information of the enemy, and none whatsoever with respect to agencies engaged in counterintelligence activities. The latter function is a responsibility of the theater political department. Principal intelligence activities at theater level are illustrated in figure 53.

h. Combat Support Force Branch Directorates. The operations department of a theater staff also contains branch directorates whose directors command all combat support units of their respective branches that are not assigned or attached to subordinate commands. These officers are, essentially, the theater special staff officers for armored, artillery, engineer, and probably chemical forces. In addition to their command functions, these individuals advise the director of the operations department and the chief of staff on matters pertaining to the employment of their respective branches; make recommendations on allocation of troop units to subordinate commands; prepare and supervise training programs for branch forces throughout the command; and advise the director of the rear service department on logistical requirements peculiar to their branches.

145. THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT

The director of the personnel department (fig. 54) assists the chief of staff in the coordination of matters pertaining to personnel management (in coordination with the director of the political department); formal organization of troop units throughout the command (in coordination with the directors of the operations and rear service depart-

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


Figure 53. Theater intelligence activities.

ments); administration of personnel replacement and rotation policies (in coordination with the directors of the political and operations departments); conduct of provost marshal activities to maintain discipline, law, and order (in coordination with the director, political department); and internal management of the theater headquarters. In

the latter capacity, the director commands special troops assigned to theater headquarters and is responsible for their training. He is provided with a secretariat to assist in the direction of the activities of a minimum of five subordinate staff sections, whose chiefs are assigned duties and functions as follows:

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


Figure 54. The personnel department.

a. *The Security Section.* The chief of the security section is responsible for internal security of the personnel department. He advises the director on safeguarding of classified information; maintains the department's records of classified materials; and, in conjunction with the chiefs of the administration and provost sections, develops, plans, and recommends measures for the local security of the headquarters as a whole. The chief of section is responsible for cryptographic activities essential to the operations of the personnel department.

b. *The Military Affairs Section.* The duties of the chief of the military affairs section include planning, coordination, and supervision of activities related to the organization and manning of military units and installations within the command; requisition, allocation, processing, and movement of officer and enlisted replacements (in close coordination with agencies of the theater political department);

development of policies pertaining to promotion, demotion, and transfer of personnel throughout the theater; maintenance of records of awards and punishments; and preparation and maintenance of all types of statistics bearing on strength accounting for the command. He may also be charged with developing and supervising training programs for clerical personnel in the theater, to include the operation of schools at theater level.

c. *Military Liaison Section.* The chief of the military liaison section plans, supervises, and administers the activities of liaison officers who, at theater level, are employed by the command and the operations department staff to supervise and inspect the execution of all combat orders and directives. The results of these inspection and supervision activities are recorded and frequently published to the command as object lessons. The execution of an order or directive is judged by the method of execution and the degree to which the overall mission was accomplished. The liaison officers are also used to transmit orders and directives for the command, to discuss and interpret provisions of the command's orders, and to transmit requests from subordinate commands for additional means or new instructions.

d. *The Provost Section.* The chief of the provost section exercises operational control over police units not assigned or attached to subordinate commands. He enforces military law, plans and supervises traffic control measures in rear areas, and provides personnel for the local security of the headquarters.

e. *The Administration Section.* The chief of the administrative section is the department director's agent for command of special troops attached to theater headquarters. He is, in effect, the headquarters commandant, since his duties may also include administration and training of headquarters troops, internal administration and arrangements for moving the headquarters, operation of headquarters messes, and operation of a visitors' bureau. The chief of section coordinates with the chiefs of various rear service department sections to administer the supply and finance requirements of the headquarters. During a move, he commands the headquarters baggage trains and is responsible for allocation of facilities in the new headquarters site.

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146. THE REAR SERVICE DEPARTMENT

The rear service department of the theater staff is the command's principal agency for planning, coordination, and supervision of theater-wide logistical activities, and for command of theater logistical forces. The department is headed by the typical Communist joint commanders—in this case a department director and a department political commissar—both of whom are of either lieutenant general or general grade. The joint heads of the department are provided a staff to assist them in the exercise of their command and staff functions, as well as a secretariat to coordinate department staff activities. The rear service department's functions as a theater logistical command are discussed in section III of this chapter. The specific duties of the various rear service department staff section chiefs with respect to planning, coordinating, and supervising logistic and certain other administrative activities are as follows:

a. *The finance officer* advises the department directors and theater staff on finance and fiscal matters. He also plans and supervises finance and fiscal operations throughout the command to include preparation and management of the theater budget, custody and disbursement of funds, maintenance of financial records, and operation of the theater accounting system. Principal accounts are those for funds, food and forage, commodities other than food and forage, and combat operations needs. In connection with budget and accounting activities, the finance officer is responsible for establishing pricing standards to guide subordinate commands engaged in local procurement. The finance officer acts as chief of his branch in the theater; as such he plans and supervises the training and employment of finance personnel within the command.

b. *The supply officer*, whose title is a misnomer by Western terminology, determines requirements for and plans and supervises the procurement, storage, distribution, and issue of food and forage as well as what the Chinese categorize as *real commodities*. This latter category of supply includes such items as tobacco, soap, individual toilet articles, and other ration supplements. The supply officer's procurement planning is based upon three principal sources: Military sources outside the theater, local procurement, and troop agricultural activities within the theater. The maximum stock level that can be




Figure 55. The rear service department.

maintained by military sources in the zone of interior is specified by the General Staff; the theater supply officer is expected to augment this stock level as required by exploiting existing sources within the theater, and by troop production programs if required.

c. *The quartermaster*, whose responsibilities are also quite different from those of a United States Army quartermaster, is the chief of the quartermaster service in the theater. He exercises operational control over all quartermaster units not assigned to subordinate commands, plans and supervises their training throughout the command, and makes recommendations on their allocation to and employment by subordinate commands. As a staff officer, he plans requirements and makes recommendations for procurement, storage, distribution,

and issue of quartermaster supplies. This category of supply includes such items as medicines; signal communications equipment; accessories for ordnance equipment, such as muzzle covers, gun covers, and holsters; individual clothing and equipment; construction materials; hand tools other than engineer tools; and mess and office equipment. The quartermaster may exploit resources within the theater to obtain facilities for fabrication of many of these items of supply; he may also operate these facilities.

d. *The ordnance officer* is the chief of the ordnance service in the theater. He exercises operational control over all ordnance units not assigned to subordinate commands, and advises the directors of the rear service department on ordnance operations within the theater. In addition, he plans requirements for and supervises ordnance operations, including the following:

- (1) Procurement, storage, distribution, issue, and recording of ordnance supplies, which include all types of ammunition, weapons, metal accessories for weapons, vehicles, observation equipment, engineer materiel, and chemical materiel.
- (2) Maintenance of weapons, ammunition, and equipment, to include management of munitions and equipment warehouses, repair shops, and salvage installations.
- (3) Equipping newly organized units.
- (4) Collection and disposal of captured ordnance materiel under supervision of the political department.
- (5) Examination, inspection, and registration of incoming ordnance materiel, and the subsequent maintenance of statistics concerning disposition of weapons, ammunition, and items of equipment.
- (6) Preparation and supervision of training programs for units under his operational control.
- (7) Technical supervision over ordnance training and operations within subordinate commands.

e. *The surgeon* is the chief of the sanitation service in the theater. He exercises operational control over medical units not assigned to subordinate commands, as well as technical supervision over medical activities throughout the command. The surgeon,

in his capacity of staff officer, heads the sanitation section and advises the directors of the rear service department and staff section chiefs on hospitalization, evacuation, and rehabilitation matters. He maintains records on sick and wounded personnel, and recommends criteria on which to base ration allowances for those hospitalized or permanently injured. He sets immunization standards, graves registration standards, and the quality of medical treatment to be accorded to prisoners. In the field of preventive medicine the theater surgeon:

- (1) Recommends and supervises sanitary measures to be enforced throughout the theater.
- (2) Supervises the theater program for control and prevention of disease, among both troop units and the civilian population.
- (3) Supervises the medical inspection of foodstuffs to be consumed by troop units.

f. *The transportation officer* advises the department directors and staff section chiefs on transportation matters and acts as chief of the theater transportation service. He exercises operational control over transportation units not assigned or attached to subordinate commands, and technical supervision over transportation training within the theater. Specifically he plans and supervises the following transportation operations:

- (1) Establishment and operation of the transportation service within the theater.
- (2) Coordination of rail, highway, air, and water transportation systems within the command.
- (3) Establishment and management of repair installations for transportation equipment.
- (4) Procurement of transportation equipment from both military sources in the zone of the interior and local resources within the theater.
- (5) Establishment and management of theater transportation schools.
- (6) Direction of the road maintenance program throughout the rear administrative area.

g. *The fuel officer* is responsible for planning and supervising procurement, storage, distribution, and issue of all types of fuel consumed by theater forces. Fuels other than POL are obtained by exploiting local resources. The solid fuels procurement pro-

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Figure 56. Sanitation units control insect vectors in the theater.

gram is implemented largely by subordinate commands within their areas of operations.

h. The veterinary officer establishes and manages the theater veterinary service. Specifically he is responsible for reception of animals from the zone of the interior, management of remount stations, technical supervision over the operation of veterinary hospitals, and supervision of the animal evacuation system. The veterinary officer also exercises operational control of veterinary units not assigned to subordinate commands, plans and supervises veterinary training throughout the command, and operates a theater school for veterinary personnel.

i. The military engineering officer advises the department directors on matters pertaining to military construction projects throughout the theater. He coordinates his activities with the theater quartermaster officer. He plans and supervises such engineering operations as:

- (1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of buildings used by troop units, such as offices, barracks, warehouses, and schools.
- (2) Construction of airports, ports, piers, POL storage facilities, and factories.
- (3) Construction of military highways, railroads, and bridges.

Section III. THE THEATER LOGISTICAL COMMAND

147. GENERAL

a. The directors of the rear service department are responsible to the theater command for full logistical support for all units located in the theater. They also exercise territorial control for the theater command within the rear administrative area in a manner similar to that exercised by the communications zone commander in a United States Army theater of operations. The directors are not responsible for the personnel aspect of logistics con-

tained in the Western concept of the term, except as it applies to administrative and service forces under their control. A typical organization of a large logistical command is shown in figure 57. In such a command, the directors of the rear service department divide the rear administrative area into geographical sections, and decentralize most operations to commanders of rear service branch headquarters units. Each unit commander is charged with rendering logistical support to forces stationed in or passing through his area, with the

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
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Figure 57. Theater logistical command.

movement of supplies to forward depots, and with territorial control of the areas. A rear service branch headquarters unit can be likened to the logistical command, type C, of the United States Army.

b. The directors of the theater rear service department require the chiefs of designated services to support the operations of branch headquarters by assigning or attaching appropriate service units to those subordinate commands. A portion of the vehicular transportation and medical troop strength is retained under the control of the appropriate chief of service in the logistical command headquarters. The remainder is disposed in support of subordinate commands. Normally all of the military railway corps and the theater military engineering service is also retained under logistical command headquarters, in a manner similar to designated intersectional services in a United States Army communications zone area.

148. BRANCH HEADQUARTERS UNITS

Typical organization of a rear service branch headquarters is shown in figure 58. The organization is not fixed. The headquarters controls a vary-

ing number of labor, transportation, service, and security elements as well as the administration of a variable number of general depots. A main depot hospital which is a part of the theater medical service is included. Garrison commands for specific metropolitan areas may be established if the necessity arises; garrison commanders are subordinate to the branch headquarters unit commander. Three principal staff sections serve and assist the branch headquarters unit commander—an operations section, a supply section, and the ever-present political section. Of these, the first two have functions peculiar to this logistical unit.

a. The operations section assists the commander in coordinating logistical and combat plans, in exercising operational control of service units assigned or attached to the branch headquarters unit, and in planning and directing activities pertaining to administrative support of all units stationed in the commander's assigned area of responsibility. Members of the operations section maintain liaison with both the planning staff of the theater logistical command and the staff's tactical commanders engaged in combat operations with whose support the unit is charged. The logistic requirements of combat

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
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Figure 58. Rear service branch headquarters.

operations are met by establishing subdepots and supply points well forward—often in operational army group or army rear areas—to insure expeditious forward flow of supplies.

b. The supply section is charged with management of general depots, subdepots, and supply points operated by the rear service branch headquarters unit. Essentially the section chief is a commander of depot troops. The supply section contains representatives who are specialists in supply matters; they

assist the section chief, who is responsible for receipt, storage, care and maintenance and issue of all supplies. The members of the section supervise accounting procedures in each depot, maintain master supply records of each class of supply, coordinate transportation requirements with the operations section, and are responsible for timely transmission of notices of shipment and requirements to maintain prescribed stock levels. The supply section also coordinates the flow of supplies to subdepots and sup-

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ply points; these subordinate supply installations are each usually limited to a single class of supply.

149. LOGISTICS—SUPPLY

Military supplies in the Chinese Communist Armed Forces are divided into four principal categories: Rations, clothing and equipment (other than ordnance), ammunition and ordnance equipment, and fuels. Responsibilities of the rear service department staff include determinations of supply requirements, establishment of storage criteria, and planning for distribution of supplies within the theater. General factors governing these planning activities are as follows:

a. *Requirements.* So far as can be determined, theater supply requirements are developed from a consideration of three general factors: The actual or anticipated troop strength within the theater, the nature of the planned combat action, and the requirements for organizing and equipping new units, or *ad hoc* units for short periods of time. These factors are considered in light of rather detailed planning guides published by the General Rear Service Department, General Staff, Peiping. Planning guides consist of formal tables of organization and equipment; an annual budget applicable to all

arms and services; a list of basic units of issue for ammunition, and an annual list of cost accounting criteria. Together, these factors and guides are used to establish minimum theater operating requirements, the supplies for which are shipped to and maintained at operating levels in the theater by the zone of interior. The theater logistical commander supplements these minimum standards by local purchase, troop production, or confiscation, or a combination of these.

b. *Storage.* Storage operations are carried out throughout the entire rear administrative area of the theater, with depot complexes convenient to troop staging areas. The general principles applied in storage operations are normal, considering the Chinese Communists' vulnerability to air attack; they consist of maximum dispersion, within a depot complex, commensurate with ease of access to transportation facilities; underground storage whenever possible; strict camouflage discipline; and storage of separate categories of supply in different subdepots and temporary dumps. Although the Communists place both ordnance equipment and ammunition in the same category of supply, these items rarely are found in the same area because of the different storage requirements.



Figure 59. A portion of a depot complex in Korea.

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c. *Distribution.* Supplies moving into a theater are normally processed through major supply complexes in the zone of the interior which also serve as staging areas for troops moving into the theater. In the theater, the distribution of supplies is the responsibility of the theater rear service department. The staff of the rear service department establishes levels of supply for various depot complexes and issues directives governing the movement of supplies through the logistical system. In general, the theater distribution system in the rear administrative area is organized to effect the movement of supplies from ports of entry to general depots within the theater by rail; rail is supplemented by motor transportation units. Rearmost branch headquarters are responsible for meeting the supply requirements of reserve armies and service elements located in their areas. They also maintain theater reserve stocks and expedite the flow of supplies to general and subdepots of branches serving tactical elements and installations in forward and intermediate rear areas. The separate staff sections in each branch headquarters in forward areas coordinate the disposition and flow of each category of supply to supply points in army group areas or direct to army depots, from which the major tactical commands draw their supplies.

150. LOGISTICS—EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. *General.* The basic mission of the Chinese Communist medical service is to bring medical aid to the battlefield and expedite the evacuation of casualties likely to respond to medical treatment and rehabilitation. Casualties in the evacuation chain who appear too far gone for medical treatment are left to die. In addition, at division level and above, the service is responsible for supervision of preventive medicine activities, such as maintenance of sanitary conditions and epidemic control. The theater plan of evacuation and hospitalization is prepared by the chief of the sanitation section (theater surgeon) in accordance with policies prescribed by the General Rear Service Department, General Staff, Peiping. Execution of the plan is largely decentralized to subordinate logistical and combat commanders who are provided medical service units when organic means are inadequate or unavailable.

b. *Responsibilities.* The theater medical service (fig. 60) is grouped into three echelons which are

related to levels of military command and types of medical care:

- (1) The first echelon is organized by medical service elements of regiment and below; its missions are to conduct unit sanitation inspections, carry out immunization activities, search and evacuate the battle field, assist in burial activities, apply first aid and preliminary treatment to the sick and wounded, and classify and prepare essential cases for evacuation to the rear. Medical service units in the first echelon are normally organic to the combat units they support.
- (2) The second echelon consists primarily of the organic field medical units of divisions and armies, and independent or attached medical units operating in army or division rear areas. Its missions are to conduct medical inspections of all types throughout subordinate commands; direct the evacuation system throughout its parent unit; supervise graves registration activities in subordinate units; provide mobile clearing stations for evacuees from the first echelon; perform minor surgery; segregate lightly wounded patients, returning them to their units after convalescence; and prepare the more serious cases for further evacuation to the rear. Medical service units of the second echelon are provided reserve strength to afford assistance to first echelon as required.
- (3) The third echelon of the theater medical service is composed of medical units under army groups and rear service branch headquarters units, as well as specialized medical service units under theater rear service department control. The primary missions of the third echelon are to care for the sick and wounded until they are fully recovered, or prepare patients for evacuation to state-operated hospitals in the zone of the interior if the former is not feasible within established evacuation policy; and support subordinate commands in the conduct of extensive preventive medicine activities.

c. *Medical Service Units.* The principal medical service units found in the first echelon are the


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Figure 60. Theater medical evacuation system.

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Figure 61. A Chinese Communist field hospital.

medical companies organic to infantry regiments. Each company is composed of an aid station and three litter platoons. In the second echelon at division level, the rear service section controls the operations of a sanitation office, a litter company, and a mobile field hospital. At army level, the rear service department controls the operations of a field hospital, two litter companies, a surgical unit, and two or more mobile field hospitals. Medical motor vehicle platoons, epidemic control units, sanitation units, and the like may also be attached to army rear service departments and operate as second echelon medical service units. Medical service units contained in the theater third echelon are controlled by the sanitation sections of rear service departments at army group, rear service branch headquarters, and theater levels. These units consist primarily of field hospitals in support of army group troops, main depot hospitals in branch headquarters units, and specialized hospitals under the sanitation section, theater rear service department. When required by the situation, army group hospitals become a part of the theater evacuation system (par. 199). Other medical service units supporting hospital operations in the third echelon—and reinforcing elements of the second echelon—consist of rail and motor transportation units; air evacuation units; surgical, toxicological, and other specialized teams; and medical warehouse and supply units. If the theater is within the confines of Communist China, state-

operated hospitals also will comprise a part of the third echelon medical service.

151. LOGISTICS—TRANSPORTATION


a. *General.* Representatives of the Chinese Communist transportation service are found in the theater rear service department staff, in rear service branch headquarters units, and in all combat units from regiment through field army. At General Staff level, the transportation section of the General Rear Service Department exercises staff supervision and control over all land, sea, and air transport operations. At subordinate levels, transportation service representatives are principally planners and coordinators; they exercise operational control over motor transportation units only. Operational control of rail, water, and air transportation units and their activities in the field is the responsibility of commanders of the railway, naval, and air force elements, respectively. These commanders are represented in the theater command structure by a commander of Railway Corps units, and commanders of theater air and naval forces.

b. *Types of Movements.* The theater transportation service is charged primarily with planning and coordinating the movement of troops and military supplies within the rear administrative area. It may also be called upon to assist in civilian reconstruction activities in rear areas. In the main, movements in these categories are administrative in nature. Tactical movements are most often accomplished by a unit's organic means or by foot march. Principal transportation means provided the theater commander with which to influence the success of combat operations are rail and highway. Air transport facilities, inland waterways, coastal shipping facilities, and the like are exploited when possible, but the Communists' capability in the field of air transport is very limited.

c. *Motor Transportation.* The Chinese Communists rely heavily on motor transportation as a means of personnel and cargo hauling. The density of motor transportation facilities in Chinese Communist units decreases rapidly as one progresses from higher to lower echelons, and, as a result, control of most motor transportation units is retained at high command levels. Only those tactical units whose characteristics and missions make organic truck transport essential are provided such units in their

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① Truck, GAZ-51, 2.2-2.7 ton, 4 x 2, cargo, Soviet.

Figure 62. Principal Chinese communist cargo vehicles.

tables of organization. Medium and heavy artillery units, anti-aircraft units, and armored units fall into this category. Motor transportation support within an army group is normally provided by placing one or more truck regiments (417 trucks each) under operational control of the transportation section of the army group rear service department. A single truck company (46 trucks) or truck battalion (138 trucks) is found in each army's special troops; each infantry division contains an aggregate of approximately 370 cargo vehicles and prime movers. Cargo vehicles in common use in Chinese Communist truck units are shown in figure 62. Besides these truck units, the transportation section, theater rear service department, controls a varying number of truck regiments which initially haul cargo from ports of entry to theater general depots, then provide support for rear service branch headquarters units. The theater transportation officer also controls a pool of quasi-military truck units formed from civilian resources within the theater. Animal-drawn cart units are still found in the Chinese Com-

munist Armed Forces, and this type unit affords a significant supplement to the theater motor transportation fleet. As operations progress within the theater, and rail transportation facilities are extended, the theater transportation officer places less emphasis on long distance motor vehicle cargo hauling activities from ports of entry and expands motor transport activities in forward areas. Emphasis is placed on efficient and timely resupply of subdepots and supply dumps in army group and army areas, as well as on provisions of a readily available source of transportation for rapid movement of reserve troops.


(1) *Operating techniques.* In the face of hostile air superiority, Communist trucking operations usually are carried out at night. Vehicles move singly or in convoys of up to 25 vehicles. Circulars admonish military convoy commanders to attempt to maintain an average speed of 40 kilometers per hour, but in practice this is rarely achieved. An average of 24 kilome-

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© Truck, GAZ-63, 2.2 ton, 4 x 4, cargo, Soviet.

Figure 62. Principal Chinese communist cargo vehicles—Continued.

ters per hour is a realistic planning factor. All trucking operations in rear areas are controlled and regulated by a system of dispatch, check, and reception points operated by the theater transportation service. The theater transportation officer (in coordination with the military engineering officer) also plans and supervises an extensive road maintenance program throughout the rear administrative areas. Emphasis is on repair and improvement of main supply routes and existing secondary routes, and on repair of bridges. Bypasses are often constructed around possible bottlenecks, such as bridges, cuts, and defiles; repair materials are stockpiled near such sites. Civilian labor is conscripted for the most of the repair and improvement program. Key bridges, crossing points, truck concealment areas, and repair facilities are heavily protected


by antiaircraft units as a further counter-interdiction measure.

- (2) *Maintenance.* The theater transportation officer strives to keep a minimum of 85 percent of the truck fleet operational at all times. To achieve this goal, he establishes and supervises an extensive program to train drivers in maintenance. He also prescribes standards for unit maintenance which require, in addition to daily servicing of vehicles by drivers, a shop inspection at 10,000 kilometers, and a general overhaul each 20,000 kilometers. An extensive vehicle recovery and maintenance service contributes to maintaining operational readiness in the truck fleet. The transportation officer establishes and supervises repair and machine shops which afford contact repair service along principal supply routes; damaged or destroyed vehicles that cannot be serv-

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© Truck, ZIS-150, 3.2 ton, 4 x 2, cargo, Soviet.

Figure 62. Principal Chinese communist cargo vehicles—Continued.

iced by these roadside shops are evacuated to centralized repair and rebuild facilities, where they are either rehabilitated or cannibalized for parts.

- d. *Railway Transportation.* The existing rail facilities in the theater are exploited—as soon as possible—to free truck transportation units for operations in forward areas. Construction, repair, and maintenance of rail lines are largely performed by conscripted civilian labor under the supervision of Railway Corps personnel; this program is augmented by other engineer forces when necessary. Extension of railway right-of-way is based on plans prepared by the theater transportation officer, who strives to transport most supply imports and major troop units by rail to forward areas as soon as possible. Once established, the theater railway transportation service is maintained by an extensive repair program and various emergency operating techniques designed to offset the effects of hostile interdiction efforts; deception and camouflage are also

employed in operation of the service. Examples of these activities are as follows:


- (1) *Repair techniques* emphasize the principle of immediate usage of the damaged area with minimum expenditure of time and imported materiel; consequently most repair work is devoted to making repairs of a temporary nature, using local resources. This method requires large working crews, but it results in rapid repairs. To effect these repairs with a minimum of delay, stock piles of ties, logs, rocks, gravel, dirt and ballast, ropes, spikes, and other equipment are stored at easily accessible strategic locations along the railroad lines. Long-range maintenance techniques consist of advance building of bypasses and alternate routes through strategic areas and around possible bottle necks. Many of these bypasses and alternate routes are not connected to the main line until the necessity

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© Truck, ZIS-151, 3.8 ton, 6 x 6, cargo, Soviet.

Figure 62. Principal Chinese communist cargo vehicles—Continued.

arises. Every effort is made to protect main tunnels, which are often used to house repair facilities.

- (2) *Emergency Operating Techniques.* Among the field expedients widely used by the Chinese Communists is the practice of off-loading and shuttling by vehicles or porters. This technique permits use of rail lines that are continually interdicted. Although it is time-consuming, this practice does allow movement by rail of freight that which would otherwise be immobilized. Descriptive of the technique is the case wherein a loaded train is run up to one end of a break in the line. Military and civilian personnel alike are then mobilized to hand-carry the freight by human portage (or carts and trucks where feasible) across the obstruction to a waiting train on the other side that moves the freight on to its destination. This technique demands that

freight be packaged in small loads which can be manhandled and results in rather inefficient loading of box cars, but it does have the advantage of allowing freight to be moved. Another typical example of field expedients used is the procedure followed when a railroad bridge is too weak to support the weight of a steam engine. In many such instances a string of cars is collected and pushed across the bridge ahead of one engine, which remains on the near approach, while another engine picks up the cars on the opposite side.

- (3) *Camouflage and deception.* The Communist awareness of the value of all types of camouflage extends to rail networks in probably an even greater measure than to other installations. Continuous efforts are made to disguise serviceable rail lines by covering tracks with miscellaneous materials such as rice bags and brush to give the impression of unserviceability. Sec-

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tions of serviceable railroad bridges are removed during the day to simulate unserviceability; they are replaced at night when required.

152. LOGISTICS—OTHER SERVICES

Other services commonly found in a Chinese Communist theater of operations are those carried out by chemical warfare, engineer, ordnance, and signal corps elements under operational control of the various chiefs of service on the theater staff. Their activities are as follows:

a. *Chemical warfare services* are provided the command by chemical units, which perform decontamination services, process protective clothing, and carry out reclamation and maintenance activities beyond the scope of chemical units organic to tactical echelons. Chemical reconnaissance units are also available to monitor hostile chemical, biological, and radiological activities. It is also probable that chemical warfare teams supplement depot staffs and perform technical supervision over storage, maintenance, and issue of chemical materiel.

b. *Engineer services* offered by special engineer units include those of construction incident to military engineering activities, repair and maintenance of roads and railways, and accomplishment of camouflage and air defense measures in large rear area installations. Supplementary engineer teams within the theater provide other services, such as rehabilitation of power systems, water supply installations, harbors, and railroad plant facilities. These teams also provide supervisory personnel for large groups of civilian laborers engaged in construction activities.



Figure 63. Transportation check points regulate movement of supply convoys.



Figure 64. Vehicle shelters are constructed along main supply routes.

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


Figure 65. Fuel is moved to theater depots by tank car.

c. *Ordnance services* in the theater are devoted principally to maintenance activities and operation of a recovery system for collection and removal of damaged or abandoned ordnance materiel. Other services include testing and inspection of ammunition and fuzes, preparation and dissemination of firing tables, disposal of damaged ammunition, and packing and crating activities incident to ordnance supply operations. Technical inspections of materiel in depots, in the hands of troops, and in repair shops are conducted under the supervision of the theater ordnance officer to insure compliance with established maintenance standards.

Section IV. ARMY COMMAND ECHELONS IN A THEATER

153. GENERAL

Operational control of ground forces in a theater of operations may be exercised in a variety of methods depending upon the troop strength and type of units deployed therein, the geography of the land mass comprising the theater, and the hostile situation. Principal command echelons that may be found in a theater are the field army, the army



Figure 66. Damaged rail lines are repaired rapidly.

d. *Signal services* in the theater supplement organic facilities within combat and service elements. Services consist principally of construction, maintenance, and operation of communications systems in the rear administrative area. Signal troops also operate message centers, provide cryptographic facilities, install air defense warning nets, and maintain messenger service between principal headquarters installations in the theater. The chief of signal services assists the commander by recommending allocation of signal equipment and troop units to support combat operations; troop units under his operational control include signal operating units for various types of telecommunications systems; signal reconnaissance units; air-ground liaison detachments; and cryptographic, messenger, and message center teams.

group, and the army. The Chinese Communist field army and army group echelons possess considerable flexibility in organization, and correspond closely to the United States Army's army group and field army echelons, respectively. The Chinese Communist army command echelon is a relatively inflexible organization for control of division-size combat elements. Besides tactical command

echelons, the Chinese Communists normally establish an air defense command headquarters for control of ground air defense units deployed in the rear administrative area. This headquarters also exercises operational control over theater reserve air defense units, and recommends allocation of forces to subordinate tactical commanders.

154. FIELD ARMY COMMAND

a. The field army command is the largest operational command echelon in the Chinese Communist Army. It is organized for control of strategic and large-scale campaign operations. Field army echelons will most likely be employed as control echelons in theaters wherein massive terrain barriers separate the maneuver forces of campaigns. A single field army echelon could serve the theater commander as a proposed command echelon for Army units in a theater in which large air, naval, and ground components were deployed. The command structure of the Chinese Communist field army permits control of a troop strength approximating 750,000 men.

b. The joint commanders of a field army in a theater of operations function under the theater commander. They have responsibilities pertaining to both administrative and combat operations. Allotment and grouping of troop units among subordinate army groups and separate armies, direction of combat operations, troop training, and continuous campaign planning are among the combat responsibilities of the field army military commander. His administrative responsibilities include supervision and control of logistical support of subordinate commands, personnel administration, military education and control activities, and fiscal management for the command. The military commander reports directly to the theater military commander. The field army political commissar is directly responsible for political activities and has supervision over other administrative activities (par. 161) in coordination with the military commander. He is the theater commissar's direct subordinate.

155. ARMY GROUP COMMAND

a. The army group affords the theater commander an administrative and operational headquarters operating between field armies and subordinate armies. The army group is an instrument

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of campaign maneuver. Each army group is capable of controlling the operations of from 2 to 6 armies, together with associated supporting arms and services. Army groups also may be employed as the principal command echelons in theater, immediately subordinate to the theater commander. This latter condition will probably exist when the theater of operations is small, is not divided by a major terrain barrier, and the number of ground tactical elements deployed therein does not warrant intermediate controlling headquarters.

b. Whether immediately subordinate to a theater or field army commander, the army group military commander is responsible for the tactical operation, training, and supervision of administrative support of the armies under his command. He estimates requirements for anticipated missions and makes recommendations for allocations accordingly. He also controls the allocation of replacements, materiel, service troops, and combat support elements to armies under his command in accordance with his assigned mission. The army group political commissar is responsible for all political activity within the command and joint supervision of other administrative activities. He reports directly to the theater or field army political commissar.

156. THE ARMY COMMAND

The closest equivalent in the Chinese Communist Armed Forces to the United States Army corps, the army is a tactical and administrative control echelon for a component of three infantry divisions and essential supporting arms and services. The Chinese Communist army is a self-sufficient combat unit. The army commander is responsible to the army group commander for the tactical employment, training, and administrative support of his divisions and limited army troops in accordance with his assigned mission and established theater policies. The commander estimates his needs and recommends allotment of supporting arms and services for his army. He allocates to his divisions such additional means as are provided to further his tactical mission. He also controls the allocation of ammunition and critical items of materiel within his army. Duality of command again is evidenced by the presence of a political commissar, the equal of the army commander, who has what amounts to command authority for army political matters.

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157. AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

a. The theater air defense command is charged with the air defense of the rear administrative area. It is the commander's agency for control of ground-air defense units, and correlation of the ground-air defense system with theater air force defensive operations. Principal ground-air defense units consist of antiaircraft artillery units, equipped with either automatic weapons or light or medium guns—some radar controlled; radar controlled searchlight units; signal communications units; and detachments equipped with early warning and ground-controlled intercept radar facilities. The entire ground-air defense system is supplemented by a ground observer corps—usually a quasi-military organization.

Overall operational control of both air and ground-air defense facilities is exercised by a joint center for combat operations; the joint center is fed by subordinate ground-controlled intercept stations at strategic locations throughout the rear area.

b. Emphasis is placed on air defense for such critical installations as main supply routes, supply complexes, highway and rail bridge networks, and key communications centers. Power facilities, such as hydroelectric stations and dams, also are accorded priority. Little or no emphasis is placed on protection of troop assembly areas and command installations in the rear administrative area beyond that that can be afforded by a combat unit's organic means.

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CHAPTER 12

THE FIELD ARMY

Section I. ORGANIZATION

158. GENERAL

a. In the summer of 1947, the Chinese Communists announced the formation of a new command echelon, the field army, as a step toward achieving a common organizational structure throughout their Army and reorganized the Armed Forces then distributed throughout areas they controlled under five field army commands. At that time the field armies were accorded designations descriptive of the areas they were to control; namely the Northeast, North China, Northwest, Central and South China, and East China Field Armies. At that time each field army consisted of several columns; each column numbered between 20,000 and 30,000 men. In the fall of 1948, flushed with the success of over a year's experience in employing large units backed by a base area (which included adequate food resources, an arms supply sufficient to equip 500,000 men, and a source of manpower), the Communist high command reorganized four of these units—the Northwest, Central and South China, East China, and Northeast Field Armies—into the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Field Armies, respectively. The various columns were reorganized into armies, and army group echelons were formed—as subordinate command echelons of the field army—to control them. The North China Field Army was abolished and its former strength grouped under 3 army groups, each directly subordinate to the high command of the People's Liberation Army; 2 of these subsequently were incorporated into the First and Second Field Armies.

b. At the close of major hostilities within China in 1949, the four field armies, certain independent units, and local provincial troops comprised the People's Liberation Army. The four field armies, plus the independent units, constituted the main fighting strength; they were available for employment as required; in fact, they provided the forces which were encountered in Korea. The provincial troops, although full-time regular soldiers, were supplemental troops. They were employed as pro-

vincial garrison forces and had a primary local defense mission; these forces later became local Public Security Forces (par. 6) and finally, People's Armed Police.

c. Early 1950 found the four field armies deployed in what today are known as the Northwest, Southwest, Central/South, and East China Military Areas (fig. 12), conveniently at hand to govern those newly "liberated" areas which were established by the common program adopted by Central People's Government in September 1949. To this end, the Central People's Government formed the territorial divisions of China as military areas for administration of the Armed Forces. The configuration of these areas was probably determined by the extent of the territory controlled by each of the four field armies and by independent units deployed therein at that time. In most cases, command of the military area was assumed by the field army commander, who also took over civil administration of the region. As the importance of the task of consolidation of Communist conquest grew, so did the stature of the military area command. With the cessation of large-scale hostilities, the field army command sank to a position of secondary importance and finally disappeared. It is probable that it will reappear only in the event of major combat operations.

d. The headquarters of each military area (par. 22) is probably designed not only to assume the role of a theater of operations, capable of independent military action, but also to provide cadres for theater Army command echelons (field armies or army groups). Existing area/naval and air headquarters would in all probability assume the role of command echelons for theater naval forces and theater air forces.

159. COMPOSITION

a. A field army (fig. 68) consists of a headquarters, certain organic field army troops, a variable number of army groups, and a variable number of supporting combat and service troops. Some or all of the latter categories of units may be attached to

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


Figure 67. Deployment of field armies in China; September 1948 to March 1950.

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
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HANDLING AUTHORIZEDNOTE:
(1) THE NUMBER OF ARMY GROUPS MAY VARY FROM 2 TO 6CONFIDENTIAL—MODIFIED
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Figure 68. The field army.

army groups. The allotment or grouping of troops with the field army is the responsibility of its commander, who may shift armies from one army group to another and alter the proportion of combat support or service troops as required by the situation. The field army may perform both tactical and administrative functions, and is the largest self-contained unit in the Chinese Communist Army. From the standpoint of size alone, the field army is the equivalent of the United States army group. The field army normally operates under a theater command; it may, however, take the place of that echelon in certain situations (par. 154).

b. The composition of a field army varies with the commander's mission, the anticipated hostile resistance, and the terrain in the area of operations. When employed in an area of secondary importance, the field army may consist of as few as two army

groups and limited combat support and service units. Employed in the direction of the principal strategic effort, the field army will consist of a powerful infantry component of 3 to 6 army groups, heavily reinforced with combat support units suited to the terrain. For example, in favorable terrain, armored and motorized forces are emphasized; in close terrain, cavalry and light mechanized troops, as well as engineers, are accorded priority. In any case, adequate signal, artillery, and air support is considered essential.

z. When operating separately, the field army is allotted sufficient service troops to establish a logistical command capable of supporting up to 750,000 troops. In other situations, the number and type of service troops allocated the field army will depend upon the capabilities and limitations of the theater logistical command, and the requirement for rein-

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forcing logistic capabilities of subordinate commands. Ordinarily, only truck regiments, Railways Corps units, and other service units sufficient to support field army troops are retained under the commander's control. Other service units are attached to subordinate commands to execute logistic and administrative missions in forward areas. Theater logistical command services usually operate within army group and sometimes army rear areas, thus obviating the requirement for large service forces subordinate to the field army.

160. COMMAND

a. The commander and political commissar of the field army are designated by the State Council, as are their assistants and principal staff department heads. They may recommend appointment of subordinate commanders, but the Council retains approving authority for appointment of all officers to positions of division commander (or equivalent position) and higher within the field army. The commander and commissar are delegated authority to promote officers of company grade under their command. As in all other Chinese Communist units, the commander and political commissar of the field army are of equal rank; probably general or marshal. They share responsibility for supervision of all administrative and combat operations of the field army; control of training management activities throughout the command; maintenance of troop morale, military discipline, law, and order in the command; approval of unit citations and recommendations for awards and decorations for general officers; and timely execution of directives received from higher authority. The military commander has virtual command authority over military training, certain administrative activities, and execution of combat operations. The political commissar has command authority over all political affairs, certain aspects of personnel management (par. 143), psychological warfare, and counterintelligence. The military staff elements are responsible to the military commander; the political staff reports directly to the political commissar.

b. The field army commander is responsible for all ground operations and military training within the boundaries of his assigned area, and may have air and naval elements under his command. In discharging this responsibility, he is expected to ex-

ploit all resources under his control, both military and civilian. He may organize civilian labor forces, quasi-military trucking organizations, civil communications facilities, and the like to support combat operations. When feasible, the commander will organize and support guerrilla operations to be carried out by small, independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying, and disrupting hostile military operations. Resistance movements by discontented or hostile elements of a population against established enemy civil and military authority are also exploited by the commander to further the success of his operations.

c. Based upon his assigned mission, the field army commander prepares and disseminates campaign plans for field army operations, allots troops and administrative support to army groups and field army troops, assigns zones of action to subordinate commanders, and directs the coordinated movements and combat actions of his major subordinate commands. Missions, objectives, and time schedules assigned army groups and other subordinate commands are clear and specific, and usually cover the conduct of an entire campaign. Execution of campaign tasks is decentralized to an extreme degree, but strict adherence to the plan is demanded—at least in the initial phases of its execution. Communist doctrine teaches decentralization of the execution of campaign plans to free the commander and his staff for preparing future operations. Precombat training exercises and postcombat critiques are planned and supervised by the commander to assure a high state of combat readiness throughout the field army.

d. From a logistic standpoint, the commander's responsibilities are normally limited to estimating the requirements for support of operations and controlling the allocation and expenditure of supplies by subordinate commands. He also must make movement plans to control maneuver of troops and materiel throughout his area of responsibility, estimate losses and requirements for replacements throughout the command, and announce and supervise execution of personnel management policies governing subordinate commands. When required to operate a field army logistical command, the commander's responsibilities are similar to those of a theater commander described in section III, chapter 11.

CONFIDENTIAL—Modified Handling Authorized**161. STAFF**

The field army military commander and political commissar are assisted in the exercise of command by a typical staff composed of an operations department, a personnel department, a political department, and a rear service department. When the field army operates independently, the subdivisions of these departments, as well as their functions, are similar to those of the theater staff described in section II, chapter 11. When the field army is subordinate to a theater of operations, the size and functions of its staff are curtailed, especially in administrative operations (par. 147). In this latter situation, the principal staff departments function essentially as follows:

a. *The operations department*, headed by the chief of staff and an assistant, is concerned primarily with campaign planning (par. 37) and supervision of the execution of the commander's military decisions. Plans cover several sequential campaigns, and include consideration of alternate courses of action based upon estimated enemy capabilities and intentions. The department is responsible for military training management throughout the command, and may establish a training unit of approximately division size for replacement training purposes as a part of the field army troops. The chief of staff makes extensive use of liaison officers to supervise execution of the commander's decisions.

b. *The personnel department*, emphasizing long-range personnel loss estimates, develops requirements for replacements. It also announces personnel management policies of higher authority and supervises their execution. The department, in coordination with the political department, recommends allocation of replacements to subordinate commands and operates minimum essential administrative installations for field army troops. It also performs headquarters commandant functions for the field army.

c. *The political department* implements policies announced by the field army political commissar. It places emphasis on political training and management, maintenance of morale, counterintelligence activities, supervision of administration of military law, and planning and supervision of civil affairs/military government matters and psychological warfare activities. The department may

operate agent- and linguist-training installations, prisoner of war camps, and censorship facilities.

d. *The rear service department* advises the commander on supply policies affecting subordinate army groups; conducts planning for future logistic requirements; and assists in establishing levels of supply, required supply rates, priorities of issue, and allocation of service troops throughout the command. The department is also the commander's initiating agency for levies to satisfy future operational needs or to replace combat losses. The department operates logistic installations for the support of field army troops, and has operational control of service troops retained under the field army commander.

162. COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE TROOPS

a. Normal ground combat support attachments may include artillery, antitank, rocket launcher, and antiaircraft divisions or regiments; armored divisions or regiments; combat and special engineer regiments; signal regiments or regiments. Air Force combat support attachments may include tactical air components, transport aircraft elements, and airborne divisions. Navy combat support forces that may be attached to a field army consist of amphibious support groups and combat vessels for protection of flanks resting on water barriers. National Public Security units may also operate under the command of the field army, either as reinforcements for Army components or as an economy force in the field army rear area.

b. Service troops placed in support of a field army may include truck regiments, Railway Corps elements, Technical Service Corps troops (par. 6), construction engineers, engineer technical detachments, and medical units. Both civilian and military labor units, as well as quasi-military animal, truck, and rail transportation units, may also reinforce conventional service troops in the field army, as may elements of the Army's military construction and production units. In the past, agricultural divisions throughout the country have provided a large portion of the food required by troops in a field army command, and rail lines and highways have been speedily repaired or extended by various types of construction divisions.

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


Figure 69. Troops of an agricultural division engaged in farming activities.

Section II. METHODS OF INFLUENCING THE ACTION

163. GENERAL

The military commander of a field army exerts his influence on the outcome of a campaign both before its initiation and after operations have been initiated. Initially, the commander influences the action by detailed planning, precombat training exercises, and dissemination of combat orders. Subsequent to initiating the action, the commander discharges his responsibility by control of logistical resources, reallocation of major combat elements, and decisive employment of reserves. The field army political commissar influences the action by intense political indoctrination and tight political control of subordinate commands, both before and during the conduct of a campaign. Both commanders are strongly influenced by MAO's remarks on the conduct of a campaign:

Win victory in the first battle by all means. Strike only when we are positive that the enemy's situation, the terrain, the people, and other conditions are favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy. Otherwise, fall back and cautiously bide our time. There will always be opportunities, and [a commander] should not rashly accept battle.

164. FIELD ARMY PLANS

Plans developed to propose ways to carry out the field army commander's decisions normally include

consideration of the general situation, the mission, immediate and subsequent missions for subordinate units, administrative matters, and command and signal matters. Plans may also include consideration of several alternate courses of action to be adopted subsequent to initiation of a campaign as certain anticipated situations arise in the course of combat. This latter technique, the Chinese Communists believe, prevents the commander from being surprised by the enemy.

a. The director of the operations department coordinates activities devoted to finding out everything possible about the enemy. His intelligence and reconnaissance staffs direct their efforts toward collecting information on:

- (1) The strength, identification, composition, and movement of enemy forces in the field army combat zone.
- (2) Data relevant to enemy reinforcements, strategy, tactics, and state of morale and training, as well as information on the capability of senior enemy commanders.
- (3) Political, economic, and social conditions affecting the hostile population.

The department utilizes spies; directs air and ground reconnaissance elements; interviews captured prisoners; and studies books, documents, and equipment taken from the enemy to gain information on conditions within the enemy lines and the

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hostile commander's capabilities and probable actions. It compiles reports for the commander summarizing the enemy's military, economic, social, and political status and predicting the enemy's probable intentions, to include time and place.

b. Intelligence reports prepared by the operations department advise the field army commander of what may happen and form the basis for preparing (or altering) a plan of campaign. If reports indicate that the enemy is weak in certain sectors, the advantage of attacking there is brought to the commander's attention. If reports state that the enemy is concentrating troops, weapons, and supplies in a particular area, pointing to an intention on his part to attack, it becomes necessary for the recommended plan to provide for meeting the attack, attacking first, or withdrawing to avoid the attack. When approved by the commander, plans are distributed in the form of circulars to army groups and armies well in advance of the operation to provide guidance for the development of tactical plans by subordinate commanders. This practice also assures that subordinate commanders will be ready to act against the enemy if necessary, in accordance with the commander's adopted plan, and will not have to wait for the issuance of detailed orders. The commander modifies his plan as the changing situation requires; changes are disseminated promptly to insure speed and accuracy in tactical planning. Once an operation is initiated, the field army commander requires that his plan be followed, regardless of local success or lack of success; changes are the prerogative of the field army commander.

165. PRECOMBAT FIELD TRAINING

a. The field army commander relies heavily on precombat field training to prepare his troops for battle against the enemy. Directives regarding training of the various army groups, supporting arms, and services within the field army are issued by the commander's operations department or rear service department, as appropriate. Training directives are prepared by staff section chiefs of the field army staff, who are essentially both special staff officers of the field army and representatives of the chiefs of branch directorates (par. 17) of the Ministry of National Defense. Field training exercises are designed to accomplish two basic goals:

- (1) Achieve combined arms or joint service coordi-

nation in battle by early association of task organizations in groups that will subsequently be employed in battle; and (2) instill familiarity with the commander's scheme of maneuver in commanders and troops at all echelons of command. The field army commander directs early formation of task organizations within subordinate commands, and supervises conduct of combined arms or joint training exercises (actually rehearsals) over terrain similar to that in the anticipated area of operations. Field army staff officers supervise and critique training exercises, frequently down through division level, and direct new exercises when necessary to correct deficiencies. No effort is spared to make the situation as realistic as possible, and when areas containing old enemy fortifications are lacking, masses of civilian labor are often recruited to construct fortifications in exercise areas on which the troops are given almost endless assault training. Chinese Communist doctrine even goes so far as to violate the accords of the Geneva Convention by recommending employment of prisoners of war to interpret the psychology, character, and tactical doctrine of the enemy so that the commander can devise appropriate methods to deal with him in the forthcoming campaign.

b. In addition to unit exercises, the commander may establish troop schools for enlisted specialists and staff officer training, both to raise standards of proficiency in subordinate commands and to insure a source for specialist replacements. The commander's training units serve as a source of basic replacements, and probably assist in the conduct of military training throughout the command.

c. As a campaign progresses through its various phases, the commander follows the practice of rotating attacking units, usually armies, phase by phase. As each is relieved, it is withdrawn to assembly areas in the rear, often directly under field army control, for rest and rehabilitation, followed by intense training for its next scheduled operation. Critiques of recently conducted actions are held, and new training exercises are based on lessons learned, both about the enemy and about unit weaknesses that have come to light.

166. COMBAT ORDERS

As in the case of field army plans, the commander's combat orders are distributed down to army

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


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


Figure 70. The field army commander establishes troop schools for officers.

level; the order is usually accompanied by one or more liaison personnel to amplify the commander's intentions where necessary and to supervise and expedite its execution by subordinate commanders. Administrative orders usually accompany or are appended to the combat order. Field army combat orders:

- a. Assign immediate and subsequent missions for subordinate army groups, armies, and supporting arms and services for each phase of a campaign.
- b. Prescribe time phasing of the campaign.
- c. Announce task organizations of subordinate army groups.
- d. Establish axes of advance and signal communications for the field army and its army groups.
- e. Delimit army group combat zones.
- f. Announce general matters dealing with signal

communications, combat security, antitank defense, air defense, CBR defense, and administrative support that pertains to the command as a whole.

167. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Once the campaign is initiated, the commander may influence the course of the action by control of and expeditious shifts in his available logistical support, as in the following examples:

- a. Engineers and construction units can be moved from quiet sectors to maintain or improve lines of communications in more critical locations to facilitate mobility for reserves. They may also be employed to overcome unanticipated major obstacles; execute extensive demolitions or erect secondary defenses in the direction of the principal effort; and,

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Figure 71. Troops participate in field exercises in rear areas.

in rare instances, effect an economy of force in quiet sectors.

- b. Truck or rail transportation, earmarked for supply functions, can be diverted to essential troop movements.

- c. Supply priorities can be altered, and ammunition, fuel, rations, and essential special equipment may be diverted from less critical sectors to reinforce the action in the critical direction.

- d. Personnel replacement plans can be revised to channel the replacement flow to units weakened by excessive casualties.

- e. Service support troops attached to subordinate commands can be transferred to reinforce other commands in more critical areas.

168. MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS

The organization of the field army is sufficiently flexible to permit reallocation of major combat elements within subordinate commands to influence the course of the campaign. The commander retains authority to shift combat support arms (including tactical air) from one army group to another, or to withdraw a portion thereof to his control for purposes of reinforcing another unit in

contact or his reserve. He also may shift armies from one army group to another; infrequently, infantry divisions may be shifted from the control of one army to another. Reallocation of armies and infantry divisions may be accomplished by reinforcing units on line from the field army general reserve, by actual movement of units from one sector to another, or by a change in the combat boundaries of major subordinate commands.

169. RESERVES

The principal method available to the field army commander to influence the course of his campaign, within the limitations imposed upon him by higher authority (par. 132), is the decisive employment of his reserves. Field army reserves are retained in concealed assembly areas in the rear of units in contact and in the vicinity of lines of communications, so that they can be shifted from one sector to another in time to exploit success, or to prevent or at least contain an enemy threat. The commander strives to maintain the road and rail net in good condition and retain control of sufficient transportation means to assure mobility for his reserves. A campaign entailing simultaneous fighting at different fronts within a theater may produce

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a shortage of combat forces that can be overcome only by improvising reserves. In such a situation, the field army commander may commit security,

reconnaissance, cavalry, or even service troops if necessary along extensive, quiet sectors to release combat forces for the formation of reserves.

Section III. FIELD ARMY MANEUVERS

170. GENERAL

The field army commander announces his tentative scheme of maneuver sufficiently prior to the operation to afford adequate time for planning by subordinate commanders. When the field army is operating independently, its commander develops his scheme of maneuver to accomplish the general mission assigned by the General Staff. When subordinate to a theater of operations, the commander's plan is based on specific instructions received from the theater commander. The following paragraphs deal with one or more of the more frequently employed maneuvers at field army level. It should be pointed out, however, that only in rare instances is one single maneuver used to the exclusion of others. Most often one maneuver will predominate in a campaign, with two or three others, or even more, complementing it. During extended operations, the field army commander may even change the predominant maneuver occasionally. The capability of the troops, which is weighed carefully, is one of the more important bases on which the commander will build his scheme of maneuver and determine the timing of a campaign. If troops are battle weary and the campaign is expected to involve long and heavy fighting, the operation must be conducted in several phases to provide rest between periods of movement or combat. Thus, the use of a combination of tactical maneuvers proves effective in gaining time for the commander to regroup his forces when necessary to continue effective combat operations. As a campaign progresses, the selection of the type of tactical maneuvers depends on the intuition of the field army commander as well as upon the situation.

171. THE ADVANCE

Major decisions concerning the advance are announced by the field army commander, and include zones of advance, axes and rates of advance, the general field army formation, objectives and missions of subordinate commands, the plan for employment of reconnaissance agencies, and deception and

security measures. The commander's plan and scheme of maneuver impose specific limitations on the movements of the main bodies of subordinate army groups and supporting troops, but accord relative freedom of action to subordinate commanders with respect to the employment of their advance guards. The following discussion applies equally to a field army when operating independently or under a theater of operations; in the latter case, however, the commander will be limited in respect to his freedom of action during conduct of the advance.

a. Planning. The commander's plan for the advance is comprehensive, and is influenced chiefly by his mission, the enemy situation, the condition of his own troops, and the terrain over which the advance is to be conducted (ch. 7). His planning techniques and methods of organizing his forces do not differ significantly from those followed by commanders of larger units in the United States Army.

b. Methods of Movement. The formation for the advance adopted by the field army commander is flexible and permits rapid assumption of combat dispositions as contact with the enemy becomes imminent. When no contact with the enemy is anticipated, the commander may concentrate his troops—taking advantage of the cover offered by the terrain to protect his force against air attack—to conserve the energy of the troops and maintain the combat efficiency of supporting arms and services materiel. Under these circumstances, the commander permits movement of troop units by type without specific regard to future organization for combat. Each type of unit moves by the most suitable method, at its own rate, accomplishing the move in a prescribed time. When the advance takes place through an area likely to be dominated by hostile ground forces, however, the commander adopts a formation that insures the combat readiness of his force. In this case the commander emphasizes:

- (1) Organization of his force into columns capable of independent action.

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- (2) Designation of zones of advance conforming to topographical peculiarities and to the scheme of maneuver (a rather narrow zone of advance for columns moving on the primary axis, and rather broad zones for those moving on secondary fronts).
- (3) Reinforcement of each troop column with field army support elements.
- (4) Importance of combat security.
- (5) Adoption of the policy of movement by echelons (serials).

The distance between major columns is determined by the effective range of available weapons, the terrain, and the enemy situation. When the movement occurs over ordinary terrain, and the hostile dispositions are not defined, this distance may equal 100 kilometers. When there is a possibility of meeting the enemy, and his dispositions are known, the distance between independent columns is decreased and an advance on a broad front is adopted. The Chinese Communists teach that this action increases the overall battle preparedness of the unit, favors exploitation of the striking power of the unit, effects a concentration which will facilitate the execution of an attack in the direction of movement, and enables a rapid and direct shift from march dispositions to contain the enemy and execute an envelopment. By adopting an advance on a broad front, the closing time of major march units is decreased, the troops are kept in good physical condition, cover is easier to find, the effectiveness of hostile air attack is reduced, and the element of surprise is maintained. The commander offsets the deficiency in tactical depth of the march disposition by retention of a powerful reserve which he may employ to create overwhelming superiority in the direction of the main assault. The width of an army group zone of advance depends upon circumstances at the time of the march and the size and composition of the army group. The zone of advance for an army group may be 50 to 150 kilometers; for an army it varies between 10 and 50 kilometers. Each army zone should ordinarily have four or five routes of advance, but a lesser number is sometimes sufficient. The number of independent columns in each army group is determined by the number of roads actually in the prescribed sector and by the possibility of movement on emergency military roads or cross country.

c. Formations. The interval between the various columns and the relative position of the heads of each column are determined by the commander's mission and the field army scheme of maneuver. When combat is anticipated, the interval between columns should be such that fire coordination is possible and freedom of movement is not impaired during deployment. Columns move in line of columns or are echeloned. The line-of-columns arrangement permits either fast flank deployment of units, or an attack by all the columns at the same time over a wide front. The commander adopts this type of march formation when attacking a hostile force defending a hastily constructed position, when combat is anticipated and it is necessary to deploy on the flanks of the enemy, or when the commander's flanks are protected. The echelon-type formation affords a certain flexibility of march disposition and allows freedom of movement both in the direction of march and on both flanks; it permits easy execution of envelopments of the enemy's flanks, and also affords a degree of security against encirclement by the enemy. There are many types of arrangements of echelons, the most common of which are shown in figure 72.

The commander may direct that the echelon formation be adopted either before the advance or during its progress, according to the situation. If it is to be carried out before the initiation of the advance, each column is allotted a different starting time; if it is to be carried out during the advance, the rate of movement of the different columns is varied until the appropriate arrangement has been achieved. When the advance takes place at a time that there is a possibility of encountering the enemy, armor and motorized units usually follow along in echelon formation at the rear of each troop column to retain freedom of action and provide security. The interval between columns should be such that an enemy attempting a flank attack against forward columns will come under fires of columns echeloned behind leading elements. Generally the interval between echelons in an army group is 20 to 25 kilometers; in an army, 5 to 10 kilometers. Intervals normally do not exceed the effective range of artillery of subsequent serials.

d. Timing. The commander controls the timing of the advance by assigning march objectives, publishing a march table, and designating phase lines. March objectives are selected so that most of the

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


Figure 72: Echelon formations.

infantry strength of each subordinate command can arrive on its objective within the prescribed time limit. Phase lines are for the purpose of control-

ling the advance of armored and motorized elements which move at faster rates than infantry units. Armored and motorized elements advance from one

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


Figure 73. Armor moves in a separate column during the advance.

phase line to another in accordance with the commander's march table; phase lines are so arranged that supporting arms serials remain within supporting distance of infantry formations at all times.

e. Supporting Troops. Doctrine contends that success in development of combat during an advance to contact is achieved by the commander who marshals his forces to deliver overwhelming fire superiority on the enemy. The field army commander disposes his supporting troops to achieve that goal and assure control of the advance and development of combat.

- (1) Most of the available artillery is placed well forward in army group columns, in the direction of the main effort, apportioned if possible on the basis of the equivalent of three artillery divisions (27 battalions) per army in the van.
- (2) In favorable terrain, armored units are employed to reinforce the army groups in the main direction of advance. In fluid situations, they may move ahead of or abreast of the main body of the army group they support; when approaching an enemy in prepared defensive positions, they follow the army group main body, prepared to support its assault if feasible.
- (3) Engineers, whose primary mission in an advance is to insure continuity of movement, are placed toward the head of army group march columns to assist in obstacle clearing, to make road and bridge repairs, to construct military roads, and to participate in river-crossing operations.

About 50 percent of the engineers will move with the advance guards of the army groups in the main effort.

- (4) Chemical warfare units are distributed according to their function. For example, those equipped to create obstacles are assigned to the army group whose mission is to contain the enemy; smoke-generating units and flame-thrower elements are distributed to army groups in the main effort. Reconnaissance and decontamination units move with advance elements of all subordinate commands.
- (5) Field army signal troops move with the main body of the army group on the principal axis of advance. Their mission is to maintain communications between the commander and subordinate army groups, the advance guards, field army reserves, and critical installations in the rear.
- (6) Control of most of the tactical air supporting the advance is decentralized to commanders of army groups leading the advance. The field army commander retains control of air units assigned campaign missions (par. 85).

f. Control. During the advance, the field army commander directs inspections of the organization and conduct of the movement, march discipline, camouflage discipline, the combat preparedness of combat security forces, and the manner of movement through critical defiles and over rivers. He also directs measures for air defense, defense against armored attack, and defense against CBR attack (elements charged with those missions are also inspected for combat effectiveness) and prescribes continuous reconnaissance of the area of the advance. He is alert to the changing situation, and dispatches orders altering bivouac areas and march tables as required. As contact becomes imminent, the commander inspects troop units in army groups to determine their combat readiness. His control is accomplished by a system of reports, by inspections by himself and his staff, and by a marching regulating organization (par. 178) distributed at critical positions along the route of advance. The position of the field army commander is determined by the situation. The commander and his operations staff will normally follow the advance guard of his main force. He may elect to advance by

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bounds from one vantage point to another, and during the interval between bounds visit units deployed adjacent to the main axis of advance. Delivery of orders and reports is accomplished by a liaison service composed primarily of motorized messengers and light aircraft. Radio and wire supplement messengers in the area behind leading elements. Special attention is paid to maintaining unobstructed contact between the commander and his reconnaissance, combat security, reserve, air defense, and antitank defense forces. Before initiating the advance, the commander distributes signal communications means to the command post of each major subordinate command; he reinforces or re-allocates his initial allocation as necessary during the progress of the advance.

g. Intelligence. The commander insures adequate and timely information of the enemy by exploiting to the maximum all collection agencies under his control and by placing specific requests for intelligence on higher and adjacent commanders. His operations staff controls air and ground reconnaissance elements operating far in advance of his forward elements. Subordinate commanders are kept informed by dissemination of intelligence studies, estimates, and situation maps. Liaison officers under the control of the field army chief of staff are also employed to keep higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands informed of the situation. The intelligence and reconnaissance staffs move with the commander, well forward on the main axis of advance; the commander is thus able to act promptly on current items of intelligence.

h. Security. The commander provides for security during the advance and in rest areas by directing his subordinate commanders to establish advance, flank, and rear guards; fixed security detachments along routes of advance; and outpost systems about unit bivouac areas. He also retains a powerful mobile security force under his direct control. Security against air, armor, and CBR attack is achieved by organizing warning systems throughout the command supplemented by air defense, antitank, and chemical warfare units under the control of both the field army commander and army group commanders.

172. ACTION UPON CONTACT

As contact becomes imminent, the commander intensifies his reconnaissance effort to assure receipt

of information which will permit him to seize the initiative and strike the hostile force while it is on the move. He directs air assault of the enemy's columns at the earliest possible time to disrupt and harass his formations. Once advance reconnaissance forces have developed the enemy, powerful advance guards assault hostile leading elements. At the same time, armor and long-range artillery strike in surprise flank attacks at the main bodies of hostile forward elements in an effort to slow the enemy's advance and gain time for the deployment of the commander's main attack force. Air support of both maneuvers is considered essential. The commander directs active defense measures in those secondary directions where he is faced with unexpected parity or superiority. Advance guards employ mobile defense tactics to ambush and destroy hostile forces and to prevent development of a coordinated enemy attack. Meanwhile, the commander deploys his main force in a determined effort to destroy the hostile main force by envelopment and encirclement whenever possible. When the flanks of hostile columns are not exposed, the commander directs a penetration of the weakest portion of the hostile array, then quickly follows with powerful envelopments to isolate and destroy the enemy columns. At the first sign of retreat, subordinate commanders on their own initiative organize pursuit of the enemy force; the field army commander reinforces pursuing elements with mobile reserves under his control.

173. OFFENSIVE MANEUVER

The field army commander plans an offensive campaign in which the scheme of maneuver is based on an uninterrupted series of major attacks in a single decisive direction. Such a series of engagements may take place over several weeks or months. Initially, he strives to deploy his force so that one or both of its flanks are protected, either by neutral countries, friendly forces, or natural terrain barriers. Having protection on both flanks, the commander may advance with his main axis on the right, in the center, or on the left of his force. If but one flank can be secured, the commander maneuvers primarily on that flank. Lacking protection on either flank, the commander places the center of his force astride the main axis of advance. Whenever possible, the commander elects to initiate his


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Figure 74. Deployment of a field army upon contact.

offensive campaign by employing one or more forms of the envelopment to isolate and destroy the main body of the enemy. When the situation precludes envelopment, the commander directs multiple penetrations of the hostile defenses, followed by envelopment of the flanks thus created. His plan provides for pursuit in the event of a hostile retreat. When organizing an offensive campaign, the field army commander announces his decision (based on his estimate of the situation); disposes troops, weapons, and supplies; assigns mission; develop plans for

coordinated action; and establishes signal communications essential to the exercise of command. Initially, execution of most operations is decentralized to major subordinate commanders; the commander, however, makes a continuing estimate of the situation and is prepared to revise his plan as necessary to influence the action.

a. During the planning phase, the field army commander makes his decision known to his major subordinate commanders at the earliest possible date to insure that units under his command have ade-

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quate time to prepare for the operation. Warning orders announce field army organization for combat, the direction of the main and secondary attacks, the missions of major subordinate commands, and administrative matters pertaining to the command as a whole. Once these orders are disseminated, the field army commander and his subordinates conduct concurrent planning to work out the details of execution of the campaign. During the remainder of the planning phase (and subsequent to initiating the campaign) the capabilities of the opposing forces, the possible effects of their employment, the weather, and the terrain are continuously evaluated. The commander's plan is altered as required to meet the changing situation by clear, concise, and timely orders.

b. In disposing his force, the commander considers only those units and resources under his command; forces available to higher or adjacent commanders are looked upon as possible reinforcements, but have little influence on the commander's immediate plans. The commander initially divides his force into several general groups: the main attack group, one or more secondary attack groups, and the reserve group (fig. 41). The commander's dispositions must:

- (1) Place a decisive force in the direction of the field army main effort at a decisive time.
- (2) Exploit all the resources of the command.
- (3) Insure disposition in depth, both at the outset and throughout the campaign.
- (4) Afford flexibility in deployment and precision in control to permit rapid reinforcement during the course of the action.
- (5) Afford security against air and ground attacks.
- (6) Insure continuity of logistic support throughout the campaign.

The extent of the enemy's defensive deployment in depth and the condition of his field fortifications determines the depth of the main attack force. When the hostile defenses are weak, the commander attacks on a broad front with comparatively little depth, usually with two or three echelons in the main attack group. When attacking a fortified zone, however, he directs that the main effort be made on a narrow front; in this case it is not unusual

for the army group(s) in the main effort to attack in columns of armies with units of assault armies deployed in as many as four to six echelons. In either case, the commander assures strong artillery, armor, air, and engineer support for his main attack group. Secondary attack groups are assigned the mission of holding the enemy in place, forcing him to commit his reserves prematurely, and precluding his reinforcing in the vicinity of the main effort. Secondary attack groups usually deploy in two echelons, over a broad front, disposed to execute multiple limited objective attacks. Field army reserves are disposed to participate in the engagement at the decisive time and place to assure victory, counter hostile attacks, or exploit success.

c. The field army commander follows the practice of assigning immediate and subsequent missions of major subordinate commands, and quite frequently to the commanders of echelons within those commands. Immediate missions usually include objective(s), zones of action, and prescribe times and directions of attack to insure unity of effort. Subsequent missions, especially those prescribed for components of subordinate army groups, normally consist of a directions of movement to be followed subsequent to the seizure of initial objectives. This practice insures continuity of the attack on the hostile defenses in great depth; it also allows the field army commander to assign new immediate missions to major units committed on the battlefield when unforeseen opportunities arise to strike at the enemy's flanks or rear.

d. Besides assigning missions, task organizations, and zones of action to subordinate commands, the commander must coordinate their actions. He prescribes continuing reconnaissance measures, designates assembly areas for major elements, directs employment of general reserve artillery and other units under field army control, and insures proper timing of the phases of the campaign. Further, he prescribes the sequence and direction of displacement of subordinate command posts; the establishment of signal communications; the time and method of transmission of combat reports to be submitted by subordinate commands; and the methods of coordination to be observed between adjacent commands.

e. Except in a surprise attack against an enemy in a hasty defense, tremendous and sustained artillery preparatory fires herald the launching of a


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Figure 75. Penetration of a hostile defense zone.

general offensive by the field army. Even limited objective attacks are often supported by tens of thousands of rounds of artillery fire. Normally, secondary attacks are initiated first to draw the attention of the enemy away from the main attack. Troops are assembled as far forward as possible consistent with the terrain and tactical situation, and are moved to attack positions under cover of darkness or smoke. Units in contact do not take a major

part in the initial attack; they cover the movement of attack forces through their positions. After the attack is launched, the commander's plan is followed closely by subordinate echelons; changes are made by the commander as the battle progresses.

f. Once committed to the offensive, the commander husband his reserves while controlling the entry into combat of successive echelons of subordinate attacking forces. During the offensive, he

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Figure 76. Airborne troops seize objectives behind retreating enemy forces.

is alert to the capability of the enemy to execute strong counterattacks or other defense measures to slow down, block, or stop the advance of leading elements. Suitable weapons and troops are attached to forward units so that they can overcome obstacles and repulse hostile armor attacks. If all goes well, field army reserves are withheld until the hostile main battle position has been broken into several small components and the enemy's second defensive position overrun. Mobile reserves then strike deep into hostile territory, execute flanking attacks on enemy reinforcements, and seize supply concentrations, lines of communications, and centers of government. If available, airborne troops are employed to seize critical objectives. Meanwhile, forces committed initially concentrate on destroying hostile elements in the former defense area.

174. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The area assigned the field army for defense and the general manner in which the defense is to be conducted are normally prescribed by higher authority. The high command, for example, may specify what space may be traded for time, what areas are to be denied the hostile force, and in which area the field army is to make a determined stand. Forward

of this latter area the commander is permitted wide freedom of maneuver. He develops his defense plan based on his mission, the time and space accorded him to accomplish his mission, the strength and composition of the opposing forces, and the terrain and weather. After his initial estimate of the situation, the commander may direct limited offensive operations to seize favorable terrain which will facilitate future defensive operations. Forward of the area on which he must make a firm stand, the commander may employ the tactics of delay on successive positions, blocking action, mobile defense, defense in one position (normal or wide front), or position defense in strong points or improvised fortresses. Ultimately, his defense includes most defensive maneuvers, coupled with aggressive offensive operations as favorable opportunities present themselves. The entire defense is but a preliminary to the counteroffensive, and the commander's efforts are devoted not only to exacting attrition on the enemy, but preserving the combat strength of his own force. Any defense is organized to repulse and destroy foot elements and effectively block and defeat armored and motorized elements.

a. The field army commander normally directs organization of three defense zones: an advance

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zone, a main defense zone, and a secondary defense zone (fig. 34).

- (1) An advance zone is most often established when the field army can assume the defense without effective interference; it is seldom employed when assuming the defense in the course of an offensive campaign. In this latter case, however, the commander may establish his main defense zone well to the rear of forces in contact, so that the latter can execute delaying tactics in zone. In any case, the commander announces whether and in what sectors an advance zone is to be established. He also specifies the forces to be deployed in the advance zone by commanders of army groups on line. The troops occupying the zone protect the main force from observation and surprise and keep the hostile force under observation. An advance zone may vary from 15 to 100 kilometers in depth, depending on the situation.
- (2) The main defense zone, consisting of the defense zones of divisions on line, is designed to stop large-scale offensives by a defense in one position. It is the zone in which the commander executes his principal defensive effort, and generally is from 12 to 15 kilometers in depth. Forces in the main defense zone have strong artillery, tank, and assault gun support, and are backed by mobile army reserves that can be shifted rapidly from one sector to another in time to prevent or at least contain an enemy penetration.
- (3) The secondary defense zone, manned by a part of the reserves of armies on line, adds depth to the field army defense zone. The secondary defense zone is eventually connected to the main defense zone by numerous switch positions built between the fortified lines, some connecting the two zones vertically, some diagonally. It is located approximately five kilometers behind the main defense zone, and has a depth of four to six kilometers.

If an extended defense in one position is contemplated, the field army commander may direct preparation of a third and even a fourth defensive zone

by army group and field army reserves. These forces also join successive lines with switch positions and fill the interval between zones with major obstacles. These latter defense zones may extend the organized depth of the field army defenses to 100 kilometers behind the advance zone, and afford the commander what the Chinese Communists call an elastic defense system.

b. Tactics employed by the field army commander in the conduct of the defense vary with the mission, the situation, the terrain, and the weather. Mobile defense tactics are employed by forces deployed in the advance zone. When enemy infantry attempts to break into the advance zone with little armor support, the commander may direct a delay on successive positions to inflict casualties on the enemy without becoming too closely engaged. By offering limited resistance on successive positions, coupled with powerful counterattacks as the hostile force becomes overextended, the commander attempts to weaken the enemy until the hostile forces are too disorganized to mount a sustained offensive. After the hostile attacks have lost their momentum, either limited objective attacks may be launched forward of the main defense zone or a counteroffensive may be initiated. Mobile defense by forces in the advance zone prevents a breakthrough by trading a minimum of space for a maximum of time to exhaust the enemy and allow the commander to prepare strong defenses or move up new forces for the counteroffensive. If the hostile infantry has armor support, the commander may employ combined arms units, with the help of strong reserves, to delay and block a main enemy thrust into the advance zone. Blocking forces must be strong in antitank defenses, and sufficiently resilient to withstand the shock of hostile armored forces. In addition, they should be situated on terrain favorable for either blocking the hostile advance or diverting its axis well ahead of the main defense zone. When a blocking force fails in its mission, the commander directs its withdrawal to another position farther to the rear to repeat the action. Its primary mission is to disable as many enemy tanks as possible to weaken the enemy's striking power and reestablish the balance of power in favor of the field army commander. Eventually, blocking forces may form the nucleus of a new defense line ahead of part or all of the main defense zone, and ahead of the combat security forces of units on line. Once driven

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in, blocking forces support units in the main defense zone from positions in depth. No forces may withdraw from the advance zone without prior approval of the field army commander.

c. Execution of most defensive measures in the field army main defense zone is usually decentralized to army group commanders whose troops are occupying the main and secondary defense zones. The field army commander, however, exercises control over the tactics employed by subordinate commands, the commitment of their reserves, the allocation of supporting arms and services, the apportionment of critical supplies, and the relief of major components on line. He also coordinates the actions of adjacent army groups, and intervenes with powerful mobile reserves when a major breakthrough cannot be contained or destroyed by local reserves. Once hostile preparations for a breakthrough have been clearly recognized, the commander moves his reserves close to the rear of the threatened sector; he positions them close enough to the front for rapid, effective employment, but far enough away to preserve their freedom of maneuver.

d. Reserves are held in assembly areas, concealed from hostile air and ground observation and from enemy air attacks and artillery. Initially the commander directs commitment of local army and army group reserves in powerful frontal or flanking counterattacks to eliminate or seal off minor breakthroughs. The tactical integrity of the reserves of subordinate commands is maintained whenever possible so that they can overrun hostile infantry in one powerful thrust and regain key positions of the former line. Subsequently, local commanders attempt to close smaller gaps by flanking actions. The field army commander protects the open flanks of the breakthrough area with general reserve artillery and air, and assembles small local reserves behind them. Should the enemy achieve a major breakthrough that causes a collapse of a wide sector of the front—50 kilometers or more—that local reserves cannot close, the commander may narrow the breach by withdrawing subordinate commands to a shorter line and strengthening resistance in sectors adjacent to the gap while he readies his counterattack. In

such a situation the counterattack force consists of several armies, supported by armor, general reserve artillery, and tactical air. When a secure shoulder in the vicinity of the breakthrough exists, the commander commits his reserve in an attack straight across the gap with the objective of cutting off and destroying the forces that have broken through. If a secure shoulder does not exist, reserves execute a powerful frontal attack, on a narrow front, against the reentrant to divide and destroy the hostile force and restore the position.

e. Having destroyed the major hostile effort, the commander may adopt the counteroffensive to seize the initiative and impose his will on the enemy. Preparations, however, may consume considerable time. In that case the commander directs limited objective attacks by units on line to keep the enemy off balance, exact attrition on weakened hostile forces, and cover large-scale preparations for the counteroffensive.

f. The enemy's attack may be so powerful that it cannot be contained in the main defense zone. In such a situation, the commander adopts a retrograde movement to cover reorganization and concentration of his force. He exercises control of the retrograde by designating zones of withdrawal, phase lines, successive defensive lines, assembly areas, security measures, and axes of withdrawal for major subordinate commands. Coordination is effected between adjacent commands, and field army reserves are alerted to execute counterattacks where necessary to assist in extricating units in contact. Although doctrine prescribes, and history shows, a complete break with the main force of the enemy as being the desirable solution, such an accomplishment is difficult in modern warfare for a force as large as a Chinese Communist field army. At least the commander will direct subordinate commanders to execute either blocking operations or delay on successive positions until a new defense line is reached on which he estimates a stand is feasible. During the course of such a retrograde, the field army commander holds the enemy at bay with an economy force, withdrawing and concentrating the major portion of his strength at a decisive location.

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Section IV. ADMINISTRATION

175. GENERAL

The field army commander is normally responsible for organization, operation, and supervision of administrative facilities to support field army troops; for exercise of control over supplies and credits for major subordinate commands; for supervision of personnel administration in the field army; and for organization and operation of movement and traffic control throughout his area of responsibility. These responsibilities require long-range planning; detailed estimates of personnel, supply, and evacuation requirements; meticulous studies of routes of communication; and provision for traffic control, transportation, and supply activities. These requirements are largely met by the joint efforts of the field army operations, personnel, and rear service departments, which are assisted in certain personnel management aspects of administration by the political department (par. 161). Staff departments coordinate closely with the operations department to insure adequate administrative support of the commander's campaign plan. As the independent nature of the commander's mission increases, so do his administrative responsibilities; under circumstances requiring a field army to conduct independent operations under the control of the high command in Peiping, the commander's administrative responsibilities are similar to those of a theater commander discussed in chapter 11. The following paragraphs discuss field army administrative responsibilities in a theater of operations.

176. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES

Administrative activities of the field army command fall into two general categories: Those conducted by administrative services, and those conducted by technical services. All four staff departments assist the joint commanders in executing administrative responsibilities.

a. The director of the personnel department provides six principal services and supervises activities devoted to their execution:

- (1) Military personnel administration.
- (2) Publication, authentication, and distribution of orders and instructions, except those bearing on combat, technical, and political matters.

- (3) Collection, processing, and dissemination of casualty data on military personnel.
- (4) Management of replacement commands.
- (5) Management of office and administrative service for the headquarters.

b. The director of the political department furnishes certain services pertaining to the command as a whole, and others that affect only political or Party personnel throughout the command. Under the supervision of the field army political commissar, and assisted by the field army Party committee, the director manages activities devoted to:

- (1) Administration of political and other Party personnel.
- (2) Publication, authentication, and distribution of political orders, circulars, and instructions.
- (3) Collection, processing, and dissemination of casualty data on political and other Party personnel.
- (4) Operation of the army postal service.
- (5) Procurement, storage, and distribution of publications and blank forms bearing on political matters.
- (6) Organization, operation, and supervision of civil affairs-military government activities.
- (7) Administration of military law and Party discipline.
- (8) Operation and supervision of entertainment and recreational facilities for the command.
- (9) Preparation, publication, and distribution of field army newspapers, discussion guides, information pamphlets, and other troop propaganda materials.
- (10) Inspection of morale, grievances, fiscal matters, and administrative activities throughout the command.
- (11) Prevention and investigation of crime.
- (12) Apprehension of absentees, escaped prisoners, and deserters.
- (13) Internment, care, treatment, and indoctrination of prisoners of war, enemy aliens, and refugees.
- (14) Custody, care, and reindoctrination of military prisoners.

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c. The director of the rear service department—concurrently commander, field army rear service command—renders both administrative and technical services, and assists the field army commanders in supervision of these services throughout the command. These services include:

- (1) Receipt, disbursement, and accounting of funds (to include soldiers' deposits) and preparation of estimates and budgets.
- (2) Operation of soldiers' stores for the sale of toilet articles, tobacco, liquor, food, and sundry personal items for headquarters and field army troops.
- (3) Provision of chemical maintenance, decontamination, and reconnaissance units for performance of assigned duties and training of personnel throughout the command.
- (4) Maintenance of a military engineering service for design, construction, maintenance, rehabilitation, or repair of military structures; supply of engineer materiel; and supervision of engineer service in the command.
- (5) Collection, sorting, evacuation, and care of sick and wounded, and medical supply for headquarters and field army troops; and supervision of the medical service throughout the command.
- (6) Maintenance of veterinary service for headquarters and field army troops.
- (7) Modification, maintenance, storage, supply, and repair of ordnance and signal equipment for headquarters and field army troops; collection, evaluation, and dissemination of ordnance and signal technical intelligence throughout the command; and evacuation and control of captured ordnance and signal items throughout the field army.
- (8) Supply, maintenance, and storage of quartermaster items of supply for headquarters and field army troops; and evacuation of salvage and captured items of quartermaster supply throughout the command.
- (9) Transportation of personnel and supplies by rail, motor vehicles, or air; supply, storage, and maintenance of transportation means; and movement control over

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LIGHT WEAPONS		
WEAPON	CALIBER	BASIC QUANTITY (IN ROUNDS)
Pistol	7.62-mm	24
Submachine Gun	7.62-mm	140
Rifle	7.62-mm	80
Light Machine Gun	7.62-mm	800
Heavy Machine Gun	7.62-mm	1600
A.A. Machine Gun	12.7-mm	1000
Very Pistol	26.7-mm	30
Hand Grenade		4
HEAVY WEAPONS		
Light Mortar	60-mm	30
Medium Mortar	82-mm	40
Heavy Mortar	120-mm	30
Howitzer	70-mm	30
Gun (Howitzer)	76.2-mm	30
Gun (Howitzer)	152.4-mm	80
Field Gun	76.2-mm	30
A.A. Gun	37-mm	120
Rocket Launcher	90-mm	10
Recoilless Rifle	57-mm	40

NOTE: In time of war, each regiment should keep 250kg of explosives on hand and also 1,000 primers, 1,000 igniter tubes, and 100 meters of igniter cord.

Figure 77. Table of basic units of issue prepared by the field army.

transportation of personnel and supplies in the field army rear area.

d. The director of the operations department publishes, authenticates, and disseminates plans, orders, and instructions bearing on combat matters. He also plans, organizes, maintains, and operates the signal communication system for the command and supervises those activities in subordinate echelons.

177. SUPPLY

a. The field army commander is responsible for all supply policies affecting the army groups and supporting arms and services within his command. He establishes supply credits, levels of supply, required supply rates, priorities of issue, and allocation of service troops within his organization. Depots and supply points operated by the field army

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


Figure 78. Transport aircraft of the type probably available to support field army operations.

commander are normally for the support of headquarters and field army troops; supplies are procured from the supporting rear service branch headquarters unit and by exploitation of local resources. The commander supervises the adequacy and efficiency of supply arrangements for major subordinate commands and takes action to insure that they are protected against unreasonable administrative demands on their resources. He receives estimates and recommendations from all elements of his command, and places levies on the theater rear service department to satisfy approved requirements. He also indicates allocation of items in short supply which have not been issued to subordinate commands, or reallocates as necessary those items already available within the command. Expenditure of ammunition and other ordnance materiel by subordinate commands is closely supervised, and the commander announces periodically the required supply rate for his major subordinate commands.

b. Since supply reserves are an important means of influencing the outcome of battle at field army level, the commander exercises close supervision over his own operational reserves and the unit and battle reserves of subordinate commands. He issues tables of basic units of issue (fig. 77) for ammunition, and prescribes reserve levels for other categories of supply (par. 149) that are to be maintained at all times. The commander requires prompt replenishment of supplies to reconstitute stocks that have been depleted by issue or loss during combat. In a war of movement, the commander is prepared to assume supply responsibility for his unit by extending the supply operations and transportation of assigned troops to the rear to link up with advance theater supply agencies.

c. The commander of the theater logistical command (par. 147) is responsible for the bulk supply of all items to the army groups and field army troops. When the theater rear administrative area is divided into geographical sections, supply operations be-

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


Figure 79. Antiaircraft units protect rail lines in the field army area.

come the responsibility of rear service branch headquarters unit commanders, as discussed in paragraph 148. Bulk supplies are normally routed through these units direct to depots and supply points operated by either army groups or armies and field army service troops. Responsibility for movement of bulk supplies rests with the theater logistical command; responsibility for movement control in the field army area is a prerogative of the field army commander.

178. MOVEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL

Movement planning and control executed by the field army commander applies to both troop and supply movements in his area of responsibility. The transportation section, rear service department, is the commander's principal agency for execution of his responsibilities with respect to movements.

a. The field army transportation officer supervises and coordinates movement planning throughout the

command. He requires his counterparts at subordinate echelons to submit periodically an estimate of transportation needs for future periods, and allocates available transportation means under the control of the command in accordance with established priorities which are based on the commander's scheme of maneuver. Requirements he cannot satisfy are placed on the theater logistical command. Approved allocations specifying mode of transportation become the field army movement plan. The transportation officer makes extensive use of rail and motor transportation, supplementing those means with water and air transportation when economical and feasible.

b. Movement control is exercised primarily by transportation and railway corps units, security forces, and air force elements when applicable. Elements of these troops are distributed throughout the command to assign priorities to movements, specify routes, schedule movements, limit traffic densities, and provide field supervision and reports

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for the field army transportation officer. Whenever possible, movement of troops and freight is made by rail for distances of 100 kilometers or more. Truck and cart transport units are employed for short hauls, or to effect priority troop movements. Close coordination is maintained between the field army transportation section and rail and highway traffic control elements. The latter usually consist of platoons stationed at 50-kilometer intervals along main supply routes and detachments posted in communications centers, at highway junctions, and at major bridges or ferries. Highway traffic control elements patrol roads and report their condition, provide spot direction to traffic, and enforce traffic regulations.

179. REPLACEMENTS

The field army replacement system is designed to attain maximum utilization of personnel within the command, and insure dependable and timely arrival of replacements at troop units as vacancies occur.

a. The field army commander decentralizes most replacement activities to subordinate commands, and requires replacement regiments to be maintained by army commanders. A replacement training division (fig. 68) is usually maintained by the field army commander. Replacement regiments average about 2,000 men in strength; a replacement division varies between 2 and 4 regiments. Commanders are able to fill the needs of subordinate units from these replacement pools. In Korea, replacements for personnel killed in action were reported to have been available within 24 hours at company level. When replacement demands are few, replacement units perform engineer, transportation, or porter and other labor tasks in addition to training activities.

b. Within the field army, replacements may be obtained by inactivation of nonessential units, utilization of personnel discharged from the hospital evacuation system, and collection of stragglers. The field army commander follows the practice of reassigning hospital returnees to their former organizations whenever possible.

c. Estimated losses that cannot be filled from field army resources are reported to theater headquarters, which in turn notifies the General Staff in Peiping of the number of replacements required to



Figure 80. Soldiers of a replacement regiment receiving individual equipment.

keep combat units up to strength. The General Staff places levies either on replacement training centers or on existing Ground Force units. Following selection, replacements are organized into carrier regiments or divisions, moved to supply areas to receive individual equipment, and then dispatched to the theater of operations as a unit. These replacement carrier units are similar in size to replacement regiments established within the field army, and include administrative and security elements. As replacement carrier units are assigned to the field army, they are allocated to subordinate commands; the usual allocation being one regiment per army. When replacements are absorbed into subordinate combat units, the officer cadre of company grade or above (training center personnel) usually are returned to the zone of the interior although in some cases they may be absorbed within the theater. Administrative and security personnel are retained as replacements.

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CHAPTER 13

THE ARMY GROUP

Section I. ORGANIZATION

180. GENERAL

a. The Chinese Communist high command established army groups in the Armed Forces in late 1948 to afford more effective control of the large numbers of armies deployed in combat under field army commanders. At the close of hostilities within China, approximately 20 to 23 army groups were in existence, controlling approximately 60 to 70 armies. Besides these standard army groups, which were composed primarily of subordinate armies, special army groups made their appearance in late 1950. These special army groups were assigned to field armies, or military areas, to cope with the formidable task of specialized training for newly activated combat and service support units. They were made up of divisions and regiments, without any intermediate army headquarters, and included such components as artillery, armored, engineer, and cavalry units.

b. The reorganization and consolidation program initiated in the Armed Forces in 1950 had a significant effect on both types of army groups. As the number of armies decreased, many standard army groups were inactivated. Special army groups were eliminated, and branch directorates (par. 17) were established for most of the supporting arms and probably for the supporting services. Today the standard army group remains an integral part of the Chinese Communist wartime chain of command, despite the small number reported on an active status. In Korea, the army group was the principal field command under the theater headquarters for the execution of campaign plans. Within China, the army group may be employed to control armies deployed in areas where combat operations are either planned or anticipated.

c. In the Chinese Communist military hierarchy, commanders of army groups (and their political commissar counterparts) are equivalent to commanders of military districts. In the past where army groups were to be found, the same individuals often commanded both headquarters. In the pro-


cess of reorganization and consolidation of the Armed Forces, the personnel of many inactivated army group headquarters reportedly were assimilated by military district command echelons. Should it become necessary for the high command to activate additional army groups at some future date, the existing military district headquarters probably will provide the trained cadre to perform essential duties in the formation, administration, and training of additional personnel to complete the required number of army group echelons.

181. CHARACTERISTICS

a. An army group (fig. 81) is a flexible combat force capable of independent combat operations. Normally, it consists of a headquarters, organic army group troops, two or more armies, and reinforcing combat and service troops. The headquarters is organized to permit performance of both tactical and administrative functions; army group troops, however, are not adequate to provide administrative and combat support for subordinate commands, although the tactical elements of the headquarters and army group troops are sufficient to permit control of up to six armies and essential combat support units. In this situation, the Chinese Communist army group compares closely, in numbers at least, to the United States-type field army. The army group normally operates under either a theater or field army commander; historical examples of independent operations under the direction of the High Command also exist, although it is unlikely today that such a situation would again come about.

b. Organic army group troops consist of a dismounted reconnaissance battalion; a signal, an engineer, a truck, and a guard regiment; and a field hospital. In combat, a replacement training regiment may be included. The number and composition of major subordinate commands varies with the army group mission, the terrain in the area of operations, and the enemy situation. In addition to two or more armies, reinforcing combat support units may include an armored division or several tank

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NOTE:
(1) ONE OR MORE TRUCK REGIMENTS MAY BE ASSIGNED.
(2) THE NUMBER OF ARMIES VARIES FROM 2 TO 6.

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Figure 81. Organization of an army group.

regiments, an artillery division, an antitank division or several regiments, a rocket-launcher division, antiaircraft regiments, cavalry elements, combat or special engineer regiments, and signal and chemical warfare elements. The army group commander may also be provided tactical air, troop carrier, and airborne units. Ordinarily, service elements are limited to those required to support organic army group troops, plus such additional truck regiments as are required to assure mobility of reserves. Each truck regiment contains sufficient vehicles to motorize the combat personnel of approximately two infantry divisions. In normal situations, rear service branch headquarters units of the theater logistical command operate forward supply and service instal-

lations in army group and sometimes army rear areas, and deliver supplies to using units (par. 148). If the situation requires administrative operations in support of subordinate commands, the army group is reinforced with suitable service elements to provide essential logistical support (par. 199).

182. COMMAND AND STAFF

a. *Command.* The commander and the political commissar of the army group are appointed by the State Council, as are all of the senior commanders in the Chinese Communist Army. The commander and the political commissar have equal rank (general or colonel general) and share responsibility for all military and political activities

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within the command. In practice, the military commander has the major responsibility for military training, combat operations, and administrative activities in support of combat operations. The political commissar is recognized as the senior in political affairs and related operations. Once a mission has been assigned, the commander develops and disseminates his combat plan, prepares and issues operations orders, allocates support, makes requests to higher headquarters for additional support, assigns missions to all subordinate units, and supervises and coordinates activities involving the various major commands.

b. Staff. The staff of the army group follows the same general pattern found in other major Communist military commands. It is composed of an operations department, a personnel department, a political department, and a rear service department. The activities and functions of the staff depend to a great extent upon the army group mission and the responsibilities assumed by the next higher headquarters. In general, all functions performed by the theater staff (sec. II, ch. 11) are carried out by the army group staff, but on a much reduced scale. Staff sections within departments are usually fewer in number; in the political departments (fig. 49), for example, cultural, psychological warfare, and propaganda and education functions frequently are combined in a single propaganda and education section. The rear service department may or may not have logistical responsibility for subordinate units, depending upon the overall logistical operation.

(1) *The operations department*, headed by

the chief of staff, is primarily concerned with the planning, supervision, and execution of combat operations. In Korea, this department was also responsible for operating a training regiment for replacements assigned to the army group.

(2) *The personnel department*, in addition to developing personnel requirements and supervising execution of personnel management policies, operates administrative installations for the army group. The functions and duties of the headquarters commandant also are found in this department.

(3) *The political department* is the implementing agency for the policies set forth by the army group political commissar and higher political authority. During combat operations, the department provides personnel to manage prisoners of war and execute civil affairs/military government functions. In Korea, army group political departments conducted agent training and supervised agent employment behind U. N. C. lines.

(4) *The rear services department* is the advisory agency to the commander on logistical matters within the command. It also acts as the command and staff agency for the army group rear service command. In the latter stages of the Korean operation, the department had only a planning and supervisory responsibility for logistical operations within the army group.

Section II. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS**183. GENERAL**

An army group is a ground unit of maneuver which is the basis for execution of the higher commander's offensive campaign operations. As such, its commander is frequently so constrained by the combat plans of higher headquarters that his methods of influencing the outcome of a campaign are limited to preliminary reconnaissance activities; detailed planning of tactical operations for major subordinate commands; issuing orders which allot divisions, supporting troops, and service support to subordinate armies and effect coordination between

major subordinate commands; prescribing security measures for the command as a whole; and supervising execution of the operation. The commander may also influence combat by employment of his reserves, and those of subordinate commanders, subject to restrictions imposed by the higher commander (ch. 10). Precombat training and postcombat critiques are carried out in furtherance of the general plan of higher headquarters.

a. Before initiating an operation, the commander employs both ground and air reconnaissance elements, which conduct battle area reconnaissance missions under his control to provide a continuous

and reliable source of information on hostile order of battle, terrain and weather, and condition of enemy defenses along his front. Particular attention is paid to hostile armor and air capabilities, the extent of enemy defenses, the dispositions of the enemy's tactical reserves and artillery, and routes of communication available to the enemy. Units in contact execute battleground reconnaissance activities to fix the hostile front, determine weakly held sectors, and discover covered avenues of approach to the hostile defense zone. Battleground reconnaissance elements frequently employ line-crossers to seek out specific locations of hostile artillery and armored concentrations in forward areas, and to determine the sites of major enemy command posts and supply concentrations. Information is exchanged with adjacent army groups, and higher and lower command echelons are kept informed of the enemy situation. Reconnaissance activities are continued subsequent to initiating the operation, the majority being decentralized to the control of armies in contact.

b. The commander prepares and disseminates combat plans based upon his preliminary reconnaissance and the senior commander's plan of campaign. His plans cover a series of major tactical operations designed to accomplish both the immediate and subsequent campaign missions of the army group. Such a series of operations constitute the several impulses of the typical Chinese Communist offensive campaign (par. 101). Army group offensive plans include immediate and subsequent missions for subordinate armies and infantry divisions, as well as for major combat support elements; attack plans for units participating in main and secondary attacks; an administrative plan and signal operation instructions governing the entire army group; the general reconnaissance and security plan; and such deception or defense plans as may be required by the operation. Army group plans are disseminated well in advance of the initiation of a campaign to permit subordinate commanders to prepare their unit plans; make recommendations; execute necessary troop movements and reconnaissance; and employ deception, surprise, and security measures.

c. Army group combat orders are brief and confirm in outline form the commander's general plan; announce changes to the plan, if any; and prescribe the time the operation is to be initiated. One or more military sketches illustrating the final army

group scheme of maneuver and logistical support plan frequently accompany the order. An example of such an order is found in appendix III.

d. The army group commander achieves security for his force before and during offensive operations by aggressive employment of air and ground reconnaissance elements, supplemented by active and passive deception measures and adequate warning and defense systems to protect the command from surprise air, airborne, armor, or CBR attack. If occupying the flank of a major force, he will normally deploy powerful combat security forces in that direction to protect against hostile ground attack. If the exposed flank does not represent a serious threat, the commander may delegate responsibility for its protection to the flank army; a portion of the army group reserves may be echeloned toward the flank to support the army in the event of a major, unanticipated hostile attack. Subordinate commanders are responsible for the security of their own units; the army group commander, however, establishes overall criteria for combat security measures and frequently specifies the size and composition of detachments to be placed before assembly areas of armies and divisions. Responsibility for security within the army group rear area is often delegated to the commander of the army group rear service command, who may be reinforced by the commander's guard regiment and a portion of the reserve. Deployment of the remainder of the reserve well forward behind attack elements also affords a degree of security and adds depth to the offensive.

184. THE ADVANCE

The army group normally participates in an advance from concentration as a part of a larger force. The senior commander (theater or field army) specifies the army group zone of advance, principal axis of advance, general formation, rate of advance, objectives and missions, and matters bearing on reconnaissance and security. The army group commander is left free to plan and coordinate the actions of his leading columns and their advance guards, however, and he places great confidence in the initiative of their commanders. Based on air reconnaissance, and information received from other sources, the army group commander keeps his leading column commanders apprised of where the enemy will be found, and dispatches orders in ample

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time before contact to make his decision known and feasible to execute. The commander strives to accord these commanders a period of not less than two days in which to prepare to execute his orders. As contact is gained, the army group commander supports advance guard actions with air, artillery, and armored units at his disposal, coordinating the operation by fragmentary orders as development of combat progresses. The commander's objective at this time is to seize and maintain the initiative through swift, decisive advance guard actions against the hostile moving columns, thus limiting the enemy's ability to deploy rapidly for coordinated action. Advance guards thus cover the deployment of the army group for a coordinated envelopment of the flank(s) or rear of the hostile force. Every effort is made to deploy before the enemy does and gain a decisive advantage over the undeployed, or partly deployed, enemy force.

a. Advance Guard Actions. As contact becomes imminent, aerial and long-range ground reconnaissance elements under control of the senior commander are used to locate the enemy force and to observe its movements. Air force units, long-range artillery, and mobile troop units are employed to engage the enemy while both friendly and hostile troops are still in the approach march. The army group commander assigns final, specific missions for advance guards to his leading column commanders as forward ground reconnaissance elements contact hostile elements. He assures that the meeting engagement is initiated on a broad front by a portion of each advance guard to disrupt and destroy hostile security forces. Column commanders commit the main body of each advance guard in an enveloping attack on forward enemy columns. Artillery under control of army group column commanders begins to deploy as soon as contact with the enemy is gained; initially it reinforces artillery with advance guards, subsequently it supports the action of infantry and armor from the main body of the column. If the enemy should succeed in deploying first on any portion of the front, the army group commander directs the commander in that area to assume a wide front defense. Simultaneously, the army group main force deploys for a coordinated attack on that part of the enemy force that is not yet, or only partly, deployed. The senior commander continues to support the development of combat by execution of air attacks on the enemy's

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Figure 82. Tanks move up to support infantry in a meeting engagement.

main force to break up his advance, isolate the immediate battlefield, and prevent complete hostile deployment for a coordinated attack.

b. Action by the Main Force. The main force of the army group is committed as soon as possible after advance guards have made contact. A flank army group will execute the enveloping maneuver or turning movement of the larger force. An interior army group will make frontal attacks, maneuvering its subordinate commands to strike between, then envelop hostile columns. The commander designates direction of attack and objectives for major subordinate commands based on the senior commander's plan and his own estimate of the situation as it is developed by battle area reconnaissance elements and the advance guards. Faced with a strong, partly deployed enemy, the commander commits a portion of his force to support advance guard actions and fix the enemy in place. The remainder of his force is committed in a coordinated attack against the main enemy force. Most of the tactical air and long-range artillery units under army group control support the force making the main attack. Combat aviation under control of the senior commander attacks hostile reserves and reinforcements to prevent their taking effective action against the army group main attack force; it also strikes at enemy supply lines, depots, and transportation facilities to isolate the battlefield. Air elements under theater control perform the strategic mission of maintaining air supremacy over the battlefield to preserve freedom

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Figure 83. Artillery deploys rapidly to support advance guards.

of maneuver for ground forces. If the hostile force initiates a withdrawal before the army group scheme of maneuver is completed, commanders of leading elements in both main and secondary attack forces begin a pursuit of retreating enemy forces on their own initiative. The army group commander supports the pursuit with reinforcements from his reserve, and extends logistical facilities to keep pace with forward elements.

c. Employment of Artillery. The army group commander is responsible for the over-all control of artillery; he relies upon the advice and assistance of his chief of the artillery section, operations department, who is also the army group artillery commander. During the advance, the latter apportions at least half of his artillery, including long-range artillery, to commanders of leading columns, who in turn attach reinforcing artillery to their respective advance guards. The remainder of the commander's artillery force, composed primarily of long-range, antitank, antiaircraft, and rocket launcher artillery, moves behind or between the main bodies of leading columns, prepared to deploy and support advance guard actions once hostile columns are within effective range. Accompanying artillery with advance guards, as well as supporting artillery with forward columns, deploys as soon as contact has been gained to neutralize enemy artillery and armor, and disrupt coordinated deployment of forward hostile columns. Whenever possible, this is accomplished before the deployment of infantry and armored elements. Units under the control of the army group artillery commander deliver fires

to disrupt the hostile main body, isolate the enemy's advance guards, and neutralize hostile heavy artillery. As the main force of the army group deploys in the attack, the artillery commander redeployes a major portion of his force to support it; the remainder continues to support forces (former advance guards) executing containing actions in the secondary direction of attack. Fires are delivered to prevent or seriously hamper the development of coordinated hostile artillery fire, the construction of obstacles and organized defenses by enemy troops, and the execution of coordinated counterattacks by the enemy. Hostile armored forces are considered a prime target for artillery during all phases of a meeting engagement.

d. Employment of Armor. When anticipating combat in suitable terrain, the army group commander reinforces leading columns with a portion of the armor at his disposal, primarily for employment with advance guards. The remainder of his armor is retained in the march formation, suitably disposed to deploy for combat in a decisive direction at a decisive time. Armor placed with advanced guards is normally committed subsequent to contact, after artillery support is assured, to isolate and destroy leading enemy units, to seek out and destroy enemy artillery, and to seize critical points on roads to block the approach of the hostile main force. Armor under the control of leading column commanders is employed with the main bodies of these columns in coordinated attacks on the main enemy force. Units under army group control either lead or support infantry elements of

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Figure 84. Advance guard tank-infantry teams strike at hostile security elements.

the main attack force. Once the enemy is successfully enveloped, armored units strike at command installations and communications centers; destroy isolated groups of enemy infantry and artillery; and block hostile escape and reinforcement routes. In pursuit, the army group commander commits his armored force in rapid thrusts into hostile territory, parallel to enemy escape routes. Once behind the withdrawing forces, the majority of the armored units turn and strike at the enemy columns to isolate and destroy them. Other units block the advance of hostile reinforcements and disrupt communications facilities.

185. ATTACK WHEN APPROACHING THE ENEMY IN AN ORGANIZED POSITION

When approaching an enemy disposed in an organized position, the army group commander relies heavily on ground and aerial reconnaissance elements to provide information on the nature of the hostile defenses. Aerial photographs are analyzed; infantry, and sometimes armored patrols, reinforced with engineer, signal, artillery, and chemical elements, infiltrate or penetrate enemy lines to study terrain, hostile troop dispositions, fortifications, and communications. The army group reconnaissance

and intelligence staff sections collect and evaluate all reconnaissance information, and advise the commander on the condition of the enemy's defenses. The type of hostile defense (hasty or deliberate defense, or fortified zone) has a direct influence on the tactics employed by the army group commander in an attack on an organized position. Almost invariably, however, preliminary preparations and execution of the attack follow prescribed procedures for conduct of offensive operations (ch. 8). Delegation of authority to and exercise of initiative by subordinate commanders is extremely limited. Before any attack, the army group commander conducts a personal reconnaissance of the terrain selected for the main attack, briefs the commanders of primary and supporting arms on their missions, and arranges for cooperation among the arms. Army commanders perform similar reconnaissance and brief attack force commanders, including key battalion commanders.

a. An attack against a hasty defense is characterized by speed in planning, preparation, and execution. The commander takes maximum advantage of the opportunities offered and acts decisively to prevent the enemy from extending and coordinating his defenses. As reconnaissance elements confirm the existence and nature of the hasty defense,

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the commander selects his main and secondary directions of attack, decides on the army group task organization, and selects objectives and missions for subordinate commanders. He directs the advance guards of leading columns to strike at and destroy hostile security forces, and conducts intense feint reconnaissance in zones outside the area to be attacked in an attempt to mislead the enemy. The army group commander deploys his attack forces from their march columns whenever possible. If the situation precludes deployment from march column, warning orders direct major attack forces to assembly areas convenient to avenues of approach to their objectives. Infantry units enter attack positions 6 to 10 kilometers from the hostile defenses; armored units generally move into assembly areas approximately 5 kilometers behind the infantry. The commander commits his attack forces after only brief occupation of attack positions, during which time they prepare to deploy subordinate echelons in their attacks. The army group attack usually takes the form of an envelopment if the situation is favorable. When in the position of an interior army group in a larger force, the commander may execute one part of the envelopment of the larger force, or be directed to attack the enemy on a broad front in a series of parallel penetration and envelopment engagements (fig. 29). In the interests of speed, the artillery preparation is often dispensed with. The artillery commander strives to maneuver his force into position to provide coordinated support of main and secondary attack forces as the major subordinate commands deploy for combat. The first echelon of the army group main attack force performs the tactical mission of overrunning the hostile defenses; the second and third echelons perform the campaign mission of driving deep into hostile territory to destroy large segments of the enemy and disrupt his command and logistical support systems.

b. An attack on a deliberate defense involves a greater amount of detailed planning and preparation than does an attack against a hasty defense. When reconnaissance information indicates the enemy is disposed in a deliberate defense, the army group commander directs that the advance be continued on a broad front by a single army, reinforced, and assigns its commander the tactical missions of gaining contact with the enemy and developing the detailed nature of the defense by means of limited

objective attacks and battleground reconnaissance activities. Other major subordinate commands are moved into assembly areas approximately 25 to 30 kilometers behind the front. Armored forces under army group control may occupy areas 50 kilometers to the rear. Subordinate commanders are briefed on the commander's plan, and use the time spent in rear assembly areas to prepare their own plans, rehearse troops, and assure adequate supplies for the impending operation. Plans are refined as information from forces in contact provides a clear estimate of the enemy situation. A few days before the attack, troops in rear assembly areas move forward to attack positions 6 to 10 kilometers behind units in contact. These positions are located to conform to the army group commander's scheme of maneuver. Units, usually of reinforced regiment size, remain in attack positions 1 to 2 days and complete final combat preparations. Artillery units are placed in position during the final stages of attack preparation, and are completely emplaced within 24 hours of the time of attack. The army group artillery commander usually restricts registration to one piece per battalion, and fire is conducted within the pattern of regular fires of units in contact with the enemy. During the 24 hours preceding the attack, battalions deploy to attack positions which may be as close as 1,000 meters to hostile front lines. Attack positions for armored units are located behind those for infantry and normally are occupied under the cover of the artillery preparation. In an attack on a deliberate defense, the commander directs that the artillery preparation be initiated in sufficient time and be of sufficient duration to cover the coordinated moves of armor to attack positions and infantry to assault positions. It may be executed in coordination with an air attack on the enemy defenses. If so, air-ground coordination is achieved by ground control of air action at army level, and by air-ground controllers who accompany assault divisions and direct aircraft in strikes. The entire preparation lasts from 1 to 2 hours, and is intense. The army group artillery commander frequently directs ruses, such as false preparations and false lifts, to lure enemy reserves into vulnerable positions or to permit friendly assault troops to reach the enemy while he is dazed and demoralized. The army group attack usually takes the form of multiple penetrations of the hostile defenses. Subsequent to breaching the enemy main battle position, at a

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


Figure 85. An attack on a deliberate defense.

depth of one to two kilometers, attack armies effect envelopments of created flanks to widen corridors for maneuver elements in army group second and third echelons. The commander assigns his second echelon, reinforced with armor, the tactical mission of destroying enemy reserves, artillery, and communications systems; his third echelon, composed primarily of mobile forces, is charged with the campaign mission of operations against forces deep in the preparation, combat aviation coordinates with artillery to attack enemy reserves and reinforcements, preventing their movement to the vicinity of penetrations in the enemy defenses. Air units also assist forward movement of attacking troops by attacks on surviving enemy fire positions, provide air cover over the battlefield, and attack enemy forces at-

tempting an orderly withdrawal to alternate battle positions.

c. An attack on a fortified zone requires detailed planning and special preparations, and such attacks are seldom made when approaching the enemy in defense. Small fortified areas are normally contained by adequate forces and bypassed by the main force of the army group. If a continuous belt of fortified defenses is encountered, however, the pattern of preliminary combat operations is similar to that when attacking a deliberate defense. Preparations by main attack forces, though, differ widely from those conducted before conventional attacks, and may consume several weeks. Army group plans are extremely detailed, and often contain explicit instructions for attack regiments. Army group objectives are deep, and normally consist of commu-

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nications centers, troop concentrations, and supply installations well behind the entire hostile defensive zone. In an attack on a fortified zone, the army group commander assigns missions to his attack echelon that insure destruction of the enemy's first battle position, to include artillery and reserves supporting tactical objectives, the capture of which requires penetration and destruction of successive hostile battle positions. Reserves are initially disposed where they can subsequently be moved to exploit success of attack forces and succeeding echelons. Army group reserves are subsequently assigned the primary campaign mission of passing through corridors that extend through the depth of the hostile defense zone, then rolling up the flanks that have been created and destroying hostile troops and installations in the enemy rear. Actions of combat aviation are similar to those during an attack on a deliberate defense.

186. ATTACK FROM THE DEFENSIVE

a. The army group commander orders an attack from defensive positions at the earliest possible moment after the enemy offensive has been blunted. Ideally, he strives to strike while the enemy has only hasty defenses prepared. If this is not practical, he directs limited objective attacks by forces in contact; these are designed primarily to limit the enemy's ability to improve his defenses. These attacks may also be executed to probe for weak points in the hostile defenses and to seize terrain essential to the success of the impending attack. The commander concentrates his main attack force, under the cover of the actions of units in contact, in assembly areas where they are protected from the effects of hostile long-range artillery. Planning and preattack preparations follow the conventional Chinese Communist pattern.

b. Provided that the terrain and the balance of armored strength are favorable, the commander either spearheads his attack or heavily supports attacking infantry with tanks; in other situations he retains his armor in reserve, prepared to exploit success. The attack is initiated by an intense artillery preparation which covers the passage of the main attack force through units in contact; the latter units are assigned a secondary attack role. If hostile forces are occupying a reentrant in the army group




Figure 86. Attack from the defensive.

line, the commander will usually execute a single or double envelopment of the hostile flanks. If no hostile flanks exist, he employs multiple penetrations; the one offering the most promise of success is reinforced heavily in an attempt to split the hostile force into isolated segments which can then be destroyed piecemeal. Combat aviation under army group control participates in the preparation and supports attacking forces during combat in depth.

187. PURSUIT

When the commander believes that the enemy can no longer maintain his position, he employs all means to preserve the continuity of the attack and to exert a relentless pressure on the defeated enemy. Great reliance is placed on the initiative of commanders of units in the attack forces, who are expected to spur on their troops and clinch the advantage with previously uncommitted forces. The army group commander supports their actions and dispatches mobile pursuing forces to place troops across the enemy's lines of retreat (fig. 87). The




Figure 87. Pursuit by an army group.

enemy is permitted no opportunity to reconstitute his defense.

a. Preliminary Preparations. In anticipation of a pursuit, the army group commander prepares and disseminates necessary plans and orders to all echelons of the command. Reserves are regrouped and partly motorized; special formations of motorized infantry and engineers, tanks, and truck-drawn artillery are held poised to execute rapid flanking maneuvers. Attacking forces are reinforced with artillery and engineers, and every effort is made to relieve their commanders of logistical problems. New and deep campaign objectives are assigned to principal tactical groupings. Air force elements under army group control are alerted to maintain observation of the rear of the enemy defense zone and to prevent his orderly withdrawal to the next battle position. Principal targets for air attack are hostile artillery positions, tactical reserves, combat trains, other convoys, and critical bridges on lines of communications. Combat aviation con-

trolled by the higher commander attacks enemy reinforcements, hostile aircraft, and air force installations. A portion of the army group's air force strength is held in reserve to engage in coordinated action with army group reserves deep in the hostile rear.

b. Direct Pressure Forces. The pursuit is conducted on a broad front by commanders of attack forces, who make use of all available transportation, including captured vehicles, to maintain pressure on the enemy. Individual commanders employ their reserves to gain access to the hostile flank and rear, or to destroy enemy covering forces. The enemy is not permitted to break contact. Artillery advances by echelon, firing from positions from which they can interdict the enemy's retreat route. A portion of the army group combat aviation supports the action of direct pressure forces by attacks on critical points in the immediate rear.

c. Pursuing Forces. At the appropriate time, the commander launches the attack of his pursuing

forces in a decisive direction to get in the rear of the defeated enemy and block his route of retreat. Whenever possible, specially organized formations of army group reserves strive to outdistance the enemy, then turn, and, in coordination with direct pressure forces, complete his destruction. As these forces advance parallel to the retreating enemy, they dispatch small task forces to strike and disrupt enemy movements. Centers of resistance are bypassed and mopped up by subsequent echelons of army group reserves. Besides its normal support role, artillery attached to pursuing forces supplements the fires of artillery with direct pressure forces by firing at bridges and defiles on the hostile retreat routes and on hostile troops attempting to form columns in the enemy rear. Combat aviation in support of pursuing forces assists their advance by close-support actions, and attacks road junctions, river-crossings, and defiles along hostile retreat routes. If airborne troops have been made available by higher headquarters, the army group commander employs them in coordination with the maneuver of his pursuing forces to seize a key location in the hostile rear.

188. SECURITY

The army group commander attains security for his force during an offensive by maintaining relentless pressure on the enemy, by timely searches for information of a hostile threat, by prompt dissemination of information and orders to combat security forces and major subordinate commands, and by retention and maneuver of appropriate reserves. He requires subordinate commanders to utilize cover, concealment, camouflage, defile, obstacles, dispersion, and night movements to the maximum, and supplements passive means by combat means for defense against air, armored, and CBR attack. The army group commander disposes the mass of the available combat means to favor his main attack force. Antiaircraft artillery initially is disposed to protect troops in assembly areas and critical command and supply installations; subsequently the commander deploys antiaircraft weapons to protect probable targets in the immediate rear of attack forces. Subordinate commands are reinforced with antitank artillery which is deployed, at the com-

mander's direction, to cover the most likely avenues of approach of hostile armored units. The commander retains an armored reserve to counter a hostile armored attack. Combat aviation contributes to the security of the army group by isolating the battlefield, striking at hostile counterattack forces, and destroying enemy artillery. Air superiority over the battlefield is the responsibility of the senior commander.

189. TERMINATION OF THE OFFENSIVE

The army group offensive is halted only by strong hostile reaction or by other elements in the situation which demand it. Within the army group, only the commander can order the termination of an offensive operation. Under conditions that force the army group to assume the defensive, units in contact entrench themselves on the ground they hold; subsequent echelons prepare defenses in depth. Once defenses are prepared, forward elements are thinned out; those remaining in place act as combat security elements for units manning the main defense zone. If it is necessary to move to the front or rear to gain favorable terrain on which to organize the defense, the commander directs units in contact to hold until darkness, and then make major readjustments. Rearward moves are made under the cover of mobile tank-infantry-artillery task forces whenever possible, and are supported by combat aviation if executed during daylight hours. The move is initiated by elements farthest from the enemy. In changing over to the defensive, the commander pays close attention to the security of his flanks and directs construction of engineering and chemical obstacles in critical locations. He considers the assumption of the defensive a temporary tactical measure to be taken to overcome a local unfavorable situation; he utilizes the defensive period to reorganize his forces and create a situation favorable for resumption of the offensive. The commander may also terminate the offensive briefly on a portion of his front to effect rotation of attacking armies that have exhausted unit loads and outdistanced the capabilities of the supply system (par. 202).

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Section III. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

190. GENERAL

As a part of a larger force, the army group conforms to the decisions of the higher commander and operates as one element in the general defensive scheme. The senior commander designates the area or areas in which the army group will conduct the defense; establishes the type or types of defense tactics, and the areas in which they are to be employed; and the locations in which an advance zone, if any, is to be established. He may also direct the type and strength of troops to be employed in the advance zone as a covering force, and the composition and general disposition of army group reserves. Based on these instructions, the army group commander plans and directs organization of his defenses to accomplish his mission successfully. For an army group operating independently, these decisions are made by the army group commander. The former situation is the manner in which the army group is normally employed.

a. The army group commander makes his preliminary decisions on organization of the defense after a map study of the terrain in his assigned area. Whenever possible, he follows this study with ground or air reconnaissance, accompanied by members of his staff and major subordinate commanders. Decisive defensive locations are inspected with a critical eye, and the commander alters or confirms his plan as the reconnaissance progresses. Every effort is made to avoid terrain which may require a readjustment in defense plans at a later, more critical time.

b. In organizing the defense, the commander considers the four basic elements in the army group plan—covering forces, organization of the main defense zone, organization of the secondary defense zone, and reserves. He normally employs a portion of the army group reserve as his covering force. Responsibility for the detailed organization of the main defense zone is delegated to division commanders; army commanders supervise to insure coordination across division boundaries. Organization of the secondary defense zone is carried out by army reserves under the supervision of army commanders. Priority in organization of the defense is accorded main defense and advance zones, with emphasis on deliberate field fortifications and antitank defense



Figure 88. Staff officers accompany the commander on his reconnaissance.

measures. Organization of the secondary defense zone, the disposition of army group reserves, and plans for major counterattacks by those reserves receive second priority.

191. FRONTAGES AND DEPTHS

The frontage and depth of the defense area (fig. 34) assigned the army group depend upon the senior commander's mission, the nature of the terrain, the time and space available to the commander in which to accomplish his mission, and the strength and composition of opposing forces. Based on consideration of these factors, the senior commander selects the army group area and directs conduct of 1 or more of the 2 types of tactical defenses: Mobile or position defense.

a. In mobile defense, the army group usually is assigned responsibility for an area 60 to 80 kilometers wide and at least 100 kilometers deep. Within that area, the commander normally disposes one reinforced army to cover the entire front, and supports its maneuver with two or more armies deployed on a final interception line deep in the zone.

b. When position defense is prescribed, the front assigned the army group is variable. Along critical avenues of approach into the defense area, the commander disposes his armies on a normal front of 25 to 30 kilometers each. In less critical locations, where terrain permits, he may effect an economy

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Figure 89. Tanks are normally retained in reserve during defense, in strong shelters to protect them.

of force and require his armies to defend on a wide front of as much as 40-60 kilometers each. In Korea, the 19th Army Group at one time had an army disposed on line over a front that covered 75 kilometers.

192. PLANNING

Once the defense plan is deemed adequate for the situation, occupation and organization of the area begins. The army group commander and his staff initiate long-range planning activities to develop plans for meeting various enemy capabilities and probable intentions, counterattacking with army group reserves, resuming the counteroffensive, or providing for retrograde movement. The army group commander does not normally coordinate in detail the fires of infantry units on line; he does, however, influence subordinate commanders' plans for coordination of infantry fires by assigning dif-

ferent frontages and depths for divisions, and sometimes regiments, occupying the main defense zone. Plans for coordination of artillery, armor, and air support are centrally controlled by the army group commander, who delegates this responsibility to his artillery and armor commanders and supporting force commander. Assisted by liaison personnel from his staff, the commander inspects the development of the defenses as they progress and directs such changes in plans as the situation may require.

193. ORGANIZATION OF ARTILLERY FIRES

a. The army group artillery commander prepares a comprehensive fire-support plan before the defensive battle begins. He coordinates his plan with the fire plans for infantry units on line, the air-support plan, and the counterattack plans of division, army, and army group reserves. He may supplement artillery fires with fires of reserve ar-

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


Figure 90. Organization of antitank defenses in the army group defense zone.

mored units. His plan provides for two additional bands of fire in front of the main defense zone to supplement the fires of infantry weapons: The band of fire of division artillery and antitank artillery, and the band of fire of army and general reserve (long-range) artillery. (The essential elements of fire organization within a division in defense are shown in figure 118.) Essentially, the artillery commander develops an orthodox fire system wherein units in the main defense zone are tied together by overlapping fires and are prepared for all-around defense. The plan provides for area concentrations in probable enemy assembly areas and along

avenues of approach, long-range interdiction and harassing fires, counterpreparation fires, counterbattery fires, close-support fires, and fires within the defense zone to disorganize and stop enemy progress. Concentrations in support of local and general counterattacks usually are prearranged, and a general counterattack by army or army group reserves is supported by an artillery preparation. The fires of antitank artillery, infantry close-range antitank weapons, and conventional artillery are coordinated into a tight network. Antitank weapons are echeloned in great depth along favorable avenues of approach for armor. Although most of the armor in the army group is normally held in reserve for counterattacks, the commander occasionally permits tanks to be employed as direct fire artillery; they may also occupy positions along avenues of tank approach.

b. The army group commander reviews the overall fire plan to insure provision for:

- (1) Defeating the enemy or delaying his approach by means of long-range artillery and air attack on his columns and assembly areas.
- (2) Fire support for covering forces and combat security detachments.
- (3) Placing massed fire on the enemy during his concentration and occupation of attack positions.
- (4) An artillery counterpreparation.
- (5) Creating, both ahead of and within the main defense zone, a solid zone of fire of all types to destroy the enemy attack and final assault.
- (6) Separating enemy infantry from tanks in front of the main defense zone and destroying each separately.
- (7) Destroying infantry and tanks that breach the main defense zone by the concentrated fire of most of the artillery and antitank weapons in coordination with close air support.
- (8) Supporting counterattacks by reserves of divisions, armies, and the army group.

194. ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND

a. The army group commander requires his subordinate commands to organize the ground as thoroughly as possible; he insists on priority for fighting

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positions which are quickly integrated into a network of strong emplacements within the defense zones. The trace of the forward edges of the main and secondary defense zones is usually indicated by the army group commander and located in detail on the terrain by army and division commanders. Terrain in front of the main defense zone is selected to prevent enemy observation and deny him suitable positions for artillery and tanks or areas offering concealment for troop concentrations. Positions in and between zones of defense and areas of antitank emphasis are indicated by army commanders and defined in greater detail on the ground by division commanders. Unit zones of defense usually are selected behind natural antitank obstacles, and include terrain features, the holding of which reinforces the stability of the defense and favors observation, organization of fire, maneuver of reserves, and camouflage of installations.

b. Obstacles and switch positions are also an important part of the army group defense system, and are prepared according to the army group plan. Antitank and antipersonnel obstacles are constructed in front of and throughout the depths of the entire army group zone (fig. 34). Those located on avenues of tank approach ahead of the main defense zone are constructed first. Location of antitank obstacles is coordinated with the system of antitank fires to establish traps for penetrating enemy tanks. The commander insures that the system of obstacles does not hinder conduct of counterattacks; gaps which can be closed quickly are established in barriers. Switch positions are established throughout the entire depth of the defense to make it possible for troops to contain enemy forces which have wedged into the position, to create fire traps, and to canalize enemy movements toward obstacles which are covered by fire. Switch positions may serve also as a line of deployment for counterattack forces, or as a base of fire to support a counterattack. Camouflage of installations and obstacles and erection of dummy positions proceed apace with organization of the ground.

c. In defensive operations, the army group commander utilizes his engineer troops to influence the action. He reinforces troops in the advance zone and armies in other critical sectors with adequate engineer forces to assist in constructing antitank obstacles, erecting concrete fortifications, building



Figure 91. Antitank ditches block avenues of tank approach before the defended area.

important command and observation posts, installing and operating searchlights for battlefield illumination, constructing and repairing military roads, and camouflaging important installations. In addition, the commander controls allocation of fortification materials and critical power tools, and may draft and allocate civilian labor forces if the situation permits.

195. CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE

a. The greatest army group defensive effort is directed at the area immediately in front of the main defense zone (final interception line in a mobile defense) where the commander intends to stop enemy infantry and break up and defeat enemy motorized and armored forces. The army group commander, however, begins the defensive battle at the greatest possible distance ahead of his first defense zone. He employs combat aviation, long-range artillery, and covering forces to gain information of the enemy, delay the enemy advance, and wear down enemy forces by repeated premature deployments. As the enemy draws near the defense, the commander seeks to determine the approximate timing of the hostile attack; if successful,

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


Figure 92. The defensive battle is initiated with the fires of long-range artillery.

he orders a counterpreparation fire, reinforced by combat aviation.

b. Artillery supporting units on line open fire as hostile forces come within range; the enemy is met with increasingly intense barrage fires as he approaches the main defense zone. Tanks are taken under fire by heavy and light antitank weapons; every effort is made to separate tanks and infantry and destroy them separately. Artillery final protective fires are supplemented by heavy infantry fires within 400 to 600 meters of the forward edge of the main defense zone. The commander directs combat aviation to attack enemy armor and artillery and infantry reserves.

c. The enemy may succeed in breaking into the main defense zone in strength. If so, a portion of the artillery under army group control prepares to support counterattacks by local reserves released to division control. The commander retains control of his own and army reserves near the threatened area, maneuvering a portion of those forces to block

ing positions near the threatened area. If local reserves do not contain and destroy the penetration, forces in the secondary defense zone are expected to destroy the enemy force. The commander directs forces still in the main defense zone to continue resistance despite the danger of encirclement. Armor that breaks through is canalized and trapped, or worn down by obstacles in depth, each covered by antitank fires. Combat aviation attacks enemy forces in the penetration area. Once the commander has gained armored superiority, he orders a tank-led counterattack to destroy hostile armor remaining in the depths of the defense position.

d. Army and division commanders are expected to continue launching counterattacks until they have destroyed the enemy and restored the position. If such actions show promise of success, the army group commander will reinforce threatened units with striking forces from his reserve. In the event of a deep penetration, the commander advises higher

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authority and commits his reserve in a general counterattack to restore the position. The counterattack is preceded by an artillery-air preparation. Tanks lead the general counterattack when terrain and

local armored superiority favor their employment. Combat aviation renders close support to counterattack forces. A general withdrawal is not within the prerogative of the army group commander.

Section IV. RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS

196. GENERAL

Retrograde movements are an integral part of Chinese Communist tactics at army group level. The senior commander may decide to yield terrain at any time to better his overall defensive situation or lure the enemy into an unfavorable position. The senior commanders of Communist China have had wide experiences in guerrilla warfare, with emphasis on movement and mobility. Their forces may execute a withdrawal at any time regardless of the enemy situation. The army group commander may direct limited withdrawals of elements in his main defense zone to shorten lines, avoid exposed flanks in critical locations, or achieve more favorable terrain from which to support a counterattack. These withdrawals must be preliminary to successful restoration of the battle position. The order, however, must come from the senior commander if the withdrawal is general in nature. Whenever possible, the units in contact withdraw at night; when the tactical situation does not allow this, the commander resorts to ruses and deceptions to cover a daylight withdrawal. When necessary, a rearguard action is fought to permit the command to disengage from battle and withdraw to new positions.

197. DAYLIGHT WITHDRAWAL

a. *Preparations.* A daylight withdrawal under enemy pressure requires a great deal more planning than a night withdrawal by the same forces. The army group commander orders such a maneuver only under extreme enemy pressure, and then only to safeguard the command; he places great reliance on the aggressive action of commanders of covering forces to secure the command. One of two methods may be employed in constituting covering forces:

- (1) The commander requires each army in the main defense zone to cover its own withdrawal; or,
- (2) The commander designates units from the second defense zone to cover movement

to the rear of divisions on line and to conduct a rear guard action after units from the main defense zone pass through.

b. *Supporting fires.* Fire support in the withdrawal is furnished mainly by long-range artillery, tanks, and combat aviation. Small-caliber artillery pieces are usually displaced to the rear in the initial stages of the withdrawal, and the support burden is shifted to guns emplaced farther to the rear; sufficient pieces are left behind, however, to maintain a deceptive pattern of fire. Antiaircraft units are placed at strategic locations along the route of withdrawal, and are displaced as the movement to the rear progresses. Tanks under army group control are used to supplement artillery fires and to lead counterattacks when necessary to extricate units in contact or block pursuing enemy forces. Tanks, with accompanying infantry, often set up ambushes along the flanks of the withdrawal momentarily to blunt the enemy advance. Combat aviation is assigned the dual mission of furnishing close support of forces in contact with the enemy and providing air cover along the route of withdrawal.

c. *Special support units.* The army group commander may provide special support to armies on line in the form of engineer, chemical, antitank, and rocket units. Engineers, organic or attached to the army group, impede the progress of the enemy through the use of demolitions and the construction of new defensive positions. Chemical units may be employed to cover the withdrawal with smoke and, if the commander so orders, with chemical agents. When the enemy is strong in armor, an antitank division may be employed to supplement the antitank weapons of units in contact with the enemy in the direction of the principal tank threat. Rocket units, having the capability of laying down intense area barrages and possessing a high degree of mobility, are often attached to the covering forces.

d. *Security.* During a retrograde movement, protection of the flanks presents a major security problem to the commander. Normally, army commanders are responsible for their own flank secu-

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


Figure 93. Chinese Communist rocket artillery.

city; their means are supplemented by reconnaissance troops or other mobile forces from army group reserves. Mobile security forces, including armor and cavalry, may be stationed along the flanks of the route of withdrawal and withdrawn as the movement to the rear progresses. Air reconnaissance and liaison contacts with adjacent units keep the commander informed as to enemy actions on his flanks.

e. Execution of the Withdrawal. Initially, an attempt is made to deceive the enemy by launching limited counterattacks and bringing down short, but intense, artillery barrages. Once enemy pressure is reduced, the actual withdrawal gets under way. After the forces in the rear have withdrawn a safe distance, units in contact are thinned out and begin their withdrawal; the remainder fight a rear guard action. These units may continue to protect the rear of the withdrawing columns or only contain the enemy until they reach the second defense zone. Forces in the second defense zone, fighting from prepared positions, then assume the mission of delaying and deceiving the enemy. Whether or not units leap frog one another until the new defensive position is reached depends upon the extent of enemy pressure and the distance to be covered.

f. Trap Withdrawal. This form of maneuver is sometimes found in position defense, but is normally common to mobile defense. One army withdraws in the face of enemy pressure, luring the enemy into a position where he is struck a counterblow by two or more reserve armies. The commander prefers to launch this counterattack from the flanks whenever possible.

198. NIGHT WITHDRAWAL

The army group commander normally requires subordinate commands to await darkness, when at all possible, before initiating a retrograde movement. The difficulties encountered in night operations are more than compensated for by the concealment and secrecy afforded by darkness.

a. Plans. Plans are made to include designation and actions of the covering force, routes and order of withdrawal, the location of check points, and new defensive positions. Most supplies and cumbersome equipment are moved to the vicinity of these new positions. A cover plan to mislead the enemy is formulated; it normally includes numerous feints and other deceptions by units in contact. If only one army is to withdraw to straighten a line, limited objective attacks may be launched in other army

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Figure 94. A 60-mm. mortar crew pulls back during a withdrawal.

sectors to cover the operation. Intensive patrolling, along with other ruses designed to indicate an attack, may be employed for several days before the actual withdrawal. False artillery preparations are frequently employed to cover an intended withdrawal.

b. Execution. During the initial stages of a night withdrawal, the commander places stress on speed until the troops are out of range of short-range artillery. The covering force, normally constituted from units in contact, steps up its activities to simulate normal actions until the main body has completed the initial phase of its movement. Small, lightly equipped forces may continue to remain on the old positions until just before dawn to warn of possible enemy pursuit. Remaining heavy equipment is displaced with the vanguard of the with-

drawing force to allow maximum time to emplace it at the new positions. Units in the second defense zone also are moved out early, unless they are to assume a delaying role or take up positions to halt an expected enemy pursuit. In Korea, army group commanders took full advantage of moonlight during night movements, and they can be expected to do so in the future when the tactical situation permits. When possible, distance for the first stage of a night withdrawal is held to under 30 kilometers; this allows most of the force to take full advantage of darkness. Support units consist mainly of engineers for demolition purposes and chemical troops to erect chemical obstacles. Darkness complements the security measures taken in the withdrawal, measures which differ little from those in a daylight operation.

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Section V. ADMINISTRATION

199. GENERAL

a. The army group commander is responsible to the field army or theater commander for certain administrative functions. The army group, however, is primarily a campaign maneuver unit consisting of a variable number of armies and other units allocated by higher headquarters in accordance with the campaign situation; responsibility for direct administrative support is usually limited to army group troops. The army group commander estimates the overall administrative requirements for an operation and, if necessary, makes recommendations for the allocation of appropriate means to the army group. When necessary, he allocates administrative means to armies, army group troops, and separate divisions and regiments attached to his command. The commander controls allocation and expenditure of ammunition and sometimes rations, and may exercise control over other categories of supplies as required by the situation. He exercises command supervision over administrative operations of subordinate commands.

b. There are several situations under which the army group may operate the service installations necessary for its own administrative support. These include:

- (1) The outset of an offensive campaign in a foreign theater, when the theater logistical command has not yet been established.
- (2) A war of movement, during which the army group rate of advance greatly exceeds the senior commander's capability to extend his administrative services.
- (3) Separate army group operations.

In any of these situations, the army group is reinforced by additional service units as required, probably in the form of one or more rear service branch headquarters units together with adequate operating troops. These forces augment the normal army group rear service command (fig. 95) and are under the control of the director of the army group rear service department. Each branch headquarters unit is capable of providing administrative support for a combat force of up to 350,000 men, assuming territorial responsibility for a portion of the army group rear, and rehabilitating essential facilities in an area damaged by enemy action. The senior

commander relieves the army group of major administrative responsibilities as soon as the situation permits.

c. The commander has territorial responsibility for his assigned portion of the theater combat zone; he normally divides this into army and division areas for forces in contact and the army group rear area. The army group rear boundary is contiguous with the line dividing theater combat and rear administrative areas. The commander disposes his reserves, security forces under his control, and the administrative installations essential to support of army group troops within the army group rear area. In addition, he exercises military government authority over the civil population, its government, and its economy.


200. ARMY GROUP REAR SERVICE COMMAND

The army group rear service command is commanded by the rear service department director (and his political counterpart), whose staff assists him in executing his dual staff and command responsibilities. As a staff officer, the director assists the army group commander in preparing logistical plans and estimates, maintains liaison with the supporting units of the theater logistical command and the rear service department of higher headquarters, and supervises service and supply operations throughout the command. As a commander he commands essential operating troops of the various services; he provides logistical support for army group troops by operating depots, supply points, and medical installations, and furnishes engineer, finance, and transportation service for the command. When the army group is delegated responsibility for support of major subordinate commands, the director's duties and responsibilities include most of those performed by the director of the theater rear service department (par. 146), but are on a reduced scale.

201. SERVICES

Each service found in the army group consists of two parts: Staff officers and their assistants in the various staff departments, and operating troops. Administrative services are similar to but less extensive than those found at field army or theater level;

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- NOTES:
(1) MAY INCLUDE LITTER UNITS.
(2) MAY INCLUDE TRUCK REGIMENTS, CART REGIMENTS OR BATTALIONS, AND PARA-MILITARY PORTER UNITS.

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Figure 95. Army group rear service command.

sive than those found at field army or theater level; operating troops consist primarily of Administrative and Judge Advocate Corps personnel and political personnel. They perform administrative services for the entire command. Technical services, which render the principal logistical support, consist of chemical, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, veterinarian, engineer, signal, and transportation units and personnel. Chiefs of the latter three provide services to major subordinate commands. Other technical services are composed of staff officers and minimum essential operating troops to support army group troops.

a. *Engineer Service* at army group level includes construction, rehabilitation or repair, and maintenance of roads, bridges, shelters, airfields, and permanent fortifications; construction and clearance of major obstacles, including minefields; camouflage of critical installations, and supervision and inspection of camouflage techniques throughout the command; and establishment and operation of water supply points in the army group rear. In operations at river lines, engineers prepare, concentrate, and operate river crossing equipment; they also provide traffic regulating service, and assist in training combat troops in specialized river crossing techniques. Also included in engineer service are engineer terrain reconnaissance; battlefield illumination; specialist training of engineer personnel; and collection, evaluation and dissemination of technical information and intelligence. Principal field installations include supply points, maintenance

manent fortifications; construction and clearance of major obstacles, including minefields; camouflage of critical installations, and supervision and inspection of camouflage techniques throughout the command; and establishment and operation of water supply points in the army group rear. In operations at river lines, engineers prepare, concentrate, and operate river crossing equipment; they also provide traffic regulating service, and assist in training combat troops in specialized river crossing techniques. Also included in engineer service are engineer terrain reconnaissance; battlefield illumination; specialist training of engineer personnel; and collection, evaluation and dissemination of technical information and intelligence. Principal field installations include supply points, maintenance

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


Figure 96. Engineers install ponton bridges in the army group area.

shops, water supply points, and engineer training centers. Principal troop units include independent specialized engineer regiments and battalions equipped for river-crossing operations and road and airfield construction, and fortification and battlefield illumination units. Technical engineer teams also are included in operating troops (par. 352).

b. Signal Service provides installation, maintenance, and operation of army group signal communications systems. The service also includes establishment and operation of a liaison system; signal reconnaissance; maintenance and repair of signal equipment; collection, evaluation, and dissemination of signal information and intelligence; and training of signal troops. Principal field installations include the army group wire network, radio stations, communications centers, signal supply points, maintenance shops, and training installations. Principal troop units include operating and maintenance regiments, battalions, and companies; supply and repair detachments; mounted messenger units; mobile broadcasting detachments; and signal radio intelligence units.

c. Transportation Service includes transportation of personnel and supplies by both military and paramilitary means in the army group area, and movement control over transportation of personnel and supplies. It also includes determination of trans-

portation requirements, operation of highway (and sometimes rail) transportation, maintenance and repair of transportation equipment, driver and mechanic training, planning and supervision of safety and economy programs, and planning and management of roads maintenance service. Principal field installations include the highway net; traffic control posts, repair shops, vehicle pools, and driver and mechanic training installations. Principal troop units consist of truck regiments, animal-drawn cart regiments and battalions, porter-supervision units, maintenance units, and movement control detachments.

202. SUPPLY

a. The army group commander, when the army group is part of a larger force, is not a link in the chain of supply, except with respect to army group troops. He receives from all elements of his command estimates and recommendations which he consolidates and forwards to the next higher commander. He may, however, be delegated authority to deal directly with the supporting rear service branch headquarters unit; in this case he places his requirements directly on the commander of that unit. The rear service branch headquarters unit delivers supplies to army depots, and to depots or supply points servicing army group troops. Armies

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are responsible for receiving, storing, distributing, and issuing supplies at their depots and supply points (par. 302). In a rapidly moving situation, or under other conditions that require him to assume supply responsibility for his army group, the army group commander prepares to extend to the rear the supply operations of organic troops and transportation by augmentation from the theater logistical command or from field army resources or both. While establishing the extended supply system, the commander follows the practice of rotating units in contact to rear areas as their unit loads near exhaustion; there the units reorganize and resupply themselves, then prepare to replace others on line. This device is another factor contributing to execu-

tion of a Chinese Communist offensive campaign in a series of impulses, each followed by a short period of relative quiet.

b. Within the army group, the commander supervises the expenditure of ammunition by the elements of his command. Where the overall supply situation is critical, he exercises tight supervision over priority of issue and consumption of rations, fuel, and major items of equipment, and requires major subordinate commands to fill shortages by local procurement, confiscation, and salvage from the battlefield. The commander has authority to reallocate critical items in the hands of using units, and frequently he does this to keep forces in critical sectors at a high level of combat efficiency.

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PART FOUR THE ARMY

CHAPTER 14

ORGANIZATION

203. GENERAL

a. Early antecedents of the Chinese Communist armies were the provincial guerrilla columns and the more regular columns of the organized Communist ground units of the midforties. At that time the designation *column* was employed by the Communist command to describe a loosely organized tactical formation of 2 to 3 brigades or divisions, or both. The strengths of the existing columns varied widely, as did their respective combat efficiency. Upon introduction of the field army echelon in the People's Liberation Army (summer, 1947), the high command took the initial action to formalize military organization. Columns were reorganized to conform to a triangular structure. Each column controlled three brigades or divisions and limited supporting troops; they totaled 20,000 to 30,000 men. From that time until the fall of 1948, field army commanders not only fought their columns in decisive engagements in China's Civil Wars, but developed both a command and staff structure and formalized operating procedures which form the basis for those of the present day.

b. By November 1948, the Communists' regular forces had grown to more than 1½ million men, and control of many columns in coordinated maneuver by a single command echelon strained the Communist high command's imagination and capabilities. Reorganization again took place; both army group and army echelons were introduced into the army. The army echelon replaced, in most cases in name only, into divisions. Within the army, the triangular structure was retained, through squad level, and each echelon of command was provided limited infantry support weapons. It was at about this time that the Communist high command also de-

veloped an appreciation of the vital need for logistical support other than that obtained off the battlefield, and adopted the Soviet concept of a logistical support system to bring together and coordinate the specialized supply problems that were beginning to plague the Army's leaders. A rear service department was formed at all levels of command above battalion, and assigned operating, staff, and coordinating responsibilities with respect to matters of supply, certain services, and finance.

c. While the reorganization of 1948 did little to increase the combat effectiveness of most basic maneuver elements, it did accomplish the primary objective of the high command at that time: It provided a flexible command and logistical support structure capable of absorbing and controlling the large masses of manpower then accruing to the Communists. The army of that day became, the basic tactical maneuver element of the Chinese Communist Army. Today, the division has largely supplanted the army in that role.

d. The armies that entered Korea in 1950 were relatively inflexible organizations; their tables of organization averaged 38,000 men. Each contained command and staff components; three small infantry divisions; an artillery regiment; and reconnaissance, guard, engineer, and signal battalions. Those armies were still essentially masses of infantrymen armed with rifles and small quantities of automatic weapons; they had only a minimum of artillery support and a limited logistical capability. Although successful in their initial operations, owing to sheer overwhelming numbers, at important points of contact the Chinese Communists' experience in Korea demonstrated clearly to the high command that their armies needed much more improvement before they could compete successfully against a

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
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Figure 97. The army.

modern, well-organized, and well-equipped military force.


e. Since late 1950, the People's Liberation Army has been undergoing a far-reaching reorganization program designed to apply lessons of the Korean War and improve the combat effectiveness of its armies. The program has resulted in a well-balanced, self-contained army with an authorized strength of approximately 61,000. The army now contains adequate combat support and service units, and divisions that are capable of limited independent combat operations. A possible future development which may come as a culmination of the current modernization program is that the infantry division may become the major self-sufficient tactical

and administrative unit. Until now the army has fulfilled that role, and will undoubtedly continue to do so for some time. The division, however, with its continued growth and logistic expansion, may take on many of the administrative duties and responsibilities currently handled by the army. In that case, the army may become a flexible combat force with functions that are primarily tactical, and be employed in a manner similar in nature to the United States Army corps.

204. COMPOSITION

The Chinese Communist army (fig. 97) is a major self-sufficient tactical and administrative force capable of independent operations. It con-

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* AUTHORIZED, BUT NOT PRESENT IN ALL DIVISIONS
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Figure 98. The infantry division.

sists of a headquarters, organic army troops, and three organic infantry divisions. The concept of organic infantry divisions is one of long standing in the People's Liberation Army, and has caused specific infantry divisions to be almost continuously associated with a parent army. An army normally fights, moves, and trains as a unit, with its infantry component remaining relatively stable. In Korea, however, there were numerous occasions where armies were reinforced with one or more additional infantry divisions for specific operations. During the final offensive campaign, for example, the 60th Army controlled four divisions for an extended period of time. The majority of the armies adhere to the "rule of three," and multiplying the numerical designation of an army by three will usually

provide the numerical designation of the highest of its consecutively numbered component infantry divisions. The 20th Army, for example, would contain the 58th, 59th, and 60th Infantry Divisions. Composition of the principal components of a Chinese Communist army is as follows:

a. The Infantry Division (fig. 98) consists of three infantry regiments; an artillery regiment; a tank regiment; an antiaircraft battalion; reconnaissance, guard (security), engineer, signal, and chemical warfare companies; and miscellaneous service and headquarters elements. The tank regiment and the chemical warfare company are both recent additions to the table of organization of the infantry division. The actual assignment of a tank regiment to each infantry division in the People's Liberation

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


Figure 99. The infantry regiment.

Army depends upon the ability and willingness of the Soviet Union to provide the necessary armored equipment, as well as technical specialists to train Chinese crews and maintenance personnel.

(1) Each infantry regiment (fig. 99) has three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, other combat support units, and headquarters and service elements. Each rifle battalion now has three rifle companies, two weapons companies, one an 82-mm. mortar company and one a heavy machine gun company, and a recoilless rifle platoon. The artillery battalion consists of an 82-mm. mortar company, a 75-mm.

recoilless rifle company, and a 75-mm. gun company.

(2) The division artillery regiment is organized along the Soviet gun-howitzer-mortar artillery organization. Besides headquarters and service elements, the regiment includes a 76.2-mm. gun battalion, a 122-mm. howitzer battalion, and a 120-mm. mortar battalion. There are indications that a division artillery headquarters and headquarters company are being added to the infantry division, and that the division artillery component may be expanded to include a 57-mm. antitank battalion and

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
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Figure 100. The Rifle Company.

a self-propelled gun battalion (Soviet SU-76).

(3) The tank regiment contains 3 tank battalions of 12 medium tanks each, miscellaneous combat support elements, and headquarters and service units.

b. A Tank Regiment identical to that organic to an armored division is found in several armies. Whether this unit is to become a formal part of an army's table of organization is as yet a matter of speculation.

c. Other Combat Support Units (fig. 97) include a dismounted reconnaissance battalion, a guard (security) battalion, an engineer battalion, and a signal battalion.

d. Administrative Units (fig. 97) consist of a truck battalion, a field hospital, from two to five mobile branch hospitals, a surgical unit, two litter

companies, and three depot units, all subordinate to the army rear service command; an army postal unit under the control of the political department; and, in combat situations, a replacement regiment under the control of the operations department.

205. MISSION

The army is a tactical unit of execution and maneuver. It is also a source of administrative support for its organic and attached components.

a. In offensive operations, the mission of the army is to close with the enemy and destroy or capture him by the fire and maneuver of combined arms teams. The mission of the army in defense is to repel the enemy attack before the battle position and to destroy or exact attrition on the enemy by the aggressive employment of combined arms counterattack forces.

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


Figure 101. The army staff.

b. The primary peacetime mission of an army is to train and support its components to preserve their combat effectiveness. An army may also be assigned a garrison, construction or production, or area security mission in time of peace.

206. COMMAND AND STAFF STRUCTURE

The command and staff structure of an army consists of the three basic components common to all Chinese Communist units of regimental size, or larger. These are: A command group, a four-department staff, and the Army Party committee.

a. The *Command Group* contains the army commander, the army political commissar, and their respective assistants. They are appointed by the Premier of the State Council. The military com-

mander and political commissar exercise joint command of the army, and are of equal rank—probably colonel generals or lieutenant generals. The two commanders have certain general duties and responsibilities in common, and relatively independent authority and responsibility in each of their fields. Each is responsible to his respective senior at army group.

b. The *Army Staff* (fig. 101) assists the joint commanders by providing information; making a continuing study of the tactical situation for anticipatory planning; submitting recommendations as to plans, estimates, and orders; translating decisions of the commanders into plans and orders and providing for their dissemination; and supervising the execution of orders to insure adherence to the com-

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manders' intentions and policies. It consists of an operations, a personnel, a political, and a rear service department. Members of the army staff perform both administrative and combat operational functions, and exercise either operational control or direct command over army troops. The chief of staff, for example, has operational control over the reconnaissance, engineer, guard, and signal battalions, which he exercises through the chiefs of appropriate operations department staff sections. The director of the rear service department commands army service troops.

c. The *Army Party Committee* is, in effect, an extension of the political commissar's staff, and serves to supervise and popularize execution of Party policies and directives in the army. In addition to representatives from tactical, logistical, administrative, and political elements of the army headquarters. The committee is divided into subcommittees which are titled and perform supervisory functions similar to the principal staff sections of the army political department.

207. REINFORCEMENTS

Reinforcements provided the army by the senior commander vary with the army's mission, the enemy situation, and the terrain on which the operation is

to be conducted. In offensive situations, emphasis is on units that enhance mobility and firepower; defensive situations call for reinforcements which increase the army's capability to secure the command against air, armor, and CBR attack. Normal reinforcements provided by the army group commander may include:

a. *Armor*, either in the form of one or more independent tank regiments or tank and self-propelled artillery elements organic to an armored division.

b. *Artillery*, including antitank, rocket, and anti-aircraft elements.

c. *Chemical Warfare* elements, including reconnaissance, decontamination, smoke, and flame thrower elements.

d. *Combat Aviation* to perform close support, reconnaissance, liaison, and artillery missions.

e. *Engineers*, to include both one or more engineer regiments and special engineer elements for reconnaissance, river crossing, and supply and repair activities.

f. *Signal Elements*, including operating and maintenance; supply and repair; and miscellaneous units such as photographic, broadcasting, and signal reconnaissance teams.

g. *Administrative Support* elements as required to maintain mobility and assure timely supply of the command.

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CHAPTER 15

OPERATIONS—GENERAL

208. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

The joint commanders employ command, political, and technical channels to execute their command responsibilities and control the flow of directives, orders, and other official communications between command echelons. Command channels are used to transmit and receive directives, orders, and instructions dealing with the commanders' joint responsibilities and the military commander's specific responsibilities. Political channels are used solely to transmit and receive material bearing on political affairs. Technical channels are used by chiefs of technical and administrative services to handle specific technical military responsibilities of the joint commanders. At army level, command responsibilities include:

a. Joint Responsibilities. In addition to being charged with compliance with all orders and directives from higher authorities, the army commander and political commissar share responsibility for:

- (1) General supervision of combat operations and administration in the Army.
- (2) General military and political education and training of the army; maintenance of combat efficiency; morale, and discipline; supply economy; troop hygiene and sanitation; and evacuation.
- (3) Personnel management functions with respect to general officers of the command.

b. Military Responsibilities. The army commander is solely responsible for all tactical and most administrative operations within the army; in practice, however, he seeks approval of major decisions and plans by both the political commissar and the army Party committee. Specifically, the army commander is charged with:

- (1) Organization and operation of the necessary services for immediate support within the army.
- (2) Establishment and maintenance of constant liaison with major subordinate commanders, army group, adjacent armies, and the rear service branch headquarters unit supporting the army.

- (3) Preparation and supervision of military training programs for units, combined arms teams, specialists, and senior officers in the army.
- (4) Personal analysis of military orders and directives from higher headquarters; continuous study of the military situation; and prompt dissemination of implementing army plans, instructions, orders, and directives.
- (5) Organization and close supervision of staff activities devoted to planning, support, and conduct of tactical operations.
- (6) Execution of personnel management functions not the responsibility of the political commissar for military personnel within the army (including promotion, demotion, appointment, and removal authority over company grade officers when so authorized during combat operations).
- (7) Conduct of personal inspections of subordinate commands (through battalion level) and terrain reconnaissance as required by the situation.

c. Political Responsibilities. The army political commissar is the senior officer for political affairs and is the Party's official representative within the army. In carrying out his responsibilities he is assisted by the army political department, the army Party committee, and the political commissars of the army rear service department and major subordinate commands. He has his own channel of control, which extends from army down to the Party small groups in each rifle squad. The army political commissar is responsible for:

- (1) Personal analysis of political directives from higher headquarters and prompt dissemination of implementing army orders.
- (2) Planning, preparation, and supervision of the execution of political activities within the army.
- (3) Organization and supervision of training programs for political personnel.
- (4) Execution of personnel management functions for political personnel.

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- (5) Maintenance of discipline, law, and order within the army, and the administration of military law and Party discipline for the command.
- (6) Planning and conduct of psychological warfare activities.
- (7) Organization and operation of the army postal service and censorship of mail.
- (8) Planning and conduct of civil affairs/military government activities in the army area.
- (9) Management of prisoners of war.
- (10) Assumption of military command in the absence of the army commander.

209. COMMANDER'S ACTIONS IN COMBAT

The army commander bears full responsibility, under the army group commander, for control of subordinate units and for their successful execution of combat missions. He is obliged at all times to be aware of the locations, actions, and needs of subordinate commands, and with influencing the course of battle with available forces and means without waiting for requests from subordinate commanders. In addition, he is responsible for prompt, effective execution of the army mission, timely requests for additional support, and continuous reports on the existing situation. The army commander insures command of the situation and fulfills his responsibilities to the senior commander, both personally and through his staff, by measures which control preparation, organization, and conduct of combat operations. These measures include: The commander's continuous estimate of the situation; a prompt decision followed by personal supervision to see that it is implemented; apportioning and reallocating tactical and administrative means to subordinate commands; constant exchange of information between higher, lower, and adjacent commands; uninterrupted communication; and exploitation of reconnaissance means to increase the possibility of anticipating the enemy's intentions and a change in the situation.

a. The commander's estimate of the situation is preliminary to his decision, and begins with an analysis of the senior commander's intentions and the army's role in the execution of the army group mission. The commander is assisted in making his estimate by both liaison officers from higher head-

quarters and his army staff. In evaluating the situation, the commander considers the organization and dispositions of the enemy, his morale and combat effectiveness, and the tactics he has employed in previous operations; the missions of adjacent units; the weather, the season, and the time of day; the composition, disposition, and combat effectiveness of his own and adjacent troops; and the terrain, to include relief, observation and fields of fire, obstacles, cover, and the road net. He also studies the economic condition of the populace in his area of operations, their social-political composition, and their attitude toward Chinese Communist forces to determine their influence on the impending operation. The commander's estimate establishes in what measure the situation facilitates or hinders accomplishment of his mission, and what measures he must take to overcome obstacles or lessen their effect. Incomplete information of the situation does not free the commander from the requirement for a timely decision.

b. The commander's decision is reached after determining the army scheme of maneuver and the method to be employed in its execution. His decision includes the portion of the front on which the main effort is to be made, and the direction of the main effort; the area(s) and direction(s) in which secondary efforts are to take place; and task organizations for major subordinate commands. The decision also announces missions for subordinate commands and supporting troops; measures to coordinate actions of subordinate commands throughout the operation; and measures dealing with administrative support of the operation. The political commissar participates in making the decision and announces measures to be taken to indoctrinate and control the troops during the operation, maintain their morale, and attain security of military information both during preparatory and combat phases of the operation. Principal factors influencing the commander's decision vary in offensive and defensive operations:

- (1) In offensive operations, the choice of the direction of the army main effort is the basis of the commander's decision. In selecting the direction, the commander determines the key part of the enemy's dispositions, the destruction of which will enhance successful accomplishment of his

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Figure 102. The army chief of staff briefs subordinate commanders on the army plan.

mission; decides upon the probability of encountering enemy reserves, and what countermeasures must be taken; and evaluates the nature of the hostile defenses and obstacles, terrain, time, and weather from the standpoint of simplicity in effecting the main effort.

- (2) In the defensive, the commander determines those portions of the terrain which must be held to offer a firm defense, and the method to be used to concentrate the main part of his troops and materiel thereon. In making his decision, the commander places emphasis on the natural defensive strength of the terrain and how it can be improved; organization of effective antitank and antiaircraft defense, and other security measures; and skillful organization of all types of fire in conjunction with natural and artificial obstacles.

c. Subsequent to receiving the commander's decision, the staff prepares plans to assure coordination between arms and services, amplifies measures to be taken for combat security and control and communications, and prepares the combat order. Coordination plans are developed by the army staff, in concert with commanders of major subordinate and supporting units and the chiefs of services. Each staff department director supervises activities in his specific field, and coordinates with other department heads as necessary; the chief of staff is the final reviewing authority for all staff actions (except political) bearing on the operation. The combat order, coordination tables (par. 213), and preliminary instructions received from the army commander form the basis for development by subordinate commanders, commanders of supporting units, and chiefs of services of their organization for combat and scheme of maneuver. The director of the army rear service department, in coordination with the operations department, prepares the logistic

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support plan and the organization plan for the army rear service command (par. 299).

210. STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

Preparatory activities by the commander and his staff are conducted under conditions designed to preserve in secrecy the scheme of maneuver and army organization for combat. Initially, the commander acquaints his political counterpart and deputy, the chief of staff, the artillery commander, and the director of the rear service department with the mission and his tentative decision. Subordinate commanders are given only individual planning tasks. The chief of staff, in turn, briefs the chiefs of his operations, engineer, and communications sections on the commander's decision, and initiates preliminary planning. As the time of the operation approaches and plans become firm, the commanders of subordinate units, and their staffs, are apprised of the overall plan. Subsequent to being acquainted with the mission and the commander's decision, the army staff plans for:

- a. Organization of the army for combat.
- b. Collection, evaluation, and interpretation of information concerning the enemy; friendly forces; and the terrain, weather, and civilian population in the area of operations; and submission of an analysis of these factors as they affect the commander's decision.
- c. Issuance of preliminary instructions.
- d. Development of the combat order and accompanying coordination tables, and their dissemination to the command.
- e. Organization of command and observation posts and provision for their security and defense.
- f. Extension of army communication systems.
- g. Development and execution of measures for communications security.
- h. Establishment of camouflage and concealment criteria for the command.
- i. Organization of a report system to render situation reports to higher and adjacent headquarters and to keep subordinate and supporting commanders informed.
- j. Supply of topographic maps, map substitutes, or photographs of the area of operations.
- k. Guidance to the staffs of subordinate and supporting commands.
- l. Supervision of the timely, precise execution of combat orders by subordinate and supporting com-

mands, and of coordination of all supporting troops and divisions in contact throughout the operation.

m. Critiques to analyze shortcomings and experiences gained in the operation, and their timely distribution to the troops.

211. COMBAT ORDERS

a. During the initial stages of an operation, the army commander exercises control of subordinate and supporting commands principally through issuance of combat orders (instructions). The combat order is usually brief, and is prepared to facilitate electrical transmission when practical. It normally contains:

- (1) A statement of the enemy situation on the army group front.
- (2) The mission of the army group and army, the army boundaries, and the commander's decision.
- (3) The missions of adjacent armies, and of army group reserves that may operate in army zone.
- (4) Combat missions (immediate and subsequent, in the offense) for subordinate commands, and their organization for combat; missions for combat security, antitank, and antiaircraft units; and the boundaries between major units.
- (5) Missions for artillery, armor, and combat aviation supporting the army operation.
- (6) Missions and composition of army reserves.
- (7) Timing of the operation.
- (8) Location of command and observation posts, and axes of signal communication for the army subordinate divisions.
- (9) Methods, times, and means of submitting situation reports.

b. The army commander may employ combat instructions in lieu of, or to amplify, the combat order. Combat instructions normally contain brief information on the enemy and adjacent friendly units, and the combat mission(s) and their method of execution for the unit to which they are addressed; they compare favorably with fragmentary orders in the United States Army. Warning orders, which do not disclose the entire army scheme of maneuver, are also employed to alert subordinate commanders and give them more time to prepare for impending operations.

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c. Combat orders are authenticated by the joint army commanders and their assistants, and are distributed to a selected list of individuals; normally, only the principal commanders in the army (division, regiment, and supporting unit commanders), the commanders of adjacent armies, and the senior commander receive copies. Supplementary measures dealing with organization of antitank, antiaircraft, and CBR defenses and reconnaissance activities are developed by the army staff jointly with the commanders of those arms and services involved, and ultimately reach those commanders in the form of individual combat instructions. Communications tasks are also handled in this manner. Combat instructions are authenticated by the chief of staff and the appropriate operations department staff section chief. Missions involving political activities are disseminated in the form of political instructions which are authenticated by the commissar and the director of the political department. Rear service tasks are defined in a separate order, similar to the administrative order in the United States Army, which is authenticated by the army commander, the chief of staff, and the director and commissar of the rear service department.

212. COMMAND POSTS

Subsequent to issuing combat orders and instructions, the army commander controls his troops through personal contact with subordinate and supporting commanders, utilization of his command communications system, and by activities conducted by himself and his staff in the army command post. In combat, the army headquarters is divided into a forward and a rear echelon. The forward echelon is called the command post; the rear echelon, the army rear service command.

a. The army command post is established in a location that facilitates troop control and continuous communication with higher, subordinate, adjacent, and supporting commands. An observation post is an integral part of the command post; it is located on commanding terrain to assure observation of the course of combat in the principal direction and to facilitate control of major subordinate commands. The location of the command post is normally designated by the army group commander. In the offense, it is established in the vicinity of the main effort, and is displaced forward along the army's axis of signal communication. In defense,

the army command post is normally located in the main defense zone in the vicinity of the anticipated principal enemy threat. Alternate command posts are established by the army commander as required in both offensive and defensive situations. The command post is normally occupied by commanders and their deputies; the chief of staff; members of the plans and operations, reconnaissance, and intelligence sections; representatives of the rear service command; the commanders of supporting arms (and assistants from their operations departments); and liaison personnel from supporting combat aviation elements. Members of the army reconnaissance and intelligence staff sections man the observation post. Displacement of the command post is planned to coincide with predetermined phases of combat and is made only after approval of the army group chief of staff has been obtained. Frequent movement is avoided to facilitate stability of communication and maintain control of subordinate commands. Moves are made by echelon; the timing is determined by the status of communications at the new location. During the move, the old command post is maintained temporarily as an alternate site.

b. The rear echelon of the army headquarters consists of the rear service department, and those portions of the operations, personnel, and political departments not directly concerned with control of combat operations. It is commanded by the director, rear service department, who is also head of the army rear service command. In the offensive, the rear echelon is located well forward on the army axis of signal communication, prepared to displace in the direction of the main effort. In defense the rear echelon is placed deep in the army defense zone in an area inaccessible to enemy armor, and close to the army axis of supply and evacuation.

213. MEASURES TO ACHIEVE COORDINATION

a. During the preparatory phase of an operation, the commander forms combined arms planning groups whose functions are to prepare coordination planning tables governing the actions of their respective forces in support of infantry throughout the entire operation. Coordination planning tables are based on the predetermined stages of the impending operation, and they are the primary means by which coordination measures are systematized; tables fre-

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TIME SCHEDULE OF ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY COORDINATION		
TIME	ARTILLERY ACTION	INFANTRY ACTION
1500 - 1501	Rapid and Concentrated neutralization fire	Approaching the Enemy
1501 - 1525	Destruction fire	1 The duration of artillery bombardment is one hour and 10 minutes, during which the infantry is to move to the Assault position for the assault. Try to get to the destination 15 minutes earlier, and under no circumstances should it be later than 1600 hours.
1525 - 1535	Howitzers suspend fire, mountain guns and mortars continue firing	Approach as close to the front of the enemy position as possible
1535 - 1600	Destruction fire	2 Notify the artillery by signal upon arrival at the Assault position for assault
1600 - 1607	Howitzers suspend fire, mountain guns and mortars continue firing	3 Work on assault preparations immediately (a) Organize fire power (b) Construct cover along the route of assault (c) Dispatch Bangalore torpedo teams to destroy wire entanglements and obstacles and clear the route of assault
1608 - 1610	Rapid and Concentrated Fire	Preparation for Assault
		Give the assault signal at 1609 hours. After one minute of concentrated artillery fire, start the assault if the situation for assault is ripe before the prescribed time, be sure to give the "prepare for assault" and then "assault" signals and wait for the one minute concentrated artillery fire before jumping off. Unless the situation is particularly favorable, adhere to the prescribed time schedule
1610 -	Extend the neutralization barrage	Encircle and Annihilate
		After the jump-off the infantry follows closely after our artillery to advance. Do not let this opportune moment slip. By this is the critical moment. If again confronted with enemy resistance or obstacles, signal for artillery support, then signal and wait for lifting of the barrage before resuming the advance

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Figure 103. An artillery coordination planning table.

quently accompany combat orders as annexes, or are distributed separately as combat instructions. Coordination planning tables normally include time-phased information on: The actions of each supporting arm or service in support of infantry; re-allocation of supporting arms or services as the operation progresses; the timing and method of displacement of artillery; and coordinating signals to be employed between the infantry and armor, artillery, and combat aviation. An example of a table governing the actions of artillery in an attack is shown in figure 103. Other preliminary actions to achieve coordination consist of establishing unit boundaries, assigning objectives to subordinate commands, prescribing a uniform system of target orientation and designation, and announcing phase lines which control the progress of the operation. These latter matters are normally announced in the army combat order or are indicated graphically on an accompanying military sketch.

b. Measures taken by the army commander sub-

sequent to initiation of an operation are based largely on command decisions made during the course of combat. The commander maintains constant direction of subordinate and supporting commands and supervises their timely execution of combat missions. He maintains continuous communications with higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands; requires constant reconnaissance; and effects timely exchange of information with appropriate commanders. He also assures that his army supports the actions of adjacent units by fire and maneuver.

214. COMMUNICATIONS

a. Signal communication is the primary means by which the commander maintains control over subordinate commands during combat. Responsibility for planning, installing, and maintaining army communication systems rests with the chief of staff and the head of the signal staff section; the latter is also the chief of the army signal service. The army sig-

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nal battalion comprises the operating troops of the signal service, and provides the commander with sufficient personnel and equipment to maintain communication, in normal tactical situations, with each major subordinate command and one adjacent army as discussed in (2) below. In typical operations, the chief of signal service establishes a minimum of four communication systems for the commander—the army command system, the coordination system, the rear service system, and the warning system. Other independent systems are established as required by the situation. At army level, the principal communication systems are employed as follows:

- (1) *The command system* assures the commander of control during combat operations through direct conversations, rapid transmission of combat orders and instructions, and timely receipt of situation reports. This system is established along the axis of signal communication, as ordered by the army chief of staff, and makes use of wire, mounted messengers, light aviation, and radio. The command system extends the army group system and assures communication with commanders two levels down the chain of command; the commander requires that the command systems of subordinate echelons be extended in a similar manner. If equipment available at army is inadequate to service all subordinate commands, the commander requires those units he cannot reach to establish communication using their own personnel and equipment.
- (2) *The coordination system* is established upon instructions from the army chief of staff between infantry divisions and units in their support; between adjacent divisions and armies; between army and major units supporting the army as a whole; and between the army, its divisions, and supporting combat aviation. Each infantry division employs its organic wire and radio facilities, supplemented by liaison personnel, to establish and maintain communication with an adjacent division. Armored and artillery units also employ their own facilities to communicate with the commanders of units they support.

Air-ground communication is provided by air force personnel who are located, together with their radios, at army and division command posts. Lateral communication between adjacent units by wire, mounted messenger, and aircraft is established from right to left on instruction from and with the equipment of, the commander on the right; radio communication is established on instructions from the next higher commander.

- (3) *The rear service system* affords the rear service commander control over army rear service units and installations; control over rear service staffs of major subordinate commands; and communications with the supporting branch headquarters unit and the army group rear service department. The system also provides the army commander with an alternate channel to reserves located in the army rear area. The system consists primarily of wire and mounted messengers, and is installed as directed by the director, rear service department, after coordinating with the army chief of staff.
- (4) *The warning system* is established to provide warning of air, armored, or CBR attack to rear service units and installations and principal command posts. The system consists of special radio and wire nets, supplemented by priority use of existing command and other systems under conditions prescribed by the army commander. The warning system may also include use of visual signals.
 - b. Wire communication provides the commander his most rapid and dependable means for transmission of instructions and receipt of reports. The army commander employs wire as a matter of routine in all phases of combat operations. He prescribes and enforces, however, strict observance of communication security measures. One method frequently employed is to restrict the number of individuals in units that are permitted access to wire communications.
 - c. The army commander relies on radio as a supplementary means of communication during combat, and requires his staff to prepare (and change frequently) tables of signals, coded maps, codes,

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Figure 104. Army liaison officers assist subordinate commanders in their study of the army combat order.

ciphers, and conversation tables to facilitate distribution of coded combat orders and instructions and receipt of situation reports. Radio transmission in the clear is permitted only under certain circumstances. These include transmission of: Warning of air, armored, or CBR attack; fire commands for artillery; reports of enemy aircraft locations to anti-aircraft units; spot commands to supporting combat aviation; and all spot combat orders of battalion or smaller units engaged on the battlefield. The army commander imposes radio silence during periods of reorganization, concentration, and preparation for combat operations. In defense, the commander does not normally lift radio silence until the enemy begins his attack; disruption of wire facilities, however, is automatic authority for subordinate commands to revert to radio.

d. Mounted messengers and light aircraft are employed in all types of operations for delivery of documents. Mobile means of communications are exploited particularly during pursuit, withdrawal, and reorganization. Signal center couriers and liaison officers are accorded movement priority over roads in the army area, and have the right to overtake troop or supply columns.

e. Visual signals are prescribed by the army commander to transmit commands in battle; to report air, armor, or CBR attack; for identification purposes; and to report reaching phase lines or objec-

tives. Army signal operating instructions announce signals of the day to be employed by regiments and divisions. Subordinate commands may prescribe other signals for local use by battalions and smaller units, providing they do not conflict with those announced by army.

f. Liaison officers are stationed in major subordinate headquarters by the army commander to assist in transmitting and interpreting army orders and instructions, and to expedite combat reports. They are usually equipped with mobile radio facilities which net with the army command system. Supporting arms and combat aviation elements also station liaison personnel at the command posts of units they support; radio equipment provided these personnel nets with the army coordination system.

215. ARMY REAR AREA

The army commander is responsible for the security and defense of the army area which may extend from 10 to 40 kilometers behind division rear boundaries. In offensive operations, the army area is normally quite shallow, and in some cases may not exist; in defensive operations the army area is extended to the rear to include at least the second defense zone and adequate space for wide deployment of reserves, service units, and administrative installations. The commander usually delegates responsibility for organization, security, and defense of the army area to the commander, army rear service command who, in turn, requires each unit and installation to organize and execute security and defense measures with its own available means. In the event that organized enemy groups are operating in the army rear, or the population is hostile, the army commander reinforces the rear service command with his guard battalion and portions of his reserve. He also requires that rear service installations be deployed as compactly as possible, near combat reserves, to strengthen security and defense. Personnel and motor- and horse-drawn supply vehicles are prohibited from moving alone, and armed teams are formed to guard supply convoys. Active measures are taken to clear the area of organized enemy groups and saboteurs, and tight controls are placed on civilian movements. Civilians may be evacuated to the rear if the situation permits. Army rear service command operations in the army rear area are discussed in detail in chapter 20.

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CHAPTER 16

MEETING ENGAGEMENT

216. GENERAL

a. The army usually participates in a meeting engagement when it is advancing to contact as a part of a larger force. Major decisions concerning the advance are made by the army group commander and include the general formation of the army, its zone and axis of advance, the location of major bivouac areas en route, the rate of movement, the army missions and objective(s), employment of army reconnaissance elements, and security measures to be taken during the movement. In other matters, however, the army commander is permitted freedom of action in accomplishing his mission, and he takes maximum advantage of the period of movement to contact to maneuver his force to gain an advantage of position before the situation stabilizes.

b. The army commander's scheme of maneuver is influenced primarily by the local tactical situation and the scheme of maneuver within the zones of friendly units on either or both flanks. He gains information on the enemy situation by exploitation of army intelligence and reconnaissance agencies, by analysis of intelligence and information received from higher and adjacent headquarters, and by study of information received from reconnaissance forces under army group control. The army coordination communications system keeps the commander informed of activities in adjacent zones, and permits rapid exchange of information on the existing and probable future friendly situation. Information gained from these sources permits the commander to clarify the situation gradually as opposing main forces approach, and he takes measures to prevent the flanks of his advance guard(s) from being turned and his main body taken in flank.

c. As contact becomes imminent, the army commander deploys each advance guard forward over a broad front. While the situation is developed in detail by advance reconnaissance elements under army group control, the army commander commits his advance guard(s) in accordance with the scheme of maneuver of the senior commander to extend the action of reconnaissance forces or to seize ground essential to the deployment of the army main body.

Speed and aggressiveness in deployment, action on a broad front, and powerful artillery fires are characteristic of advance guard actions. They are intended further to develop the enemy situation, destroy his security forces, and lessen the possibility of his deployment in a coordinated attack on the army main body before its deployment.

d. Based on his estimate of the situation, the army commander organizes a coordinated attack, frequently striking directly from the march column. He indicates the actions to be taken by divisions and supporting arms through combat instructions delivered by liaison officers. Allocations of army troops and reinforcing units are made to divisions in accordance with their missions, requirements, and the terrain. The basic army scheme of maneuver is envelopment, and divisions are deployed to strike the flanks and rear of hostile columns to isolate them from local reinforcements and destroy them piecemeal. Once committed in the attack, the engagement follows the pattern of an attack against an enemy in a hasty defense (par. 224).

e. The army may become involved in a meeting engagement in a war of movement when the force is being employed as a turning or enveloping force, or during an offensive campaign when the army is directed to move to contain a major enemy counter-attack. In these situations, the army commander's actions are essentially the same as those described in subsequent paragraphs of this chapter.

217. PLANNING

a. Planning during the advance takes the form of continuous refinement of tactical plans made before the initiation of the operation in anticipation of a meeting engagement. The army commander and his staff hold planning conferences prior to each day's advance, study critical areas of possible contact with the enemy, and determine favorable and unfavorable areas for deployment and development of combat. Air and ground reconnaissance elements operating on the front and flanks of the army afford information of enemy Order of Battle, direction of enemy movement, and the probable time hostile columns will pass given points. As contact

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becomes imminent, attention is focused on the probable area of contact to determine objectives which must be seized to insure the success of the army's deployment. The army commander assures rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on the enemy situation by requiring a portion of his intelligence, operations, and reconnaissance staffs to move with the advance guard on the main route of advance.

b. Based upon information received from higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands, and on the intentions of the army group commander, the army commander and his staff:

- (1) Determine the principal tactical axis of advance in the army zone of movement, areas of possible contact with the enemy, and the army scheme of maneuver upon contact.
- (2) Decide upon the army march organization.
- (3) Plan measures to attain coordination during deployment and conduct of battle.
- (4) Determine and assign objectives that must be seized and held by advance elements to protect deployment of the army.
- (5) Organize antitank and antiaircraft defenses and prescribe general march security measures.
- (6) Establish measures to afford control of major subordinate commands during the march and during deployment and conduct of battle.

Subsequent to the daily planning conference, the operations department prepares and disseminates combat instructions that confirm the commander's decisions. Instructions are limited to those implementing decisions that change the existing plan, and are dispatched several hours before the march is to be resumed to afford subordinate commanders ample time to put them into effect.

218. FORMATION

The formation adopted by the army commander (fig. 105) depends primarily upon his mission, the enemy situation, and the availability of roads or cross-country routes in the army zone of movement. It normally consists of two or more march columns. When the army moves along several routes, the army commander may apply any of the echelon formations illustrated in figure 72 to facilitate maneuver




Figure 105. March formation of an army in advance to contact.

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and attain maximum security. When assigned the mission of gaining contact with the enemy on the army group front, the commander normally will direct his three divisions to advance abreast. In any case, artillery, armor, and other reinforcements not included in division columns move in independent columns in the trace of, or parallel to the leading or center division(s). Army troops move on the main axis of advance; division trains move in separate columns behind their respective divisions.

219. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

The army organization for combat is influenced primarily by available information on the strength, composition, and location of the enemy. When information is precise, the commander adopts an organization for combat that provides for the army's protection during movement and for early, decisive action. When information is vague, the commander strives to provide for protection of the army main body and for mutual support between divisions in the event of surprise attack. In either case, the army organization for combat does not deny the commander freedom of maneuver.

a. The army commander usually designates the division moving on the primary axis of advance as his advance guard, and reinforces that unit with artillery, armored, reconnaissance, and engineer forces. He requires each division commander to secure the movement of his unit with appropriate advance, flank, and rear guards even though they may all be moving in a single column. A division moving on a single route is secured by a reinforced regiment as its advance guard; in the case of the army advance guard division, this regiment is treated as an advance combat force by the army commander who may employ it directly to seize and hold an objective critical to the army operation. When divisions are required to move on a broad front, the army commander requires each regimental column to protect its move with an advance guard of reinforced battalion size. The army guard battalion is usually assigned rear guard functions for the army.

b. Army artillery is located in the march column to facilitate its rapid deployment on contact. Part or all of it is allotted as reinforcing artillery to the advance guard division for control during the advance. The army commander further requires his

division commanders to place most of the artillery under their control with division advance guards. He strives to attain a ratio of one artillery battalion to each infantry battalion in army and division advance guards. If necessary, artillery units reinforcing the army are employed to achieve this. The commander also allots most of the antitank artillery in the army to advance guards. The army antitank reserve moves in the trace of the division moving in the direction of the hostile tank threat. The remainder of the army artillery (if any), and reinforcing artillery provided by army group, are formed into a separate column under control of the army commander, and move well forward in the column on the main axis of advance. Antiaircraft artillery, and combat aviation under higher commanders, are employed to protect the main body as it passes defiles, river lines, and other critical locations in the zone of movement. Division antiaircraft artillery is located to protect the division main body, advancing by bounds to afford continuous cover. Organic and attached antiaircraft artillery is distributed to afford cover for the army main body during the move and during its deployment on contact. Forward displacement of all antiaircraft artillery is in accordance with the army artillery commander's air defense plan.

c. The army commander usually requires division tank regiments to move, when possible, on routes that parallel each division's route of advance; when the road net precludes parallel movement, division tank regiments move at the head of each division main body. Tank units and self-propelled artillery reinforcing the army are apportioned, in part, to advance guard commanders when the situation indicates suitable conditions for their employment. The remainder of the armored force is placed on the main axis of advance, in a separate column, and moves behind or parallel to reinforcing artillery, under the army commander's control. All armored units advance by bounds, and usually occupy bivouac or assembly areas ahead of the army main body.

d. Most reinforcing engineer and chemical warfare troops are allocated to divisions for employment with advance guards and division main bodies. The army commander retains a small reserve of both type troops, a reserve which moves with other army troops on the main axis of advance. Engineers support the forward movement of columns by conduct-

ing engineer reconnaissance, removing obstacles, repairing roads and cross country routes, and facilitating river crossings. Chemical troops execute CBR reconnaissance, and are prepared to neutralize chemical obstacles, perform decontamination tasks, and screen the actions of forward elements with smoke.

e. Other army service troops move with the army trains at the rear of the main body on the main axis of advance; they are not advanced to forward areas until their presence is required.

220. CONTROL

a. Initially, the army commander establishes control of the advance by his march order (example 2, app. III) which assigns routes of movement for subordinate commands. This order frequently prescribes phase lines, objectives, or bivouac areas to be reached each day, and the time they are to be reached by all major subordinate elements of the command. It also announces the army and division axes of signal communication and establishes the location of the army command post on the march. A graphic march table and traffic control instructions frequently are appended to the march order to assure the orderly advance of the army. As the advance progresses, daily combat instructions developed subsequent to the commander's planning conference confirm or revise previous instructions contained in the march order as required by the current situation. March progress and bivouac reports are required from subordinate commands in time for them to receive consideration during the daily planning conference.

b. The army commander achieves continuous control of his troops during the advance by employment of mounted messengers, aircraft, and, if the situation permits, wire. He prescribes listening silence for command and coordinating radio communications systems during the advance, and uses his net control station to transmit limited, coded signals of interest to listening units. Special reconnaissance nets are not restricted, but must transmit information in code. Communications elements designated for the axis of signal communications and the army communications center move with the army command post. Those designated for communications with subordinate commands move with the operations staffs of those units. The army commander and his staff usually move at the head

of the main body of the advance guard division, whose commander moves with his own advance guard. Other major unit commanders and their staffs move at the head of the main body of their command.

221. INTELLIGENCE

The army commander insures adequate and timely information of the enemy by exploiting his available reconnaissance means and by specific requests for information to higher and adjacent units. He normally attaches the army reconnaissance battalion, reinforced with technical reconnaissance personnel, to his advance guard division. He requires the division commander to employ it on battle area reconnaissance missions in accordance with the army reconnaissance plan. Other divisions are required to execute battleground reconnaissance in their zones of advance, and keep the commander continuously informed of the situation. The commander supplements ground reconnaissance activities with aerial missions by tactical air elements under his control. In addition to routine Order of Battle information, the commander emphasizes the following essential elements of information during the advance:

- Opposing commander's capabilities and intentions.
- Direction, method, and speed of the hostile force's advance.
- Location, strength, and composition of enemy reserves.
- Condition of hostile lines of communications.
- Status of the local populace in the area of expected contact.
- Weather and terrain in the area of anticipated deployment.

222. ACTION FOR CONTACT

As contact becomes imminent, the army commander strives to achieve a decisive movement of the army main body in the attack before the opposing force has completed deployment. He attaches special significance to a swift decision, timely transmission of his decision to subordinate commands, and rapid deployment of his forces. The commander takes every possible action to disorganize hostile march and combat formations and divide them into separate groups, then to destroy those

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groups piecemeal by coordinated attacks on the enemy's flanks and rear, and by subsequently encircling him.

a. The army commander makes his decision for the meeting engagement as early as possible before the time his advance combat force contacts the enemy. His decision is based initially on the intentions of the army group commander and on information received from air and ground reconnaissance elements; it is refined and made more detailed as forward units develop combat. The decision, which is disseminated in combat instructions carried by liaison officers, includes:

- (1) The army scheme of maneuver, and the direction of the main and secondary attacks.
- (2) The line or area and time at which the army will deploy.
- (3) Immediate and subsequent missions for major subordinate commands (including infantry regiments).
- (4) Missions for armor, artillery, and combat aviation.
- (5) Tasks for antiaircraft and antitank defense elements, and other measures for combat security.
- (6) Methods of coordination between the various units.
- (7) Battleground reconnaissance and rear area security measures.

b. The direction of the main attack usually is selected over terrain that favors employment of armor, if possible. The terrain selected must also permit access to the flank(s) and rear of the enemy by the army main body. The commander avoids terrain containing large, built-up areas whenever possible. Once combat instructions have been received at subordinate commands, direct control of division advance guards is decentralized to division commanders. These commanders make their decisions and prepare to deploy their forces as leading security elements clash with the enemy.

c. The meeting engagement is initiated by the collision of forward reconnaissance elements and the army advance combat force with the enemy. These elements act decisively to destroy leading enemy reconnaissance elements and to seize and hold objectives until the arrival of the advance guards, at which time they revert to control of the advance guard commanders. The greater part of the artil-

lery in the army is deployed during the final advance guard approach march, on the initiative of local commanders, and supports the deployment and attack of these units to destroy leading enemy security elements and seize favorable areas to protect the deployment of the army main body. Initially, advance guard actions are supported by the fires of most of the artillery available to the army commander. The army artillery commander centralizes control of artillery as soon as possible, however, and directs its coordinated employment in support of the army scheme of maneuver.

d. The army commander directs strikes by combat aviation as soon as possible during the final phases of the advance to contact to inflict damage on the enemy columns prior to their deployment. He employs a portion of his tactical air resources in close-support strikes to support his advance guards in the destruction of enemy security elements. Most of his available combat aviation is directed against hostile columns in the area of the army main attack and against enemy forces that may threaten the army flanks. Particular attention is paid to destruction of enemy armored, mechanized, and artillery elements. Combat aviation under the control of the campaign commander supplements the army commander's ground air defense measures and protects the deployment of the army main body.

e. Tanks organic or attached to infantry divisions are employed initially in support of advance guard actions. They later are employed in mass in the direction of their division's principal effort. Armor under army control attacks the flank(s) and rear of the enemy's columns in coordination with infantry and artillery elements in the army main attack.

f. The army command post is established as leading elements initiate combat. Subsequent to the commander's decision, an alternate command post may be established in the direction of the main effort from which the commander may observe the deployment and actions of his main attack force. From this point of vantage the commander controls his force by brief combat instructions issued personally or through liaison officers at subordinate headquarters with radio or mobile means of communication at their disposal. If a portion of the enemy force is able to deploy first, and attacks leading elements in superior strength, the army commander directs the advance guard(s) in that direction to assume a defense on a wide front to


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Figure 106. A meeting engagement.

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stop the enemy, hold positions reached, and secure the deployment of the army main body in a coordinated attack. If the commander succeeds in deploying his force first, the enemy columns are split and disorganized by decisive actions of the army main attack force. Former advance guards act as blocking forces in secondary directions and support the actions of divisions in the main attack. The commander exploits success boldly, and he gives the enemy no opportunity to organize a defense or reorganize his forces on the battlefield. If the enemy attempts to withdraw, the commander directs pursuit. Elements of his main attack force move

on routes parallel to hostile forces, attempt to outdistance them, and then turn and destroy them. Secondary attack forces exert direct pressure on the enemy and do not permit him to break contact. When the army commander meets a superior or equal force that succeeds in deploying first, he deploys his main body on positions favorable for mobile or wide-front defense and strikes at the enemy with artillery and combat aviation to disorganize his combat formations, inflict casualties, and halt his attack. He holds this position until the arrival of the army group main body, then participates in the coordinated army group attack.

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CHAPTER 17

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

223. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

a. The army is the ground maneuver element that constitutes the unit of execution on which the army group commander bases his offensive campaign plans. In turn, the infantry division is the unit of execution on which the army commander normally bases his tactical plans for the attack. In certain situations, however, the army commander may base attack plans on the regiment, or even the battalion, as his unit of execution; this case usually occurs in an attack of a fortified zone, during operations in exceptionally close terrain, or in certain special operations (see ch. 19).

b. In any case, the army commander initiates planning activities well in advance of the actual tactical action; attack plans are developed fully, and completed as contact is gained. In his plan of attack, the commander concentrates maximum strength and fire power in the main effort. He also establishes measures to control his divisions and assure coordination between adjacent commands and the attacks of ground and air forces.

224. TYPES OF ATTACK AND FORMS OF MANEUVER

a. As in the case of the army group commander (par. 185), the army commander's attack plans are influenced heavily by the type of defense (hasty or deliberate defense, or a fortified zone) that is occupied by the enemy. An attack against an enemy in a hasty defense is most often employed in an advance to contact, and is usually executed directly from the army march column. Attacks against an enemy occupying a deliberate defense or a fortified zone are normally executed while in direct contact. Whenever possible, the commander executes an envelopment of the enemy defenses and employs either a single or double envelopment or a turning movement to encircle the enemy and destroy or capture him in zone. When no exposed hostile flanks exist,

the commander initiates his attack with a penetration to create conditions favorable for envelopments and subsequent encirclement.

b. In the case of a penetration of a hasty defense, the envelopments are executed by army support and reserve echelons whose action may extend through the tactical depth of the enemy defense. In an attack on an enemy in a deliberate defense, the envelopments subsequent to penetration may be made by army reserves; if so, they are usually limited in depth to the extent of the first hostile battle position, inclusive of local reserves and artillery. When the army attack echelon has met with overwhelming success, the range of the envelopments may be extended to the second hostile battle position; in this case they are executed by both support and reserve echelons. More frequently these envelopments are executed by a reserve army whose range of action includes the second hostile battle position and the forces thereon. Envelopments subsequent to penetration of a fortified zone by an army are always made by the reserve armies or armored forces of a higher commander, the army having been committed fully in the penetration.

c. Thus, all attacks by a Chinese Communist army may be classified, with respect to the hostile defense, as an attack against a hasty defense, against a deliberate defense, or against a fortified zone. From the standpoint of tactical maneuver, the commander may employ an envelopment, a penetration, or a combination of both to accomplish his mission. Each type of attack, regardless of the maneuver(s) employed, requires the commander to apply certain principles in planning for, organizing, and conducting the operation, principles which apply in a greater or lesser degree to all cases. These principles are best exemplified by the army commander's actions during an attack of a deliberate defense, as discussed in the subsequent paragraphs of this chapter. Major variations in technique, as they apply to an attack of a hasty defense or a fortified zone, are given appropriate emphasis.

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225. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

a. An army normally participates in an attack on an enemy in a deliberate defense as a part of a larger force advancing to contact, whose commander announces his decision well in advance of the operation. When battle area reconnaissance information indicates the enemy is occupying an organized position of greater strength than that of a hasty defense, the army group commander usually directs continuation of the advance with a single, reinforced army (army group advance guard) whose immediate tactical mission is to gain and maintain contact and develop the enemy situation. The advance of the army group main body is curtailed, and other armies and supporting troops are directed to forward assembly areas to await development of the situation and effect attack preparations.

b. Where information indicates the enemy has established general and combat outposts before his main battle position, the advance guard army is directed to destroy or drive in enemy security forces, establish contact with forces in the enemy main battle position, and conduct reconnaissance in force of the enemy main line of resistance. If, in the course of this action, the enemy is taken by surprise, advance guards of the army in contact drive into the enemy's main battle position and continue the attack. The army commander reinforces successful advance guard actions, and reports to the army group commander. The latter, without delay, exploits success by committing other armies, either direct from their march columns, or from already occupied forward assembly areas. When the enemy offers stubborn resistance, however, the army group commander directs seizure and consolidation of a line in close contact with the hostile main line of resistance, suitable for deployment of his main body. Other armies are closed in assembly areas to initiate attack preparations.

c. During the preparatory period, the army group commander requires both the army in contact and supporting combat aviation to execute reconnaissance missions and determine, if possible, the—

- (1) General nature of the hostile defense system, to a depth of several days' advance.
- (2) Disposition, strength, combat readiness, and composition of the enemy.
- (3) Exact outline of the main line of resistance of the main (first) and second enemy defensive zones, the number and location of firing positions and connecting trenches, and the location and nature of intermediate and switch positions.
- (4) Location of strong points, gaps, boundaries, and flanks in the enemy's defense.
- (5) Enemy's antitank defense system, to include disposition and nature of antitank and antipersonnel obstacles in front of the enemy main line of resistance and in the depth of his defenses.
- (6) Location of command and observation posts and firing positions for artillery and mortars.
- (7) Density of defensive fires of all types ahead of the enemy main line of resistance.
- (8) Assembly areas for enemy tanks and other reserves.
- (9) Daily routine of the enemy's troops.

d. The commander may also require reconnaissance in force or limited objective attacks, if necessary, to develop the situation or seize terrain on the hostile main line of resistance to provide observation into the enemy's depth. All information is evaluated by the army group commander in making his estimate and final decision. The commander's decision is communicated to armies in forward assembly areas in sufficient time for their commanders to complete attack plans and preparations.

Section II. PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK

226. GENERAL

Preparations for the attack carried out by the army commander in the army assembly area are conducted in secrecy, under cover of other forces in contact and combat aviation. All preparations for the attack are completed so far as practicable before

the occupation of attack positions, and preparatory measures likely to betray the operation are deferred as long as possible. Preparations include development of signal communication systems and plans for their extension during the attack (par. 214); provision for unit loads of ammunition, rations, and

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


Figure 107. Schematic of the army attack plan.

other supplies and for resupply throughout the attack (par. 300); establishment of measures to achieve coordination throughout the operation (par. 213); development of the plan of attack, the fire support plan, and the army's organization for combat; conduct of field exercises; organization of security measures throughout the attack; and preparation of attack positions. During the preparatory phase, the army commander gives special attention to measures that will enhance continuity of the attack. The commander makes adequate provisions for relief and regrouping of units at specified intervals and for availability of engineer units and material to facilitate the advance of attacking elements.

227. PLAN OF ATTACK

a. The army's direction of attack, the front over which the attack is to be made, and the depth of the army's objective(s) are determined by the army group commander. In an attack on an enemy in a deliberate defense, the army commander usually is

assigned a zone up to eight kilometers in width; when a fortified zone is to be attacked, the army is rarely assigned a front of over four kilometers. Within this zone, the army commander is assigned the immediate mission of effecting a penetration of the enemy's forward battle position. His subsequent mission is normally to develop the penetration by seizure of objectives on or behind the hostile second battle position which will facilitate capture of the enemy's second defense zone. Initial army objectives are thus often 10 to 15 kilometers deep; final army objectives may extend to a depth of 30 kilometers behind the enemy main line of resistance. Based on consideration of these factors, the terrain, and the local enemy situation, the army commander develops his plan of attack.

b. When committed in the army group main attack, the commander gives little consideration to secondary attacks, except as requirements for them may develop during the course of combat. He normally divides his force into an attack, a support, and a reserve echelon; depending on the terrain




Figure 107. Army attack plan—Continued.

and the frontage assigned, he may apportion one or two divisions to the attack echelon; the remainder of his infantry strength is assigned support and reserve roles (fig. 107). When attacking an enemy in a hasty defense, the commander may attack with three divisions abreast, each deployed in three echelons to add depth to the army attack. In this case, the army reserve rarely exceeds regimental-size. In an attack of a fortified zone, the commander normally attacks in a column of divisions. Missions and objectives assigned divisions in attack and support echelons complete the commander's attack plan and the general scheme of maneuver for the army reserve, and assure continuity of the attack to the army's final objective(s).

c. The immediate mission of the division(s) in the army attack echelon is to break through the enemy main battle position and destroy regimental reserves and artillery positions. Initial division objectives are three to four kilometers behind the enemy main line of resistance, and their seizure assists in destruction of hostile forces in the enemy main battle position. The subsequent mission normally

requires the attack division(s) to develop the breakthrough into the depth of the enemy main defense zone, in coordination with forces in the army support and reserve echelons. Seizure of final division objectives (10 to 15 kilometers deep) results in destruction of enemy division reserves and heavy artillery, and possession of terrain from which to support or participate in an attack on the enemy's second defense zone.

d. The immediate mission of the division(s) in the army support echelon is to support the breakthrough of the enemy main battle position by fire and maneuver, or to complete it, if necessary. Support division objectives often coincide with those assigned attack forces. The subsequent mission usually requires the support division(s) to spearhead the attack through the depth of the hostile main defense zone. In coordination with other divisions, the support echelon destroys enemy reserves and seizes objectives on or behind the enemy second battle position which will support further army attacks or other attacks on the enemy's second defense zone by army group reserves. With an exceptionally




Figure 107. Army attack plan—Continued.

favorable development of the breakthrough of the first defense zone by the attack echelon, the support division(s) may be assigned the subsequent mission of seizing the enemy second defense zone.

e. In the army attack plan, the army reserve commander is assigned only a general mission which requires him to follow behind attack and support echelons, prepared to counter a hostile threat or exploit success upon order. The army commander assigns specific missions to his reserve only during the course of the operation.

228. FIRE SUPPORT PLAN

The army fire support plan normally is prepared by the army artillery commander after the announcement of the attack plan. The fire support plan usually covers the artillery preparation, fires in support of the attack, and fires in support of combat in the depths of the enemy defenses. When the hostile defense zone contains exceptionally strong fortifications, the army group commander may require that a period of preliminary bombardment be included in the plan to be fired before the preparation.

a. The army artillery commander establishes a planning group which includes representatives from the division and reinforcing artillery commands; antitank, antiaircraft, chemical warfare, and tank units; and supporting combat aviation. Together,

members of this group develop a coordinated fire-support plan which includes:

- (1) Allocation of artillery to infantry divisions and regiments, and the composition of artillery groups retained under army control.
- (2) Duration of the artillery preparation.
- (3) Assignment of fire missions during preliminary bombardment (if any), during the preparation, in support of the attack, and in support of combat in depth.
- (4) Manner and time of deployment of artillery, and the time(s) that fire is to be opened.
- (5) Counterbattery missions for army and division artillery groups.
- (6) Missions of supporting artillery and combat aviation under army group control.
- (7) Missions of combat aviation under army control.
- (8) Composition and mission of the army antitank reserve, and its deployment during the course of the operation.
- (9) Reallocation of artillery support in the event the support or reserve echelon is committed in the attack.
- (10) Composition and missions for antitank and antiaircraft forces.

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- (11) Allocation of chemical warfare units and programming of smoke and flame-thrower missions.

b. The artillery commander submits the fire-support plan for approval through the army chief of staff. The army commander, in turn, secures approval from army group, where the army plan is coordinated with those of adjacent armies, supporting combat aviation, and the overall army group scheme of maneuver. The ultimate fire-support plan provides for coordination of the missions of all crew-served weapons organic to or in support of the army except those organic to infantry regiments and battalions. These organic weapons are employed in accordance with plans developed by regimental and battalion commanders; the weapons may, however, be required to fire during the preparation on the army commander's order.

229. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

In organizing the command for combat, the army commander allots army troops and reinforcing units to divisions and regiments in accordance with their missions, requirements, and the terrain. He apportions his means to give maximum strength possible to his attack echelon.

a. Artillery. The army commander allocates the greater portion of his artillery for creation of artillery groups in support of divisions and regiments in his attack echelon. Each regiment in the army attack and support echelon is allotted at least one such group. Supporting artillery groups receive fire missions from and maneuver under the control of division artillery commanders until the regiments they are attached to are committed. Heavy, and sometimes high-power artillery elements are employed to form long-range artillery groups under the control of divisions in both the army attack and support echelons. They perform a general support role; the long-range artillery group(s) in the support echelon receive missions for the maneuver under the control of the army artillery commander until forces in the support echelon are committed. Other high-power artillery is formed into one or more army long-range artillery groups to perform counterbattery and reinforcing missions. Antitank artillery is employed primarily to reinforce regiments in the army attack echelon; the army commander retains an antitank reserve, and also re-




Figure 108. Automatic weapons provide active air defense in the army area.

quires his division commanders to retain one. Army antiaircraft artillery is retained under army control to protect reserves, command posts, supply installations, and bridges in the army area.

b. Armor. The army commander requires attack division commanders to place their tank regiments in support of attack regiments whenever terrain and the enemy armor situation permit; when tank regiments are so employed, the army commander makes self-propelled guns available if possible to form associated supporting artillery groups. Independent tank regiments attached to the army are held in army reserve initially prepared to exploit success at any point on the army front.

c. Engineers. The army commander attaches most of the available engineer troops to divisions in his attack echelon. An engineer reserve is retained under army control.

d. Chemical Warfare Elements. Flame-thrower elements are allotted to attack divisions, whose commanders further allot them to assault elements. Smoke generating units are initially retained under army control for centralized employment as the attack jumps off; subsequently, they are attached to attack echelon division commanders.

e. Combat Aviation. Air elements allotted by the army group commander are retained under army control. The supporting air force unit com-

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Figure 109. A Chinese Communist flame-thrower team.

mander makes air-ground liaison teams available, which the army commander distributes to attack divisions and his own forward command post.

230. FIELD EXERCISES

The army commander requires his infantry divisions and regiments to participate in combined arms field exercises during the preparatory period to develop combined arms coordination and familiarity with the unit mission. Exercises are conducted over terrain similar to that in the unit's future zone of action; facsimiles of hostile fortifications are constructed on the terrain, and live ammunition is fired as a part of each exercise. Assault of the enemy main line of resistance and coordination during combat in depth receives emphasis during the combined arms training period. Division commanders and their staffs hold map and terrain exercises, the latter often being conducted from the observation post of units in contact. An army command post exercise usually terminates the preattack training phase.

231. SECURITY MEASURES

All possible measures for concealment of attack preparations are planned by the army staff and en-

forced by the commander. Planning activities are conducted in strict secrecy, and ground reconnaissance activities are conducted in concert with units in contact. The army commander directs primary employment of mounted messengers for communication, restricts use of wire, and imposes radio silence on all units during the preparatory phase. Troop movements, construction of engineer works, and transport of supplies are concealed during daylight hours or reduced to conform to the normal pattern established by forces in contact. Security measures for the impending attack are also developed by the army staff during the preparatory phase. In addition to specifying combat security measures to be taken by subordinate commands, the army commander establishes coordinated antitank, antiaircraft, and CBR defense measures.

a. Antitank Defense measures in the army are established to assure repulsion of counterattacks by enemy armor. The commander establishes coordinated reconnaissance and warning measures for hostile armor, and supplements the antitank defense measures of subordinate commanders with the maneuver of his antitank reserve and a planned capability to mass artillery fires and air strikes on hostile threats.

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Figure 110. Tanks and infantry participate in combined arms exercises prior to an operation.

b. *Antiaircraft Defense* measures are also based upon a coordinated observation and warning system. In addition, the commander specifies passive measures to be adopted by subordinate commands and supplements their active means with the fires and maneuver of army antiaircraft artillery. Air-to-air defense measures are a responsibility of the higher commander.

c. *CBR Defense* is established by providing attack divisions and regiments with adequate reconnaissance and decontamination means and establishing a suitable warning system. The army commander retains a reserve of chemical warfare units.

232. PREPARATION OF ATTACK POSITIONS

Preparation of regimental attack positions is made by reserves of units in contact—assisted by army engineers—whenever possible. Measures are taken to assure concealment and cover of personnel and material from enemy air strikes and artillery counter-preparation. Positions for infantry and armor,



Figure 111. Weapons are camouflaged and dug in as a passive air defense measure.

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artillery firing positions, command and observation posts, and avenues of approach to assault positions are constructed or improved at night. Infantry,

tank, and artillery units in the army support echelon prepare their positions with their own resources, and also operate at night to preserve secrecy.

Section III. OCCUPATION OF ATTACK POSITIONS

233. GENERAL

The army commander defers deployment of his force from rear assembly areas until attack preparations have been completed and he and his staff have inspected major commands to determine their combat readiness. Forward movements are time-phased by type of unit and its anticipated employment. The army time schedule for the approach march is coordinated with those of adjacent units, and assures arrival of subordinate commands at attack positions or forward assembly areas within the time limits prescribed by the army group commander. Subsequent to closing in forward areas, the army commander checks the final state of com-

bat readiness of his force by inspections performed by his operations staff, the commanders of supporting arms, and the chiefs of services. Inspection reports usually reach the army commander several hours before the scheduled initiation of the artillery preparation.

234. MOVEMENT OF ARTILLERY

Artillery units deploy from rear assembly areas or supplementary firing positions first, and occupy final firing positions not later than 24 hours before the time of attack. Troops and weapons are carefully camouflaged, and registration is conducted within the normal pattern of artillery fires of units in con-



Figure 112. Small unit commanders observe terrain and attack objectives prior to the operation.

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tact as prescribed by the army group artillery commander. Artillery elements are prepared to neutralize hostile weapons that may participate in a counterpreparation.

235. MOVEMENT OF INFANTRY

Infantry units deploy forward to their attack positions after artillery is emplaced, usually during the 24-hour period preceding the attack. The move is made at night whenever possible, and especially when the time of attack affords small unit commanders with minimum essential daylight hours to

observe the terrain, enemy dispositions, and attack objectives. Occupation of attack positions may often coincide with a relief of other units in contact. If so, division commanders take steps to relieve forward elements first, unit by unit, and strengthen combat security measures. Regiments are alerted to repel a possible enemy attack.

236. MOVEMENT OF ARMOR

Tanks move forward at the last moment, either under cover of darkness and normal artillery fires or under cover of the artillery preparation.

Section IV. CONDUCT OF ATTACK**237. GENERAL**

The army attack normally lasts over a period of several days. Throughout the attack, the army commander adds power to his attack echelons at decisive times by use of army support and reserve echelons, by employment of army artillery, and by requests for additional air support missions. The army commander follows the progress of the battle through observation, personal contact, reports from staff and liaison officers, and situation reports and other information received from subordinate commanders and battleground reconnaissance agencies. Subsequent to the attack, as the course of the attack indicates, he adjusts or changes missions of subordinate commands; makes necessary changes to timing, zones of action, objectives, and supporting means; and effects timely commitment of his support echelon or reserve to take advantage of enemy weaknesses and decisively defeat the hostile force.

238. THE ATTACK PHASE

a. With the consent of the army group commander, the army commander orders the artillery preparation. Division, regimental, and battalion commanders observe the course of the artillery preparation from their command posts, and report results to their respective superiors. At a prearranged time, and with the consent of the army commander, attack division commanders order leading regiments to initiate the attack; these regiments, and supporting tanks, deploy to assault positions under the cover of the final phase of the artillery preparation.

b. The signal for the assault is normally coincident with the shift of preparation fires into the depths of the enemy battle position. It is given by

attack regiment commanders at a prearranged time announced in the army coordination planning table, with the approval of the army and attack division commanders. As preparation fires shift, attack regiments direct the fires of all types of weapons at forward enemy fire positions and assault the enemy main line of resistance in a coordinated tank-infantry blow, close behind the fires of their own supporting artillery. Regimental assault echelons drive straight for their initial objectives; support and reserve echelons follow closely, clear remaining enemy groups from trenches and other shelters, and destroy undamaged enemy fire positions. Support and re-



Figure 113. Tank-infantry teams assault the hostile main line of resistance.

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serve echelons of the attack division(s) advance behind attack echelons at a distance that provides some protection from enemy fires directed at attacking troops, yet assures rapid commitment when necessary to maintain the momentum of the attack or exploit success. If not required to assist attack echelons to seize initial objectives, attack division commanders usually commit support echelons as initial objectives are consolidated. Commitment of an attack division support or a reserve echelon requires the army commander's approval, and more often than not these echelons are committed on his order. Once committed, these forces strike at local enemy reserves and artillery supporting the enemy main battle position to accomplish the subsequent mission of attack division commanders. The army commander maneuvers his support echelon at approximately 15 kilometers behind his attack echelon, prepared to engage in combat in depth to seize the enemy's second battle position and destroy hostile division reserves and heavy artillery. The reserve follows at a distance of about 5 kilometers behind forces in the support echelon.

c. Subsequent to participating in the artillery preparation, supporting artillery groups attached to attack regiments fire and maneuver in direct support of the advance of the units they support. Other supporting artillery groups, and army and division artillery, are retained under the army artillery commander, and fire and maneuver in general support of the overall army attack. Priority is given to massed fires on enemy strong points that impede the advance of infantry and armor. General support artillery also gives depth to the attack by counterbattery fire, by fires on enemy reserves, by restricting movement in the hostile rear, and by disrupting enemy command agencies. Artillery groups under army control displace behind attacking elements in a manner that permits continuous support of tanks and infantry by the majority of the artillery. The artillery commander is prepared to shift fires to cover reorganization of attack forces, to support the reserve, or to repel enemy counterattacks.

d. Combat aviation under army control is employed to neutralize centers of hostile resistance, neutralize and destroy hostile artillery, and attack local enemy reserves. Shifts of preplanned air strikes are directed by air liaison personnel who are stationed at the army command post. Combat aviation under army group control conducts strikes



Figure 114. Combat aviation in close support of infantry.

against artillery positions and reserves in the depths of the hostile defense and isolates the battlefield.

e. The commander of the army antitank reserve maintains close contact with division commanders in attack and support echelons, and is prepared to move on order of the army commander in the direction of the attack, the army commander employs the antitank reserve to repel counterattacks by enemy tanks, to assist in consolidating objectives that have tactical importance, to secure the flanks of attacking units, or to organize an antitank defense in depth.

f. Throughout the attack phase, the army commander directs battleground reconnaissance activities to secure information that influences the ensuing phase of battle—Combat in depth. Ground reconnaissance elements at his disposal seek out information on the degree of neutralization of the enemy defenses, the location of enemy weapons and obstacles that may impede the friendly advance, and the condition of the terrain. Aerial reconnaissance elements provide information on the locations and movement of enemy reserves, with emphasis on hostile armor; the displacement of enemy artillery; and if, and in what strength, the enemy's second battle position and second zone of defense are occupied. As the attack phase draws to a close with the consolidation of initial army objectives, the com-

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mander considers this reconnaissance information and makes his decision for further employment of his force in the depths of the hostile defense.

239. COMBAT IN DEPTH

a. From the army commander's standpoint, combat in depth begins as soon as the initial army objectives have been seized. The commander may direct its initiation by divisions in his attack echelon if they are still effective fighting forces. Normally, however, this phase is opened by commitment of the army support, or second echelon. In any case, the main effort of the army is directed toward completing the breakthrough of the first defensive zone and seizing final objectives which will facilitate the attack on the enemy's second defense zone. The commander concentrates the efforts of tanks, infantry, artillery, and supporting aircraft in the direction where success is apparent to widen the breakthrough toward the flanks and to develop its depth. Attack and support echelon divisions are rotated when necessary to assure the continuous advance of the army to final objectives. The commander usually commits his support echelon around the flanks of or through intervals between divisions in the attack echelon; it is passed through an attacking division only when that unit has lost its combat efficiency.

b. The army support echelon is normally committed during combat in depth as the attack echelon divisions reach the area of the enemy's primary artillery positions. The commander so times his order for its employment that leading elements of the support echelon reach the area of deployment at the same time as leading attack echelon units. The army reserve echelon follows closely, prepared to ward off enemy counterattacks. The support echelon commander deploys his first echelon in a coordinated attack to complete the breakthrough of the first defense zone. His second echelon usually is employed to strengthen the attack to complete the penetration of the hostile first defense zone; it may, however, be reinforced with armor and artillery to strike at enemy forces attempting to occupy organized defenses in the enemy's second defense zone. Army artillery reinforces the fires of artillery in the support echelon by successive concentrations ahead of it and on its flanks. Combat aviation renders close support by neutralizing and destroying enemy artillery, antitank weapons, and armor that hinder

the advance of the support echelon. Other aircraft under army group control strike at hostile reserves and troops occupying the second defense zone. If the support echelon should be halted by hostile resistance, the commander commits his reserve around its flanks to maintain the momentum of the attack. A new reserve is quickly formed from available forces.

c. Commanders of attack divisions initially employ tanks during combat in depth to assist infantry to destroy enemy key points of resistance and to overrun hostile foot troops assembling for counterattacks. As enemy resistance becomes less organized, they direct their tank units (with accompanying infantry) to range ahead of attacking infantry and destroy enemy command posts, cut hostile communications, capture supplies and equipment, and destroy enemy troops. Armor under army control may be held to counter enemy tank threats or may be committed in the main attack in coordination with the attack of the army support echelon.

d. Engineers under division control conduct route reconnaissance, seek out enemy stores of engineer materiel and water supply sources, neutralize obstacles, and make minimum essential repairs to roads and bridges. Army engineers improve work done by division engineers, extend military roads where necessary to assure mobility of reserves, assist in preparing positions for artillery and armor, and assist in construction of hasty fortifications and installation of minefields when necessary to defend against enemy counterattacks. They also establish army water-points and assist other units in camouflaging supplies and equipment.

e. During the combat in depth phase, control of supporting artillery groups is decentralized to the commanders of units they support. These commanders (usually regimental) employ their artillery to assist the advance in accordance with the overall army coordination planning table. Continuous supporting fires for regimental attack elements are achieved by deploying a part of each supporting artillery group as accompanying artillery. These elements assist tanks and infantry to destroy hostile troops on intermediate or final objectives and to reduce obstacles or strong points impeding the advance. The remainder of each group fires destruction, annihilation, and neutralization fires under regimental control. Division commanders reinforce the fires of supporting artillery groups and

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Figure 115. Army artillery (152-mm. howitzers) reinforces the fires of division artillery.

conduct counter-battery fire with their long-range artillery groups. Army artillery reinforces the fires of the division(s) in the main effort and conducts counterbattery fires across the army front. Anti-aircraft artillery is employed to protect command and supply installations, reserves, and artillery positions from enemy air attack; priority is accorded to command posts and mobile reserves.

f. During combat in depth the commander takes all possible steps to protect his maneuvering attack forces from possible enemy counterattacks. Captured lines or objectives in the depths of the enemy's defense are consolidated by specially designated troops, and routes for movement of reserves are cleared or prepared promptly. The antitank reserve, reinforced with engineers, is held posed in the direction of the enemy tank threat. Reconnaissance means are exploited to warn of the advance and deployment of enemy reserves; once their advance is detected, the commander directs the seizure of terrain suitable for the deployment of his own support or reserve echelon in attacks to break up enemy movement and prevent his orderly deployment for combat. At the decisive time, hostile reserves are struck with attacks against their flanks and rear, encircled, then destroyed. Forces repelling enemy counterattacks are heavily supported by artillery and combat aviation. If the enemy

counterattacks with strong armor support, the army commander may direct attacking divisions to defend in place temporarily and meet the attacking enemy with artillery and air strikes to break up his combat formations and inflict heavy losses on his force. Once tactical superiority is regained, the army commander strikes at the counterattacking enemy force with flank attacks to encircle and destroy his exhausted force. A serious threat to a flank may also cause the army commander to direct a temporary halt in that direction to reorganize his forces to repel the enemy; the advance in the main direction, however, is continued whenever possible.

240. PURSUIT

The army commander takes steps to prepare for initiating a pursuit in anticipation of an enemy withdrawal. Observation is increased and reconnaissance in force is conducted over a wide front, especially at night, to provide timely information of the enemy's intention to withdraw. Other reconnaissance activities are intensified to detect the beginning of the withdrawal, the routes used, the enemy formation, the presence of obstacles along withdrawal routes, the condition of roads and bridges on routes leading to the enemy's rear, and the preparation and occupation of defense positions in the hostile rear. All preliminary measures are

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designed to prevent the enemy from breaking contact and to deny him the opportunity to organize resistance on a new line.

a. Upon detecting the beginning of an enemy withdrawal, the army commander directs flank attacks by his attack echelon, supported by artillery, tanks, and aviation, to destroy hostile covering forces and to sever enemy withdrawal routes. Attack divisions are assigned pursuit missions and zones of action and provided suitable reinforcements. Their commanders are informed of the missions of adjacent units and supporting combat aviation. The army commander also gives instructions pertaining to maintenance of signal communication and to coordination signals for use between adjacent units and between forward elements and combat aviation. He normally employs the remainder of the army as a direct pressure force to maintain frontal pressure on the withdrawing enemy. If frontal pressure is to be maintained by other forces under army group control, however, the commander moves his divisions to routes parallel to the axes of enemy withdrawal and conducts a pursuit with his entire force; in this case, the commander's mission is to gain the flanks and rear of the enemy and, in conjunction with troops in the army group direct pressure force, to encircle and destroy the hostile force.

b. Upon receipt of orders to pursue, or on their own initiative, division commanders dispatch reinforced advance guards to move as rapidly as possible into the rear of the withdrawing enemy main body and seize important objectives on enemy withdrawal routes. These advance guards bypass enemy covering forces and proceed directly to their objectives; there they consolidate their position and prepare for action against the heads of retreating enemy columns. The main body of each division follows its advance guard as closely as possible to an assembly area near advance guard positions; whenever possible, division commanders strive to deploy their entire force in one or more coordinated attacks on retreating enemy columns. If the enemy succeeds in establishing a defense while divisions are on the march, commanders deploy from the march column and attack to overrun the defense and destroy the enemy.

c. A part of the army artillery is attached to divisions in the flanking force; the remainder is retained under the army artillery commander and moves behind leading divisions. Throughout the

pursuit, all artillery moves forward by echelons and fires on defiles, road intersections, bridges, and river crossing sites along hostile withdrawal routes to hinder enemy movement, destroy bunched troops, and prevent organization and occupation of a new defense position. Army antiaircraft artillery covers the main body of the flanking force and is prepared for action against both enemy air and ground forces.

d. Division commanders in the flanking force place a portion of their armor with their advance guard, whose commander employs it to seize and hold bridges, road junctions, and defiles to facilitate the advance and prevent escape or reinforcement of the withdrawing enemy. The remainder moves with each division main body; from there it is employed to make surprise flank attacks on retreating enemy columns or overcome centers of resistance impeding the advance. Armor with the army's direct pressure force attacks enemy armor and retreating vehicular columns and repels hostile counterattacks.

e. Combat aviation under army control is employed primarily in close support of divisions in the flanking force against the enemy on his withdrawal routes, especially at defiles, road junctions, bridges, and river crossing sites. It is also employed against enemy centers of resistance that block the advance of pursuing forces and in uninterrupted reconnaissance of the army zone. Air elements under army group control attack enemy reserves in depth and prevent work on or occupation of new defense lines deep in hostile territory. Aviation under theater control maintains air superiority over the battlefield and may, when necessary, effect aerial resupply of fuel, ammunition, and rations to pursuing forces. The army commander may detail small units to seize enemy airfields to assure uninterrupted air support of pursuing troops.

f. Principal engineer tasks for division and army engineers include: Removal of obstacles from and repair of roads, bridges, and river crossing sites along the route of advance; destruction of river crossing sites in the rear of the enemy's columns, and mining of withdrawal routes; and construction of obstacles against counterattacks by enemy tanks or motorized infantry.

g. The commander exercises control of his force during pursuit by radio, mounted messengers, aircraft, and liaison officers. The army commander and his staff move by bounds behind the leading

echelon of the main pursuit force. The army operations staff establishes forward information collection posts to facilitate exchange of information; they usually are mobile and are equipped with radio, wire, and messenger service. Only essential rear

service facilities move with pursuing forces. The army commander displaces other installations forward as required by the situation; he places emphasis on timely supply of fuel and ammunition to pursuing forces.

Section V. TERMINATION OF THE OFFENSIVE**241. GENERAL**

Once begun, the army offensive is halted only by enemy action or by other factors of the situation which demand it. In almost every case, the order to terminate offensive action most come from the higher commander. The sole exceptions are when an objective has been taken, but fatigue and disorganization render the position vulnerable and a period of reorganization is required; and when elements in the attack echelon are confronted with a powerful, tank-supported counterattack. In these cases, the army commander may order a local halt to offensive action; provisions for defending the position must be preliminary to resumption of the offensive and include maintenance of contact with the enemy. Other cases that affect the entire army are the prerogative of the army group commander. Quite often the higher commander elects to terminate the offensive on all or a portion of his front to alter the direction of his main effort, to assume a defense in one position, or to rotate exhausted units.

242. CHANGE IN DIRECTION

a. When faced with a local unfavorable situation in the direction of his main effort that cannot be overcome by further application of mass, the army group commander considers a change in his main axis of advance. Applying the principle of economy of force, the commander orders his main attack force to halt; he directs one or more of the armies therein to assume either a defense on a wide front or a mobile defense to cover reorganization of his force and to obtain the mass to be employed in the new direction. The time and place of the new main effort having been determined, men and means are conserved by further reducing their employment in other directions to the minimum consistent with safety. A classic example of this technique is found in the fifth Communist offensive in Korea in the spring of 1951. In that campaign, the Communists committed eight armies in their

main attack on the western front. This effort, however, came to a halt on 1 May; deep U. N. C. withdrawals had resulted in breaks in contact which forced the Communist command to interrupt the offensive and consider whether supplies and materiel should be replenished and troops displaced forward to continue the attack. Faced with a locally unfavorable situation, the Communists elected to alter their direction of attack. Leaving three armies to defend on a wide front, they redeployed five armies to the eastern front. In that reinforced area, seven armies participated in a new attack on 16 May against U. N. C. forces in the east.

b. The army group order to terminate the offensive prescribes the manner and time of relief of the army, its withdrawal route to the rear to a depth that will permit secure reorganization for a lateral march to a new concentration area, the lateral route of march, and time of arrival in the new area. Upon receipt of the order, the army commander orders leading elements to halt and defend in place; support and reserve echelons, if uncommitted, are ordered to halt and dig in on commanding terrain from which they can support the relief of forward elements. Contact with the enemy is maintained by the aggressive actions of reconnaissance and combat patrols. As the defense is being established, the army commander and the commander of the relieving unit (usually the second echelon of an adjacent army) prepare the plan of relief which includes:

- (1) Times and sequence of relief.
- (2) Distribution of routes of march.
- (3) Order of concentration of troops in departure and assembly areas and the order of departure therefrom.
- (4) Traffic control measures.
- (5) Communication and control during the relief.
- (6) Order of displacement of rear service units and installations.

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(7) Combat security measures.

(8) Joint reconnaissance activities.

c. The relief is carried out under the command of the army commander. As elements of the army arrive in assembly areas they are quickly reorganized and prepared for the lateral march to the new concentration area. Units initiate preparations for the new offensive as they arrive in the army concentration area, usually under command of the assistant army commander. Subsequent to the close of the army in the concentration area, the commander completes preliminary preparations and alerts his forces for the move to forward assembly areas from which the impending action is to be initiated.

243. ASSUMPTION OF THE DEFENSE

When the offensive is terminated because of strong enemy action across the army group front, or a requirement exists to effect an economy of force over part or all of the front, the army group commander orders some or all of his armies to adopt the defensive. As a preliminary measure, the army commander directs forces in his attack echelon to halt and defend terrain on their position, and supports their action with air, armor, and artillery at his disposal. After a terrain reconnaissance, he prescribes the general trace of his main and secondary battle position and directs their organization by troops of his support and reserve echelon. Moves to the front or rear to gain more favorable terrain are conducted during darkness whenever possible; major readjust-

ments during daylight hours are covered by smoke and combat aviation. Organization of the ground proceeds rapidly; the army group commander reinforces the construction effort with troop or civilian labor and engineers and materiel where possible. As division zones near completion, the army commander thins out forces in contact, leaving behind only essential combat security forces, and moves the bulk of each division to positions in the army defense zone.

244. ROTATION

In extended offensive campaigns the army group commander follows the practice of rotating attack armies to rear areas as their unit loads near exhaustion. When an army is relieved of its attack mission, its commander directs assumption of a hasty defense to support a passage of lines by new attack forces. Subsequent to the passage the army commander orders his force to move to assembly areas under the cover of the new attack force, then organizes and executes the move to the army concentration area. The concentration area is usually located near a major supply base and affords the commander facilities to reorganize his force, resupply unit loads, replace equipment, and build his subordinate commands up to strength. After reorganization is completed, the army may be directed to act as a part of the army group reserve and move to forward assembly areas or be employed to replace another army in contact with the enemy.

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CHAPTER 18

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section I. ORGANIZATION OF A DELIBERATE DEFENSE

245. GENERAL

The army normally participates in defensive operations as a part of a larger force. As a consequence, the zone assigned the army for defense, the trace of the forward edge of the main and second defense zones, the general locations in which security forces are to be established, the type of defense, and priorities for organization of the ground are specified by the army group commander. The army group commander also controls plans for coordination of air, armor, and artillery support of the defense and develops the obstacle plan to be followed by armies on line. Based on his mission, these supplementary instructions, and the results of his reconnaissance efforts, the army commander plans and directs organization of his defense.

a. The army commander is normally ordered to assume the defense when not in direct contact with the enemy. The commander's actions when the defense is assumed because of direct enemy pressure are discussed in chapter 17. Whether the senior commander's plans contemplate a defense in one position or a mobile defense, the army commander must visualize sharp, aggressive action based on a defense in depth which presents increasing opposition, capable of stopping an enemy who has broken through and creating favorable conditions for his destruction. In developing his defensive plans the commander emphasizes a multizoned defense, with defensive positions distributed in depth in each zone; proper selection of defensive positions and skillful preparation of the terrain; deft organization of defensive fires of all types—in particular, artillery and mortar fires; coordination of all types of fire with antitank and antipersonnel obstacle systems; and camouflage and concealment of troops and defensive installations. He also stresses precombat indoctrination of the troops to enhance their stability in action and to prepare them for a protracted defensive battle, and institutes measures to assure firm and continuous control of subordinate commands.

b. The army intelligence staff places well-defined missions on army reconnaissance agencies and subordinate commands and maintains contact with higher and adjacent commands to obtain continuous intelligence of the situation and the capabilities and intentions of the hostile commander. The staff keeps the commander continuously informed of the situation to assist him in suitably disposing his subordinate commands. In addition, the army commander and his staff conduct both map studies and ground or air reconnaissance of the army zone to assure that decisive defensive positions are properly located.

c. As army plans for occupation and organization of a defense zone are completed and implementation begins, the commander and his staff initiate planning far in advance of the current situation. Plans to meet various enemy capabilities and intentions, for counterattacks, for the counteroffensive, and for retrograde movement are prepared while initial defense measures are being taken.

d. The army commander initiates the defensive battle as far forward of his main line of resistance as the situation permits and supports the actions of covering forces and security elements with long-range artillery and combat aviation. As the hostile force approaches the main battle position, he decentralizes execution of most defense measures to division commanders whose troops occupy the main defense zone. Subsequent to that time, his principal methods of influencing the course of battle consist of employment of army and reinforcing artillery in support of units in the main defense zone, control of the reserves of subordinate divisions and regiments in defense positions, decisive employment of army reserves (with army group approval), and timely reallocation of combat and administrative support means. If, as a result of a successfully conducted defense, favorable conditions are created for striking a decisive blow against the enemy, the army commander immediately takes action to organize and execute the counteroffensive, and reports to the army group commander.

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246. RECONNAISSANCE

a. Upon receipt of a defensive mission the army commander directs initiation of battle area and battleground reconnaissance activities by air and ground reconnaissance agencies under his control. These agencies develop and provide a continuous source of information on the enemy situation. Plans developed by the army intelligence and reconnaissance staff sections exploit air reconnaissance means to locate the hostile force in zone and discover its direction of movement and concentration areas. Once located, ground reconnaissance elements gain and maintain contact with the enemy to ascertain his order of battle and the avenues of approach he is likely to employ. Ground reconnaissance elements employ raids, ambushes, clandestine observation, radio intercept and direction finding and, if necessary, reconnaissance in force to develop the situation. An extensive ground observation post system is established ahead of and within the defense zone, under the control of the army chief of staff, to complement the activities of ground and air reconnaissance elements. This system becomes the commander's basic reconnaissance means after contact is made. Battleground reconnaissance activities of units in contact and aerial reconnaissance missions supplement the ground observation system and assist in keeping the commander informed during the course of the defensive action.

b. The army commander's decision with respect to the detailed defensive dispositions of subordinate commands is often made during the course of his command reconnaissance. He is usually accompanied during this activity by his principal operations staff officers and his major subordinate commanders, to include commanders of regiments that are to occupy the main battle position. During his reconnaissance the commander affirms the locations of defense zones and sectors for divisions and regiments and establishes the forward edge of the main and second defense zones and the locations of principal defensive positions in detail. He points out critical avenues of approach and indicates positions on which he will base the stability of the army defense zone. As the reconnaissance progresses, the army artillery and armor commanders outline the defensive fire plan and recommend position areas for artillery, armor, and antitank elements. The army engineer considers the senior commander's obstacle

plan and recommends measures to implement and strengthen it in zone, as well as priorities for organization of the ground throughout the army zone. The commander, meanwhile, outlines measures for the security of boundaries and flanks; determines probable avenues to be employed by division and army reserves to execute counterattacks; estimates probable enemy assembly areas and attack positions before the defense zone; and seeks out advantageous locations for command and observation posts. After making his final decision, the commander specifies, on the ground, the disposition and combat mission of each major subordinate command, announces coordination measures, and gives instructions regarding organization of the ground. When the defense is adopted in the face of the enemy, the commander makes his decision after completing a map study of his assigned zone; he refines it by a subsequent ground reconnaissance after hasty defenses have been occupied. In no case does the commander delay the departure of divisions to their assigned zones; warning orders are dispatched prior to the commander's reconnaissance, and timely occupation of defense positions is observed at all times.

247. DISPOSITIONS IN DEFENSE

a. The army defense is organized from front to rear into three basic zones: The advance zone (or combat security position), the main defense zone, and the second defense zone. The commander normally divides his force into two echelons and apportions his means between them, depending upon the type of tactical defense to be adopted. The advance zone, when established, is occupied initially by a part of the army second echelon or reserve. The main defense zone is occupied by the army first echelon. The army second echelon, minus any forces initially deployed in the advance zone, occupies the second defense zone. The advance, main defense, and second defense zone, including switch and intermediate positions, antitank defense areas, and integrated obstacle systems, comprise the tactical depth of the army commander's defense.

b. Within each zone, the commander assigns defense zones to divisions and defense sectors to regiments. Defense zones and sectors are not normally organized to permit independent resistance as cohesive units, and immediate mutual support is usually limited to that provided by artillery fires.

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UNIT	NORMAL FRONT	WIDE FRONT
BATTALION	1 - 2 km	5 km
REGIMENT	3 - 4 km	8 - 12 km
DIVISION	6 - 12 km	16 - 36 km
ARMY	16 - 36 km	40 - 78 km

Figure 116. Defense frontages within the army.

Battalions are disposed in *defense areas* distributed in width and depth throughout each regimental defense sector. Each battalion area is organized to permit independent resistance as well as mutual support if the defense mission and the terrain permit. A regiment may organize a defense area if assigned to a critical position that must be held at all costs. The width of the several defense positions is shown in figure 116.

c. The manner in which the army commander disposes the available combat means is influenced by his mission, the terrain, the time available to complete deployment, and the enemy situation. During the defense in one position on a normal or wide front, the first echelon occupies the position on which the main effort of the defense is concentrated; the commander places the bulk of his force in that position. If occupying an interior position in a quiet sector, he may place all three divisions on line in the first echelon. In either case, the main defense zone is strongly held with a view toward stopping and destroying the enemy before the position. In mobile defense, the opposite is true; the second echelon receives emphasis, especially in infantry strength. The main defense zone is extremely deep and is lightly held with regimental combat teams; the second echelon means the army *final interception line*, disposed in strong positions on which the commander bases his defense.

248. THE ADVANCE ZONE

a. The advance zone is usually established in the area bounded by the extension of the army boundaries forward of the main defense zone to a distance of 15 to 100 kilometers, depending upon the enemy situation and the decision of the higher commander. Figure 34 portrays the organization of the zone. The advance zone also includes the army combat security position. From front to rear the zone is organized and manned by forces under the control

of the army commander and the commanders of divisions, regiments, and battalions in the main defense zone, respectively. Division, regimental, and battalion commanders each control the actions of security detachments posted by the next lower unit.

b. The army group commander directs the location, composition, and mission of the forces to occupy the forward portion of the advance zone, and announces along what portion of the front and in what strength regimental combat security detachments will be deployed. The army commander usually deploys a reinforced regiment in the forward portion of the advance zone as his general outpost. Security forces posted by the division commander are usually limited to reconnaissance forces which patrol forward of regimental security detachments. Division commanders normally require regiments on line to locate their combat security detachments four to six kilometers in front of the main defense zone. Regimental commanders control the location of battalion and company combat security positions. They are normally placed at not more than 2,000 and 750 meters, respectively, ahead of the forward edge of the main defense zone.

c. Combat security forces are assigned the general mission of guarding against surprise attack by hostile forces in the area immediately before the main defense zone. They also provide time for forces occupying forward defensive positions to prepare for combat by forcing premature deployment on the enemy and deceiving him as to the true location of the main defense zone. Infantry elements deployed throughout the army combat security position vary from a squad to a reinforced battalion. They are reinforced with appropriate weapons and supporting fires of weapons available to their parent unit.

249. THE MAIN DEFENSE ZONE


The army main defense zone (① fig. 117) is made up of the defense zones of divisions in the army's first echelon. It consists of the *main defense positions* of division on line, their *positions in depth*, organized antitank defense areas, obstacle systems, and switch positions between the two division defense positions and the army defense zones.

a. A *Division Main Defense Position* constitutes that portion of the army main battle position in the division's zone. The position includes the defense

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sectors of regiments on line (the division's first echelon) and consists of regimental main defense positions and positions in depth. Regimental defense sectors are based on battalion defense areas and anti-

tank defense areas which are tied together by defensive fires and obstacles along the front and in the depth of the defense sector. Adjacent regimental positions normally are mutually supporting,




① The army zone.

Figure 117. Disposition of the army in a defense in one position.

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② The division zone.

Figure 117. Disposition of the Army in a defense in one position—Continued.

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(1) *Regimental main defense positions are* manned by battalions in the first echelon of each line regiment. These units are assigned the mission of preventing an enemy penetration and inflicting a decisive defeat on the enemy in front of the main defense zone.

- (2) *Regimental positions in depth* are occupied by battalions in the second echelon of each regiment on line. Their mission is to support the defensive actions of forces in main defense positions by fire and maneuver, and to stop and destroy hostile elements that may penetrate forward battle positions. They may also be required to cover by fire the local withdrawal of forces in contact when their positions become untenable.

b. Division Positions in Depth constitute the army's second battle position in the main defense zone. Each position is formed by the defense sector(s) of the regiment(s) in the second echelon of line divisions and consists of organized battalion defense areas. It also contains alternate positions for use by forces in the division's first echelon. Each position in depth is linked with forward main defense positions by switch positions, obstacles, and covered routes of approach for movement of reserves. The mission of the forces on this position is to contain an enemy penetration into the depth of the defense and to act as a base of fire to support the maneuver of mobile counterattack elements. The forward trace of division positions in depth is usually about 4 to 6 kilometers behind forces occupying the forward edge of the main defense zone.

The second defense zone is organized and occupied by troops in the army second echelon. It normally consists of a single division zone containing regimental sectors; these sectors contain battalion-size blocking positions and associated anti-tank defense areas which are located on critical avenues of approach into the depths of the defense. Alternate positions for forces in the main defense zone are also included as time permits. Forces in the second defense zone are assigned the mission of

preventing penetration in depth by enemy tanks and infantry that have broken through the main defense zone and of supporting the deployment of army or army group reserves in major counterattacks. The forward edge of the second defense zone is located about 15 to 20 kilometers behind the main defense zone; the zone has a depth of 10 to 12 kilometers. When the main defense zone becomes untenable, the army group commander may direct occupation of the second defense zone and its development into a new line of which he hopes to make a firm stand.

Coordination of the fire of infantry, armored, and artillery weapons with the employment of combat aviation is the responsibility of the army artillery commander, who forms an appropriate planning group for this purpose. Plans provide for bringing the enemy under effective artillery fire as early as possible and for concentrating the fires of all weapons so that the enemy is subjected to progressively heavier concentrations as he approaches the main defense zone. They also provide for fires within the position to destroy a penetrating hostile force or support a counterattack. Plans developed by the army artillery commander do not include control of infantry crew-served weapons; the army commander influences organization of these fires, however, by assigning defense zones and sectors and by requiring that small-unit fire plans be coordinated by successively higher levels from platoon through division. The army artillery commander plans for the coordinated employment of division artillery, provides for reinforcing these fires with army artillery and combat aviation, and controls the organization of antitank and antiaircraft fire throughout the army.

- a. *Infantry Unit Fire Plans* are coordinated by division commanders, who assure that battalion defensive areas are organized to utilize the natural defensive strength of the terrain and to gain maximum effect from the fires of all weapons. A system of flanking fire by machineguns supplemented by the fires of other weapons makes up the basic defensive disposition of infantry battalions on line. In addition to defending their own fronts, adjacent units cover each other's positions by flanking fire. Dead spaces in bands of machinegun fire are covered by mortars and artillery or, in some cases, by teams of riflemen or grenadiers. The effect of

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Figure 118. Organization of fire in a division defense zone.

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these defensive fires is increased by obstacles which canalize movement of the enemy and eventually hold him in areas subject to intense frontal and flanking fire. Minefields and dummy positions are installed in portions of regimental defense sectors that are especially exposed to hostile fire. Dummy positions are left unoccupied except at night. These areas are covered by fire from adjacent battalion defense areas.

b. *The Artillery Fire Plan* developed by the army artillery commander provides for allocation of army, division, and reinforcing artillery to artillery groups and for measures to achieve coordination between them. Artillery groups are formed at regimental, division, and army level. Supporting artillery groups are placed with regiments in the army first echelon. Two or more groups are provided each regiment on line; each regiment in division second echelons is provided one supporting artillery group whenever possible. Artillery groups are not placed with regiments in the army second echelon. Long-range artillery groups are formed in each division and at army level. The artillery fire plan also provides for centralized fire direction of long-range artillery at army level and of supporting artillery at division level. The army artillery commander, however, may give division artillery commanders instructions regulating the employment of supporting artillery groups in the execution of distant fire missions or fires within the defense zone. Close support of the army main battle position is a governing factor in all artillery fire plans, which are based on fires that:

- (1) Delay and disorganize the enemy's approach through the advance zone by long-range harassing and interdiction fire.
- (2) Break up the enemy's attack preparations by counterpreparation fire.
- (3) Disrupt the attack on the main defense zone by interdiction and destruction fire.
- (4) Contain an enemy penetration by fires within the defense zone.
- (5) Support counterattacks by regimental, division, and army reserves.

The army fire plan usually specifies the priority in which targets are to be engaged. Enemy armor is accorded first priority; hostile artillery, including antiaircraft artillery, second priority; and enemy infantry, third priority.

c. *The Army Antitank Fire Plan* coordinates the employment of defensive means against hostile armor which include combat aviation, artillery, tanks, antitank weapons, mines, obstacles, organization of the ground, and a warning system. The plan locates antitank defense areas and specifies the forces that are to man them. It outlines the army antitank defense system and establishes the time it is to be complete; specifies the composition, mission, and location of the army antitank and tank reserve; and allocates antitank defense means to divisions. Probable areas of deployment for the army antitank and tank reserve are frequently announced in the plan along with instructions as to preparation of access routes to those areas, possible directions of employment, and coordination signals to be used between the reserves and friendly infantry, artillery, and aircraft.

d. *The Antiaircraft Fire Plan* provides for centralized fire direction of both army and division antiaircraft artillery weapons to cover artillery positions, assembly areas for reserves, and principal command and observation posts. Whenever possible, the plan locates antiaircraft artillery near antitank defense areas to permit reinforcing antitank fires when necessary. The plan cites principal targets for antiaircraft which are, in priority, enemy aircraft, tanks or motorized elements, and ground troops. It also provides for displacement during combat to cover planned moves of reserves and establishes the antiaircraft warning system.

e. *Plans Covering Combat Aviation* are normally developed in conjunction with the army group staff and provide for coordination of air strikes with long-range artillery fires on the advancing enemy; participation in the counterpreparation; and close support of ground action to defend the main defense zone. The plan announces air-ground coordination measures and allots liaison personnel to the command. It also provides for call missions to attack targets of opportunity or to support designated units executing counterattacks.

252. ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND

a. Organization of the ground begins as soon as elements of the army arrive in the defense zone and, except when interrupted by enemy action, continues as long as the position is occupied. When the army

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CONFIDENTIAL FIRST PRIORITY

- 1 CONSTRUCTION OF ANTITANK AND ANTIPERSONNEL MINE FIELDS AND OBSTACLES AND FIELD FORTIFICATIONS IN FRONT OF THE MAIN DEFENSE ZONE
- 2 CLEARING OF FIELDS OF OBSERVATION AND FIRE
- 3 CONSTRUCTION OF FIELD FORTIFICATIONS, ANTITANK DEFENSES, AND CONNECTING TRENCHES IN BATTALION DEFENSE AREAS IN THE ARMY MAIN BATTLE POSITION
- 4 CONSTRUCTION OF FIELD FORTIFICATIONS, ANTITANK DEFENSES AND CONNECTING TRENCHES IN BATTALION DEFENSE AREAS IN THE SECOND ECHOLON OF LINE DIVISIONS
- 5 CONSTRUCTION OF ANTITANK DEFENSES, ARTILLERY FIRING POSITIONS, AND TANK AND SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE DEPTH OF THE DEFENSE
- 6 CONSTRUCTION OF COMMAND AND OBSERVATION POSTS
- 7 PREPARATION OF CROSS-COUNTRY ROUTES OF MARCH AND REPAIR OF ROADS ESSENTIAL TO MANEUVER OF RESERVES
- 8 CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT
- 9 CONSTRUCTION OF WATER POINTS

SECOND PRIORITY

- 1 IMPROVEMENT OF FIELD FORTIFICATIONS AND CONNECTING TRENCHES IN THE MAIN BATTLE POSITION
- 2 ADDITIONAL MINING ACTIVITIES IN FRONT OF THE MAIN DEFENSE ZONE, MINING NEW LOCATIONS IN THE DEPTHS OF THE DEFENSE, AND IMPROVEMENT OF ESTABLISHED OBSTACLES
- 3 CONNECTION OF BATTALION DEFENSE AREAS IN THE MAIN DEFENSE ZONE BY CONTINUOUS TRENCHES AND IMPROVEMENT OF FIELD FORTIFICATIONS IN BATTALION DEFENSE AREAS IN THE SECOND ECHOLON OF LINE DIVISIONS
- 4 CONSTRUCTION OF ANTITANK AND ANTIPERSONNEL OBSTACLES IN FRONT OF THE SECOND DEFENSE ZONE
- 5 CONSTRUCTION OF HEAVY SHELTERS AND DUMMY INSTALLATIONS
- 6 CONSTRUCTION OF ALTERNATE POSITIONS FOR ARTILLERY, TANKS, AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS AND PREPARATION OF ALTERNATE COMMAND AND OBSERVATION POSTS
- 7 PREPARATION OF FIELD FORTIFICATIONS, ANTITANK DEFENSES, AND CONNECTING TRENCHES IN THE SECOND DEFENSE ZONE AND PREPARATION OF ASSEMBLY AREAS FOR MOBILE DIVISION AND ARMY RESERVES
- 8 IMPROVEMENT OF CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

THIRD PRIORITY

- 1 IMPROVEMENT OF TASKS OF FIRST AND SECOND PRIORITY
- 2 CONSTRUCTION OF SWITCH POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE TACTICAL DEPTH OF THE DEFENSE
- 3 CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL HEAVY SHELTERS
- 4 IMPROVEMENT OR CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL ROADS TO SUPPORT SUPPLY AND EVACUATION AND TROOP MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMY ZONE
- 5 CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL DUMMY INSTALLATIONS
- 6 IMPROVEMENT OF CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

Figure 119. Priorities accorded construction tasks when organizing the defense.

mission and available forces and equipment permit, construction tasks are carried out simultaneously in all defense zones. When this is not feasible, construction of the main defense zone is initiated first. The army commander apportions construction tasks to division commanders and allots engineer support and materiel to assist in organization of the defense. He assures that adequate troops are concentrated early on tasks that require the greatest construction effort. Members of the army staff inspect progress throughout the command and recommend reallo-

ment of support where necessary to assure timely completion of the defense. The sequence in which construction tasks are to be performed is announced in the army defense plan in the form of priorities as shown in figure 119.

b. A portion of the engineers retained under army control are placed initially in support of covering forces in the advance zone, where they assist in construction of obstacles and installation of minefields. Others prepare antitank defense areas throughout the depth of the defense, perform engineer, reconnaissance, construct major command and administrative installations for the army, construct water supply points, and camouflage installations in the army rear area. They also assist reserve units in preparation of concealed assembly areas; construct or repair roads, bridges, and air strips; improve cross-country routes to facilitate maneuver of reserves; and erect dummy positions and objects throughout the defense zone. In prolonged defensive operations, army engineers are required to construct reinforced concrete fire positions and large personnel shelters.

c. Principal field works in battalion defense areas are located on key terrain, usually in the middle or below the crest of hills and ridges, on the forward slope, and face the enemy's probable direction of attack. Other works that command secondary directions are usually located on reverse slopes or on the flanks of the primary positions, from where it is convenient to launch counterattacks or to support forward and adjacent elements by fire. Battalion defense areas always include supplementary works located to deal with enemy attacks from the flanks and rear. Battalion defense areas, once completed, are quickly joined both laterally and in depth by connecting trenches or covered routes that assure retention of freedom of maneuver in the army main battle position. A similar technique is applied to the organization of the second battle position. The area between these positions is filled with numerous obstacles and minefields, gapped to permit maneuver of division reserves; switch positions join the two battle positions and serve to canalize hostile movement and provide a base of fire to support counterattacks. The second defense zone is organized in the same manner as the main defense zone and is joined to it by a belt of obstacles and switch positions constructed as time permits.

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Figure 120. A camouflaged firing position in a battalion defense area.

253. SECURITY

The army commander requires that prompt and continuing security measures be taken in those directions from which the enemy is capable of attacking. The army defense plan outlines combat security measures and establishes counterreconnaissance activities to be conducted by subordinate commands to screen the preparations and dispositions made for defense. Combat aviation, covering forces in the advance position, combat security forces, and direct security detachments posted by all subordinate commands comprise the normal army combat security measures. Battle area and battleground reconnaissance activities also afford a degree of security to the command by locating the enemy and determining the direction of his advance and the distribution of his forces. In addition to these security measures, the army commander establishes measures to protect the command against air, airborne, armor, and chemical attack; and he also takes action to achieve maximum security in the vicinity of flanks and large unit boundaries.

a. The air defense plan provides for an observation and air warning system, assigns missions to available air defense means, and establishes the manner in which they are to be controlled. Through his plan, the commander assures mutual coordination of antiaircraft defense means between subordinate units and adjacent commands. He also establishes criteria for unit air defense with infantry weapons and for passive security measures to be taken by units occupying defensive positions. The plan provides for coordination of the fires of antiaircraft weapons with the actions of combat aviation assigned air defense missions. Air defense observation posts established by all units of company size and larger are manned at all times; warning of the approach of enemy aircraft or airborne landings is accorded first priority over all communications systems.

b. Defense measures against enemy airborne operations are developed by the army staff and announced in special combat instructions. Subordinate commands are responsible for their own

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


Figure 121. Antiaircraft artillery is deployed near possible drop zones.

defense measures. The plan designates forces that are to be prepared to engage hostile airborne troops in the army rear area and assigns assembly areas for designated units and routes of movement to possible drop and landing zones. Those zones are filled with obstacles and kept under observation; when possible, antiaircraft weapons are located nearby and are assigned a secondary mission of engaging air-dropped enemy troops.

c. Antitank defenses are organized by all units in the army, in accordance with the army commander's defense plan. The army defenses are based on reconnaissance activities and a warning system to provide timely disclosure of hostile armor and coordinated employment of all possible weapons and obstacles to contain the enemy attack and effect

maximum destruction on his armor. The army plan includes the—

- (1) Manner of employment of artillery, tanks, antitank weapons, combat aviation, and obstacles.
- (2) Designation of antitank reserves, through regimental level.
- (3) Location of assembly areas and probable directions of counterattack for antitank and tank reserves.
- (4) Establishment of reconnaissance activities and an associated warning system throughout the command.

d. Defense against CBR attack within the army includes warning measures, countermeasures to break up the enemy attack, local activities to protect troops against the effects of CBR agents, and activities to eliminate the effects of contamination subsequent to the attack. Timely warning is afforded by continuous reconnaissance of the enemy, the terrain, and weather by chemical warfare reconnaissance elements and the organization of a system of gas sentinels and a warning net. Countermeasures to break up the enemy attack take the form of counterpreparation fires against known enemy concentrations of chemical warfare troops, weapons, and supplies. Local defense for protection of troops is achieved by prescribing passive defense measures, allocation of individual and collective means of protection, assignment of decontamination units to subordinate commands, and by timely relief of units that have suffered the effects of a hostile attack. Activities to eliminate the effects of CBR attack include timely first aid on the battlefield, decontamination, prompt evacuation from and marking of contaminated areas, and construction of passageways through contaminated areas that bar access to critical terrain.

Section II. CONDUCT OF POSITION DEFENSE**254. GENERAL**

a. The army commander maintains the integrity of his defense zone by aggressive employment of firepower, limited offensive actions, defense in place, and counterattack. From the time the enemy meets covering forces in the advance zone until he reaches the main line of resistance he is hit with progressively heavier fire designed to destroy his infantry strength.

The army commander is prepared at all times to take advantage of errors or failures on the part of the enemy; should a favorable opportunity present itself during the course of the enemy attack, the commander orders a counterattack in force before the defense zone.

b. The defensive actions of elements before or within the army main battle position are directed

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toward retention of the main defense zone and the destruction of as many of the enemy as possible. Division and regimental commanders strive essentially to develop maximum firepower against the advancing enemy, to reduce their own losses by utilization of their knowledge of the terrain, and to stop the enemy's advance or throw him back by local counterattack. Small unit commanders also are alert to seize local advantages and execute raids, feints, harassing fires, and ambushes at opportune times to exact attrition on the enemy.

255. ACTION OF SECURITY FORCES

Forces in the advance zone engage enemy columns initially with long-range artillery fire, reinforced by the fires of other artillery pieces deployed before and within the main defense zone. As contact is joined, units defend in place from prepared positions to delay the advancing enemy as long as possible, fire his troops, and inflict maximum casualties on his force without becoming too closely engaged. Whenever the battle is interrupted by nightfall or atmospheric conditions, security forces push patrols forward and maintain close contact with the enemy. Troops defending the advance zone may withdraw to successive delaying positions only on order of the army commander, and then only as a result of direct enemy pressure. Withdrawals are made along previously planned routes under cover of combat aviation, smoke, and long-range artillery fires from selected pieces within the defense zone. The action of security forces in adjacent zones is coordinated by adjacent army commanders and the army group commander. By offering limited resistance on successive positions, the army commander hopes to weaken the enemy until his forces are too disorganized to mount a sustained offensive against the main defense zone. Once driven in, security forces revert to the control of their parent unit. Actions by elements in division combat security positions are, within their capabilities, similar to those of the army security forces.

256. MAIN DEFENSE ZONE ACTIONS

a. As the enemy maneuvers his forces to assembly areas to prepare for the attack, the army commander directs counterpreparation fire, supplemented by combat aviation, to destroy personnel and materiel and to disrupt hostile attack preparations. If the

enemy attempts a reconnaissance in force of the main line of resistance, he is repelled by the fires of infantry weapons and specially designated artillery pieces which occupy supplementary positions to avoid disclosing the general pattern of the army's defense. Observation of enemy actions is particularly alert at this time to detect an attempt to attack behind the cover of the reconnaissance in force. Passages made by enemy reconnaissance elements through obstacles in front of the main line of resistance are either quickly closed or may be deliberately left open and covered by planned artillery concentrations. During the course of the hostile air and artillery preparation, infantry elements in the main battle position take cover while artillery and combat aviation concentrate defensive fires on enemy tanks, assembled infantry, and artillery and mortars.

b. With the beginning of the enemy attack, defensive fires reach their highest intensity. Massed attacks by enemy armor are repelled by the concentrated fire of all artillery that can be brought to bear, by the fires of antitank weapons, by tanks, and by air strikes. Every effort is made to separate tanks and accompanying infantry and to destroy them separately with appropriate weapons.

c. If the enemy succeeds in penetrating the main defense position of a regiment on line, the division commander strives to contain the enemy by massed fire and to secure the flanks in the sector of the enemy breakthrough. Then, by counterattacks executed by his second echelon, he attempts to destroy the enemy in his zone and restore the situation. The counterattack is supported by all supporting artillery groups that can be brought to bear and by air strikes in close support of ground maneuver elements. Combat aviation and long-range artillery under army control seek to seal off the penetration and interdict movement of hostile reserves and materiel into the reentrant. The army commander, meanwhile, may shift other artillery units and reserves from unattacked sectors to reinforce the defense in depth or further support the division commander's actions. When possible, the division commander directs counterattacks at the flanks and rear of the enemy while he is still attempting to consolidate his gains. Counterattack forces, as a rule, attack from sectors where enemy attacks have been successfully repelled and, after restoring the situation, consolidate the ground and prepare for further defensive action.

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d. Local reserves usually cannot contain a penetration that succeeds in breaking through the position in depth of a line regiment. In this case the division commander takes all possible steps to hold the second battle position and reorganizes his supporting fires to that effect. Having determined the enemy's main direction of attack, the army commander strikes penetrating enemy forces with combat aviation and artillery fires to isolate and disorganize them and takes steps to strengthen the defense and prepare for the army counterattack. Forces and equipment are drawn from unthreatened sectors to reinforce the division's efforts to hold in place, and artillery is regrouped as necessary to contain the enemy and support the impending counterattack.

257. THE COUNTERATTACK

a. The army commander deploys his antitank reserve and reserve armor to previously prepared positions with a view toward preventing further expansion of the enemy penetration and counterattacks with his reserve division, whose commander is assigned the mission of destroying the enemy force that has penetrated and restoring the situation. The counterattack by the reserve division is executed swiftly and usually is directed at the base of the reentrant. Attack forces strike at the enemy's flank and rear in coordination with smaller counterattacks by the reserves of first echelon divisions. The counterattack is supported by air strikes and artillery fires. If the penetrating enemy is weak in armor, the division commander spearheads his attacking forces with the division tank regiment; if the enemy is strong in armor and antitank weapons, however, the army commander precedes the counterattack with an extensive preparation fire executed by artillery and antitank weapons, and tank and self-propelled artillery which fire from previously prepared positions and ambushes to knock out enemy armor and achieve local superiority. Combat aviation reinforces the preparation fires and interdicts movement of enemy reserves and supply trains toward the vicinity of the penetration.

b. If a counterattack is deemed inexpedient by the army group commander, the army commander is ordered to hold positions in depth, inflict maximum casualties on the enemy, and prepare to support the counterattack by army group reserves.

Army flanks in the sector of the breakthrough are consolidated first by organizing a defense on intermediate blocking positions and switch positions in zone. Artillery is reallocated to support the defense, and army artillery and combat aviation prevent movement of enemy reserves into the sector of the breakthrough.

258. DEFENSE ON A WIDE FRONT

A defense on a wide front may be adopted by the army commander in areas of secondary importance where terrain is not generally suitable for passage of foot troops. The commander may also adopt it either in the absence of adequate men and materiel or during a withdrawal to cover the movement of the main body. In any case, its adoption requires approval of the army group commander.

a. Organization of a defense on a wide front is based on the commander's mission, the extent of his assigned frontage, the nature of the terrain, and the degree of hostile activity in the area. The defense is usually based on holding separate key terrain features which control the most important axes of advance open to the enemy, coupled with powerful counterattacks from the depths of the army defense by mobile forces. When defending on a wide front the army is capable of occupying a line of up to 60 kilometers. Over this distance, the commander requires first echelon divisions to establish reinforced battalion defense areas; in terrain that greatly favors the defense, he permits independent company-size key points to be established as required. The army commander allots the bulk of his artillery and engineer support to first echelon divisions and spells out in detail what will be provided to reinforce each battalion area. Division commanders then establish battalion defense areas in the width and depth of their zones and assure that they are mutually supporting by fire. Intervals between battalion areas are filled with trenches, dummy positions, and obstacles and are covered by the fires of weapons in adjacent positions. When the army commander disposes all three divisions on line, depth is obtained by creating strong combined arms reserves; a portion of each division is withheld under army control for this purpose. These reserves are situated in prepared defense areas astride avenues of approach into the depths of the defense zone.

b. The army commander normally retains one

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division as his reserve and deploys it in regimental and sometimes battalion-size combat team groups in several locations near roads that lead to critical areas. When an open flank exists, a portion of the reserve is charged with its defense; battalion defense areas are established thereon and are linked to those in the main defense zone. The commander usually does not retain any artillery (other than antitank and antiaircraft) under his immediate control; instead, he attaches it to his first echelon divisions whose commanders form division long-range artillery groups and regimental supporting artillery groups. Some of the division artillery is placed within battalion defense areas; the remainder of the artillery is deployed well forward behind battalion defense areas to increase the range at which the enemy can be engaged. The army commander may retain control of artillery with his reserve(s), at least until

these forces are committed. Roads and trails are improved and alternate firing positions are constructed to permit rapid maneuver of artillery to support threatened sectors. The army commander also directs preparation of positions for the antitank reserve, tanks under army control, and self-propelled artillery along critical avenues of tank approach. All such positions are protected by preplanned artillery concentrations. As the defensive battle develops a clear understanding of the direction of the hostile main effort, the commander prepares to shift men and materiel to the threatened sector at the expense of secondary sectors. Penetrations between battalion defense areas are contained by the fires from those positions, and the enemy is destroyed or driven out by powerful tank-infantry counterattacks which are supported by artillery fires and combat aviation.

Section III. CONDUCT OF MOBILE DEFENSE

259. GENERAL

a. The army commander is frequently ordered to conduct a mobile defense in coordination with plans for a forthcoming counteroffensive campaign. The principal factors influencing the senior commander's decision are the existing balance of power on the battlefield, the time required by the commander to initiate the counteroffensive, and the possession of adequate terrain which may be traded for the required time. The army commander himself frequently directs forces in his portion of the advance zone to employ the tactics of mobile defense to gain time for defensive preparations in zone. The commander deliberately plans his defense to exact maximum attrition on the enemy's manpower and materiel; to fight battles of quick decision when the tactical situation is favorable; and to lure an exhausted, overextended enemy into a decisive engagement with his mobile reserves. Judgment of success or failure of a mobile defense is made after consideration of the combat exhaustion inflicted on the enemy and the extent to which the campaign commander's intentions have been realized; it is not gauged by the resulting curtailment or expansion of the combat zone.

b. The army usually participates in a mobile defense as a part of a larger force. The action is con-

ducted as a series of defensive battles fought at previously designated lines of resistance forward of a final interception line where the majority of the force and army group reserves lie in wait for the enemy. Defensive battles are closely coordinated with surprise counterattacks, ambushes, and frequent raids in strength. Coordination of the actions of forces forward of the army's final interception line with those of adjacent commands is carried out by the army commander locally, and the army group commander across the entire front; a retrograde in one defense zone is not permitted to expose or threaten adjacent friendly forces. An effective mobile defense depends upon surprise and deception and upon close coordination of the aggressive offensive employment of mobile forces consisting of regimental and battalion combat teams.

c. The army commander permits unit commanders in his first echelon to exercise a great deal of initiative in employing their forces, a situation that does not exist during defense in one position. Their actions, however, are limited by two requirements: The necessity for close coordination of their maneuver with that of adjacent units, and the need to hold the enemy forward of the final interception line for a specified period of time. Within these restrictions, unit commanders in the army's first echelon are relatively free to maneuver their forces and de-

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


Figure 122. The army defense zone in a mobile defense.

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


Figure 122. The army defense zone in a mobile defense.

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lay, harass, and exact attrition on the enemy. Forward of the final interception line the army's conduct of the defense takes place in a series of delaying actions which normally repeat themselves sequentially until the final defense position is reached. If the defense should at any time alter the balance of power in his favor, however, the army group commander quickly orders the counteroffensive to destroy the weakened enemy.

260. THE DEFENSE ZONE

a. The army defense zone is designated by the army group commander, who also establishes the trace of the initial defensive position and the final interception line and announces the length of time the enemy must be held forward of the final position. In selecting the location of the final interception line, attention is paid to maintaining an appropriate distance between its location and the assembly areas of army group reserves. These reserves must be able to move into battle rapidly, yet be far enough from defending forces to avoid casualties from hostile artillery fires directed at the defending forces. The army may be assigned either a wide front or one that is similar to that in a defense on a normal front. The depth of the sector may vary from 60 to 100 kilometers, depending upon the terrain and the time required by the senior commander.

b. The army commander usually selects other defensive positions after a map study and a thorough terrain reconnaissance; when the defense is assumed in the face of the enemy, however, this responsibility is often delegated to division commander(s) in the army first echelon, at least for the more forward positions. In addition to the element of time, factors influencing selection of positions in the defense zone include the—

- (1) Defensive strength of the terrain, including natural obstacles on the flanks and front of each position, fields of fire and observation, and the availability of cover and concealment.
- (2) Availability of covered routes of withdrawal from each position to the rear.

Successive defense positions selected within the zone are so located as to force the enemy to reorganize and redeploy his forces to attack each position. When possible, the commander strives to locate them from 10 to 15 kilometers apart.

c. Auxiliary defensive installations are constructed in front and on the flanks of each successive position, as well as in the area between positions, when time permits. The plan for organization of the ground includes full use of mines, obstacles, dummy works, and demolitions. Auxiliary defenses are frequently the bases for planned ambushes and are normally covered by long-range artillery fires.

d. Organization of the final interception line does not differ significantly from that of the main defense zone in a defense in one position.

261. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

Mobility and a powerful antitank capability are essential to a force engaged in a mobile defense; as a consequence, the army is usually reinforced with one or more antitank and tank regiments; several truck companies; and artillery, engineer, and signal troops as required by the situation. The army commander places the majority of these reinforcements with forces occupying the forward portion of the defense zone. The balance is retained under army control to assist in preparing the final interception line and to provide general support for forces in contact.

a. *The Army First Echelon* usually consists of an infantry division, reinforced. The army commander requires the division to organize regimental combat teams which act as interception and blocking forces in zone forward of the final interception line. These forces are mobile, and have strong artillery, antitank, and armored components. Each regimental combat team is provided two or more supporting artillery groups, and is reinforced by the fires of long-range artillery groups under division control. The division usually deploys two regimental combat teams on favorable terrain to prevent the enemy advance or divert its axis. The third combat team is held as division reserve, and supports the actions of units forward of the final interception line by fire and maneuver or covers their withdrawal to the next defensive line. The division commander may also employ it to effect relief of a unit in contact.

b. *The Army Second Echelon* is composed of the remaining two infantry divisions and such supporting troops as are retained under army control. A portion of this force, usually of regimental combat

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team-size, may be deployed forward of the final interception line in general support of the army first echelon's actions; the army commander also uses this force to serve as a screening force, or general outpost, before the final interception line. The regimental commander is provided two or more supporting artillery groups and a long-range artillery group which initially reinforces the fires of artillery in the army first echelon. Upon commitment of the regiment, artillery supports the counterattack or screening action, in coordination with artillery in the army first echelon.

262. ORGANIZATION OF FIRE

a. During a mobile defense, army and division commanders practice decentralization of control of infantry heavy weapons and antitank pieces and fire direction of artillery to an extreme degree. Their objective is to achieve maximum development of fire power as far forward as possible. When an enemy that is superior in troop strength and armament is encountered, the commander of the first echelon directs that the hostile force be engaged with long-range fires designed to break up his combat formations and inflict maximum casualties on his troop and materiel strength. The commander supplements the fires of forward elements with long-range artillery and combat aviation. Should the enemy appear inferior, however, the commander follows the practice of delivering surprise fires at short range after the enemy has advanced into the depths of the system of defensive fires. Fires are delivered from concealment, in abrupt concentrations, achieving surprise and shock effect.

b. Long-range defensive fires are organized to interdict the most likely avenues of hostile approach, and preplanned concentrations are prepared to cover obstacles thereon. Fires of supporting artillery are planned to supplement long-range interdiction fires as the enemy approaches the battle position and to deliver destruction fire before the position. All types of artillery participate in the planned fires to support a counterattack and cover the withdrawal from the position. Tank fires supplement artillery on the near approaches to the position, and antitank weapons are skillfully located and camouflaged in positions along avenues of tank approach and near obstacles they control.

c. The commander of the first echelon division requires that the fires of infantry heavy weapons

and small arms be organized to form a dense fire net in front of each successive position, based on the principles of concealment, surprise, and violence in delivery of fire. Surprise fire points are assigned on which designated units must be able to concentrate the fires of the bulk of their weapons; these points are assigned numbers to facilitate fire direction.

d. The army commander plans for fires to support action on the final interception line in a manner similar to that in defense in one position, and makes provision for fires to support a counteroffensive at the appropriate time. Centralized control of artillery is reestablished as the army first echelon withdraws through screening forces forward of the final interception line. The commander's fire plan includes support of his first echelon by combat aviation, and provides for coordinated employment of all supporting means to cover and support the action of his first echelon as it draws near and subsequently withdraws through forces on the final interception line.

263. CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE

a. The defense begins when the enemy makes contact with patrols operating forward of combat security forces protecting the first defensive line. Depending on the strength of the enemy force, combat security forces may either call for long-range fires on the enemy or permit him to approach to a point where destruction of his advance guards is assured by the delivery of intense surprise fire. As enemy pressure increases, security elements withdraw to behind the first battle position; their withdrawal covered by combat aviation and long-range artillery fires from the depth of the defense zone. As security forces withdraw they exact maximum delay and inflict casualties on the enemy; they avoid decisive combat, and move under cover of darkness whenever possible. Their withdrawal is covered locally by surprise counterattacks, small delaying elements, and ambush parties.

b. The duration of each defensive action by the division, the number of successive withdrawals, and the depth of a retrograde movement depend upon the overall situation, the terrain conditions, and the distribution of the division's forces, and therefore vary in each instance. Intermediate movements of minor significance are within the prerogative of the

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LEGEND

- (27) HMG SQUAD
- (57) RECOILLESS RIFLE SQUAD
- ○ ○ ANTITANK ASSAULT TEAM
- ○ ○ FIRE POWER TEAM
- OBSERVER
- ANTITANK MINES
- ◇ ANTITANK DITCH




Figure 123. A tank ambush established by a delaying party.

division commander and are made whenever individual units are under particularly heavy pressure. Partial withdrawals are permitted only with the approval of the army commander; the retrograde movement of the entire division is contingent upon his personal order.

c. From the standpoint of the army and the division commander, the action at each defensive line does not differ initially from that during a defense in one position. It is extremely important, however, to recognize the exact time at which the enemy finally abandons his attacks against units on line, only to renew them with fresh troops on the flank, at a gap, or in a different sector. The division commander makes every possible effort to obtain information which will indicate the change in the enemy's intentions. When any such indications are observed, the commander immediately withdraws all tanks and most antitank artillery from the block-

ing force to strengthen his reserve, and prepares to shift reinforcing fires to support elements in the direction of the new enemy threat.

d. Having received permission to withdraw, either as a result of direct enemy pressure or because of other factors in the situation, the commander shifts his force to a new position, leaving behind small forces to fight a delaying action. The move is made under cover of darkness whenever possible. As the withdrawal progresses, artillery barrages and concentrations are placed on preplanned locations through which the enemy must pass. When the enemy reaches the abandoned position he is subjected to the concentrated fires of all artillery that can be brought to bear. The withdrawal is covered initially by long-range artillery, then by the actions of small scale counterattacks, delaying parties, and ambush elements disposed near damaged bridges and blocked defiles. Counterattack by the army

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mobile reserve may be employed, if necessary, to help forces in the first echelon break contact.

e. As the first echelon falls back from one defense line to another, the division commander keeps his superior informed of the enemy situation and advises him of the opportune time to employ his reserve in a decisive blow. Should the enemy show signs of exhaustion or of being disorganized, he is promptly struck by a coordinated counterattack by both the army mobile reserve and reserve elements of the

first echelon. If successful, and with army group approval, the army commander prepares to initiate the counteroffensive in zone. If no favorable opportunity presents itself prior to the withdrawal of the army first echelon through forces on the final interception line, the army commander prepares to offer strong resistance on his permanent position until the hostile attacks have lost their momentum, then participate in the coordinated army group counteroffensive.

Section IV. WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION

264. GENERAL

A withdrawal from action is the means by which the army commander disengages from the enemy. The army takes part in such an action on order of the senior commander when that course of action will permit him to alter an unfavorable situation and place his troops in a more advantageous position. The army group commander normally employs the withdrawal to take up the defense on a more favorable line, to shorten his defensive front, or to concentrate troops for the counteroffensive. When ordering a withdrawal, the army group commander normally designates the army's zone of action, the rearward positions on which its components will assemble, and the operation to be undertaken subsequent to the action. The order is issued in adequate time to permit the development of the army plan and dispatch of reconnaissance elements to survey the assembly areas and routes leading thereto. It usually requires the army commander to hold out until nightfall and execute the disengagement under the cover of darkness.

265. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

a. Upon receipt of the order to withdraw from combat, the army commander alerts subordinate commands and dispatches reconnaissance elements to the rear to gain information on the routes over which his force will move and on the areas in which they will assemble. Reconnaissance parties are reinforced with engineers. These parties perform road reconnaissance, hire and post guides, seek out sources for water, and stake out unit positions in assembly areas. His mission, the enemy situation, and information received from his reconnaissance

elements influence the commander's decision upon the manner in which he will execute the withdrawal.

b. When in close contact with the enemy the commander considers how and at what time he can best disengage his force and whether, during the ensuing withdrawal, he can move his troops directly to the rear or must effect a delay on successive positions employing the army main body. In all cases the movement of the army main body is carried out under the cover of rear guards (covering forces); the commander's decision indicates whether each division in contact should form its own rear guard or whether a general rear guard for the entire army is to be employed. In the latter case, the withdrawal of divisions in contact is covered locally by small delaying detachments. The commander also weighs the enemy armored capability; if the enemy is strong in armor, the commander causes tanks in subordinate commands to move with the army main body, prepared to counter a hostile envelopment. When the enemy does not have armor strength, the commander allocates his tank force to rear guard commands.

c. On the basis of the commander's decision, the army staff prepares the combat order (or issues separate combat instructions); the order usually includes:

- (1) A resume of the enemy situation.
- (2) Purpose of the withdrawal, and the order of withdrawal of adjacent units.
- (3) Method and time for divisions to break contact, their zones of withdrawal, the routes they are to use, and the location of their assembly areas.
- (4) Designation and missions of rear guards.
- (5) Composition and missions of delaying forces to be posted by units in contact.

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


Figure 123. A tank ambush established by a delaying party.

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c. From the standpoint of the army and the division commander, the action at each defensive line does not differ initially from that during a defense in one position. It is extremely important, however, to recognize the exact time at which the enemy finally abandons his attacks against units on line, only to renew them with fresh troops on the flank, at a gap, or in a different sector. The division commander makes every possible effort to obtain information which will indicate the change in the enemy's intentions. When any such indications are observed, the commander immediately withdraws all tanks and most antitank artillery from the block-

ing force to strengthen his reserve, and prepares to shift reinforcing fires to support elements in the direction of the new enemy threat.

d. Having received permission to withdraw, either as a result of direct enemy pressure or because of other factors in the situation, the commander shifts his force to a new position, leaving behind small forces to fight a delaying action. The move is made under cover of darkness whenever possible. As the withdrawal progresses, artillery barrages and concentrations are placed on preplanned locations through which the enemy must pass. When the enemy reaches the abandoned position he is subjected to the concentrated fires of all artillery that can be brought to bear. The withdrawal is covered initially by long-range artillery, then by the actions of small scale counterattacks, delaying parties, and ambush elements disposed near damaged bridges and blocked defiles. Counterattack by the army

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first echelon. If successful, and with army group approval, the army commander prepares to initiate the counteroffensive in zone. If no favorable opportunity presents itself prior to the withdrawal of the army first echelon through forces on the final interception line, the army commander prepares to offer strong resistance on his permanent position until the hostile attacks have lost their momentum, then participate in the coordinated army group counteroffensive.

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265. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

a. Upon receipt of the order to withdraw from combat, the army commander alerts subordinate commands and dispatches reconnaissance elements to the rear to gain information on the routes over which his force will move and on the areas in which they will assemble. Reconnaissance parties are reinforced with engineers. These parties perform road reconnaissance, hire and post guides, seek out sources for water, and stake out unit positions in assembly areas. His mission, the enemy situation, and information received from his reconnaissance

elements influence the commander's decision upon the manner in which he will execute the withdrawal.

b. When in close contact with the enemy the commander considers how and at what time he can best disengage his force and whether, during the ensuing withdrawal, he can move his troops directly to the rear or must effect a delay on successive positions employing the army main body. In all cases the movement of the army main body is carried out under the cover of rear guards (covering forces); the commander's decision indicates whether each division in contact should form its own rear guard or whether a general rear guard for the entire army is to be employed. In the latter case, the withdrawal of divisions in contact is covered locally by small delaying detachments. The commander also weighs the enemy armored capability; if the enemy is strong in armor, the commander causes tanks in subordinate commands to move with the army main body, prepared to counter a hostile envelopment. When the enemy does not have armor strength, the commander allocates his tank force to rear guard commanders.

c. On the basis of the commander's decision, the army staff prepares the combat order (or issues separate combat instructions); the order usually includes:

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- (4) Designation and missions of rear guards.
- (5) Composition and missions of delaying forces to be posted by units in contact.

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


Figure 124. Withdrawal from action.

- (6) Location of any intermediate positions on which the main body will defend.
- (7) Antitank and antiaircraft defense measures, and designation and missions of combat security elements.
- (8) Reconnaissance activities, both in the zone of withdrawal and in the direction of the enemy.
- (9) Special defense measures to be taken at critical points along the routes of withdrawal to secure the passage of the army main body.
- (10) Manner in which rear service units and installations are to execute the withdrawal, to include methods of evacuation of personnel, supplies, and equipment.
- (11) Order of destruction of installations and material to be abandoned.
- (12) Tasks to be performed by engineer and signal troops.

266. EXECUTION

a. The army commander controls his subordinate commands during the initial phase of the operation from his command and observation posts. These installations are closed following the disengagement of the army main body. Once subordinate units are formed into march columns, the army commander and his staff move from one previously prepared command post to another from which they exercise control over the retrograde movement. All means of communication are employed during the action to break contact and during the withdrawal; emphasis is on wire when fixed lines exist along the army's axis of withdrawal. The commander pays special attention to maintaining communications with rear guards, flank security detachments, and adjacent and higher commands. Rear service units and installations not essential to local support of the action are moved back several days ahead of

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the action, and divisions are permitted to retain only essential transportable supplies. The army commander reinforces army and division medical installations with transportation to assure timely evacuation of the sick and wounded, designates the line behind forces in contact that is to be occupied by the army rear guard or by the rear guards of divisions in contact, and establishes traffic control elements along all routes in his zone to facilitate troop movement.

b. The commander normally directs units in contact to disengage at night. Divisions break contact under the cover of small delaying forces which are usually reinforced with tanks, self-propelled artillery, artillery, and mortars. These delaying forces remain in position as ordered by the army commander and simulate the normal activity of a fully garrisoned position with fire from different positions, reconnaissance by combat patrols, and routine use of radio and pyrotechnics. Division commanders may execute limited counterattacks across their front to help small units break contact; if necessary, the army commander is prepared to commit his reserve in a coordinated tank-infantry attack, supported by massed artillery, to extricate a major component that is heavily engaged. Once units in contact succeed in disengaging they move to the rear through the rear guard position, form

into march columns, and move to designated assembly areas. As divisions withdraw in zone, troops destroy bridges, roads, and signal communication facilities and establish obstacles to impede the enemy's advance. Small delaying forces covering the action to break contact withdraw behind the rear guards and join their parent units after the army main body has passed the rear guard position.

c. Rear guards in contact with the enemy withdraw from one position to another, on army order, and make extensive use of demolitions in their respective zones. Their actions on each position are aggressive, and are supported by combat aviation and artillery under army control. Rear guard commanders employ tanks and self-propelled artillery in coordinated counterattacks against a flanking enemy and in planned ambushes set up in the zone of withdrawal. Artillery with rear guards is used to contain the enemy, to support counterattacks, and to cover the retrograde movement of the rear guard. Rear guards employ tactics designed to enable them to delay and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy without becoming decisively engaged. The army commander does not hesitate to commit his reserves, if necessary, to retain freedom of maneuver for a rear guard that is heavily engaged.

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 19

Section I. ATTACK OF A FORTIFIED POSITION

267. GENERAL

Techniques employed by the Chinese Communist commander in an attack of a fortified position depend upon the strength, composition, and combat efficiency of the hostile force; the density and type of permanent defensive installations and obstacles in the enemy position; and the depth of the hostile fortified zone. The attack, normally preceded by a reconnaissance in force over a broad front by forces under army group control, is accomplished by multiple penetrations of the hostile main battle position. This phase of the operation is followed by rapid exploitation in depth of the most successful penetration to widen the breach and permit passage of other forces to seize successive defensive positions. The role of an army in the attack echelon of an army group is usually limited to penetration of the enemy main battle position in one or more places, and destruction of the forces therein. The attack is characterized by preliminary destruction of permanent defense installations by heavy and high-power artillery and combat aviation; the employment of specially organized assault units; and wide application of flame throwers, demolitions, and smoke-generating equipment. Exploitation is normally a function of army group support and reserve echelons.

268. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

The army commander is normally assigned a zone of about four kilometers over which his attack is to be executed. He is also assigned immediate and subsequent missions which, if successfully accomplished, will assure rupture of the enemy main battle position. Initial army objectives usually include hostile regimental reserves and principal artillery positions. Final objectives are often key terrain features behind the enemy main battle position; their seizure facilitates destruction of enemy troops in the main battle position and permits support of further attacks on successive enemy defensive lines in depth by the army group.

a. Preparations for the attack are initiated subsequent to the army group's establishment of close contact with the hostile main line of resistance. The army commander provides for a comprehensive study of the enemy defense system. Elements in contact conduct battleground reconnaissance and reconnaissance by fire to determine the enemy's system of defensive fires; the location of obstacles in front of the defense zone; the number, type, and location of permanent installations in the enemy's main battle position, and avenues of approach thereto; and suitable locations for attack and assault positions near avenues of approach into the enemy defense zone. When necessary, artillery and engineer survey teams are employed to determine the exact locations of enemy bunkers. Air reconnaissance missions cover the entire depth of the hostile defense and provide a continuous source of information on enemy obstacles and fortifications in depth; the location of hostile reserves, armor, and artillery; and the routes that reserves will probably employ in movement toward threatened sectors. Information received from reconnaissance activities is plotted in detail on maps and disseminated to subordinate commands, through company level, so that troops who are to carry out the attack are informed of the strength, type, and location of enemy fortifications.

b. As the army attack plan is finalized and organization for combat is developed, the commander requires commanders of small units in his attack echelon to observe and familiarize themselves with the terrain. These officers study the location where they are to make a breach, their assault objectives, unit attack and assault routes, the location of enemy fire points they must neutralize, and the strength of the enemy defensive positions. They also inspect proposed attack and assault positions and make tentative allocations of space for their subordinate units. Subsequent to their reconnaissance, small unit commanders return to assembly areas in the rear and conduct unit and assault team training.

c. Training in seizure of fortified positions and

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in overcoming and destroying obstacles is carried out in areas equipped with obstacles and bunker mock-ups similar to enemy installations. Special attention is accorded to measures to achieve coordination of assault team actions with the balance of the attack force. Artillery and armored units place emphasis on the techniques of delivering destruction fire on permanent defensive installations. Subsequent to critiques of field exercises, the army staff finalizes coordination planning tables in the greatest possible detail; definite missions and objectives are assigned to assault units and their supporting arms, and plans are expanded to cover every possible contingency during the attack. Assault unit commanders have no authority to make local readjustments during the course of the action; the actions of individual assault units are coordinated with adjacent assault units, and with supporting artillery, armor, and aircraft at division and sometimes army level.

d. As the time of attack draws near, the army commander concentrates his forces in forward assembly areas and completes final preparations for their deployment to attack and assault positions. Assault unit commanders are required to occupy their final positions, often within a few tens of meters of the enemy main line of resistance, within one day of the assault. This move is accomplished at night, and with great secrecy, employing specially constructed connecting trenches and even underground tunnels if soil conditions permit.

269. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

Distinctive features of the army's organization for combat when attacking a fortified position include an exceptionally deep combat formation, the creation of special assault formations, a heavy concentration of tanks and self-propelled artillery for close support of infantry, and the formation of armored reserves at division and army levels. The army is reinforced with heavy, high-power, rocket-launcher, and antitank artillery; tanks and self-propelled guns; engineers, and chemical warfare units. The army commander normally disposes his forces in two principal echelons (attack and support) and retains a small infantry reserve. The attack echelon frequently contains two divisions, reinforced, which are to attack abreast in the army zone; the support echelon contains the third division minus a regiment or

battalion designated as the nucleus of the army reserve.

a. The army commander reinforces divisions in his attack echelon with engineers, artillery, tanks, self-propelled and rocket-launcher artillery, and flame-thrower and smoke-generating equipment. Sufficient artillery is normally available to provide 2 supporting artillery groups for each regiment and at least 1 long-range and 1 destruction group for each division; divisional light pieces are employed as accompanying artillery. The commander requires each attack division commander to form *assault groups* within each infantry battalion. In the case of assault battalions, these groups breach the enemy main line of resistance; in other battalions in the attack division these groups are employed to destroy hostile fortifications along the route of attack. The composition of these assault groups is determined by the nature of the fortifications to be destroyed. A group usually includes 2 or more platoons of infantry, a platoon of engineers, several flame throwers, several pieces of accompanying artillery, 2 or more mortar squads, and a platoon of tanks; its commander is a specially selected and trained officer. The division commander requires each assault group to be organized into four combined arms teams: a demolition, an assault, a weapons, and a support team.

(1) *The demolition team* destroys obstacles in front of enemy fortifications, under cover of supporting fire, and opens gaps for the assault team. It also participates in the attack on pillboxes and other fortifications in coordination with the assault team. The team is organized about a rifle squad or platoon with engineer troops carrying explosives, Bangalore torpedoes, wire cutters, and other equipment to breach obstacles. To facilitate control within the team, small groups of 3 or 4 men each are assigned specific objectives to destroy. When the situation requires crossing a trench or scaling an obstacle, a ladder group is organized within this team or attached to the team. The demolition team precedes the other groups.

(2) *The assault team* is organized about a rifle and a tank platoon. Infantrymen carry from 6 to 8 hand grenades, and are armed with submachine guns. The team

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Figure 125. Assault teams frequently include ladder groups to assist in scaling obstacles.

is reinforced with mortars or heavy machine guns to provide its own base of fire. Flame thrower elements are included to increase shock effect. A portion of the team also carries demolition material for clearing away any obstacles not breached by the demolition team. The assault team follows the demolition team.

- (3) *The weapons team* provides supporting fire to facilitate the movement of the assault and demolition teams. It is normally organized with picked riflemen, heavy machine guns from the battalion, 82-mm. mortars, recoilless rifles, and sometimes 2 or 3 infantry howitzers from regimental artillery.
- (4) *The support team* is organized in a manner similar to the assault team. It is the

maneuver element of the assault group's second echelon. The support team exploits success or continues the action through the assault team, should the latter fail in its assault. The support team is prepared to repulse a counterattack.

b. The army support echelon is normally reinforced with engineers and sufficient artillery to permit allocation of a supporting artillery group to each regiment and a long-range group to division. Artillery with the support echelon, however, is required to fire and maneuver under army control until the support echelon is committed. The army commander also requires the support echelon commander to form assault groups in each of his infantry battalions. These forces are held concealed, beyond the range of hostile medium artillery, and continue training and preparations for combat in the enemy depths against specific fortifications as preliminary operations are initiated.

c. Principal forces held in army reserve include tank, infantry, antitank, and engineer elements. The commander may withdraw tanks from his support echelon commander if necessary to assure possession of an armored reserve. He normally forms a balanced tank-infantry combat team from these forces which he maneuvers from one concealed position to another in the rear of the attack echelon to insure success or to counter hostile reaction. Artillery of the long-range and high-power type is retained under army control to reinforce the destruction fires of artillery in the attack echelon and to extend the action to the enemy's depths by long-range harassing and interdiction fires and counterbattery actions.

270. THE ATTACK PHASE

a. The army commander's preparations in forward areas immediately preceding the attack phase are methodical, and are carried out over a period of several days under cover of preliminary bombardment fires, the actions of units in contact, and combat aviation. During this period engineers prepare attack and assault positions, construct or improve covered routes between these positions, prepare direct fire positions for supporting artillery and tanks, and construct passages through major obstacles forward of assault positions. Artillery observers occupy newly constructed observation posts, and supporting artillery moves up and registers cautiously. Forces

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Figure 126. An assault team advances toward its initial objective.

in the attack echelon move to attack positions under cover of darkness. Units in contact cover the noise of demolitions and movement by heavy mortar and artillery fire, and combat aviation concentrates on prevention of hostile aerial reconnaissance.

b. The attack phase is initiated by the artillery preparation which usually begins on the eve of the attack; if hostile fortifications are exceptionally strong, however, it may be of several days' duration. Assault groups move to their respective assault positions during the latter stage of the artillery preparation. When these groups arrive in assault positions, often as close as 100 meters to each group's initial objective, preparation fires are lifted from the forward edge of the hostile defense to avoid inflicting casualties on friendly troops. Direct fire artillery with assault elements continues to neutralize or destroy forward enemy fire positions that still resist. At this time, assault group commanders determine the locations of hostile fire positions that can still bring effective fire to bear on their troops during the assault, and estimate the degree of destruction that has resulted to obstacles along assault routes. If necessary, they direct local sapping operations to clear their respective assault routes and call for destruction fires on targets beyond the capabilities of their own weapons. In the meantime, other infantry and tank elements of attack division assault echelons move to their assault positions from which they can quickly follow assault groups into the enemy

defenses. At the appropriate time, assault group commanders signal their readiness for the assault.

271. THE ASSAULT PHASE

a. The signal to initiate the assault is timed to coincide with the close of the artillery preparation. As assault groups strike at their initial objectives, artillery shifts its fires to targets in front and on the flanks of advancing troops. Assault groups contain and destroy surviving fire positions while other troops in division assault echelons break into the intervals between fire positions, without stopping at the first fortifications, and move forward behind barrage fires into the depth of the enemy's forward position. Self-propelled and other accompanying artillery pieces conduct direct fire on enemy fire positions that hinder the advance of tanks and infantry. If these fires are not sufficient to eliminate resistance, the positions are stormed by the assault groups that are a part of each battalion. The advance into the hostile position is a step-by-step process; its rate is determined by the progress of the several assault groups. Attack division commanders attempt to maintain the rate of advance at a steady pace to prevent the enemy from reestablishing the continuity of his defense.

b. Division and regimental commanders locate themselves well forward during the assault phase where they can exercise a direct influence on the action at critical moments. They commit second

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Figure 127. Flame throwers are used to cover the approach of the demolitions team.

and third echelons of attack regiments in directions where success has been achieved to widen the breach and deliver blows from the rear on hostile fortifications and centers of defense in the enemy main battle position. These forces push through and around emplacements under the protection of all available supporting fires and troops in the support echelons of attack divisions. They are protected by fires and smoke placed on other enemy positions that may interrupt their advance, especially flank positions. Assault groups with these forces utilize special demolitions charges to gap minefields, breach obstacles, and destroy enemy fire positions. Captured areas are consolidated by specially designated units, and all fortifications not required to defend an area are demolished. Attack division commanders maneuver their tank-infantry and anti-tank reserves close behind other combat formations, prepared to defeat enemy counterattacks and maintain the rate of advance. At the appropriate time, attack division commanders commit their support echelons to seize and destroy key positions occupied by enemy regimental reserves and artillery.

c. During the assault phase, the army commander supports his attack divisions with air strikes on hos-

tile positions in depth and on enemy reserves that attempt to move towards the breach in the fortified zone. Army artillery concentrates its fire on hostile targets that constitute the greatest threat to the success of the assault, interdicts movement in the enemy rear, and conducts counterbattery fire. The commander maneuvers his support echelon and reserves behind the point of principal effort, and is prepared to commit these forces in combat in depth to breach the entire enemy main battle position or counter a major hostile threat that cannot be contained by local reserves. A significant gain is exploited rapidly by the commitment of the support echelon; the enemy is not permitted to consolidate a defense on switch or intermediate positions in front of his second battle position.

272. COMBAT IN DEPTH

From the army commander's standpoint, combat in depth during the attack of a fortified zone begins with the breakthrough of positions occupied by the battalions on the enemy's main line of resistance. He may hasten initiation of this phase by commitment of his support echelon when he sees that such a breakthrough is imminent.

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Figure 128. Accompanying artillery destroys fortifications by direct fire during combat in depth.

a. Combat in depth consists of the seizure of key terrain behind the enemy's main battle position and the successive destruction of all enemy defenses in his regimental reserve area. Regiments and battalions in the army support echelon acting in coordination with effective elements remaining in the attack echelon complete the breach of the enemy main battle position, widen the breach by offensive action to the flanks, and hold a secure passage for exploitation forces under army group control.

b. During this phase, battalions attack predesignated or newly discovered fortifications. Frontal attacks are avoided in favor of small enveloping attacks to isolate and destroy the enemy piecemeal. As each strong point is seized it is either destroyed or occupied and adapted for combat to hold the shoulders of the breach. Once final objectives are seized, commanders make preparations to resist an enemy counterattack. Troops are reorganized, ammunition replenished, and avenues of approach to

established positions are blocked. The shoulders of the penetration are quickly organized into an integrated defense to cover the advance of exploitation forces.

c. During the period of combat in depth, the army commander maneuvers his reserve to maintain the momentum of the support echelon's attack, block hostile forces that may attempt to break out of local encirclement, and contain enemy counterattacks. Artillery under army control continues counterbattery fires, assists in interdicting movement in the enemy rear, and reinforces the fires of artillery with the support echelon. Combat aviation attacks enemy movements in depth and coordinates with friendly ground forces in the destruction of encircled hostile troops; resupply by air is executed when necessary. As final army objectives are consolidated the army commander prepares to reorganize his force and participate in further offensive operations.

Section II. OPERATIONS AT RIVER LINES


273. GENERAL

Actions at wide and unfordable river lines are normally large-scale operations coordinated by the army group or higher commander; thus the army will participate in these operations as part of a

larger force. When a river line is encountered in the course of an offensive campaign, the senior commander must decide in advance whether the line can be forced by a hasty crossing or if a deliberate crossing in the face of organized resistance must

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① A division bridge.



② An infantry foot bridge.

Figure 129. Chinese Communist bridging equipment.

be executed. In organizing a defense, the senior commander announces what portion of his front he will rest on a river line and the type of defense to be employed thereon.

a. Either type of attack to force a crossing of a river line is characterized at army level by careful organization of the command and secrecy in preparation. The commander concentrates as much crossing means as possible and initiates the operation with surprise and deception. Swift seizure and expansion of bridgeheads, prompt destruction of enemy artillery and mortars, and effective air defense measures are applied throughout the operation. Surprise is achieved by rapid and concealed concentration of troops and material and feints and demonstrations at locations where the enemy might logically expect crossings to occur; the main effort is directed toward areas where the enemy does not anticipate a crossing and, because of terrain features or the characteristics of the river itself, has left the vicinity lightly defended.

b. The army's defense of a river line depends upon the intentions of the senior commander, the characteristics of the river, the local terrain, and the enemy situation. When adequate strength is available, and when the near bank is low and exposed, the army commander either establishes defenses on both banks or holds a small bridgehead on the far

bank in the direction of the principal enemy threat. In quiet sectors, or when there is an unfavorable balance of strength, the commander directs that the defense be prepared on only the near bank. The main line of resistance of a defense on the near bank is normally the water's edge, and both close defensive and final protective fires are organized to strike the enemy while he is astride the river. Islands and sand bars are occupied by small units to prevent surprise attacks and deliver flanking fire along the river. In locations where it is necessary to draw back from the water's edge, the commander requires units on line to establish strong combat security forces on the bank and to emplace minefields in unoccupied terrain. The army commander retains a mobile reserve and centralized fire direction of division and army long-range artillery groups.

274. RECONNAISSANCE

a. Preparations to force a river line include organization of ground, air, and technical reconnaissance elements by the army commander in a coordinated effort to secure information about the enemy's defenses, the terrain on the near and far banks, and hydrographic information. Ground reconnaissance elements, through raids and reconnaissance in force, drive in hostile security elements and seek out information on suitable concealed

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routes of approach to the river and the locations of areas that permit concealed concentration of troops and crossing equipment. They also execute reconnaissance by fire and raids in force on the far bank to develop the enemy's defense and discover gaps or lightly held sectors. Air reconnaissance elements cover the depth of the hostile defense and provide information on enemy dispositions and movements, routes in the hostile rear, and the condition of enemy defense positions. Engineer reconnaissance teams chart the width and depths of the river, the speed of the current, and the nature of the river bottom. They report on the condition of the banks; the location of avenues of approach to the river; and the locations and condition of fords, bridges, locks, and dams that may assist in the attack. The presence of underwater obstacles and obstacles on the far bank is noted, and the near bank is searched for materials that can be used to improvise crossing means. The army commander considers this information and makes tentative selections of assembly areas, attack positions, and crossing sites that will further his scheme of maneuver. Subsequently, in a command reconnaissance, he confirms or alters his choices and acquaints his major subordinate commanders of his selection as the reconnaissance progresses. Reconnaissance subsequent to the attack does not differ from that in conventional operations.

b. When organizing the defense of a river line the army commander employs both air and ground reconnaissance elements on the far bank to provide timely warning of enemy preparations to force a crossing and to report the locations of the enemy's main body, his artillery, and his concentration areas for men and equipment. As in the offense, engineer reconnaissance elements are employed to provide technical information on the river and recommend demolition methods to destroy man-made structures that span the river. As the enemy draws near the river and reconnaissance elements are driven in the army commander employs them to provide flank and rear security. Units on line execute conventional battleground reconnaissance missions in accordance with the army plan.

275. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

a. When the senior commander elects to force a river line by a hasty crossing the army normally attacks from march formation, across a broad front,

employing whatever organization for combat exists at the time the order is received. Additional engineers and river-crossing equipment are made available to leading elements whenever possible, and extensive use is made of field expedients. The immediate mission of the army is to seize a bridgehead as quickly as possible; its subsequent mission is developed as the action progresses. A deliberate crossing, however, requires considerable preparation, and the army commander carefully plans the organization of his force for the impending operation. The commander plans his deliberate crossing over a broad front, and normally attacks with two divisions abreast in his attack echelon. He causes the army, each attack division, and each attack regiment to be deployed in two echelons. Small reserves are retained at army and division level; below division, reserves are rarely retained. Artillery and engineers, as well as river-crossing equipment, are placed primarily with the army attack echelon to insure success of the crossing. Division artillery, and frequently regimental heavy weapons, in the army support echelon are initially allocated to support the attack echelon; these pieces rejoin and support their parent units as they are committed. Attack division commanders usually form one supporting artillery group for each attack regiment, allot specific pieces for direct fire missions, and retain the balance of the artillery under division control. Engineers, assault crossing equipment, and direct fire artillery pieces are placed with assault battalions. Division commanders require assault battalion commanders to organize special river-crossing groups similar to the assault groups employed in an attack of a fortified zone. These groups, however, are based upon combat engineers rather than demolitions experts; armor is usually omitted, since it cannot be employed profitably at this stage of the operation.

b. The army's organization for combat when defending a river line differs significantly from that of a conventional defense (par. 247) in two principal ways. The army commander maintains a larger proportion of his second echelon as a mobile reserve to assure prompt destruction of enemy bridgeheads, armor, or airborne troops; a portion of the tanks organic to divisions in the first echelon may be withdrawn to achieve this purpose. He also requires that battalions on line be heavily reinforced with direct fire artillery pieces and regimental heavy

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weapons to develop a high density of defensive fires over the river's surface.

276. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK

An attack to force a crossing is normally executed in three phases—the crossing of the river and the seizure of the far shore; the creation and enlargement of the bridgehead into the depths of the enemy defense; and consolidation of the bridgehead. The army is usually assigned to the immediate mission of creating, enlarging, and consolidating a general bridgehead; its subsequent mission varies with the local situation and the strength of the enemy's defense. If, after completion of its immediate mission, the army's combat effectiveness and the hostile defenses permit, the army group commander assigns new objectives and missions to the army that require continuation of the attack into the enemy depths. When the army has expended its offensive strength or when hostile resistance is strong, however, the army is required to hold in place and secure the passage of new attack forces under army group control.

a. Having been assigned his attack mission, the army commander makes his estimate of the situation and announces his decision. He normally assigns immediate missions to his attack divisions that assure seizure of the initial bridgehead; their initial objectives are normally at a depth of 1,000 meters, and their seizure secures terrain that denies the enemy effective hostile small arms and machinegun fire on crossing sites. Subsequent missions for attack divisions provide for seizing objectives that enlarge the bridgehead and forestall effective hostile observed artillery fire on crossing sites. Missions and objectives assigned the support echelon assure rupture of the enemy's main battle position and further expansion and consolidation of the bridgehead.

b. The army commander initiates the attack phase from 24 to 48 hours prior to the assault. This phase includes construction of firing positions and other emplacements in assault positions, road clearing operations, and organization of crossing sites in sectors selected for the forcing of a crossing. Elements of each attack regiment, reinforced with engineers, move up under cover of darkness and preliminary bombardment fires and construct field fortifications and forward command-observation posts; engineers organize 1 boat crossing site for

each assault battalion and 1 ferry crossing point for each attack regiment. Adjacent units in contact execute feints and demonstrations to mislead the enemy, and attack division commanders maintain a tight security screen to insure that no enemy patrols discover the preparations. A normal pattern of artillery and other fires is maintained across the army front. At the appropriate time the army commander orders the preparation and directs that the balance of each attack regiment be moved to assault positions. During the closing stage of the attack phase, preparation fires neutralize and destroy enemy personnel, observation posts, and weapons in the hostile main battle position; interdict movement in the hostile rear; and open passages through obstacles. Special attention is paid to hostile artillery and mortars that threaten crossing sites.

c. The assault phase is usually initiated under conditions of limited visibility under cover of the preparation. As assault battalions jump off from the near shore, artillery suppresses and destroys hostile artillery and mortars, places smoke on the flanks of friendly troops astride the river, and continues neutralization of the enemy main battle position; long-range artillery and combat aviation under army control reinforce the fires of division artillery, execute counterbattery fire and bombardment, and interdict movement in the hostile rear. A portion of each attack regiment's supporting artillery does not participate in the preparation, but is employed as direct fire artillery to engage point targets of opportunity that oppose the crossing of assault battalions. Once begun, the crossing is supported by the fires of tanks, self-propelled artillery, mortars, and machine guns. As assault elements reach the far shore, they normally announce their arrival by flare signals; at this time artillery shifts to fires in support of the final assault. If the enemy main line of resistance does not lie along the far bank, however, the army commander continues preparation fires until leading elements signal initiation of the final assault. Attack division commanders cross the balance of their first echelons rapidly after assault battalions reach the far shore, and cross themselves after their first echelons close on the far shore. At least one-third of each division's artillery crosses with its first echelon; tanks and self-propelled artillery also cross with these forces to maintain the momentum of the attack. As soon as first echelon forces of attack divisions seize terrain which denies

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


Figure 130. Assault elements initiate action on the far bank.

effective hostile small arms and machinegun fire on crossing sites, the army commander directs assembly and construction of bridges. One bridge site is constructed for each division; construction activities are covered by smoke across a wide front and anti-aircraft artillery emplaced on both the near and far bank. Support and reserve echelons of attack divisions, together with division artillery, cross as early as possible; subsequent to their closing on the far shore, attack division commanders execute coordinated attacks to seize objectives that deny effective hostile observed artillery fire on division crossing sites and secure the initial bridgehead. The army commander crosses as attack divisions close on the far shore, and prepares to direct coordinated operations to rupture the enemy main battle position and enlarge and consolidate the bridgehead.

d. The army commander orders his support echelon and reserve to cross in that order as soon as adequate space for maneuver exists in the bridgehead. Prior to that time, he places emphasis on movement of artillery and armor into the bridgehead. Priority is accorded to armor during this time to provide protection against enemy armored counterattacks; this use of armor in an antitank role is an exception to

doctrine which warns against employing tanks to fight tanks (par. 327). Army artillery crosses by echelons, one-third crossing while two-thirds fire. During the action to seize the initial bridgehead, artillery provides continuous support for attacking troops, repels enemy tank-infantry counterattacks, and interdicts movement of hostile reserves. Combat aviation is employed in close support of ground actions and on reconnaissance missions to warn of movements in hostile rear areas. The commander presses reorganization without delay once final objectives of attack divisions have been seized. As soon as his support echelon and some reserves have crossed the river, the army commander directs a coordinated attack on final army objectives. Once these objectives are seized, the army commander consolidates the enlarged bridgehead and prepares to support the passage of fresh troops under army group control, or to continue the attack into the hostile depths.

277. DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE

a. The army commander is normally required to organize his defense of a river line astride the river. In this situation, either the entire main defense zone

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


Figure 131. Tanks and self-propelled guns cross on regimental ferries.

or only the army main battle position may be in the bridgehead on the far bank. In the former case, the first echelon of the army occupies and defends the bridgehead; the army second echelon occupies the second defense zone on the near bank from which it supports the action of the first echelon by fire and counterattack or defends the near bank to cover withdrawal of the first echelon and destroy the enemy as he attempts a crossing. When only the main battle position is on the far bank, which will usually occur when the river is narrow, only regiments in the first echelon of divisions on line occupy defensive positions on the far bank; regiments in their second echelons defend the near bank. The army second echelon occupies and defends the second defense zone some 15 kilometers behind positions on the near bank. When it is impossible to organize the defense astride the river, the army commander places reinforced combat security forces in the advance zone on the far bank, and supports their actions with combat aviation and the bulk of

the available artillery firing from positions in the main defense zone on the near bank.

b. When the defense is organized on both banks the army commander emphasizes construction of a large number of bridges and crossing sites, measures for their defense and ultimate destruction, and retention of reserves of stream crossing equipment. He also stresses coordination of artillery fires and antiaircraft defenses on both banks, and organization of strong antitank defenses on the far bank. Forces occupying the bridgehead are disposed on narrow fronts and are heavily reinforced with artillery, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and engineers. The flanks of the forces in the bridgehead are rested on the river. The depth and width of the bridgehead affords maneuver space for division and army reserves, denies the enemy ground observed artillery fire on crossing sites, and prevents the enemy from covering the bridgehead laterally with cross fire. Within the bridgehead, the army commander requires that deliberate field fortifications be con-

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


Figure 132. Division bridges are constructed as soon as crossing sites are free from hostile small arms and machinegun fire.

structed and special crossing site defense positions be established. He stockpiles adequate reserves of fuel, food, and ammunition on the far bank.

c. The defense is normally initiated as far forward as is possible by combat aviation and long-range artillery which strike at enemy river-crossing preparations, artillery, and troop concentrations. As the enemy draws near, security forces in the advance zone conduct delaying actions until forced to withdraw under direct enemy pressure. Forces in the bridgehead contain the enemy attack by fire and by maneuver of local reserves in tank-supported

counterattacks. The army commander supports their actions with long-range artillery and combat aviation. No forces may withdraw from the bridgehead without prior approval. If the hostile attack cannot be contained by forces in the bridgehead and the enemy succeeds in forcing a crossing, the army commander counterattacks by fire and maneuver with his reserve to destroy the enemy while most of the hostile attack force is astride the river and before hostile gains are consolidated on the near bank. The army counterattack is supported by concentrated artillery fire and air strikes.

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Section III. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

278. GENERAL

a. The army may participate in joint amphibious operations as a major landing force against an enemy-held shore; in this situation its mission is usually to seize and hold a beachhead and support the subsequent advance of other water-transported attack forces. It may also take part in an amphibious operation, as a part of the offensive of a larger force along a seacoast, with the mission of turning the enemy's flank and conducting operations in the hostile rear. In either case, the army commander is designated the landing force commander for his unit. A landing commander is also designated from among the naval forces that are to support the operation and implement the plans to move and land the army. The naval landing commander is responsible for embarkation, movement by sea, and landing the army, and during these periods is in command of the operation. The naval landing commander is responsible for defense against hostile naval and air attack during embarkation, movement, and landing. He is charged with neutralization and destruction of hostile artillery and underwater obstacles in the vicinity of the landing beaches, support of assault elements when seizing the beachhead, defense against hostile naval attacks on the beachhead, and support of the army's operations ashore by naval gunfire. The naval commander is also responsible for delivery of supplies and replacements to the army ashore; evacuation of sick, wounded, and prisoners; and evacuation of the army, when necessary, on completion of its mission or in the event of its failure to do so.

b. Command of initial ground operations in the beachhead area is decentralized to regimental and division commanders who coordinate the maneuver of their units with adjacent units and with naval gunfire and combat aviation according to prearranged coordination planning tables. The army commander takes command of the operation ashore as soon as adequate communications have been established, normally not later than when the landing of the army attack echelon has been completed.

c. The army's operation is characterized by thorough preembarkation point planning and training, prelanding air and gunfire bombardment, gunfire support during the landing, landing of assault

forces in waves, and air and gunfire support during the action on the beachhead. The senior commander prescribes security measures to preserve secrecy during preliminary preparations, and designates antiaircraft and air elements to provide air defense during all phases of the operation. He also retains control of campaign reconnaissance operations in the area of the impending landing, and exercises direct supervision over joint planning and training activities of the assault army and its supporting naval force.

279. JOINT PLANNING

a. The army's operation plan is prepared jointly by the army staff and that of the naval landing commander. The plan includes a general statement of the intentions of the senior commander and announces immediate and subsequent missions for the army once ashore. The army's organization for combat is outlined, and the task organization for assault battalions is spelled out in great detail. The plan also provides for measures to achieve coordination ashore; announces the artillery and air support plans; and illustrates the army commander's scheme of maneuver graphically on an accompanying sketch map which points out landing beaches, regimental and division zones of action, and unit objectives. Naval personnel in the joint planning group draw up loading tables for the army and announce the time, place, and method of assembly for subordinate commands. Naval planners also include movement tables which list the order of movement by sea, and prescribe measures to protect the army during embarkation, movement, and landing against hostile air and naval attacks. The planning group also develops a coordinated reconnaissance plan; establishes communications systems for use at sea, during the landing, and ashore; announces measures bearing on organization of the beachhead and its defense; and outlines sea and aerial supply and evacuation activities. The completed army operations plan is the basis for preparation of combat orders and instructions by the army staff, which prepares separate orders for execution of the embarkation and the landing. Coordination planning tables accompany the landing order, and cover the assault landing and the accomplishment of the army's immediate and subsequent missions.

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


Figure 133. Troops are taught loading techniques.

b. The plan of operations governing supporting naval forces is prepared by the naval landing commander's staff, coordinated with the army commander, and approved by the senior commander. It includes missions for naval combat vessels throughout the operation, provision for sea rescue facilities, and defense measures to be taken against hostile air, CBR, and naval attacks. The plan also designates embarkation point commanders, and prescribes the number of army personnel to be provided them to assist in controlling the embarkation, to maintain order, and to act as unit quartering parties.

280. JOINT TRAINING

Amphibious training is not part of the normal training program for a Chinese Communist army. Instead, the senior commander of the projected operation instigates a detailed amphibious training program for the scheduled operation. This training program is organized into three phases: specialist training, individual training, and unit training.

a. *Specialist Training.* This training is conducted in troop schools staffed by army and naval personnel; selected personnel from various units are

taught the operation, maintenance, and navigation of landing craft. Other individuals are instructed in shipboard billeting procedures and loading techniques. Selected personnel receive basic navigation training against the possibility that need for such personnel will arise.

b. *Individual Training.* All personnel are instructed in basic seamanship practices during this phase. Subjects included are swimming instruction for all assault personnel, familiarization trips aboard sea-going vessels, blackout procedures, noise discipline, and sea rescue techniques.

c. *Unit Training.* During this phase, which follows the individual training cycle, subordinate units are trained in the tactics and techniques of amphibious operations. This phase generally follows the normal unit training cycle, but it is keyed specifically to the forthcoming amphibious operation. During unit training, forces participating in the operation are assembled in appropriate task organizations, trained jointly, and maneuvered over terrain similar to the enemy shore. When possible, task forces embark and rehearse the operation as realistically as time and equipment permit. Personnel are also taught combat loading and unloading procedures;

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special emphasis is placed on utilization of equipment for unloading weapons, heavy equipment, and animals. In addition, certain groups receive special training for the assault. Such training emphasizes:

- (1) *Demolition.* Selected engineer and naval personnel are grouped and trained as demolition teams. Their mission is to precede the initial assault wave and destroy coastal defense obstacles, including underwater obstacles. These teams utilize hand grenades, Bangalore torpedoes, and explosive charges to destroy beach and underwater obstacles and landed wire entanglements.
- (2) *Amphibious assault tactics.* Officers and men alike are progressively trained in amphibious tactics. This training begins with squad and platoon and advances to battalion or regimental level, depending upon the availability of surface vessels for training purposes. The training covers formations to be used in the assault waves; signal coordination; and beach operations, including establishment of the beachhead and conduct of the breakout phase following consolidation of the beachhead.
- (3) *Fire support.* All heavy weapons and artillery units are given special training in off-loading to small boats for the actual assault and in the employment of weapons in the support of the beachhead operation.
- (4) *Signal communication.* All signal personnel are instructed in the use of code signals for the tactical operation. Selected personnel are taught the use of code signals used primarily for the control of amphibious craft. Joint air-sea-ground communication training programs are instituted to achieve a high state of technical proficiency in all communication personnel; they join in combined maneuver held prior to the actual operation to integrate their specialized skills into unit task forces.

281. RECONNAISSANCE

Reconnaissance activities prior to the landing are under the direction of the army group and higher

commander. These activities are conducted over a wide front by air and naval elements to provide timely information on the enemy's defenses and the disposition of his troops and material in the proposed landing area. Engineer reconnaissance in the vicinity of beaches and hydrographic survey of the coastal strip in the landing area are performed by specially trained frogmen and naval elements to locate mines and underwater and beach obstacles, determine the characteristics of the sea, and chart beach approaches. Reconnaissance elements under the senior commander also seek out and maintain continuous observation of the enemy fleet and air force to provide early warning of attack on waterborne troops. As the landing begins, control of the execution of ground and some aerial reconnaissance activities is decentralized to the army commander in his zone. Other air and naval elements continue to execute the senior commander's reconnaissance plan.

282. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

a. Embarkation operations are normally planned to take place at night or under other conditions of poor visibility. Movement to embarkation points is usually made by small units of battalion- or company-size according to prearranged time schedules and the sequence in which they are to be employed in the landing. On arrival at embarkation points, units are met by their respective quartering parties and led directly to their ships. The practice of loading entire units, battalions or companies, on single ships is followed whenever possible; unit supplies and equipment accompany the troops and are loaded in such a manner as to permit rapid unloading in the desired priority. Other supplies, including ammunition, are loaded by type on single vessels in a manner that permits rapid off-loading as they are required in the objective area.

b. Prelanding operations in the objective area include reconnaissance, preliminary naval and air bombardment, underwater demolitions, and destruction of beach obstacles to facilitate the landing of assault forces. Other air and naval forces establish a counterreconnaissance screen to protect forces from hostile naval and air attack as they arrive in the objective area. Air elements under the senior commander strive to achieve air supremacy over the landing area, and isolate the area; they also range

deep into the hostile rear to strike reserves, communications centers, airfields, and supply concentrations.

c. As the amphibious force approaches the landing area the army and naval landing commanders review current intelligence and make any necessary changes to previously selected landing beaches. Final authority for these changes rests with the naval landing commander, who bases his decision on the possibility of achieving a swift and easy debarkation whenever possible. Based on his estimate of the situation, the naval commander also decides whether the assault should be made during the day or at night, and whether preparation fires are necessary. Dawn is the favored time for a large-scale operation, and air and gunfire support of the assault is usually heavy.

283. THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

a. The attack echelon of the army is comprised of one or more divisions, depending upon the number of available landing beaches and the anticipated enemy resistance. Each division in this force is, in turn, formed into an assault and a support echelon and a small reserve. Each division assault echelon is formed into battalion combat teams which are reinforced with accompanying artillery, tanks, flame throwers, engineers, and sometimes detachments of specially trained naval personnel. These combat teams are moved to regimental beaches under the cover of an air and naval gunfire bombardment, and assault the beach in columns of companies in a series of waves.

b. Before the arrival of the first assault wave at the shore, supporting fires are shifted to targets farther inland, and small demolition teams composed of engineers and naval personnel land and open passages through beach obstacles that have not been breached or destroyed by the preliminary bombardment. Upon landing, units in initial assault waves move directly to initial objectives, which are usually enemy fortifications denying egress from the beach. Their assault tactics closely follow those employed in an attack of a fortified position. Fol-

lowing assault waves pass around initial elements and strike at deeper objectives whose fires threaten the beach area. The main body of each attack regiment and division follows rapidly, and drives toward objectives on commanding terrain which afford the enemy ground observation of the expanding beachhead. Former assault battalions are frequently reorganized and employed in lateral thrusts to link up with adjacent friendly forces and consolidate the beach area. During this period, emphasis is placed on the rapid landing of tanks and artillery. The naval landing commander directs gunfire and combat aviation to neutralize or destroy enemy defenses and artillery that impede the advance of attacking elements, and provides cover by fire and smoke for the landing of the support echelons and reserves of attack divisions. He also supervises the continuity of debarkation of successive echelons of the force and the continued supply of ammunition and equipment to forces ashore. As soon as the beach is protected from effective ground observed artillery fire the naval landing commander initiates operations ashore to clear the beach and establish a logistical base.

c. The army commander establishes his command post ashore as soon as possible after the landing of his attack echelon and assumes command of the operation. The army support echelon, reserve, and reinforcing troops are landed at his call as soon as adequate maneuver area exists; priority is accorded to army and reinforcing artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns, and engineer and signal units. At the earliest possible time the commander reorganizes his force and executes a coordinated attack to seize the army's final objectives; once secured, forces prepare to defend in place, consolidate the beachhead, and support the passage of other forces into the depths of the hostile shore. The naval landing commander supports the army commander's attack with gunfire that reinforces army artillery by counterbattery fire, and fires to destroy enemy communications systems, disrupt hostile command agencies, and isolate the battlefield by preventing movement of enemy reserves.

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Section IV. OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS

284. COMBAT IN WOODS

a. An attack against an enemy defense established in a wooded area requires application of special tactics by the army commander to overcome difficulties in control and coordination of large combat formations, in observation and adjustment of artillery fires, and in employment of tanks and combat aviation. The commander's scheme of maneuver is usually based on the coordinated maneuver of small units in an envelopment of the hostile defense; if this is not feasible the commander executes a frontal attack. In either case, hostile defenses in projecting portions of the forest are seized first, and enemy defenses in isolated wooded areas are bypassed and contained by fire and smoke. Attacking forces advance from one intermediate objective to another, carefully maintaining direction, and reorganize on each before continuing the attack. Air-ground recognition devices are employed at company and platoon level to mark front lines and identify friendly troops. Captured sections of the woods are consolidated as the advance progresses by specially designated units from the army support echelon or reserve which mop up bypassed enemy groups and establish defenses at road junctions and along important routes through the area. The army's organization for combat is normally based on regimental- or battalion-size combat teams, and the commander requires attack division commanders to retain reserves at regimental, battalion, and company levels. Regimental howitzers and some division artillery pieces are employed as accompanying artillery; they are employed for direct fire missions in support of the assault. Most army artillery, and part of each division's artillery is formed into long-range and supporting artillery groups and placed under division and regimental control to support attacking troops by successive concentrations against enemy weapons and personnel barring the advance. The army commander usually retains heavy howitzers under his control. In sparse woods and tank terrain, division tanks are employed in close support of infantry; when terrain precludes their employment with attack forces the army commander may retain them as a part of his reserve to exploit success once the wooded area has been overrun. The army commander employs combat aviation

under his control to destroy enemy artillery and troop concentrations in clearings and on forest lanes and roads as well as to destroy individual firing positions and other defensive installations in the depths of the enemy's defense.

b. When required to defend in a wooded area, the army commander bases his defense on battalion defense areas, widespread use of obstacles, and counterattacks. The first echelons of divisions on line are deployed in battalion defense areas at the forward edge of the woods; forces in second echelons, to include mobile reserves, are deployed in areas which are close to roads, lanes, and clearings and are prepared for all-around defense. The trace of the forward edge of the second defense zone is usually located along roads and forest lanes some 4 to 6 kilometers behind the main defense zone; fields of fire for infantry weapons are cleared, in the absence of roads and lanes, in a strip of woods some 400 to 500 meters wide in front of the defense zone. The disposition of the division(s) in the army second echelon is similar to that of those manning the main defense zone. The army commander requires that the greater part of each division's artillery be allocated to regiments and battalions for employment as direct fire artillery. The balance of the artillery in the army is formed into long-range artillery groups under army and division control. Antitank artillery is allocated to regiments and battalions and is employed in accordance with the army antitank defense plan along roads and lanes and near clearings where hostile armor can maneuver. The commander requires that tanks and self-propelled artillery be allocated to infantry regiments, whose commanders employ them in small groups to execute counterattacks and ambushes and as an armored reserve. Most army and reinforcing engineers are placed with regiments and battalions to clear fields of fire and observation, construct lanes in the depths of the defense for direct fire artillery and antitank pieces, and erect obstacles and install minefields. Other engineers are retained under division and army control to construct defensive positions at intersections of roads and trails and prepare covered routes for maneuver of reserves. The army commander requires commanders at all levels to select, prepare, and mark clearly routes to be employed by counterattack forces. Once the defensive

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battle is joined, it is characterized by stubborn combat at close quarters to maintain the integrity of battalion defense areas, and by surprise counterattacks by small tank-infantry-artillery teams to destroy enemy forces that have penetrated between battalion areas.

285. COMBAT IN TOWNS

a. Offensive combat in towns is characterized by restricted visibility and fields of fire, limited troop control, and extremely limited maneuver of divisions and regiments. Because of these characteristics, the army commander decentralizes control of most combat operations to division and regimental commanders in his attack echelon and places heavy reliance on the initiative of small unit commanders. When encountering a town that must be seized during the advance, the army commander normally strives to capture it from his march formation. Strong advance guards make their way into the town, seize important objectives, and hold them until the main body arrives; division commanders reinforce advance guards wherever they have achieved success, blockade the town, and isolate its garrison. The army commander orders an attack to assure rapid seizure of the town. When an attack from a march column fails to seize a defended town, the commander establishes a blockaded town and initiates preparations for a deliberate attack.

- (1) The commander's plan for a deliberate attack normally consists of several converging attacks initiated in different sectors of the town to split the enemy defenses in several segments for subsequent piecemeal destruction. In the case of a large city, several such attacks may be executed against a portion of the city in coordination with other friendly forces. Attack divisions are assigned zones that include 3 or 4 principal streets leading to the center of the town; regimental sectors usually include 1 or 2 streets and the adjoining blocks. These zones and sectors extend to the depth of the army's final objective(s) and contain initial, several intermediate, and final objectives for divisions and regiments. The army commander retains a powerful support echelon and reserves; their usual mission is to follow and support attack echelon forces, con-

solidate gains, and contain enemy counterattacks. The commander normally precedes the attack with an artillery preparation. He accompanies attack orders with annotated large-scale town plans on which town blocks and objectives are numbered and important underground installations are indicated.

- (2) The army commander reinforces attack divisions with heavy, high-power, and self-propelled artillery; engineers; and flame thrower and smoke-generating elements. He requires that his division commanders organize their assault and support echelons into battalion- or company-size combined arms teams, each heavily augmented with artillery, tanks, and engineers. Other artillery is formed into supporting and long-range groups under regimental and division control, respectively. Artillery retained under army control is formed into both long-range and destruction artillery groups and employed in counterbattery and destruction fire missions. Reserves are retained at all echelons through battalion level. Control of combat aviation and antiaircraft artillery is retained at army level; these components are employed in a coordinated air defense role. The commander also employs combat aviation to neutralize or destroy centers of stubborn enemy resistance and to isolate the battlefield about the town.

The attack is usually initiated under cover of darkness or smoke; once initiated, the army commander decentralizes control of attack forces to first echelon division commanders. Whenever necessary, these commanders direct small unit tactics and reallocate support to reinforce success. Captured strong points and street intersections are consolidated as they are seized, and surrounding buildings are cleared of hostile troops by specially designated search teams. Whenever possible, underground passages are employed to dispatch reconnaissance elements or reinforced combat groups to the hostile rear to observe and harass the enemy; passages not used are quickly blocked by demolitions. Armor with assault elements is employed to support the infantry's attack by fire, to assist in consolidating

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captured town blocks, and to repulse enemy counterattacks. The attack through the town follows the path of least resistance. Division commanders direct the efforts of their units toward seizing weakly held areas and those strong points that can influence the outcome of combat in their zones; others are bypassed and neutralized by fire and smoke. The army commander maneuvers his support echelon and reserves at appropriate distances behind attacking forces, prepared to commit them to reinforce success or stop a hostile counterattack; specially designated units of these forces mop up hostile strong points bypassed by attack forces and assist in consolidating gains in captured portions of the town.

b. The defense of a town or city is organized and coordinated by the army or army group commander, to whom all troops assigned the defense are subordinated. When assigned such a mission the senior commander organizes an all-around defense based on inner and outer defense zones. Inner defense zones are established throughout the entire town; their number and size are dependent on the size of the town and the overall defense plan. Each zone is based on a system of defense centers, each of which, in turn, consists of two or more strong points. The forward edge of the first inner defense zone is normally placed on the town's outskirts; it may be moved forward if commanding terrain exists immediately beyond the town built-up area. Outer defense zones are established on the approaches to the town. Their number depends on the terrain and the available manpower and materiel; frequently these positions are merely combat security positions. The rearmost of the outer zones is established sufficiently far forward of the town to prevent the hostile artillery preparation from reaching both inner and outer zones at the same time. The army's defense sector includes both inner and outer defense zones.

(1) Whether the army commander assigns defense zones to each of his divisions or prescribes division defense sectors within the army area depends on the width and depth of the army's defense sector. Divisions in the army first echelon organize and occupy inner defenses; the army second echelon is employed initially to organize outer defenses. Within subordinate divisions, regiments organize and occupy defense sectors which include sev-

eral positions in depth; battalions usually defend centers of defense.

(2) The main defensive effort of the army is concentrated on holding battalion centers of defense. One or more buildings, usually located on major intersections and public squares, are used to form strong points in each battalion position; strong points are connected by passages through adjacent buildings or connecting trenches into battalion centers of defense. Each strong point and center of defense is organized for all around defense and fire support of its neighbors; structures that interfere with fields of fire are demolished. Barricades are erected on surrounding streets to prevent centers of defense from being flanked or bypassed; these are covered with flanking and oblique fire. Ammunition, rations, water, and other essential supplies are stockpiled on battalion positions. Regimental and higher commanders prepare covered routes and underground passages in their sectors of responsibility to permit rapid and secure maneuver of reserves to support individual defense centers or counterattack a penetrating enemy. The army commander prescribes measures to be taken locally for firefighting, and retains a reserve of engineers and conscripted civilians for this purpose.

(3) When organizing his command for combat, the army commander requires that battalions occupying centers of defense be heavily reinforced with artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns, engineers, and chemical warfare elements. He places other artillery with each regiment to support two or more battalion centers of resistance, and requires division and regimental commanders to retain an armored reserve. Artillery retained at army and division levels is usually of the howitzer type; it is employed to reinforce the fires of supporting artillery. The army commander also employs two or more long-range groups to extend the action to the depths of the enemy's combat formation.

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Defensive combat in outer defense zones does not differ significantly from that in the advance zone in front of a normal defense. That within the city, however, normally breaks down into a series of local, small-unit actions to hold strong points and centers of defense. These garrisons continue to resist even when surrounded; their commanders employ tanks singly or in small groups, supported by self-propelled guns and flame thrower elements, to counterattack the enemy and destroy him in front of the positions. Regimental and division commanders support these small-unit actions with artillery fires and coordinated tank-infantry counterattacks by their own reserves to encircle and destroy the enemy. The army commander influences the action by interdicting movement of enemy reserves toward the city with artillery fires and combat aviation and prompt maneuver of his mobile reserve to eject a major hostile force or to counter a hostile threat to his flanks and rear. He also adjusts combat and administrative means as required by the situation to reinforce units in threatened sectors.

286. OPERATIONS IN EXTREME COLD

a. Tactics employed by the army commander when executing an attack under conditions of extreme cold do not differ appreciably from those employed under conventional climatic conditions; the most significant modifications are in preparations for the attack, the depths of objectives assigned subordinate commands, and logistical operations to support the operation.

(1) During preparation for the breakthrough of an organized defense the army commander requires timely construction of heated shelters for materiel in assembly areas and attack positions; construction of military roads, if necessary, to connect attack positions and assembly areas; and preparation of covered routes of approach (including snow tunnels and trenches) to assault positions. Shelters within assault positions are also constructed to provide minimum essential shelter to personnel. When tanks and self-propelled guns are to be employed, their attack positions are moved as far forward as possible, often ahead of infantry attack positions. Preliminary preparations also usually include



Figure 134. Troops build snow trenches.

preparation of snow sleds or ski mounts for mortars and accompanying artillery and troop training to teach the men how to move over ice and deep snow and to survive in extreme cold. Prior to the attack army and division engineers perform reconnaissance of snow and ice conditions and other obstacles before the hostile defense zone and determine the depth of the snow and thickness of ice on rivers and lakes, in the zone of attack. They also clear roads and cross-country routes, post road markers, and construct breaks to protect principal routes from snow drifts.

(2) Initial objectives are shallow, and intermediate and final objectives are spaced close together so troops will not become too tired before capture of the final objective; this spacing of objectives also

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Figure 135. Cavalry may be employed in a flank security role.

assists small-unit commanders in maintaining proper direction during the course of the attack. Whenever possible, attack regiment commanders are provided with tractor-drawn and self-propelled artillery, which they move with leading infantry elements; infantry heavy weapons mounted on skis and sleds also move with assault forces. Commanders at all levels maneuver their support echelons and reserves close behind attack elements to effect prompt relief when necessary and maintain the rate of advance.

(3) Logistic measures include issue of appropriate winter clothing and devices to aid over-snow movement as well as provision for adequate hot food for the troops. The army commander also requires subordinate units to construct personnel and animal shelters whenever they halt, and to take prompt action to provide warming

facilities. The army medical service establishes aid stations close to the front to reinforce divisions in contact, and measures are taken for prompt evacuation of personnel. Warming and feeding stations are established along routes of supply and evacuation to support supply convoys and care for the sick and wounded.

b. The army commander organizes a defense under conditions of extreme cold in a rather routine manner. When possible, the zone of defense is situated in an area containing populated points or other locations that afford shelter from the cold, and first priority is accorded to organization of defenses in the vicinity of towns and villages, road intersections, and wooded areas. The trace of the forward edge of both defense zones is frequently located behind natural obstacles difficult to overcome in winter, and all cover available to the enemy in front of the main line of resistance is destroyed by demolitions or covered with artillery fire. When

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the main line of resistance rests on a frozen lake or river, holes are drilled or cut in the surface and the ice is mined, often with controlled mines. During a prolonged defense the commander takes special precautions to maintain obstacles and keep essential roads and cross-country routes cleared of ice and snow. Winter camouflage measures are practiced throughout the command, warming points are established along axes of supply and evacuation, and measures to prevent frostbite are enforced at all levels. The army commander takes special steps to increase flank and rear area security, and may maintain combat patrols on skis or employ reinforcing cavalry in those areas. He requires that small units in forward positions be rotated frequently to recuperate from the rigors of the weather in heated shelters in the rear.

287. MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS

a. The limited number of roads, large dead space area, concealed approaches, limited cross-country maneuverability, problems in orientation, and limitations on signal communication all affect the army commander's plan of attack in mountainous terrain and cause him to accord a large measure of independence to division and regimental commanders. The usual type of offensive action employed in mountainous areas is a breakthrough of an enemy defense along roads and valleys in conjunction with an envelopment or turning movement across adjacent mountains. Small enveloping or turning forces are employed to seize commanding heights, mountain passes, and road intersections on the flanks and rear of the enemy position, then to strike the enemy defenses from the flank or rear in coordination with forces executing the breakthrough. Secondary attack forces are deployed to conduct harassing operations against the enemy in the interval between the frontal attack and enveloping forces. Infrequently, the commander will initiate the frontal attack first to seize commanding terrain that will cover movement of his flanking forces. A breakthrough along roads or valleys is exploited under either condition with tanks and tank-borne infantry. The army commander pays meticulous attention to organizing his force for combat and planning his scheme of maneuver since, once committed in separate attacks, control of attack forces and changes in their combat formations are difficult to achieve. Each division and regiment in the attack forces is reinforced with

artillery, with emphasis on howitzers, and with engineers and chemical warfare units. When available, animal pack trains and military or civilian porter companies are also placed with subordinate commands. The army commander requires his major subordinate commanders to reinforce infantry battalions and companies in attack echelons with regimental and division artillery, antitank weapons, and heavy mortars and to retain reserves through battalion level. Forces in the army support echelon are reinforced in a similar manner, and a strong mobile reserve is retained primarily for flank security missions. The commander designates small infantry components of his support echelon and reserve to act as garrison forces for valley and road junctions and other important installations; these elements, reinforced with accompanying artillery, tanks, mortars, and engineers, take up their assigned positions as the attack progresses. Combat aviation is retained under army control and employed primarily to strike enemy troops and installations in areas where use of artillery is precluded; it is also employed to adjust artillery fire, resupply units, and interdict movement of enemy reserves.

b. The army commander bases his defense in mountainous terrain on organization of commanding heights. He accords special attention to security in the vicinity of unit boundaries, flanks, and mountain passes in the rear of his main defense zone, and to swift, timely counterattacks by local and army reserves to destroy a penetrating enemy. He usually locates his main line of resistance on forward slopes, and assures control of approaches to key terrain features by antitank and antipersonnel obstacles on valley floors which are covered by antitank weapons and machine guns and preplanned artillery and mortar fires. The army second echelon does not usually occupy a second defense zone, but is situated in prepared positions in the vicinity of road junctions and mountain passes in the rear of first echelon forces from which it can be maneuvered to execute counterattacks, defend against a hostile turning movement or envelopment, or counter an enemy airborne threat. The commander practices decentralization of artillery to an extreme when defending in mountainous terrain, retaining only sufficient, appropriate weapons to execute effective counterbattery fire; he extends the battle to the enemy's depth by employment of combat aviation. When the defensive battle is joined, forces in the

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army first echelon meet the enemy with artillery and mortar concentrations and flanking and enfilade fire on avenues of approach and with artillery and mortar fires on dead spaces in front of the main line of resistance. Enemy troops that succeed in penetrating between key terrain features are slowed by obstacles and struck by the fires of tanks and self-propelled artillery firing from ambushes, and are destroyed by counterattacks of local reserves. In the event of a major breakthrough into the depths of the defense, troops on key terrain features continue to defend, and subject the enemy to intense flanking fire; the penetrating force is sealed off by artillery fires and combat aviation and counter-attacked by elements of the army second echelon. Forces still defending on the forward shoulders of the reentrant normally execute coordinated local counterattacks to assist in encircling and destroying the enemy. All counterattacks are usually conducted from the heights, along ridges and through or across valleys, over previously reconnoitered and prepared routes.

288. NIGHT COMBAT

Chinese Communist night operations range from coordinated, supported attacks on a strongly held position to such small-scale operations as combat patrols, raids, and ambushes. All employ similar techniques, and are characterized by thorough preparation and rapid execution of stereotyped offensive maneuvers. Large-scale, coordinated night operations are conducted to gain critical terrain for future operations, to maintain pressure against the enemy, or to exploit success. Combat patrols, raiding parties, infiltrations, and ambushes are ordered primarily to harass the enemy, to gain information regarding hostile positions, and to capture prisoners. These operations are particularly intense immediately prior to a large-scale, coordinated night attack, during the period in which the commander seeks detailed information—on terrain and the enemy situation—on which to base his plans. Offensive combat at night is not limited to periods when the army is on the offensive; commanders are enjoined to make full use of night operations to supplement the conventional defensive measures taken during periods of darkness. During periods of prolonged defense, small units are used offensively at night to keep the enemy off balance;

obtain information of hostile intentions; and, through deception, possibly cause the enemy to fix his forces in place—disrupting his attack plans—or shift his reserves unnecessarily. The techniques of night operations are also applied to the organization of counterattacks, which the army commander executes during periods of reduced visibility whenever possible.

a. *Offensive Actions* are characterized by methodical, concealed preparations; timely reconnaissance; troop training in techniques of night operations; and stealthily execution. The army commander assigns objectives that are limited in depth and permit approach by well-defined, straight routes; distances between echelons at all levels is reduced, and reserves are maneuvered close behind attack and support forces. When combat is likely to extend into the night and develop into a static fire fight and a suspension of forward movement, subordinate commanders are required to effect a timely transition by movement of support echelon elements into attack positions prior to nightfall to continue the attack under cover of darkness. The army commander issues detailed instructions for maintaining secrecy to include matters dealing with reconnaissance activities, signal security measures, and conduct of artillery and other supporting fires. In many instances he may elect to dispense with the artillery preparation and initiate artillery fires at the time of the assault; when a preparation is employed, it usually is short and intense and is begun and lifted by a prearranged time schedule. When the preparation is not employed, the army commander requires all artillery to be prepared to intervene promptly to neutralize enemy artillery, isolate the attack area, or cover a withdrawal. The commander's plan of attack includes provision for illuminating the terrain and objectives by combat aviation, artillery, or searchlights; for establishing illuminated landmarks and markers to assist in maintaining direction; and for visual signals to coordinate the action. Once the attack jumps off, control is executed by adherence to coordination planning tables; when units seize attack objectives their commanders bring up supporting weapons, organize for defense, and dispatch reconnaissance and security forces. Contact with the enemy is maintained at all times.

b. *Defensive Combat At Night* is characterized

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by application of techniques by division and regimental commanders to prevent and repulse surprise enemy attacks and to keep forces occupying the army main battle position fully prepared for battle. These techniques include:

- (1) Movement of infantry heavy weapons and direct fire artillery pieces to alternate firing positions close to or ahead of the main line of resistance.
- (2) Timely preparation of artillery firing data for delivery of fires at night on possible enemy concentration areas, attack positions, and lines of departure, as well as for illuminating fires.
- (3) Movement of local reserves to temporary attack positions to facilitate night counterattacks.
- (4) Establishment of tank-infantry ambus-

caes in front and on the flanks of forward positions.

- (5) Increased reconnaissance and patrol activities.
- (6) Establishment of additional listening posts.

- (7) Reinforcement of combat security forces.

The army commander supports the actions of his subordinates during a defense at night by the conduct of aerial and signal reconnaissance to warn of a surprise attack and to detect troop movements in the hostile rear, by counterbattery fires and fires to reinforce division artillery, and by air strikes against hostile targets that threaten the main battle position. Army and division reserves are not normally shifted at night; small detachments, however, may be deployed to strengthen security on the flanks and in the vicinity of major unit boundaries.

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CHAPTER 20

ADMINISTRATION

Section I. RESPONSIBILITIES

289. GENERAL

The general principles of administration in the Chinese Communist Army, as they apply to logistical operations and management at higher levels of command, have been discussed in appropriate sections of chapters in Part Three. In summary, these principles affirm that all logistical activities are directed toward assuring the success of the combat operation. Within the combat zone, the army is the key unit of logistical operations and management. Planning, execution, and coordination of these functions in support of tactical operations is centralized at army level and is a function of command. Logistic plans and orders are coordinated among all supporting arms and services within the army, as well as with infantry components two echelons down the chain of command, by the director of the army rear service department. Coordination of operations is achieved by principal staff sections, or service chiefs, who execute their responsibilities through technical channels extending through regimental level. In executing logistic responsibilities, the army commander adheres to the principle that the impetus of supply and service support is from the higher to the lower unit throughout his command.

290. COMMANDER, THEATER LOGISTICAL COMMAND

The commander of the theater logistical command (par. 147) is responsible to the theater commander for rendering full administrative support to armies disposed in the theater combat zone, as well as to other forces in the theater. He executes this responsibility through a variable number of rear service branch headquarters units (par. 148) disposed on a territorial basis throughout the theater rear administrative area. The commander of a branch headquarters unit charged with support of an army deployed in the combat zone coordinates with the supported army commander to establish the axis of supply and evacuation; once established,

the branch headquarters unit commander disposes general and subdepots and other administrative installations to accomplish his mission. The flow of supply within the theater to each army in the combat zone is thus from a branch headquarters unit's general depot through a specific subdepot to an army's depots in the combat zone. The channel of evacuation is just the reverse. A similar system exists in peacetime within China, wherein supplies flow from military district depots direct to the depots of armies deployed throughout the area.

291. THE ARMY GROUP COMMANDER

The army group commander estimates the logistical requirements for a campaign and makes recommendations to the field army or theater commander for the allotment of appropriate means, including personnel replacements, for the armies and army group troops under his command. When necessary, he allocates service elements to the armies. He normally controls allocation of ammunition, fuel, and rations to the armies, and may control the allocation of any item of supply or service element to insure that adequate means are available to meet tactical requirements. The army group commander supervises arrangements, policies, and procedures for supply, hospitalization, and evacuation of his armies, and designates the location of army rear boundaries.

292. THE ARMY COMMANDER

The army commander is responsible to the army group commander for planning, execution, and management of all logistic operations within the army. He must also study the overall service requirements for an operation and, when necessary, make timely recommendations for the allocation of appropriate means to the army and to subordinate commands. These responsibilities require long-range planning, detailed estimates of logistical needs, careful study of lines of communications, and constant liaison with both the army group commander

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and the commander of the supporting branch headquarters unit. The commander discharges his responsibilities through established logistical channels, the chiefs of the various arms in the operations department, and the tactical chain of command. He is assisted in this function by the director of the army rear service department, who is in the chain of command.

293. COMMANDER, ARMY REAR SERVICE COMMAND

The director of the army rear service department commands the army rear service command as well as all service troops assigned or allocated to the

army, except engineer and signal units. He is responsible to the army commander for the supply and service support of the divisions, army troops, and reinforcements allotted to the army; for planning and supervising all logistical operations in the army rear area; and for maintenance of constant liaison with the rear service departments of higher, adjacent, and lower commands and with the supporting branch headquarters unit. He is also charged with defense and security of installations in the army rear area. The director discharges his responsibilities through established technical and command channels; he is assisted by the staff of the army rear service department.

Section II. ARMY LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION

294. REAR AREAS

a. Chinese Communist practice usually assigns unit rear areas to infantry regiments and divisions, armies, and army groups; each echelon establishes unit rear command posts (rear service command CP's) and unit service areas (fig. 140). Rear and lateral boundaries delimit the extent of unit rear areas, fix territorial responsibility, and serve to coordinate service operations. The boundaries of a unit are designated by the next higher commander on the advice of his rear service department director. Thus regimental rear boundaries are designated by the division commander, division rear boundaries by the army commander, and army rear boundaries by the army group commander. That of the army group is fixed by the theater commander; it coincides with the line dividing the theater combat zone and the rear administrative area (par. 140).

b. A rear boundary does not constitute a barrier to logistic operations. Theater service units frequently operate forward of army group and army rear boundaries; army service units, forward of division rear boundaries; and division service units, forward of regimental rear boundaries. Within the army, axes of supply and evacuation in unit rear areas are designated by the army commander. The number of routes so designated depends upon the situation, the number of usable routes in the army zone, and the command's capability to repair damaged routes or construct military roads; supply and evacuation are normally carried out over as many routes as possible. Maintenance and control of

roads in the army zone, forward to the line of division depots, are executed by army; these depots may be established well ahead of division rear boundaries. Maintenance and control of roads forward of division depots are as prescribed by the army commander.

c. Unit rear areas vary in size depending upon the local situation, the need for dispersal of combat troops, and the extent of rear service installations to be established. During offensive operations, the army commander assumes greater logistic responsibility and reduces subordinate unit rear areas to a minimum to free subordinate commanders of territorial responsibility; in some offensive situations, regimental rear areas are eliminated entirely. Figure 136 illustrates the normal depths of unit rear areas in the theater combat zone.

295. MISSION OF THE ARMY REAR SERVICE COMMAND

The primary mission of the army rear service command is to provide timely and uninterrupted distribution of supplies and effective services to the infantry divisions, army troops, and attached units. Specifically, this mission entails:

- Establishment of army supply requirements with the supporting branch headquarters unit.
- Timely receipt and distribution of supplies in accordance with unit demands and the assigned mission.
- Coordination of the operations of army service units under rear service command control.

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


Figure 136. Rear areas in a theater combat zone.

- d. Technical supervision of service operations in subordinate commands.
- e. Organization and control of army transportation units.
- f. Establishment and operation of the army medical and veterinary services.
- g. Maintenance of authorized levels of material in all organic army units.
- h. Procurement, storage, and movement of reserve supplies.
- i. Operation of the army rear service command post during combat.
- j. Establishment of rear area security and defense

measures, and maintenance of discipline, law, and order.

- k. Conduct of political activities within the army rear service command.

296. COMMAND

Duties performed by the commander of the army rear service command and his political counterpart pertain to the fields of supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, service, and command of the army rear area. Duties also include planning and supervision of technical training of personnel not only in the army rear service command but also in the army as a whole.

a. The commander's specific duties with respect to supply encompass determination of supply requirements; requisitioning, procurement, storage, security, distribution, and documentation of supplies; allocation of weapons and munitions, and other materiel in critical supply, in accordance with priorities established by the army commander; and collection and disposition of salvage and captured enemy equipment.

b. In the field of evacuation and hospitalization his duties include evacuation and hospitalization of injured, sick, and wounded troops and animals in accordance with established theater policies.

c. Duties bearing on transportation include movement of personnel and materiel by motor vehicles or other available means to include operation of carriers; control of movements in the army rear to include selection of routes, highway regulation, and traffic control; and determination of time of movement and destination of service units.

d. Service responsibilities of the rear service commander involve supervision of maintenance and repair of supplies and equipment; construction of service facilities and installations in the army rear area; maintenance and effective employment of adequate numbers of service troops; conscription and employment of civilian labor; sanitation measures throughout the command; and finance and fiscal activities.

e. Command of the army rear area requires duties that include supervision of uninterrupted liaison with army commander and chief of staff and with higher, adjacent, and subordinate rear service commands; disposition of units within the army rear area; assignment of missions and duties to rear area

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


Figure 137. Composition of a typical army rear service command.

units; defense and protection of the army rear area; provost activities; and special combat and political training programs for rear service elements. It also entails exercise of administrative control over portions of the operations, personnel, and political departments that are not included in the army forward command post.

f. The commander is assisted by the army rear service department staff sections, the commanders of army service troops, and the commanders of other service or combat units that may be placed under his control. Typical composition of an army rear

service command during combat is shown in figure 137.

297. STAFF

The staff of the army rear service department also serves as the staff for the army rear service command; staff section heads also act as the chiefs of their respective services throughout the army.

a. The Administration Section is the commander's coordinating agency for other staff activities of the command and serves also as the rear service operations section during combat. Its chief

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is more or less a chief of staff for the commander, and may assume command in the absence of the commander or his deputy. Other duties of the chief of section consist of preparation and control of all administrative orders and instructions for the commander; supervision of provost activities in the army rear area; liaison with other army staff departments; coordination of local procurement activities; preparation of consolidated logistical reports; conduct of headquarters commandant activities for the rear service command; and organization and supervision of combat training programs, supply economy activities, and rear area defense and security measures.

b. The Finance Section and its chief are, in general, responsible for planning, supervising, and executing finance and fiscal operations in the army to include preparation and management of the army budget, custody and disbursement of funds, maintenance of financial records, and operation of the army accounting system. The finance officer is also responsible for announcing pricing standards prescribed by the theater to guide the army and its major subordinate commands in local procurement and in operation of soldier banking facilities. The finance officer acts as chief of service in the army and plans and supervises the training and employment of finance personnel within the command.

c. The Food and Forage Section and its chief determine requirements for and plan and supervise the procurement, storage, distribution, and issue of food and forage, to include ration supplements. The section estimates transportation requirements for movement of food and forage to division depots and other units' supply points and places demands on the army transportation officer in the form of a distribution schedule. It also collects, stores, and distributes captured rations; inspects rations supplied to the troops; documents food and forage statistics and maintains the army food and forage account under the supervision of the finance officer; and, from time to time, assembles and directs the activities of army and division procurement groups for the local procurement of food and forage. At army level this section also manages procurement and distribution of solid fuels, other than POL; these fuels are distributed along with rations to major subordinate commands.

d. The Fuel Section chief is responsible for planning and supervising procurement, storage, and dis-

tribution of petroleum products consumed by the army. He monitors fuel consumption throughout the command and, in coordination with the army transportation officer, plans and supervises that part of the driver and mechanic training program designed to effect fuel economy in the army.

e. The Medical (Sanitation) Section is headed by the army surgeon, who is the senior medical officer in the command. The surgeon is responsible for planning, establishing, and supervising the medical service within the army to include hospitalization, evacuation, and rehabilitation of personnel; preventive medicine measures; medical supply for subordinate commands; and veterinary activities. In performing his duties he determines requirements for, and supervises requisitioning, procurement, storage and distribution of medical, dental, and veterinary supplies and equipment; plans and recommends requirements for and employment of medical troops, to include their training; plans and supervises medical reconnaissance activities to gain information on possible locations for field installations, including axes of evacuation; and supervises sanitation measures in the army area. He makes frequent medical and sanitary inspections of the command and provides statistics on sick and wounded personnel, immunization activities, and the condition of animals within the army. The surgeon also exercises operational control over army medical units and those attached to support the command.

f. The Supply Section is the principal coordinating agency for requisitioning, procuring, storing, documenting, and issuing supplies for the army. The chief of section has operational control over army depot troops and labor forces, and has primary responsibility for procurement and utilization of indigenous labor for logistical support operations. During combat, supply personnel from other staff sections are placed under his control to assist in the execution of his responsibilities. The supply section chief establishes the location and controls the movement of army depots and supply points in coordination with his counterpart in each division, and supervises management of army depots. The members of the section supervise accounting procedures in each depot, maintain master supply records of each class of supply, coordinate transportation requirements with the transportation officer, and effect timely transmission of notices of shipment and requirements to maintain prescribed unit stock levels. The

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supply section supervises the flow of supplies to infantry divisions and regiments as well as to army and attached troops, and supervises depot and supply point management throughout the command.

g. The Quartermaster Section plans requirements and makes recommendations for procurement, storage, distribution, and issue of quartermaster supplies (par. 146). The section maintains statistics on quartermaster items in the army, estimates transportation required to distribute supplies and equipment, and effects minor repair of quartermaster items in army or local repair installations. The section chief is responsible for planning and supervising salvage and battlefield collection programs for his category of supply throughout the army, establishing a supply economy program for quartermaster items, processing POL drums, and supervising the training of quartermaster personnel.

h. The Transportation Section chief exercises operational control over transportation units not assigned or attached to subordinate commands, and technical supervision of transportation service and training throughout the command. As chief of the army transportation service, he plans and supervises:

- (1) Transportation service within the army.
- (2) Maintenance and repair service for transportation equipment.
- (3) Procurement of transportation equipment, to include local requisition of civilian resources and collection of captured materiel in coordination with the army ordnance officer.
- (4) Driver and mechanic training programs.
- (5) Unit maintenance programs.
- (6) Technical inspections of transportation units and equipment throughout the command.
- (7) Traffic control in the army.
- (8) Use and maintenance of main supply routes in the army area.

i. The Ordnance Section chief is chief of ordnance service in the army. He exercises operational control over all ordnance units not assigned or attached to subordinate commands, and advises the director of the rear service department on ordnance operations within the army. In addition he plans requirements for, and supervises, ordnance operations, including the following:

- (1) Procurement, storage, distribution, issue, and recording of ammunition and ordnance supplies (par. 146).
- (2) Maintenance of weapons, ammunition, and equipment other than wheeled vehicles, to include management of munitions and equipment supply points, repair shops, and salvage installations.
- (3) Collection and disposal of salvage and captured ordnance materiel.
- (4) Examination, inspection, and registration of incoming ordnance materiel, and the subsequent maintenance of statistics concerning disposition of weapons, ammunition, and items of equipment.
- (5) Training programs for units under his operational control.
- (6) Ordnance training and operations within subordinate commands.

298. SERVICE UNITS

Army service units under the control of the rear service command consist of a truck battalion, several hospital elements, 2 litter companies, and 3 depots.

a. The Army Truck Battalion (fig. 138) contains minimum essential headquarters, staff, and service elements and three truck companies. Each truck company contains 46 cargo vehicles (fig. 62). Chinese Communist transportation practice indicates a cargo capability of 4.5 tons per truck over distances of 50 kilometers or less; loads are limited to 3.5 tons per vehicle over longer distances. When employed to move personnel, trucks carry 30 troops each. The truck battalion gives the army command the capability of motorizing the combat strength of one infantry division without pooling vehicles in other subordinate commands.

b. Army Hospital Elements consist of a hospital headquarters, a surgical unit of approximately company size, a field hospital, and from 2 to 5 mobile field hospitals, depending upon the army's mission and the situation. Each mobile field hospital has a capacity of about 200 beds; the army field hospital is capable of providing convalescent care for about the same number of patients. Army hospital elements provide surgical and therapeutic care, screening and evacuation, and convalescent care for sick and wounded troops, and pharmacy and outpatient service for army headquarters. Veterinary personnel

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
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Figure 138. The army truck battalion.

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nel are included to organize and supervise veterinary service in subordinate commands and care for animals that may be assigned the army.

c. *The Two Litter Companies* each contain a small headquarters, staff and service elements, and three little platoons. Each company provides a total of 36 litters and adequate personnel to effect battlefield evacuation. Company personnel are also trained in the rudiments of first aid. These units are employed during combat to reinforce either the army's mobile field hospitals or those in subordinate commands.

d. *Each Army Depot* (fig. 139) consists of a headquarters element, a staff containing elements of each service involved in supply operations, a storage and distribution section, a service element, and a labor platoon. The labor platoon is frequently employed to supervise conscripted civilians. Each depot is reinforced with ordnance, quartermaster, signal, chemical warfare, and engineer maintenance elements as required by the situation. A depot is capable of performing the functions of reception, classification, storage, and issue, and

limited maintenance, repair, and salvage of supplies for an infantry division. It can also maintain a portion of the army's operational reserves. Depots contain minimum essential facilities, and are readily moved during combat.

299. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

The army rear service command is formed only in anticipation of combat operations. It is composed of the army rear service department, less liaison personnel at the army's forward command post; administrative elements of the operations and personnel departments; and those sections of the political department involved in civil affairs, prisoners of war, and propaganda and education. In effect, this group comprises the rear echelon of the army headquarters. The director of the rear service department (commander, rear service command) assigns the task of establishing the army's service area (supply base) to the chief of his supply section, and provides a portion of each rear service staff section engaged in supply activities to that officer to assist him in carrying out his mission. The director requires

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
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Figure 139. Organization of an army depot.

the army surgeon to establish medical service in support of the impending operations. The rest of the personnel in the army headquarters rear echelon are grouped in the command post of the rear service command, and placed in a location from which it is convenient to supervise logistical activities; perform personnel management and political activities; and direct security, defense, and civil affairs measures in the army rear area.

a. The command post of the army rear service command is located on the army axis of signal communication, usually near the army rear boundary. The selection of its actual location, its interior arrangement, and details concerning its future movement are the responsibility of the rear service department director, upon approval of his recommendations by the army commander. The manner and frequency of movement depend on road, traffic, administrative, and tactical conditions, and on the availability of transportation, signal communication, and space. Installations normally found in or about the rear service command post include the army post office, the finance office and soldiers' banking facility, the army replacement regiment, the prisoner-of-war cage, the political department's printing facilities, and an aid station. A small supply point for local troops may also be included.

b. The army's service area supply base is centrally

located in the army rear area on terrain that provides good road facilities and protection against enemy ground and air attack. This supply base provides certain services to the command as a whole and supplies troops disposed in the army rear area. Within this area the supply section chief locates his own command post and those of the army truck battalion and the officer in charge of traffic regulation and control. The army salvage and the captured materiel dumps, and vehicle and ordnance maintenance installations are also located in this area. He disposes at least two of his depots outside the service area, well forward on division main supply routes. The third depot, within the service area, is employed to operate supply points to service other army troops and installations in the army rear.

c. The army surgeon establishes his headquarters on the army axis of evacuation and locates the army field hospital in the immediate vicinity. He places a mobile field hospital, reinforced with surgical teams, in support of each division, close enough to effect prompt care and evacuation. When the army is reinforced with ambulance units, army litter companies are placed in support of divisions in contact; in other situations they are attached as required to mobile field hospitals. If other mobile field hospitals are available, they are distributed throughout the army rear area in support of army




Figure 140. Disposition of installations in the army area.

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


Figure 140. Disposition of installations in the army area—Continued

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troops and reserves. The surgeon places aid stations with the army forward command post and the rear service command.

300. THE REAR SERVICE ORDER

The administrative order issued by the army rear service command is based on the army commander's decision, the capabilities of the supporting branch headquarters unit, and the intentions of the army group commander. The order normally includes the—

- a. Designation of army, division, and regimental routes of supply and evacuation and assignment of maintenance responsibilities therefor.
- b. Boundaries of the army rear area (division rear boundaries are also indicated).
- c. Task organization of the rear service command.
- d. Disposition of army rear service units and installations, and their proposed displacement.

- e. Locations where division and regimental supply points are to be established.
- f. Locations of supply points to service army and attached troops.
- g. Authorized levels of individual, unit, battle, and operational reserves for subordinate commands.
- h. Expenditure rates for various categories of supplies.
- i. Schedule for delivery of supplies to division or regimental supply points.
- j. Plan of evacuation and hospitalization.
- k. Traffic regulating and control measures (which may be issued in separate instructions).
- l. Methods to be employed in exploiting local resources and handling captured materiel.
- m. Measures for rear area defense and security.
- n. Manner in which the rear service communication system will be established.
- o. Reports, including method and time of submission.

Section III. SUPPLY**301. GENERAL**

Supply planning in the army is a responsibility of the several chiefs of arms and services in the operations and rear service departments; the director of the army political department is also involved in planning for political supplies such as propaganda and educational material. All supply planning activities are coordinated by the director of the rear service department, who bears primary responsibility for supply operations. At army level, supply planning is based on consideration of unit tables of equipment, tables of allowances for individual equipment and expendable supplies established by higher authority, and the nature of the planned tactical operation.

a. A table of equipment lists the organizational equipment of a unit required to accomplish its mission. Such tables are the basis for requisitions on the theater logistical command to maintain army components at authorized levels. Within the army, shortages that cannot be filled are met by use of captured materiel or by reallocation of items by the army commander, or both.

b. Tables of allowances prepared and distributed by the theater commander govern issue of expendable supplies such as clothing, rations, ammunition,

and political material. They may also establish authorized levels of operational supplies and supply reserves that are to be maintained by divisions and larger units. The level established for an infantry division normally does not exceed that that can be moved by its organic means.

c. The tactical situation and the overall supply availability influence the amount of supply reserves authorized a unit, the priority in which each category shall be delivered, and how and where supplies shall be stored. In defensive situations, for example, unit reserves are increased, priority is accorded ammunition and fortification materials, and supplies are frequently stockpiled at battalion and company positions. In a highly fluid offensive action, on the other hand, unit loads are reduced to only minimum essential supplies; priority is given to ammunition, food, and fuel; and reserve stocks are retained in army depots.

302. FLOW OF SUPPLIES

a. Supplies are normally delivered to army depots by motor transportation under the control of the supporting branch headquarters unit. From army depots, supplies reach division supply points by transportation organic to the army. When the situation permits, supplies are frequently sent direct to regi-

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Figure 141. Supplies are delivered to army depots by theater branch headquarters units.

mental dumps to avoid unnecessary handling. Army troops usually draw direct from army supply points in the army rear area.

b. At division level, supplies are normally distributed to infantry regiments by division transportation; division troops draw direct from supply points in the division rear area. Regimental supply points are little more than distributing points at which supplies are broken down for distribution to subordinate units. Regiments carry only small emergency stocks of items other than rations and ammunition; items received are usually issued as soon as possible. Regimental transportation is employed to move supplies to battalion distributing points; there supplies are broken down for companies and moved forward by animal-drawn carts, push carts, pack animals, or porters.

303 AMMUNITION AND ORDNANCE SUPPLY

Ammunition and ordnance equipment includes such materiel as combat weapons, spare parts, engineer material, ammunition, and demolition materiel. The Chinese include chemical bombs, gas masks, cleaning and preserving materials, and protective clothing in the category of combat weapons. Demolition materiel includes such items as mines, dynamite, firing devices, and Bangalore torpedoes.

Vehicles of all types, which are also included in this category of supply, are discussed in paragraph 309.

a. The chief of the army ordnance section is under the army group ordnance chief for technical operations, and is responsible for directing ordnance operations in divisions and separate units of the army. His staff responsibilities with respect to ammunition and ordnance supply are discussed in paragraph 297.

b. A basic quantity is the standard by which ammunition is requisitioned, supplied, and stored. Unit stock levels are established in multiples of this unit of measure. Figure 77 shows typical values of the basic quantity by type of weapon. At the outset of an operation the army commander announces the number of basic quantities that will be carried into combat and the number to be carried as reserve stock for each individual and crew-served weapon. For example, a unit's total load to be carried into combat is often designated as 3 units of heavy and 2 of light ammunition per appropriate weapon.

c. Ammunition stocks to be maintained at each army, division, and regiment are usually specified by army group. Prior to an offensive the amount of ammunition stockpiled in forward areas is increased and mobile ammunition teams are organized to replenish ammunition in combat units. These teams often comprise the greater part of regimental

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Figure 142. Porters frequently complete delivery of supplies to forward units.

and division ammunition supply points in offensive operations. They consist of trucks and wagons loaded with ammunition for ready supply. In defense, the army commander maintains relatively large amounts of ammunition on battalion positions and in regimental sectors. Carrying parties resupply the troops in combat, and in emergencies reserve units are utilized to carry ammunition.

d. Unit tables of equipment are the basis for supply of ordnance equipment. The ordnance officer stocks limited amounts of small arms and crew-served infantry weapons in the army rear area to fill unit requisitions to replace combat losses. Heavy equipment is supplied on an exchange basis whenever possible. More often than not heavy ordnance equipment must be forwarded from equipment pools in the theater rear administrative area, and unit losses are not promptly replaced.

e. Cleaning and preserving materials are issued in accordance with established tables of allowance which announce annual amounts per item of equipment. Local procurement is exploited to supplement rather meager allowances.

304. QUARTERMASTER (CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT)

Quartermaster supplies include individual clothing, bedding, and equipment of the soldier, as well

as organizational equipment and supplies (par. 146). In combat the quartermaster section puts emphasis on supplies needed to support the tactical operation; the army does not stock supplies of clothing and nonessential equipment.

a. A man entering the service receives an initial issue of a seasonal uniform. Thereafter, during the months of February or March of each year, he receives 2 cotton summer uniforms; in September or October he is issued 1 cotton-quilted winter uniform. Approximately every 2 months he receives a pair of rubber-soled canvas shoes. These items last the wearer from issue to issue. The individual is allowed to retain his summer uniform but is required to turn in his winter uniform when he receives each new summer issue. He is also given an initial issue of a cotton blanket, three towels, a leather belt, a raincoat, rice bowl, canteen, cup, spoon, and a cloth carrying bag. The equipment of those killed in action is either salvaged or used as replacement articles by the unit.

b. Organizational equipment consists of mess, signal, and office equipment. Organizational supplies include such items as cleaning and preserving material, medicines, and tools and spare parts for organization equipment. These items are issued to fill requisitions based on unit tables of equipment and tables of allowances for expendable supplies.

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Figure 143. A forward ammunition supply point.

305. RATIONS

The chief of the food and forage section is charged with planning and supervision of ration and forage supply and for local procurement of ration supplements. Ration supply planning, procurement, storage, and issue are based on strength reports submitted by lower echelons. The Chinese Communist field ration includes solids fuels, and the food and forage section procures and distributes coal, charcoal, and wood as well as forage and supplementary foodstuffs along with the basic ration. These activities are handled through the depots of the supply section, which also send out procurement teams to contact the local populace and obtain items needed to supplement the ration.

a. The individual Chinese Communist soldier is issued approximately 3 pounds of food per day as his basic ration. Although inferior to the diet of most Western armies, it is rated considerably superior to the average Chinese civilian's diet. In combat, troops are normally fed at 0600 and 1600 hours. The average meal prepared in unit kitchens con-

sists of a combination of rice, kaoliang, millet, and soybeans. To supplement this diet radishes, other vegetables, and meat are sometimes included in the menu.

b. The principal combat ration is a baked mixture of soybean, corn, millet, and kaoliang that is soaked in water prior to consumption. Prior to entering into an operation, each individual is issued the equivalent of from 5 to 7 days' rations, a part of which is precooked combat ration sufficient for 2 days. The soldier carries this ration into battle in a ration bag, 3 inches in diameter and 4 feet long, wrapped around his waist.

c. Rifle companies and infantry regiments each normally store emergency rations equivalent to from 3 to 7 days' supply, divisions maintain 10 days', and armies from 1/2 to 1 month's supply. The infantry battalion normally does not maintain stocks of food. Although it is an established policy to utilize food stocks captured from the enemy, their consumption at troop level is carefully controlled by the army.

d. Rations are requisitioned on a headcount basis. Platoons and companies report the number of personnel present for duty as of the preceding day. Battalion supply officers consolidate the reports of lower units and submit a ration request to regiment. Army normally delivers rations to division or regiment, each regiment delivers to its battalions and companies, or direct to forward positions. Fodder for the animals in divisions is obtained in the same manner as food for the troops. Rations may be issued from unit reserve stocks in an emergency or to prevent spoilage. Stocks are then replenished by the next delivery from army or division, as the case may be. The breakdown of rations to a using unit is accomplished at regimental ration issuing stations.

306. FUEL

Owing to the fact that vehicles are pooled within the army at regiment, division, and army levels, large stocks of fuels are not maintained in forward areas. POL dumps are maintained in unit service areas, so trucks can refuel at the beginning of supply runs; trucks usually carry sufficient fuel for a round trip. Small amounts of fuel and oil required for lanterns and generators are maintained at each regiment and division. The chief of the fuels section plans and supervises supply of POL, and designates where

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Figure 144. Soldiers packaging emergency grain rations.

dumps are to be established. Supply of solid fuels such as coal, charcoal, and wood is supervised by the food and forage section. These items are provided by the army on the basis of standard allowances. Troops in rear areas cut trees and make charcoal which is distributed and stored in forward positions. Coal is requisitioned for cooking on the basis of 1 catty (1 1/3 lbs.) per man per day.

307. MEDICAL SUPPLIES

Medical supplies consist of expendable items such as medicines, bandages, and disinfectants, and non-expendable items such as X-ray equipment, surgical instruments, and sanitation equipment. The army surgeon is responsible for the requisitioning, receipt, storage, distribution, use, and accountability of these supplies. His supply section receives these supplies from an army depot and stores and distributes them to subordinate units through medical channels. Medical supplies are stored in pharmacies and medical supply dumps maintained by medical sections at army, division, and regimental levels. Supplies are issued to hospitals and aid stations in accordance with the level of medical care given, in small, light-weight containers that assure preservation; battalion and company medical personnel are issued limited expendable supplies in field medical chests. Issue



Figure 145. Chinese Communist uniforms.

to individual soldiers is limited to a single first aid packet and water purification tablets. Medical ex-

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Figure 146. POL handling in the field.

penditure reports, requisitioning procedures, and unit stock levels are announced by the army surgeon, who also establishes schedules for routine issue of expendable supplies and announces special issues for specific tactical situations.

308. MAP SUPPLY

Map supply is a responsibility of the army chief of staff, who is expected to procure and issue maps automatically as each new combat mission is received. Map substitutes, such as aerial photographs and military sketches, are frequently employed when maps are not available. Maps are handled by the plans and operations section of the army operations department. The chief of section submits requests for maps to army group, prepares map substitutes locally when necessary, and distributes them to divisions and to army troops in accordance with instructions from the army chief of staff. All maps are accounted for; they are signed for by subordinate commands and are either returned or destroyed

when they are no longer of use. By Western standards maps and map substitutes are of limited availability in the Chinese Communist Army.

309. VEHICLE SUPPLY

Vehicles of all types are supplied by the army ordnance officer according to unit tables of equipment and plans developed by the army transportation officer, as are associated repair, maintenance, and pioneer tools. Spare parts are supplied on an exchange basis. Requests for vehicles, tools, and spare parts are processed through the chain of command to the army ordnance officer, who is the approving authority within the army. Subordinate commands send personnel to army to receive vehicles approved for issue; tools and spare parts are brought to division supply points by army transportation. Vehicle supplies available within the army are stored and maintained by army maintenance elements in the army service area. Vehicles other than damaged, salvaged, or captured ones,

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are usually not stored at army but must come from pools available to the theater logistical command.

310. WATER SUPPLY

Water supply for the army is a function of the chief of the army engineer section who determines army requirements and plans for future needs. Technical operations are executed by army, division, and regimental engineers who work in close coordination with unit surgeons at each level. Subsequent to an engineer-medical reconnaissance, the army engineer locates water points and designates units to draw from them; publishes a schedule for their use; and, when necessary, establishes transportation requirements to accomplish delivery of water to subordinate commands. Simple water points may be constructed by unit engineers or by the troops themselves; in either case the purity of the water is monitored by the unit surgeon. Unit surgeons are responsible for providing personnel to test potability

of water sources, for bulk chlorination in the field when necessary, and for issue of water purification tablets for individual use when water must be obtained from unknown sources.

311. SUPPLY OF POLITICAL MATERIALS

The director of the army political department is responsible for the supply of political materials to the command. The director requires the chief of his propaganda and education section to plan requirements for and supervise procurement and distribution of such items as training aids, printing and reproduction devices, paper, and movie projectors. Political materials, to include newspapers and magazines, are procured and distributed through political channels. Accounting, custody, and issue are performed by propaganda and education section personnel at army through regimental levels; unit political officers perform this function at battalion and company levels.

Section IV. SERVICES**312. GENERAL**

At army level, both technical and administrative services provide service for the entire command. Within the services that also have a supply mission, emphasis is on maintenance of materiel, salvage, and battlefield recovery in support of organizational operations to keep materiel in operating condition. The efficiency of the commander's repair and maintenance program may vary to a great extent, because shortages of critical parts and qualified mechanics are often severe and may contribute heavily to low maintenance and repair standards.

a. Maintenance. In general, preventive maintenance and minor repairs are a unit responsibility. Each infantry division and major separate army unit is capable of performing medium repairs on artillery, radios and telephones, gas masks, pioneer equipment, and wheeled and tracked vehicles, as appropriate. Organic repair elements carry small stocks of spare parts and supplement the minor repair capabilities of using units. These elements are usually located in unit service areas, convenient to the axis of supply and evacuation. Repair facilities at army level are more extensive, and often in-

clude quasi-military shops and installations, supervised by technical service personnel, located near or within supply installations that handle their particular category of equipment. Materiel that cannot be repaired at army level may either be cannibalized for spare parts or sent to salvage and rebuild installations in the theater rear administrative area. The latter procedure is normal for equipment that has been imported from the Soviet Union.

b. Salvage. The army commander attaches great importance to salvage operations to assist in overcoming supply shortages. Each service involved in supply operations maintains a collecting point for salvaged materiel at appropriate supply installations in army and division rear areas. At lower levels, a single salvage collection point is usually designated. Within the division, salvage operations are carried out in close coordination with operations devoted to collection and evacuation of captured materiel. All equipment that is repairable within the division is made usable and redistributed to subordinate commands; other materiel is evacuated to army on returning supply vehicles. A similar process is applied at army level; unusable materiel is


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Figure 147. Engineers build roads in the army rear area.

evacuated to the supporting branch headquarters unit.

c. Battlefield Recovery. The army commander requires commanders at all levels to organize prompt recovery and evacuation measures for both damaged equipment and captured materiel. Special teams are organized at regimental, battalion, and company levels to search the battlefield and collect materiel which is then forwarded to division collecting points or unit maintenance establishments. There, damaged equipment is either repaired and returned to service or, if unrepairable, evacuated to the rear. Captured items are examined by technical intelligence personnel, who subsequently train front line troops in their use when necessary; serviceable captured weapons and ammunition are invariably placed in the hands of the troops.

313. CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Chemical warfare service within the army is normally provided by the chemical warfare units organic to infantry divisions and regiments, under the supervision of an officer designated as army chemical officer. These units have a limited capability to perform decontamination services, process protective clothing, perform smoke operations, conduct chemical reconnaissance and technical intelligence activities, carry out troop training programs, and perform technical supervision over storage, maintenance, issue, and salvage of chemical equipment. Activities beyond the scope of these elements are carried out by chemical warfare teams stationed with the supporting branch headquarters unit. In the event of widespread use of chemical warfare,

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the senior commander reinforces the army with appropriate units to expand its chemical warfare service.

314. ENGINEER SERVICE

The chief of the engineer section, operations department, is chief of engineer service in the army and has operational control of engineers not attached to subordinate commands. He is charged with supervision and support of engineer construction, rehabilitation or repair, salvage, and maintenance activities in subordinate commands and execution of these tasks in the army rear area. Operating troops include the army engineer battalion and such independent engineer units as may be placed in support of or attached to the army. Engineers under army control camouflage critical installations in the army rear and supervise and inspect camouflage activities throughout the command. They may also operate water supply points in the rear area, as well as installations for salvage, minor repair, or fabrication of simple pioneer equipment. Also included in the army engineer service are engineer terrain reconnaissance; operation of simple river crossing equipment; battlefield illumination; training of engineer specialists; and collection, evaluation, and dissemination of engineer technical information and intelligence.

315. SIGNAL SERVICE

Signal service provided by the army signal battalion includes installation, operation, and maintenance of the army signal system; signal reconnaissance; maintenance, salvage, and limited repair of signal equipment; collection, evaluation, and dissemination of signal information and intelligence; and training of signal troops. The chief of the army signal section (signal officer) is head of signal service. He exercises technical supervision over procurement, storage, maintenance, repair, and distribution of signal items throughout the command. The army signal battalion comprises the operating troops of the signal service; it is under the operational control of the signal officer. The chief of signal service also supervises employment of signal troops in divisions and regiments, and of any other signal units that may be attached or placed in support of the army.

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Figure 148. Ordnance maintenance elements are found at division and army.

316. QUARTERMASTER SERVICE

The chief of the quartermaster section, rear service department, is head of the army quartermaster service. The service is limited to evacuation of salvage and captured materiel of the type handled by the army quartermaster, processing petroleum storage drums, collection and processing of quartermaster technical intelligence, and minor maintenance of quartermaster items of supply except those items maintained by the engineer and signal services. Minor clothing repair within the army is usually performed by the individual soldier; major repair programs prior to seasonal issues are handled by theater installations or by civilian facilities in the army area.

317. ORDNANCE SERVICE

Ordnance service in the army is headed by the chief of the ordnance section, rear service department. Ordnance service is devoted primarily to maintenance and repair activities, operation of a

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recovery system for removal of damaged or abandoned ordnance materiel and captured equipment, and supervision of unit maintenance and repair techniques. Spare parts for repair of small arms, mortars, and machineguns are carried by infantry units to effect local, minor repairs on the spot. Replacement parts for larger caliber weapons are carried by artillery and armored unit organizational maintenance elements. The ordnance service provides maintenance elements at division and army levels to supplement unit capabilities and effect medium repairs. Ordnance equipment that cannot be repaired is evacuated to repair installations under theater control. Other services include testing and inspection of ammunition and fuzes, salvage of brass, disposal of damaged ammunition and enemy duds, and dissemination of firing tables. The army ordnance officer directs technical inspections of materiel in depot, in the hands of troops, and in unit repair installations.

318. TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

a. The army transportation service provides means for movement of personnel and supplies in the army area and effects movement control of these operations. In addition, the army transportation officer coordinates planning of transportation requirements; supervises army highway transportation activities; supervises maintenance and repair of the army's wheeled vehicles; prepares and supervises army-wide driver and mechanic training, safety, and economy programs; and, in coordination with the army engineer, plans and manages the road maintenance service in the army area. Principal operating units include the army truck battalion (138 cargo vehicles), contact maintenance elements, and highway traffic control teams (par. 178). The latter two operating units are usually provided by the army group or field army transportation service; when necessary, they are formed from resources available within the army. The army may be reinforced by additional truck units, animal-drawn cart units, or pack trains as required by its mission and the local situation.

b. Motor transportation is the principal transportation means within the army area forward to the line of regimental dumps. Animal-drawn carts, pack animals, and porters predominate in battalion areas. To assist in movement planning in the army,



Figure 149. Brass is salvaged in the army service area.

the transportation officer plans and announces load limits, average speeds, and fuel consumption rates for these transportation means and requires army staff section chiefs and subordinate commands to adhere to these standards whenever possible. Factors developed from Chinese Communist operations in Korea are as follows:

Vehicle	Load (tons)		Speed (km./hr.)	Fuel consumption rate (km./gal.)
	under 30 km.	over 30 km.		
Cargo vehicle.....	4.5	3.5	24	8
6-wheel cart.....	1.5	1.0	3	-
4-wheel cart.....	1.0	0.65	3	-
Pack animal.....	0.13	0.1	5	-

These are planning factors only: they will vary in practice with the mechanical condition of the vehicle or the physical condition of the animal, and road conditions, visibility, and weather.

c. The army transportation officer attempts to keep 85 percent of the army truck fleet (approximately 1,200 cargo vehicles) operational at all times through an extensive driver maintenance program

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Figure 150. Drivers and their assistants perform daily servicing of vehicles.

backed up by division and army vehicle repair installations. Wheeled vehicle drivers and their assistants are responsible for performing daily service and inspection of their vehicles, either at unit motor pools or along main supply routes. Preventive maintenance is performed by the drivers themselves; unit maintenance facilities make minor repairs when parts are available. Vehicles requiring repairs beyond unit capabilities are evacuated to division or army installations. In addition to daily servicing by drivers, a shop inspection at 10,000 kilometers and a general overhaul each 20,000 kilometers is required. Scheduled replacement of vehicle tires is at 30,000 kilometers.

319. MEDICAL SERVICE

Medical service within the army is established to bring medical aid to the battlefield and expedite the evacuation of casualties, afford limited care for the sick, supervise graves registration activities, maintain sanitation standards, and apply epidemic control measures. At army level and below the medical service also carries out veterinary activities. The army medical service is supported by theater facilities which care for patients until they are fully recovered or prepare them for evacuation to state-operated hospitals in the zone of the interior; the army may be reinforced by ambulance units, addi-



Figure 151. Minor repairs to wheeled vehicles can be made at division.

tional field hospitals, and specialized medical service units as required.

a. The army surgeon is responsible for establishing, operating, and supervising the army hospitalization and evacuation system in accordance with the commander's plan and theater policy. The army rear service command order announces the locations and planned movement of these facilities and desig-

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Figure 152. An army mobile field hospital.

nates the axis of supply and evacuation. The axis of evacuation is normally the same as the axis of supply, especially above the regiment, to facilitate evacuation by returning supply vehicles.

b. Medical service operating troops within the army consist of from 2 to 5 mobile field hospitals (sometimes called branch hospitals), a field hospital, a surgical unit, and 2 litter bearer companies at army level. At division, the medical section includes a division field hospital, a health office, and a litter company. Each regimental medical company usually contains approximately 8 doctors, 3 male nurses, a pharmacist, several aid men and upwards of 100 litter bearers. Battalion medical personnel consists of 1 or 2 doctors, 2 male nurses, a pharmacist, and aid men. It is reinforced by litter bearers from the regimental medical company. A company has a medical NCO and up to four aid men. The nurses found in regiments and battalions are little more than aid men. Within the army, the quality of medical personnel and treatment varies from mediocre to poor in comparison to Western armies. Emphasis seems to be upon salvaging the wounded soldier for future combat, rather than upon saving human life, especially when the tactical situation is unfavorable.


c. Initial evacuation of a serious casualty from the battlefield is accomplished by company aid men,

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Figure 153. Casualties are evacuated from rifle companies by litter bearers.

who administer crude first aid and carry or drag the wounded to a sheltered spot. Battalion litter bearers evacuate the casualty to the battalion aid



station, from where he is taken by litter to the regimental aid station. At this point his wounds are examined, classified, and re-banded. The casualty is transported to the division hospital by vehicle. Division is the first echelon at which facilities for surgery are available. Evacuation is by vehicle to army hospitals where there are facilities for further

surgery, post-operative care, and extensive medical treatment. At army level most surgery is completed. Patients evacuated from army installations are either those whose wounds or disorders are beyond army medical capabilities or those whose period of convalescence exceeds theater limits for the combat zone. Personnel with light wounds or minor

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injuries seldom progress past battalion or regimental aid stations in the evacuation chain; these individuals are treated and returned to duty as soon as possible.

d. Battalion aid stations are located $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 kilometer from the front line, outside inhabited areas on the established line of evacuation safe from enemy ground observation, near a water source, and in a position convenient to rifle companies. Wooden signs with red crosses are posted along roads and trails as guides to the aid station. Battalion rescue teams are formed from litter bearers and supply and political personnel. These teams evacuate the wounded from the companies to the battalion aid station. Slightly wounded personnel must walk. In emergencies, each litter or push cart team must evacuate two wounded persons each time; the more seriously wounded is carried while the other is supported while walking. Battalion aid stations treat only the most urgent cases by providing emergency treatment, performing preliminary classification of the wounded, and segregating those who need emergency operations. Transportation to the rear is provided by regimental litter bearers.

e. Regimental aid stations are collecting points for all wounded personnel in forward areas. Depending on the situation, these stations are located 2 to 5 kilometers from the front line, preferably outside of inhabited areas. Medical treatment is limited to urgent cases only. The functions of regimental aid stations are generally limited to changing bandages, applying splints, treating gas casualties, and maintaining a limited pharmacy. Personnel of each regimental aid station are organized into: a command and inspection team, 3 or 4 mobile aid teams consisting of a doctor and medical aidmen, and an evacuation team whose leader supervises battlefield evacuation.

f. Casualties usually reach the division field hospital by returning supply vehicles. Division medical personnel segregate and care for those casualties who will respond to limited treatment or surgery. Others are evacuated to supporting army mobile field hospitals. There, casualties are processed and either sent to the field hospital for further treatment and convalescence or evacuated to the supporting branch headquarters base hospital. Personnel that return to duty after convalescence at army are sent to their former units.

320. FINANCE AND FISCAL SERVICE

The chief of the army finance section provides finance and fiscal service for the command. The section prepares and manages the army budget, disburses funds for pay and local procurement purposes, maintains financial records for the command, and performs audit and accounting activities throughout the army. In connection with budget, audit, and accounting activities the finance officer is responsible for reviewing management of soldier benefits; local procurement activities; and food and forage, combat operations needs, and commodities accounts handled by other army staff sections. The finance section also operates the soldiers savings system.

321. POSTAL SERVICE

The army postal service is also a responsibility of the political department, which supervises operation of the army post office and censorship of mail throughout the command. Letters written by soldiers are turned in at company headquarters; there they are censored and passed in signal channels through battalion, regiment, and division headquarters to the army post office. Mail collected at army level is routed by messenger through rear administrative area evacuation channels to theater headquarters, thence to the zone of the interior. Incoming mail follows the reverse route; first censorship is usually at army level.

322. OTHER SERVICES

a. *Replacements.* Personnel replacements are requisitioned and allocated to subordinate commands by the operations department and the political department. These departments coordinate with the personnel and rear service departments which account for, receive, and move the individuals concerned. Replacements for the army come from inactivated units, convalescent hospitals, prisoner rehabilitation centers, or induction stations within China. Personnel usually arrive at army in carrier units of regimental size. Replacements are normally placed in the army training regiment and receive combat indoctrination before moving to the subordinate unit to which they are assigned. At army level, requests for personnel replacements are based primarily on anticipated battle losses. During combat, only the dead or seriously ill or wounded

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portation sections of a unit's rear service department. These teams clear the battlefield and care for all dead bodies, select burial grounds and insure that the dead are buried in accordance with instructions, provide wooden markers or cairns to mark graves, and maintain a rudimentary record of burial places.

e. Morale and Personnel Services. Other than the morale and political indoctrination activities conducted by the army political department (par. 208), personnel services in the army are extremely limited in scope. The soldier is expected to solve his own personal problems, and must fend more or less for himself for nonissue personal luxury and comfort items. Government-sponsored civilian comfort groups from the zone of the interior on occasion visit units in the combat zone and distribute items such as writing materials, sewing kits, and tobacco. Limited post exchange facilities may sometimes be established down to company level in inactive situations. The principal personnel service offered by the army is supervision of administration of soldier benefits; this service is a responsibility of the personnel department. Authorized

relief payments, death benefits, and gratuities are announced periodically, and the department reviews requests for allotments and pensions; processes death benefits; and authorizes gratuities granted to technicians, combat heroes, and all troops on holidays. Special cases requiring funds exceeding authorized amounts are forwarded to army group for approval. Divisions maintain accounts of authorized funds, and report periodically to army on their status; reports are reviewed and consolidated by the army personnel department, then forwarded through finance channels to the theater. An additional financial service offered the soldier is a savings plan roughly similar to the U. S. Army's soldier's deposits.

f. Civil Affairs and Military Government. Civil affairs and military government functions in the army are a responsibility of the political department's civil affairs section. There are no organizations at army level comparable to U. S. Army military government detachments. Coordination of local government activities and army operations within the army area is a Party responsibility which is discharged through the army civil affairs section and the Party committees of all units.

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PART FIVE OTHER UNITS

CHAPTER 21

SUPPORTING FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

323. INTRODUCTION

a. Since 1927 the Chinese Communist Armed Forces have grown from a quasi-guerrilla band to a force to be reckoned with by the world powers. Today, their armed strength includes most of the supporting forces required to support infantry in ground combat that exist in Western armies. Most of these supporting forces did not exist before 1950, the year in which the Soviets began to supply the Chinese Communists with the more modern implements of war. Before that time, the Chinese Communist forces used arms and equipment they captured from the Japanese and from CHIANG Kai-shek's Nationalists.

b. With each major defeat or defection of the Nationalists, the Communists acquired materiel that permitted them to create limited supporting arms and services. They seized equipment which included artillery, light tanks, aircraft, small boats, trucks, and some chemical equipment; equally important, they acquired personnel familiar with the operation and maintenance of this materiel. At this stage, however, air, armor, artillery, and other supporting forces were a hodgepodge of various types of equipment. Very few repair facilities existed, and replacements and spare parts for worn out equipment were not to be had.

c. As more and more captured equipment became available, the Communists established extensive schools and training centers to learn something of the tactics and techniques required to employ their new supporting weapons. The instructors for these installations were mainly ex-Nationalists and Japanese officers. A few Communist officers who were graduates of Whampoa or foreign military

institutes established some degree of uniformity in doctrine for the tactical employment of these special arms. Early training efforts resulted in a blending of standard techniques into the Chinese Communists' theory of the art of war.

d. This situation existed until the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance in 1950 and the resulting expansion of Soviet aid and assistance to Communist China. Under the terms of this agreement the Soviets began an extensive buildup of Chinese Communist air, armor, and artillery forces. The U. S. S. R. furnished arms and equipment as well as instructors to teach tactical doctrine and repair and maintenance techniques. This program is continuing to modernize and standardize tactical doctrine. The Chinese readily accept Soviet doctrine when it applies to employment of supporting forces. Korea gave Chinese military leaders an opportunity to test—and accept or reject—some of their new theories and units under combat conditions.

324. MISSION AND TYPES OF SUPPORTING FORCES

The mission of supporting forces in the People's Liberation Army is to support the infantry in its ground action.

a. Armor. The Chinese Communist Army contains three types of armored units: Tank regiments organic to infantry divisions, independent tank regiments, and armored divisions. A limited number of amphibious tanks are found in the Navy's marine-type component.

b. Artillery. Communist artillery is of two types—that organic to divisions, and independent artillery regiments and divisions. Most independent

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artillery is organized into divisions; these include artillery, antitank, antiaircraft, and rocket-launcher divisions. These divisions, and the few independent artillery regiments that exist, are usually attached to large units which decentralize them in support of subordinate infantry components.

c. Airborne and air-landed. The Chinese Communists have a sizable number of trained airborne troops but do not have the transport lift to employ one-tenth of them. Airborne units of division size exist although airlift capability does not permit their employment en masse. A fairly extensive civil glider training program may indicate that the Chinese Communists eventually contemplate employment of air-landed forces with assault gliders.

d. Chemical Warfare. Although Communist doctrine advocates both offensive and defensive employment of chemical warfare units, little is known of the quantity and type of units that exist in the Army. Each infantry division contains a chemical warfare company that is charged with decontamination, smoke operations, and chemical reconnaissance; a similar, but smaller component is found in each infantry regiment. Crude smoke generators were employed in Korea, and flamethrowers have been employed tactically. These elements may be grouped into independent battalions or regiments for administrative control. Since the Communists did not initiate their chemical warfare program until 1950 it is too early to determine the size, organization, and function of independent chemical units.

e. Air. Thanks to Soviet assistance, the Chinese Communists possess the world's fourth largest Air Force. The employment of this force in close support of ground operations has been very limited, however, despite the fact that about half of its strength is fighter-type aircraft. The Air Force has a limited capability in a ground support or light bombing role, but has very few medium, and no heavy, bombers. Although it has not been openly evident from practice, present Chinese Communist doctrine clearly subordinates the Air Force to the Army in joint operations.

f. Engineers. Engineer troops in the Army consist of two general types: combat engineer units organic to infantry regiments and divisions, armies,

army groups, and field armies and independent engineer units. These forces are backed by several quasi-military engineer units that perform a civil construction role within China. Within the Army, organic engineers at all levels are inadequate to support tactical operations. This handicap is overcome by reinforcing tactical units with independent engineer units, by utilizing other arms for pioneer work, and by widespread conscription of civilian labor and equipment.

g. Public Security. Public Security forces were organized initially to fill a need for garrison troops in conquered areas of China. Once a very large force, Public Security forces are now limited to about 20 divisions and independent regiments. These units are equipped as light infantry and employed under military control as an economy force to guard the country's frontiers and to support regular Army units in the field.

h. Navy. The People's Navy, like the Air Force, was organized after the war with the Nationalists. Although the Navy is very small and inexperienced and contains practically no "deep water" fleet, the Soviets have recently added submarines and destroyers to the Navy, and may intend to build it up as they did the Air Force. Senior naval commanders are mainly ex-officers of the Army. The Navy includes a marine-type shore component and a small air arm, but is subordinate to the Army in joint operations.

i. Other Forces. The People's Liberation Army contains other units that vary in their operational value; some are regular military forces, and some are of a quasi-military nature. Some of these military units, such as signal, searchlight, and transportation units, will no doubt change as more modern equipment becomes available. Their organization, number, and employment reflect the continued scarcity of such organizational equipment now available to the Chinese Communist Army. The quasi-military forces, which perform civil construction and production missions for the state, assist in support of the regular Armed Forces. These forces will no doubt continue to exist as long as the regime continues to maintain large Armed Forces and China's industrial potential remains low.

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Section II. ARMORED FORCE

325. GENERAL

The Chinese Communist Army's armored force grew out of the Sino-Soviet pact of 1950. Under the terms of this agreement, the U. S. S. R. has supplied Communist China with a considerable quantity of tanks, self-propelled artillery, and other armored vehicles. With this materiel, the Soviets sent training literature and advisors and technicians to teach their confederates how to train, maintain, and employ an armored force. Today there are a number of schools and training centers in China that are charged with formal training of armored officers and selected enlisted men, replacement training of enlisted men, and activation and training of armored units. Recent officer service regulations have established an officer corps for armor. Within the Army, tank regiments are a part of the table of organization of the infantry division; independent tank regiments and armored divisions also are available to reinforce large units.

326. MISSION

a. Doctrine teaches that the primary mission of organic armor in support of infantry in offensive operations is to guarantee the infantry's advance into the depth of the enemy's defense and to destroy enemy infantry and supporting weapons. The primary mission of independent armored units is either to spearhead an offensive campaign or to exploit success subsequent to the breakthrough of an enemy defense zone. In defensive operations the primary mission of organic armor is to counterattack, either independently or in conjunction with infantry. Missions assigned independent armored units in defensive situations include: Protecting the flanks or a boundary of a large unit, covering the reorganization of a force, holding a captured line or area pending the arrival of other units, reinforcing organic armor, or covering a general withdrawal.

b. Little was learned about the application of this doctrine in Korea. Armored units were kept




Figure 157. The T-34 (85) medium tank.

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


Figure 158. The JS-2 heavy tank.

well to the rear, and sightings in forward areas usually showed tanks or self-propelled guns to be emplaced in well dug-in positions to deepen antitank defenses and augment artillery fires. A few instances of the use of armor in an infantry support role tended to verify this doctrine. Although the Soviet influence predominates in Chinese publications dealing with the employment of armor, the Chinese at present do not have the capability to emulate Soviet tactics in their entirety. Present practice seems to relegate armor to the primary mission of supporting infantry, and then only under extremely favorable circumstances.

c. Although doctrine teaches the employment of large armored forces in relatively independent operations, the Chinese Communist commanders probably will continue to husband their armor until large armored forces are available; until the enemy situation precludes friendly defeat; and until ter-

rain, weather, and logistical factors all favor the commander.

327. ARMORED VEHICLES.

Chinese Communist armored vehicles include tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored cars. Principal items of equipment in these classes consist of:

a. *Light Tanks.* Although a few light tanks of foreign manufacture still remain in the Chinese Communist Army, this type of vehicle does not play an important role in existing armored units. The light tanks that still exist probably are being used at training centers for familiarization purposes. The Soviet Army has done away with light tanks, and none are manufactured in the U. S. S. R.; thus there appears to be no source of replacements for Chinese light tanks now being lost through attrition.

b. *Medium Tanks.* Medium tanks are the principal armored vehicles in the armored force. These

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


Figure 159. The JS-3 heavy tank.

vehicles are found in both organic and independent tank regiments and in the armored division. The Chinese do not consider this class of armored vehicle generally suitable for use against hostile tanks. The Chinese Communists' medium tank is the Soviet T-34 (85) medium tank (fig. 157); this tank has a low silhouette and gives good cross-country performance. It weighs 34 tons, has a maximum speed of 35 miles per hour, and a cruising radius of 190 miles with main tanks. It carries 3 inches of armor on the turret and 2 inches on the hull front. Its armament consists of an 85-mm. gun and two 7.62-mm. machineguns, 1 coaxial and 1 mounted on the hull.

c. *Heavy Tanks.* Heavy tanks are found in armored divisions and independent tank regiments. These vehicles are considered capable of combating enemy tanks. Heavy tanks are of two types, both of Soviet manufacture:

- (1) The most common heavy tank in the Chinese Communist Army is the Soviet-built

JS-2 (fig. 158), which weighs 51 tons. It has a maximum of 4 1/4 inches of frontal armor at 60 degrees, 5 1/4 inches of side armor at 12 degrees, a maximum speed of 23 miles per hour, and a maximum cruising range of 75 to 85 miles with main tanks. Armament consists of a 122-mm. gun, three 7.62-mm. machineguns, and a 12.7-mm. anti-aircraft machinegun.

- (2) The JS-3 (fig. 159) is the current standard heavy tank in the Soviet Army, the JS-2 now being obsolete. The Soviets have supplied some JS-3's to their Satellites, and it is reasonable to assume that, if they continue to supply Communist China, the JS-3 will eventually become the standard heavy tank in the Chinese Communist Army. Reports indicate that the Chinese now have a few JS-3 heavy tanks. The JS-3 also weighs 51 tons and has performance capabilities generally

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


Figure 160. The SU-76 self-propelled gun.

similar to the JS-2, although it has only one 7.62-mm. machinegun. Hull and turret armor have been improved, however; the hull has been brought to a point at the front, and frontal armor has been increased to 4.72 inches at 55 degrees. The turret in the new model is more rounded than in the JS-2.

d. Special Tanks. Although Chinese Communist doctrine discusses employment of flamethrowing, mineclearing, amphibious, and engineer tanks, as well as tank dozers, the Chinese are not believed to have sufficient quantities of these vehicles for them to be considered standard equipment.

e. Self-propelled Guns. The Chinese Communist armored force includes a limited number of self-propelled guns of Soviet make. These weapons are employed on the battlefield as assault guns in sup-

port of infantry or as direct fire support weapons in armored operations. They are found primarily in the armored division and the independent tank regiment.

- (1) The SU-76 self-propelled gun (fig. 160) is known to be in Chinese Communist hands in limited numbers. It consists of a 76-mm. gun mounted on a modified Soviet T-70 light tank chassis. It has a maximum speed of 28 miles per hour, a maximum cruising range of 224 miles, and weighs about 12 tons. Maximum frontal and side armor are 0.98 and 0.63 inches, respectively. The SU-76 is sometimes equipped with a 7.62-mm. machinegun.
- (2) The SU-100 self-propelled gun (see ②, fig. 161) is also known to be in Chinese Communist hands. It consists of a 100-

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
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① The JSU-122 self-propelled gun.

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② The SU-100 self-propelled gun.

Figure 161. Other self-propelled guns.

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


Figure 162. The BA-64 armored car.

mm. gun mounted on the chassis of a T-34 medium tank. It has a maximum speed of 35 miles per hour and a cruising radius of 190 miles with main tanks. Frontal armor is 3 inches thick and side armor 1.8 inches.

- (3) The primary nondivisional self-propelled gun is the JSU-122 (fig. 161), consisting of a 122-mm. gun mounted on a modified JS-2 heavy tank chassis. It weighs 51 tons and has a maximum cruising range of 75 to 85 miles with main tanks. Maximum frontal and side armor is about 3 1/2 inches. In addition to its main arma-

ment, it has a 12.7-mm. antiaircraft machinegun mounted on top of the fighting compartment.

j. Armored Cars. The Chinese Communist Army is known to have a considerable number of Soviet BA-64 armored cars. These vehicles are employed in armored units in lieu of light tanks. The BA-64 armored car (fig. 162) weighs about 2 1/4 tons, has a maximum speed of 50 miles per hour, and a maximum cruising range of 370 miles. Frontal and side armor are well-sloped and have maximum thicknesses of 0.59 and 0.24 inches, respectively. Armament consists of one turret-mounted 7.62-mm. machinegun.

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
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Figure 163. Organization of the independent tank regiment.

328. ORGANIZATION

Major armor organizations not organic to the infantry division consist of independent tank regiments and armored divisions.

a. The independent regiment (fig. 163) consists of 4 medium tank companies with 10 tanks each; a heavy tank and a self-propelled gun company with 4 heavy tanks and 4 self-propelled guns; an artillery battery with 4 pieces; and headquarters, service, maintenance, signal, security, reconnaissance, and engineer elements. The firepower of this regiment is considerably less than that of a U. S. Army medium tank battalion.

b. The armored division (fig. 164) is built around two tank regiments, which are basically the same as the independent tank regiment, reinforced with a motorized infantry regiment and a motorized artillery regiment. Staff, service, and other combat sup-

port elements complete the division. Its strength and weapons equate the combat capability of this unit to a small U. S. Army armored combat command.

329. COMBINED ARMS COORDINATION

a. Tank-infantry Coordination. Chinese Communist doctrine forbids unnecessary exposure of armor without adequate protection; as a consequence, infantry is charged with protecting and assisting tanks on the battlefield. The tank-infantry team contains two types of infantry. Most infantry in a tank-infantry team is called *coordinating infantry*. These troops have their own combat mission—to capture an objective. They assist the tanks when doing so does not interfere with this primary mission. In addition to the coordinating infantry, certain infantrymen, normally one squad per tank, are assigned the mission of protecting the tank during combat. These men are called *accompanying infantry*. They may ride on the tanks or advance alongside on foot. They pass from control of their parent unit and take their orders directly from the tank commander or tank unit commander. Accompanying infantry accomplishes its mission by destroying enemy antitank teams, reducing antitank obstacles, pointing out targets, and indicating routes of advance.

b. Tank-artillery Coordination. Armored unit commanders and artillery commanders assigned to support them engage in joint planning for each operation. In general, the artillery commander is charged with:

- (1) Providing artillery support when tanks move from the assembly area to the attack position.
- (2) During the preparation, destroying enemy antitank obstacles, covering infantry and engineers while they are clearing mine fields, and conducting counterbattery fire.
- (3) During the assault, neutralizing enemy artillery and antitank fire and destroying enemy infantry with air burst fire when tanks reach the objective.
- (4) Breaking up enemy tank-supported counterattacks and harassing units in enemy rear areas.
- (5) Neutralizing enemy artillery while tanks are reorganizing.

c. Tank-air. The Communists realize the value

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
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Figure 164. Organization of the armored division.

of air-ground coordination in operations involving armored units. The senior commander places combat aviation in support of large armored formations to perform reconnaissance missions, safeguard assembly areas and reorganization on the battlefield, and furnish close support for attacking armor formations.

330. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Armor is retained under the operational control of the highest level possible consistent with communication and other tactical factors.

a. An armored division is normally kept as a reserve to be employed under the direction of the army group commander. In some instances it may be retained under the control of the field army or

theater commander. Regardless of the level at which the armored division may be controlled tactically, operational plans for the division are developed by the armor section in the theater or field army staff. At present, armor is too scarce to allow an armored division to be committed under operational plans emanating from lower headquarters.

b. An independent tank regiment may be attached to an army or an infantry division to reinforce organic armor. The army or division commander is usually told in great detail the manner in which the regiment will be employed. It can be expected that this tight control will be relaxed in the future when more armor is available and tactical commanders have become more familiar with the employment of armored forces.

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Figure 165. The tank-infantry team.

331. EMPLOYMENT

a. *Offensive.* Little was learned of Chinese Communist armored tactics in Korea, mainly because of the restrictions of the terrain and the scarcity of armor. Communist armored doctrine, however, closely parallels both Western and Soviet teaching. Present doctrine cites surprise, mass, and maneuver as being essential to the employment of armor. Armored divisions are usually employed to seize objectives deep in the enemy rear and to cut off, encircle, and destroy major enemy units in conjunction with other combat arms. When terrain or other factors preclude this use, the senior commander retains his large armored unit as his primary weapon in the exploitation phase of an offensive operation to insure maximum utilization of armor's offensive potential. Independent tank regiments may be attached to subordinate commands for similar small-scale operations or to reinforce organic armor in support of infantry. Armored divisions are seldom broken down and attached to subordinate commands. Under any condition, armor is heavily supported by conventional artillery. Self-propelled guns support tanks by direct fire in offensive operations. These weapons are located initially about 200 to 300 meters behind attack positions of the infantry and usually occupy their positions before the beginning of the artillery preparation.

Because of their usual employment as direct-fire weapons, self-propelled guns do not follow a set fire plan after participating in the artillery preparation, but usually fire independently on targets of opportunity. Primary targets are enemy antitank weapons and hostile tanks. Self-propelled guns accompany tank formations until the objective is overrun. These weapons have a continuing mission of retaliating instantly when tanks are fired upon.

b. *Defensive.* In the defense, the commander seldom commits armor en masse in an antitank role; rather he retains his armor as a mobile reserve, prepared to lead counterattacks against the enemy's advance elements. Under favorable conditions, and when the situation demands, well-positioned tanks may be employed as antitank weapons in forward areas. Armor normally is used to add depth to the defense area and to give the commander a fast-moving reserve force with which to meet unexpected situations.

c. *Limitations.* A big limitation on the employment of armor in the Chinese Communist Army is the lack of senior commanders experienced in large armored operations. Korea gave the Communists very limited experience in employment of armor; tanks and self-propelled guns were introduced on a very minor scale. Experience with armored divisions is limited and has been held largely to training

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maneuvers under the supervision of Soviet advisors. Another severe limitation is the lack of a heavy industry capable of producing and replacing heavy armored vehicles, spare parts, and guns. Fuel must

also be imported. The armored force is entirely dependent upon foreign sources for everything except personnel. Communist China is attempting to correct these deficiencies, but it will take time.

Section III. ARTILLERY

332. GENERAL

a. When it entered the Korean War, the Chinese Communist Army's artillery arm contained a wide variety of artillery pieces which were loosely organized into units of battery and battalion size. Each battery in a battalion was frequently armed with a different type of weapon; pieces were of United States, Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese manufacture. Many infantry divisions had only a battalion of light artillery. Communications equipment was lacking, and centralized fire direction and control were almost nonexistent.

b. The deficiencies of such an organization were initially felt in Korea, where for the first time the Chinese Communist Army fought against a modern, well-equipped force. A modernization program for the artillery arm was instituted early in the Korean conflict. This program caused a reorganization of the Chinese Communist artillery arm which resulted initially in standardization of organizations of battalion size and in improvement of communications to permit centralized fire direction; and, finally, in the establishment of an organic artillery regiment modeled on the Soviet gun, mortar, howitzer con-

cept within the infantry division. A similar unit is found in armored divisions. The present trend toward a division artillery organization (par. 204) indicates another tendency on the part of the Chinese Communists to parallel Soviet artillery organization.

c. The Chinese Communist artillery arm is built around the division artillery regiment; these regiments are supported by independent artillery regiments and divisions of all types (par. 334). Improved communications give the artillery arm the capability of centralized fire direction at division and probably at army level. Acquisition of improved fire-control equipment from Soviet sources has resulted in a limited capability to mass and shift fires of tactical groupings of divisional and non-divisional artillery units. Increased flexibility in employment of artillery is being made possible by the substitution of trucks for animals as a means of moving artillery pieces.

333. TYPES OF WEAPONS

Chinese Communist artillery pieces emphasize lightness, simplicity, and ruggedness to facilitate maintenance and field operation. They are, how-

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


Figure 166. The 76-mm. (M1942) division gun.

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


Figure 167. The 122-mm. gun M1931/37.

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


Figure 168. The 152-mm (M1937) gun-howitzer.

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


Figure 169. The 57-mm. (M1943) antitank gun.

ever, equal in effectiveness to the artillery pieces found in Western armies. There are three general categories of artillery pieces in the Chinese Communist Army—conventional field artillery weapons, specialized artillery weapons, and certain infantry heavy weapons that the Chinese classify as artillery pieces.

a. Conventional field artillery is grouped into four

general classes, based upon function of the piece, its range, and its caliber.

(1) *Mountain artillery* is designed so that it may be disassembled and carried on pack animals or drawn as one unit over difficult terrain and roads not negotiable by other types of artillery. Pieces are small, usually howitzers of approximately 75-

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


Figure 170. The 132-mm. M13 rocket launcher.

mm., with a range of about 9,000 meters. The 76-mm. regimental gun (howitzer) also falls in this class.

- (2) *Field artillery*, in Chinese terminology, is restricted to guns with an effective maximum range of approximately 13,000 meters whose caliber is usually 75-mm. or 76.2-mm. These pieces have a low angle of fire, are easily maneuverable, and can be fired at a high rate. Pieces usually are towed by vehicles.
- (3) *Heavy artillery* includes weapons ranging from the 105-mm. gun and howitzer through the 152-mm. howitzer. Pieces may be mechanized, motorized, or horse-drawn.
- (4) *High-power artillery* includes 152-mm. guns and larger-caliber artillery pieces that

are characterized by long range and heavy firepower. These weapons are either pulled by tractors, mounted on self-propelled gun mounts, or dismantled and transported in separate sections by vehicles.

b. Specialized artillery pieces also fall into four general classes that are based upon the function of the piece; these are:

- (1) *Self-propelled artillery*, which consists of a gun mounted on a tank chassis with an enclosed fighting compartment. The vehicle is as maneuverable as a tank of equal size. The JSU-122 self-propelled gun is the principal weapon in this class although SU-100's and SU-76's are known to be in Chinese Communist hands. Charac-

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


Figure 171. The 85-mm. anti-aircraft gun.

teristics of these weapons are discussed in paragraph 327.

- (2) *Antitank artillery*, which ranges in caliber from 37-mm. to 105-mm. Weapons may be either motorized or horse-drawn. Antitank artillery weapons are characterized by high muzzle velocity and a high rate of fire.
- (3) *Rocket artillery*, from 82-mm. to 300-mm. in size. The principal weapon in this class is the Soviet 132-mm. M13 rocket launcher. This multi-rail launcher, usually mounted on a truck, has a capacity of 16 rockets which are fired by electrical means.
- (4) *Antiaircraft artillery*, which ranges from 20-mm. to 105-mm. These weapons are usually drawn by or mounted on a truck. Some medium guns are electronically controlled. In addition to their antiaircraft role, these pieces occasionally are employed against ground targets.

c. Infantry heavy weapons considered as artillery

by the Chinese Communists fall into two general classes:

- (1) *Recoilless rifles*, which are organic to infantry regiments and battalions. The Chinese possess and probably manufacture both 57- and 75-mm. weapons in this class.
- (2) *Mortars*, which are organic to infantry divisions, regiments, and battalions. The 120- and 82-mm. mortars are the principal weapons in this class.

334. TYPES OF ARTILLERY UNITS

The Chinese Communists consider artillery the most important supporting ground arm. Within the Army, artillery units other than those organic to armies, divisions, and independent armored regiments, consist of divisions and independent regiments. Although present units sometimes contain mixed pieces, the trend is toward artillery regiments that are homogeneous in armament. Organization of present units is as follows:

a. *Artillery Division*. The artillery division is composed of essential staff and service elements, three artillery regiments, and an antiaircraft battalion. Each regiment consists of 3 artillery battalions of 12 pieces each. Although an attempt is made to arm each regiment with the same type of weapon, there may be three different types of weapons within the division itself. Each regiment may be equipped with 1 of 5 basic kinds of artillery pieces: 152-mm. howitzers or gun-howitzers, 122-mm. guns, 105-mm. howitzers, or 76.2-mm. guns. The antiaircraft battalion is equipped with twelve 37-mm. antiaircraft automatic weapons and twelve 12.7-mm. antiaircraft machineguns.

b. *Antitank Division*. The basic units of the antitank division are three antitank regiments, each composed of six firing batteries. There is no intermediate battalion echelon in an antitank regiment. In each regiment, 3 batteries are equipped with 76.2-mm. antitank guns; the other 3 are equipped with 57-mm. antitank guns. The firing batteries each have 4 guns; the division totals 36 weapons of each type.

c. *Rocket Launcher Division*. The rocket launcher division contains three regiments and essential staff and service elements. Each regiment consists primarily of 2 battalions; each battalion

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


Figure 172. Artillery units.

contains 3 firing batteries equipped with 4 M13 132-mm. rocket launchers. The division totals 72 rocket launchers mounted on trucks; each weapon is capable of firing 16 rockets simultaneously.

d. Antiaircraft Regiment. An antiaircraft regiment (fig. 175) consists of staff and service elements and three antiaircraft battalions. Regiments may be homogeneous or mixed. Homogeneous units contain three battalions, each equipped with twelve 85-mm. antiaircraft guns. Mixed regiments contain 2 battalions equipped with 85-mm. antiaircraft guns and 1 battalion containing twelve 37-mm. antiaircraft automatic weapons. In either type of organization, each gun battery has four weapons; the entire regiment is motorized.

e. Antiaircraft Division. An antiaircraft division

is organized around three mixed regiments identical with the ones described above. In addition, it contains a conventional staff and a guard, a signal, and an engineer company. The division is motorized.

335. MISSIONS

Artillery in the Chinese Communist Army has three principal missions during combat operations—it supports other ground combat units by fire to neutralize or destroy those targets which are most dangerous to the supported unit; it extends the depth of combat by counterbattery fire and by fire on targets in hostile rear areas; and it protects other ground combat arms from hostile air or armored attack.

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


Figure 173. Antitank units.

336. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT


All independent artillery divisions and regiments within a theater are controlled by the artillery directorate of the theater staff. The chief of the artillery directorate is the senior artillery officer in the theater; he advises the commander on all matters concerning employment of his arm. Artillery units under theater control are allotted to major subordinate commands in accordance with the commander's intentions, the capabilities of each artillery unit, and the requirements of subordinate commands. Similar staff officers exist at field army and army group level. These officers advise their respective commanders on employment of artillery allocated to the command; control its allotment to subordinate units; and, in certain situations, exercise command of artillery retained by the field army or army group commander. The artillery officer at army level has both staff and command responsibilities. He advises the commander on the organization for combat of both organic and attached artillery; exercises

tactical command of artillery retained under army control; and influences fire direction in subordinate commands by selection of certain targets, concentration or distribution of artillery units (and hence, fire), and allocation of ammunition to subordinate commands. He retains operational control over artillery allotted to infantry divisions to the extent that he may alter the artillery's organization for combat during the course of a campaign as required by the local situation.

a. Conventional Field Artillery Units. Conventional artillery divisions and regiments are allotted to field commands to provide maximum concentration of fire at the point of main effort. Units are rarely retained under field army or army group control. Artillery divisions normally do not retain their tactical integrity below army group level; there the unit is usually broken up and allocated, by regiment, to subordinate armies. At army level, even regiments often lose their unit integrity; the army artillery officer directs formation of various combat groupings depending upon the type of available units, the commander's intentions, and the tactical situation. These combat groups are not formal organizations, but compare favorably in size with the field artillery battalion-group of the U. S. Army artillery doctrine; they are of three types, and are allotted to infantry regiments and divisions or retained under army control as appropriate.

(1) **Supporting artillery groups** are made up of division, army, and reinforcing artillery elements, and they usually contain pieces that do not exceed the size of the 122-mm. howitzer. These groups also may include 120-mm. mortars; regimental howitzers; and, infrequently, regimental mortars. Two or more such groups normally are allocated to infantry regiments in the direction of the army main effort; these groups fire and maneuver under regimental control. Other regiments in the army are allocated one or more groups, depending upon availability of artillery. A group allocated to a regiment not initially committed fires and maneuvers under division control until the regiment it is to support enters combat. In offensive actions, division commanders may direct employment of lighter pieces in these groups as accompanying artillery for

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③ The antitank regiment.

Figure 173. Antitank units—Continued.

direct-fire support of forward attack elements. In defensive situations, a portion of each group may be employed as roving artillery in support of combat security forces or to confuse the enemy by conducting fires from several alternate positions before or within the defense zone.


(2) *Long-range artillery groups* are composed of division, army, and reinforcing artillery elements of appropriate caliber and range, notably the 122-mm gun, the 152-mm howitzer, and the 152-mm gun howitzer. Two or more long-range groups are allocated to each infantry division in the army main effort to reinforce the fires of supporting artillery groups; other divisions are allotted at least one group, which fires and maneuvers under army control until

its associated division is committed. The army commander retains one or more long-range groups under his direct control to reinforce the fires of division artillery and to extend the battle to the enemy's depths.

(3) *Destruction artillery groups* are combat groupings of heavy and high-power artillery that are formed especially for reduction of permanently fortified positions. These groups normally contain 152-mm howitzers and gun howitzers, and are employed under control of attack division commanders; groups are disbanded upon accomplishment of their mission and elements rejoin designated long-range groups.

b. *Antiaircraft Artillery.* Independent antiaircraft divisions and regiments are employed primarily

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NOTE (1) LITTLE INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON DIVISION TROOPS

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Figure 174. The rocket launcher division.

ity for air defense of critical installations in the theater rear administrative area under the control of the theater air defense command. The battalion is believed to be the basic tactical unit assigned an area air defense mission; in Korea, however, complexes approaching regimental size are believed to have existed. Antiaircraft units allotted to field commands in the combat zone are not normally placed below army level; these units are charged with protection of lines of supply and evacuation, critical command and supply installations, artillery and armor concentrations, and reserves. An antiaircraft division may be assigned the mission of es-

tablishing the antiaircraft defenses for an army group, forward to the line of division rear boundaries; an antiaircraft regiment, that of an army rear area. When participating in an advance from concentration or in a retrograde movement, the senior commander retains centralized control of antiaircraft elements and disposes them to afford maximum protection to the main body of the command.

c. *Antitank artillery.* Antitank divisions are controlled centrally by the theater commander and normally allocated on the basis of one per army group in the direction of the principal tank threat. In offensive situations the army group commander




Figure 175. Antiaircraft units.

usually decentralizes employment of the division, allotting a regiment to each army operating in the threatened direction; army commanders, in turn, place antiaircraft batteries with attack regiments. Each commander retains an antiaircraft reserve which is commanded by the appropriate command echelon of the antiaircraft division. The antiaircraft reserve of an infantry division is usually composed of that unit's organic means. In defense, the army group commander employs the antiaircraft division to organize the antiaircraft defenses of the command; the division commander retains operational control of his subordinate commands whenever possible, and places one regiment in support of each army on line. These regiments usually organize army antiaircraft defenses, reinforce the fires of division antiaircraft weapons, and provide the army antiaircraft reserve. The basic combat unit in either offensive or defensive situations is the antiaircraft battery.

d. *Rocket artillery.* A rocket launcher division

is usually allocated to each army group in the senior commander's main effort. Army group commanders may place one or more regiments in support of armies in their main attack force. At army level, one or more rocket launcher battalions are placed in support of divisions in the army main effort for employment with supporting artillery groups. The short range of the 132-mm. rocket launcher precludes its tactical employment under a higher infantry commander. In the defense, rocket launcher battalions are placed in supporting artillery groups to augment close defensive fires.

e. *Self-propelled Artillery.* Self-propelled artillery is not organized into independent units in the Chinese Communist Army. Rather, it is organic to armored divisions and independent regiments, and normally is employed in support of tanks and armored infantry. In situations that preclude conventional employment of armor, self-propelled artillery components are placed in supporting artillery




Figure 175. Antiaircraft units—Continued.

groups to reinforce the fires of other artillery pieces. These weapons frequently are employed as accompanying or roving artillery in support of infantry.

337. PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT

In the Chinese Communist Army the word "artillery" includes all artillery pieces and all infantry heavy weapons except machineguns and 60-mm. mortars. However, to afford a clearer understanding of the subject by the American reader, the word "artillery" in this pamphlet is exclusive of infantry heavy weapons. This arbitrary usage in no way alters the tactics and methods of employment expressed by the Chinese Communists.

a. *Capabilities of Artillery.* In the Chinese Communist Army, artillery is the supporting arm that carries out the battle of firepower. Long-range shock effect and destructive power, compara-

tive mobility (4 to 6 km. per hour for horse-drawn artillery, 20 km. per hour for motorized artillery), and maneuverability of fire characterize the artillery arm. The Chinese Communists consider artillery capable of—

- (1) Concentration, dispersion, or shifting of fires without changing positions.
- (2) Fire missions of different densities (single pieces, batteries, or battalions).
- (3) Placing fire on targets beyond range of infantry weapons.
- (4) Delivery of sudden and concentrated fire from covered position, inflicting unexpected losses on the enemy.
- (5) Delivery of destruction fire on strong fortifications and armor.
- (6) Shock effect, neutralization of enemy personnel and weapons, and disruption of enemy communications.

b. *Limitations of Artillery.* The Chinese Communists recognize the following inherent limitations of artillery:

- (1) Inability to operate independently.
- (2) Inability to capture or defend positions alone.



Figure 176. Antiaircraft artillery defends installations in rear areas.

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


Figure 177. Rocket launchers fire in support of main attack forces.

- (3) Relative sensitivity to terrain and consequent limitation of its mobility.

c. *Deficiencies Noted in Korea.* In spite of improved techniques, Chinese Communist artillery remains limited in some respects. In Korea the following deficiencies were noted:

- (1) Counterbattery fire was relatively ineffective because of the lack of aerial observation. Harassing and interdiction fires also were limited to a maximum of 12,000 meters to the rear of U. N. C. lines. These limitations probably were attributable to the fact that the Chinese Communists were reluctant to place their heavy artillery well forward where its immobility made it especially vulnerable to attack.

- (2) Absence of organic motor transport and the consequent reliance on animal trans-

port in tactical units, and lack of effective engineer support in forward areas, contributed to a general failure to maintain adequate amounts of ammunition at firing positions. A constantly interrupted flow of ammunition reduced the overall effectiveness of the Chinese artillery arm.

d. *Principles of Employment.* The Chinese Communists apply three general principles to the employment of artillery; these principles provide for formation of temporary tactical groupings, concentration of means at the point of main effort, and coordination of fires with the action of other arms.

- (1) *Temporary Tactical Groupings.* Artillery units are organized into combat groupings that exploit the particular capabilities of various artillery pieces to provide integrated artillery support for each oper-

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ation. Inherent limitations of one type of artillery are thus counterbalanced by the capabilities of another type; flat trajectory fire, for example, is supplemented by higher trajectory fire.

- (2) *Concentration of means.* Artillery is used primarily to support the major offensive or defensive effort. As a consequence, the Chinese Communists stress concentration of artillery means, including fire-control and communication equipment, artillery pieces, and ammunition. The general lack of adequate fire-control equipment, however, limits the capability of fire control to battalion level.
- (3) *Coordination.* Recognizing the limitations of their fire-control and communi-

cation equipment, the Chinese Communists place great emphasis on coordination of artillery with other arms, particularly infantry and armor. Detailed coordination planning tables (fig. 103) prepared by the army or higher commander form the basis for coordination of infantry, armor, and artillery. Based on these tables, infantry, armor, and artillery commanders conduct joint reconnaissance, exchange intelligence, and prepare coordinated, detailed plans. The artillery commander requires maximum effective use of available communication facilities and dispatches liaison teams to supported units to insure coordination during all phases of combat.

Section IV. AIRBORNE AND AIR-LANDED FORCES

338. GENERAL

The Chinese Communists had no airborne troops whatever until late 1948, and concerted efforts to develop an airborne force were not evident until mid-1949. The number of troops that have undergone some form of airborne training since that time now probably exceeds 25,000. These troops are organized into airborne divisions which probably are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. A number of airborne training centers provide these units with trained replacements. As is the case in other special forces, airborne organization and training in China are believed to be under the direct tutelage of Soviet advisors. Because of control difficulties, a limited lift capability, and the complicated nature of airborne operations, the Chinese Communists currently are estimated to possess an extremely limited airborne capability. It is estimated that they can drop only small-sized units which would present more of a nuisance than a serious combat threat to an enemy. Capabilities undoubtedly will improve, however, and the following discussion is based on the assumption that Chinese Communist airborne units eventually will increase their capabilities to a maximum.

339. COMPOSITION

Chinese Communist airborne troops are organized into a limited number of independent divisions.

Each division (fig. 178) contains conventional staff and service elements, limited combat support elements, and three airborne regiments. These divisions probably are mixed units with a table of organization of about 8,000 troops, containing both parachute and air-landed units. It is doubtful that the Chinese Communists have progressed to techniques permitted airdrop of conventional artillery; while regimental heavy weapons elements are probably parachute elements.

340. MISSION

The primary mission of Chinese Communist airborne units is similar to that of other specialized units—assisting the advance of ground forces. To accomplish this mission they land on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy's main body and cut off his lines of communication; disrupt his supply and liaison; interdict enemy reserves; occupy the depths of the hostile defensive zone; or reinforce encircled friendly troops. In carrying out one or more of these operations, airborne units may conduct independent operations by surprise landings on military, political, economic, or communication centers in the enemy's rear as well as by raids on airfields, arsenals, and important bridges. A small number of airborne troops may be landed in the enemy's rear to carry out intelligence work, engage in guerrilla activities, or support the subsequent landing of a large number of troops.

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
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Figure 178. The airborne division.

341. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

Command of airborne units in a theater is vested in the theater commander, who may employ them in a coordinated action with an army group in the direction of the theater main effort. During the staging and movement phases of an airborne operation, units are under the control of the theater air commander; the air force commander is also responsible for logistical support and any buildup in the area seized by the air-transported force. Subsequent to the landing, airborne forces act inde-

pendently in accordance with the senior commander's plan until link-up is effected; at this time they revert to the command of the large unit commander in whose local zone they are operating.

342. PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT

a. The Chinese Communists have largely developed their own tactical doctrine for infantry on the basis of actual combat experiences in China and Korea. On the other hand, since they have never employed airborne infantry units in combat, their airborne doctrine probably is based on Soviet doc-

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


Figure 179. Paratroops may be employed to seize bridges in the hostile rear.

trine. It is conceivable that the Chinese Communists will adhere to Soviet airborne doctrine in the foreseeable future. Ground operations subsequent to an airborne operation, however, will follow normal tactical doctrine for ground forces.

b. Chinese Communist doctrine requires that the following conditions be met when employing airborne units:

- (1) The link-up of airborne and ground units must be thoroughly planned. The distance between the main body of the ground combat element and the airborne unit's objective should not exceed three

days' combat for the ground combat element in the link-up operation.

- (2) The air force must gain air superiority to insure the safety of troop transports along the route to the objective, and must maintain it during their ground operations prior to the link-up. Aircraft transporting paratroopers or towing gliders must be escorted by fighters. The landing of the force should also be protected by close-support aircraft.
- (3) The operation planned for the airborne units must have a decisive effect on a campaign.

Section V. CHEMICAL WARFARE FORCES**343. GENERAL**

So far as can be determined, establishment of a chemical warfare arm in the Chinese Communist Army was not begun until 1950. Before that time,

only limited steps had been taken to provide a modicum of protection against an enemy who could employ chemical, biological, or radiological warfare. These steps included unit gas sentries and crude in-

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Figure 180. Smoke is used to impede the enemy's vision.

dividual and collective protective devices. Realizing their deficiencies, the Chinese Communists' high command took steps in 1950 to lessen the danger inherent in such a system and established the first known chemical warfare schools within China. Unit chemical officers were subsequently included on the staffs of infantry regiments and divisions. Shortly thereafter, the table of organization of these units was increased to include organic chemical warfare elements; these elements appeared in the field during 1953. There are indications that the Chinese have independent chemical warfare units of possibly battalion and regimental size that are equipped for smoke and flamethrower operations. Other recent reports on training in defense against atomic attack in the Chinese Communist Army (par. 70) give rise to the possibility that small chemical warfare elements exist that are trained and equipped to detect radiologically contaminated areas, to advise the command on decontamination and defense measures, and to train the troops in col-

lective and individual defense measures. None of these specialized units or elements has been identified, however. Chinese Communist doctrine for the employment of chemical warfare units apparently has been adopted *in toto* from the Soviets, and the eventual appearance of a more or less complete chemical warfare arm in the Chinese Communist Army is probable.

344. MISSION

Doctrine teaches the employment of chemical warfare units both in direct support of infantry elements on the battlefield to further the combat action and in support of the command as a whole to protect against enemy CBR attack. It also teaches that the decision to employ toxic agents is vested in the senior commander in a theater; it is supposedly to be resorted to only after the enemy has engaged in unrestricted chemical warfare activities. Tasks commonly accorded chemical warfare units by current doctrine include:

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


Figure 181. The Soviet ROKS-3 portable flamethrower.

a. Missions in direct support of infantry:

- (1) Use of chemical fires and flamethrowers to inflict casualties on enemy troops and to damage materiel.
- (2) Installation and maintenance of chemical minefields.
- (3) Temporary contamination of critical avenues of approach to restrict hostile movement.
- (4) Employment of smoke to deny hostile observation of friendly activities or vital areas.

b. Missions in support of the command as a whole to defend against enemy CBR attack:

- (1) Chemical warfare reconnaissance and technical intelligence activities.
- (2) Study of the weather to determine its effect on friendly employment of chemical warfare.
- (3) Decontamination of areas, installations, equipment, and personnel.
- (4) Organization of unit CBR warning sys-

tems and technical supervision of unit CBR defenses and training programs.

- (5) Maintenance and salvage of unit chemical warfare equipment, and technical supervision of unit supply.

345. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

The chemical staff officer advises the unit commander on chemical warfare activities and the employment of chemical equipment in accordance with directives from higher headquarters.

a. In defense against a chemical attack, the chemical staff officer recommends the location of the command post, prepares the unit chemical defense plan and submits it for approval, and insures that chemical warfare units and other subordinate units are prepared to execute it. The plan includes the establishment of weather reconnaissance and antgas outposts operated by chemical warfare personnel, the location of the decontamination stations, and the number of gas sentries to be posted by infantry units. To insure that adequate defensive

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measures are taken, each subordinate commander is required to report the portion of his area he believes to be most vulnerable to gas attack. In the event of a gas attack the commander orders artillery and heavy weapons fire on the source of the chemical attack if it can be determined. Troops wearing gas masks and protective clothing repulse the enemy ground attack, employing normal defensive tactics. After the enemy has been repulsed, weapons and areas are decontaminated under the supervision of chemical warfare personnel.

b. In support of an attack, chemical agents are disseminated by means of artillery shells, bombs, land mines, or hand grenades. Chemical agents are used to inflict casualties on enemy personnel, impede the enemy's use of weapons, restrict his vision, hinder his maneuverability, and disturb activities in his command posts and rear areas. Phosphorous high explosive shells are used to produce a screening smoke and also for the incendiary effect on troops and areas. The Chinese Communists reportedly have used common irritant chemical grenades similar to United States types as well as various types of incendiary grenades and Molotov

cocktails. Flamethrowers are employed against fortified positions or used to defend a key point. The Chinese are currently using the Soviet ROKS-3 portable type (fig. 181).

c. Smoke is employed to screen the movements of troops, restrict enemy observation, cover movement in a defense position, screen a river-crossing operation, or cover the withdrawal of friendly troops. Communist doctrine also calls for use of smoke candles and smoke pots in support of small-scale actions. In addition, extensive use is made of natural vegetation and debris, which are burned to create smoke screens to conceal the movement of troops. In Korea, during a U. N. C. attack supported by smoke to deny the enemy observation, the Communists fired smoke on their own position, making it appear that U. N. C. forces were receiving fire from their own weapons. Meanwhile, the Communists concentrated a counterattacking force, close to the U. N. C. objective, under cover of the smoke. These tactics indicate the unorthodox methods of employment of smoke practiced by Chinese Communists.

Section VI. AIR FORCE

346. MISSION

As in the case of other special forces in the People's Liberation Army, doctrine ascribes missions to the People's Air Force that exceeds its present capabilities. This doctrine is based entirely on that of the U. S. S. R., especially in the case of the dominant role assigned to ground commanders in air-ground coordination matters. Reliance by the Chinese on Soviet instructors, and the tight political control exercised by Moscow through the Communist Party, makes Soviet control of the training of the Air Force complete. In fact, the almost total dependence of the Chinese on Soviet technicians and equipment gives the Soviets much influence over the development of the People's Air Force. Although the primary mission of the Air Force today is air defense, its potential for conducting offensive air operations is growing; Air Force leaders are striving to reach the point where they can effectively carry out the strategic, campaign, and tactical missions assigned by current doctrine.

a. *Strategic missions* include gaining and main-

taining air superiority by attacking hostile aircraft and ground installations essential to their operation; reconnaissance of enemy defense installations, military supply centers, air installations, communications and government centers, harbors, forces at sea, and communication and air defense systems; and attack of hostile reinforcements, supply concentrations, manufacturing complexes, and communication centers. When employed on strategic missions in support of ground operations, Air Force units are under the control of the senior ground commander in the area, who is usually the theater commander.

b. *Campaign missions* include isolation of the battlefield by attack on the enemy's supply lines, reserves, depots, and transportation facilities; attack on the hostile main body to disrupt its deployment for combat; destruction of enemy equipment and air fields in rear areas; execution of battle area reconnaissance to determine disposition of hostile troops and equipment, enemy troop movements, disposition and completeness of enemy field works, and the locations of critical installations in the enemy rear; and denial of the air over the battlefield to hostile

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reconnaissance aircraft. Campaign missions are normally planned, coordinated, and executed under the control of a field army or army group commander.

c. *Tactical missions* include close support of ground forces by dive-bombing and strafing attacks and medium- and low-altitude bombing raids against enemy targets on the battlefield; battle-ground reconnaissance flights to seek out the locations of the enemy's forward dispositions, movements in his immediate rear, dispositions of local reserves, locations of critical installations in forward areas (supply dumps, vehicle concentrations, lines of communications, and command posts); movement of airborne units and air-transported troops and supplies; provision of fighter cover for friendly flights and major troop movements; and execution of flights for liaison and artillery reconnaissance and adjustment purposes. Control and coordination of tactical air missions are usually vested in army group and army commanders in the field.

347. ORGANIZATION

a. *Subordination.* In Communist China's Armed Forces, the Army occupies a position superior to that of the Air Force. In China's Communist history, the Army has enjoyed a long career; the Air Force is only five years old. True, a separate headquarters exists for the Air Force within the structure of the People's Liberation Army, but in practice Army leaders dominate the high command. The Air Force headquarters in Peiping is directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense; both the General Staff and the Ministry are composed almost entirely of personnel who rose to their present positions through the Army. Senior officers in the Air Force are also men who rose to their positions through long service in the Army. How long this subordination will continue is open to debate, especially if the Air Force continues its present rate of growth. Already it ranks as the fourth largest in the world. If emphasis is shifted to further expansion of the present long-range aviation component, which already can cover a significant portion of Asia, the Air Force may approach a more independent status in the People's Liberation Army. A major part of its overall mission, however, probably will remain that of support of ground forces.

b. *Command Structure.* The Air Force is headed

by a commander in chief and a political commissar who are assisted by four principal deputies (fig. 10). The first deputy is also the Chief of Staff; the other three deputies direct the political affairs, combat training, and rear service departments. As is common practice with the Chinese Communists, the Air Force headquarters maintains tight administrative control over air units in the field. Although there is an air headquarters in each military area, air units normally receive their orders directly from Peiping. The air headquarters in each military area is permitted some degree of independence from Peiping in matters that concern routine administration. A military area whose region is strategic to the defense of mainland China may also be permitted some degree of control over flights and other operations within its boundaries. During peacetime, however, the chain of command normally runs from Air Force headquarters directly to air divisions, independent air regiments, and other units in the field. In an active theater, the theater commander has operational control of the air units assigned to his command.


c. *Organization.* The basic combat unit in the Air Force is the air regiment, which normally is equipped with 37 aircraft. The regiment is further divided into three battalions for tactical control. The largest combat organization is the air division, believed to consist of from two to three regiments. These air units are supported by independent aircraft maintenance and airfield-operating elements, schools and training centers, visual-sonic and electronic early-warning elements, and ground-controlled intercept units.

d. *Aircraft.* The Air Force contains five basic types of aircraft, all Soviet manufactured.


(1) *Fighter.* The backbone of the Air Force is the jet fighters, which consist of Fagots (MIG-15), Fargos (MIG-9), and Frescos (MIG-17). In addition, the Air Force contains piston-driven fighters consisting of Fritzes (La-9) and Fangs (La-11). Fighters make up over one-half of all tactical aircraft in the Air Force; three-fourths of all fighters are jets. At present, jet fighters are employed on air-defense missions; Fangs have been committed in a ground-support role.

(2) *Ground attack.* Ground attack aircraft, which have the primary mission of sup-

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① Maintenance personnel perform engine overhaul.



② Ground personnel spot aircraft.

Figure 182. Aircraft-maintenance and airfield-operating elements support combat units.

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


Figure 183. Chinese Communist aircraft.

porting ground forces, consist of piston-driven Beasts (IL-10). These aircraft comprise approximately one-tenth of the Air Force's total strength.

- (3) *Light bomber.* Light bomber regiments are equipped either with jet Beagles (IL-28) or piston-driven Bats (Tu-2). Of the total number of light bombers, two-fifths are jets. Bats have been committed in medium- and low-level bombing raids in support of ground actions.
- (4) *Medium bomber.* The Chinese Communist Air Force contains only a token force of medium bombers. These aircraft are Bulls (Tu-4), the Soviet copy of the United States B-29.
- (5) *Transport.* The Chinese Communists have only a limited number of transport

regiments. These units are equipped with Cabs (Li-2) and Coaches (IL-12), which are Soviet copies of the United States C-46 and C-47, respectively.

348. CONTROL AND COORDINATION

a. Chinese Communist air support doctrine indicates a system of control and coordination with overall control centralized at army group level or higher. Coordination is insured through the exchange of air and ground liaison personnel. Target areas and times of attack are decided by the ground commander. The method and means of carrying out the missions are decided by the air commander, and operations are directed from his command post or from the command post of the ground commander through air staff representatives. Communication between the ground and air units is carried out by:

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- (1) Radio equipment in the air and ground unit headquarters.
- (2) Panels, flares, and air-ground radio control stations at subordinate ground unit headquarters.
- (3) Wire communications between ground and air unit headquarters.
- (4) Liaison aircraft.

b. Aside from the small-scale air operations involved in the Chinese Communist offshore island attacks in 1955, there is no direct historical background to indicate the operational system which the CCAF would use in support of ground forces. However, since the CCAF utilizes Soviet equipment and has been developed entirely under Soviet guidance, it appears certain that Soviet operational procedures described below would be followed as closely as possible. During the course of an operation, air units act in support of ground units, control being retained by the air commander. To insure coordination between air and ground units in the battle area an air liaison officer operates at the command post of the tactical ground commander. Air requirements of tactical commanders are transmitted to the air commander through this air liaison officer. The liaison officer must assure the air commander of uninterrupted communication and timely information on all changes in the situation, both on the ground and in the air.

c. When armored or motorized units are employed, a portion of the air force may be subordinated to the commanders of these units, thus insuring closer coordination between the air and the ground units. A liaison officer from the ground unit flies in an aircraft of the air unit in support of the operation; similarly, a liaison officer from the air unit is at the ground unit's command post.

d. Air-ground radio control stations are deployed throughout the zone of action to insure the timely arrival and proper direction of aircraft over the combat area. These control stations grant authority for aircraft to attack targets and issue spot orders in the event of changes in the situation or mission. When close air-artillery coordination is required, the artillery commander receives information on the same radio frequency as the aircraft in flight. Likewise, tank radios may be operated on the same frequency used for directing friendly aircraft to targets. Air-ground liaison panel sections and teams with



Figure 184. Air-ground control stations control aircraft in the combat area.

forward infantry elements guide friendly pilots to targets by means of ground signals, rockets, and flares.

349. OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS

Air support of the ground attack is performed by both ground attack and bomber aircraft; strikes are either preplanned, executed on request of the ground commander, or carried out on the initiative of the air commander. Strikes are synchronized with the lifting of friendly artillery fire. During the preparation, the attack, and the ensuing fighting within the enemy's defense zone, the Air Force:

- a. Neutralizes enemy weapons that are identified in the course of the battle.
- b. Spots targets that can be attacked by friendly tanks.
- c. Impedes enemy counterattacks by striking at the enemy's tactical reserves and preventing the approach of reinforcements to the combat area.

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- d. Disrupts movements in the enemy's rear on the routes leading to the combat area.
- e. Protects friendly troops from hostile air attack at the point of main effort.

350. DEFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS

In defense, air units support the actions of general and combat outpost forces during the battle before the defense zone, participate in the counterpreparation, and support the action of forces in the main defense zone. Specifically, the ground commander employs combat aviation to:

- a. Attack the enemy during his approach march and in his assembly areas.
- b. Participate, with the artillery, in executing the defensive fire plan.
- c. Strike at the attacking enemy's artillery, tanks, forward airfields, and reserves.
- d. Coordinate with the counterattacking force to destroy an enemy force that has broken through.
- e. Attack mobile or airborne troops that have penetrated into the depths of the Chinese defenses.
- f. Protect friendly forces, especially the artillery, the second echelons of the army, and the reserves of the divisions, against air attacks.

Section VII. ENGINEERS**351. GENERAL**


The Chinese Communist Engineer Corps consists of two basic categories of units—organic engineer units and independent engineer units. Organic engineer units consist of the platoons and companies found in divisions and the battalions and regiments assigned as army, army group, and field army troops. Although these units are under the command of their parent organization, the Engineer Directorate in Peiping exercises technical supervision of their activities through the engineer officer at each echelon of command. Independent engineer units consist of engineer regiments and quasi-military engineer construction divisions which specialize in various heavy engineer tasks, and special engineer teams that are trained in highly skilled technical tasks. During peacetime, independent engineer units are deployed in military areas within China and perform both military and civil construction and operating tasks under the military area commander. These units, too, are under the technical supervision of the Engineer Directorate. In time of war, independent engineer units are employed to reinforce other units organic to field commands which possess only a limited capability for engineering tasks in combat. This section deals with the organization, mission, and employment of independent engineer units.

352. ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

- a. The engineer construction divisions (fig. 185) are considered to be quasi-military units. They contain typical headquarters and staff elements,

minimum essential division troops, and 3 engineer construction regiments of approximately 1,800 officers and men each. The mission of the engineer construction divisions is to build, repair, and maintain roads, airfields, and bridges; they are normally employed on large construction tasks in the theater rear administrative area. Principal items of equipment probably include trucks, bulldozers, road graders, rock crushers, air compressors, cranes, and mobile asphalt or oil spreaders. Division service units include necessary maintenance and repair facilities.

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Figure 185. The engineer construction division.

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


Figure 186. The engineer regiment.

A division of this type reportedly has built and is maintaining military roads linking China and Tibet.

b. *The engineer regiment* (fig. 186) is a purely military unit. It contains conventional staff and service elements, a security company, and 3 engineer battalions of approximately 500 men each. An engineer regiment is trained and equipped according to the type of technical mission it is to accomplish; regiments usually specialize in river crossings, permanent fortification, or routine construction tasks. The last-named type of unit is most common. In Korea an engineer group was employed to control two or more regiments. Independent regiments are employed to reinforce field commands in the combat zone of a theater of operations. It has been reported that independent regiments are being reorganized on the Soviet model to include components specializing in scouting, camouflage and obstruction, bridging, demolitions, land mines, hydraulic engineering, and electrical engineering.

c. *Supplementary Engineer Teams* consist of small groups of technicians, each trained in a highly specialized field. Specialties include installation of defenses against air and gas attack; restoration or operation of communication systems, water supply systems, electric power plants, harbors, and railway station and yard facilities; and supervision of indigenous and troop labor engaged in engineer construction tasks. The mission of these teams is to provide prompt restoration of essential civilian facilities in the field and to assist field commanders to accomplish vital engineering tasks by use of civilian labor. They are employed in both the rear administrative area and the combat zone in a theater of operations.

353. EMPLOYMENT OF ENGINEERS

The large-unit commander employs engineer forces under his control to assure the mobility of combat troops and the continuity of their supply by

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


Figure 187. Engineers search for enemy mines.

construction, repair, and maintenance of roads and bridges; by rendering assistance during river-crossing operations; by maintenance and security of ferries, bridges, and fords during troop movements; by overcoming terrain and natural obstacles; and by construction of airfields or landing strips. Engineers are also employed to assist all the arms and services in the employment of camouflage techniques and equipment; to protect friendly troops and impede the enemy by the construction of field works and obstacles and by laying mines; and to conduct terrain reconnaissance. Establishment and operation of water points and provision of engineer tools and equipment to other troops are routine engineer functions.

a. *During Marches.* Engineer units are dispatched prior to the departure of the main body during administrative movements for route reconnaissance purposes and to report on the trafficability

of roads and bridges. When the march is of a tactical nature, engineers are assigned to each serial of the march column; the bulk of engineer strength follows the advance guard or moves near the head of the main body. When necessary, roads and bridges are repaired, maintenance teams are stationed at critical points, and all precautions are taken to insure the uninterrupted advance of the main body. Communist doctrine stresses that the commander should make engineer units available to armor or artillery to facilitate their movement in the event they are committed.

b. *During Bivouacs.* While at a halt, engineers are assigned to units manning outposts, where they assist in constructing obstacles and road blocks. Other engineers prepare routes within the bivouac area and assist artillery and armored units in construction of vehicle and weapons shelters and firing positions when necessary.

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c. *Meeting Engagement.* During an encounter of this type the primary task of the engineers is to insure the successful advance and rapid deployment of advance guards and the main body; emphasis is placed on deployment of artillery and tank units. Engineers also protect the flanks of the main body from enemy attack by employment of mines and construction of antitank obstacles, road blocks, and other obstacles.

d. *During the Attack.* In the attack, engineers reconnoiter routes of approach, provide assistance to artillery and tank units, construct unit command and observation posts, and reconnoiter and clear or breach obstacles and minefields. When a pursuit is launched subsequent to a successful attack, engineers are attached to the pursuing columns to clear obstacles and insure rapid passage of the force; these units may also be employed to construct obstacles in the rear of retreating enemy forces to block their movement. In a night attack, engineers supervise employment of searchlights to dazzle the enemy at the point of assault, reveal the objective, and mark the direction of attack for assault troops. Searchlights may also be used to counteract enemy illumination or provide concealment for infiltrating troops by directing lights on the enemy position.

e. *During the Defense.* In the defense, engineer units construct antitank obstacles and aid in the preparation of the defense by clearing fields of fire and by construction of command and observation posts, antipersonnel obstacles and dummy positions, and artillery and tank positions. In night operations, engineers are employed to illuminate the battlefield, to prepare temporary portable obstacles, and to counter enemy tunneling operations. In a retrograde movement, engineers prepare routes of withdrawal to insure safe passage of troops over roads and bridges, aid the rear guard in consolidating its position, construct obstacles on the flanks, and subsequently destroy roads and bridges along the route of withdrawal to hinder enemy pursuit.

f. *River Operations.* In an attack of a river line, engineers clear routes of approach and existing ob-

stacles on the near bank; effect the crossing by boats, ferries, and bridges; and construct obstacles in the water against enemy watercraft and on the far bank against enemy counterattack. In the defense of a river line, engineers construct obstacles on the defended bank, lay mines in the dead areas and fords, prepare for the destruction of bridges and fords, and place floating and submerged mines to destroy enemy river-crossing equipment.

g. *Other Operations.* In general, Communist mine warfare doctrine is patterned after that of the Soviets. Minefields, consisting mainly of captured or improvised mines, are of antivehicular, antitank, and antipersonnel types. Mines are often set one on top of the other and placed under roads and bypasses. Mine detection is usually accomplished by visual or probing methods; mine detectors are also employed. Enemy mines are recovered when possible rather than destroyed. During jungle or mountain operations, engineers are attached to the lower echelons to assist in overcoming the terrain barriers. When the Communists are operating in built-up areas, fire fighting is added to the normal duties of the engineers.

354. LIMITATIONS

The severest limitation placed upon the employment of engineer units in the Chinese Communist Army is the shortage of modern power equipment. Engineer equipment, by Western standards, is in extremely short supply; this situation results in much engineer work being accomplished by sheer manpower. For example, the engineer battalion that is part of an army has no organic vehicles. Organic vehicles are found only in independent engineer divisions and regiments, and then only in limited numbers. Communist China is not able to produce heavy engineer equipment and must rely upon imports for essential items. Last, but not least, the Communists do not have enough engineer units. For example, the infantry division contains only 1 organic engineer company consisting of a little over 100 men. An army contains only 1 battalion, which numbers less than 400 men.

Section VIII. PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES

355. GENERAL

As the Chinese Communist Army rolled south and westward over China in 1948 and 1949, it left

behind large areas devoid of regular Army units. Loath to deploy regular troops as a line of communications force, the high command absorbed

local provincial guerrilla columns into the Army and employed these forces to garrison conquered areas and fill the military void. These garrison forces controlled the civilian population, safeguarded military and civilian installations, suppressed anti-Communist activities, protected lines of communications, and served as civil police under local Communist military government. Garrison forces had no uniform organization, and their equipment varied from province to province. Subsequent to the end of organized Nationalist resistance within China, the high command standardized organization of these garrison troops and titled them Public Security Forces. From that time until the summer of 1955, Public Security units were identified as engaged in a variety of activities such as guarding railways, furnishing customs security, garrisoning various localities, acting as provincial security forces, as well as acting as components of the Regular Army. All of these categories of units were administered to and either directly or indirectly controlled by the high command. Operational control of Provincial and Military Railway units in the field was delegated to the Ministers of Public Security and Railways, respectively. The high command retained control of and employed regular and garrison units as an economy force to guard China's frontiers and police large cities and centers of government. On 1 August 1955, the central Government again reorganized these forces and passed control of all provincial (local) forces to the Ministry of Public Security; today they are known within Communist China as the *People's Armed Police*. In effect, this action disassociated the Army from police-type functions; it is probable that the former garrison and railway, guard, and customs units were affected in a similar manner. The former regular Public Security Forces are all that remain under control of the military.

356. ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

Public Security Forces consist of divisions and independent regiments. Divisions are organized along the same lines as similar infantry units in the Army, but lack heavy-caliber artillery and armor and have smaller service units than those found in field divisions of the Chinese Communist Army. Regiments, too, are lighter than their Army counterparts. The primary mission of these Public Security units is to guard China's frontiers and critical state-

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


Figure 188. Organization of a Public Security division.

owned installations and to engage and destroy any major hostile elements found on the mainland. Toward this end these units are deployed at critical locations within China and on land frontiers, manning defenses along the China seacoast, and garrisoning the offshore islands. These Public Security units are retained under operational control of the military. Divisions and independent regiments are subordinate to the commander of the military area to which they are assigned, but may be shifted from one area to another. Very often, Public Security units are attached to regular units for training, logistical support, or operational control. The presence of security forces within his command gives the military area commander a ready force specifically trained and equipped to suppress any major dissident elements within his area and at the same time releases regular units from this responsibility.

a. A Public Security division (fig. 188) con-

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
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Figure 189. Organization of an independent Public Security regiment.

tains small command and staff elements, limited division troops, and 3 Public Security regiments of approximately 2,300 troops each. These regiments are equipped as light infantry and are believed to contain only limited heavy weapons components. Recent reports indicate that a 57-mm. recoilless rifle element has been added to each regiment, probably as a regimental troop unit.

b. Independent Public Security regiments (fig. 189) are similar to those found in the Public Security division. Each consists of essential command and staff elements; reconnaissance and signal, security, and infantry gun-howitzer companies; and 3 light infantry battalions, each containing approximately 600 troops. Each light infantry battalion includes four rifle companies, a heavy machinegun company, and an 82-mm. mortar company. The rifle companies each total 100 officers and men.

357. EMPLOYMENT

a. Within China, Public Security units are employed to secure the country's land and sea frontiers, to guard important state-owned factories and hydroelectric installations, and to participate in major antiguerrilla campaigns. They may also be called upon to reinforce the People's Armed Police or to relieve Regular Army units of garrison duties. When necessary, employment of Public Security units is coordinated with local Militia operations by the military area commander in whose area they are deployed. Public Security units may also be required to conduct and supervise Militia training.

b. In areas of active combat operations, Public Security units are placed under the senior field commander to support the actions of Regular Army units. The commander may employ these units as line-of-communication troops, as garrison forces to consolidate and control critical cities or areas, or as combat elements in quiet sectors to hold a portion of the front or provide flank security. In Korea, these units were employed to provide security for critical installations in the rear administrative area. During operations against Nationalist-held offshore islands in early 1955, Public Security units followed closely behind Regular Army units to consolidate and garrison captured islands and, in at least one case, carried out an entire operation against weak forces without assistance.



Figure 190. Public Security troops training with a 57-mm. recoilless rifle.

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Section IX. THE NAVY

358. GENERAL

a. The People's Navy was organized in 1949 around a small number of obsolescent, conventional navy craft acquired by capture and defection from the Chinese Nationalists. This initial force has since been augmented by approximately 60 Soviet naval craft allotted the Chinese Communists in 1950 and 1951; by an unspecified number of ships bought from the Soviets during and subsequent to the Korean War; and by numerous Chinese-built motor launchers, landing craft, gunboats, and other auxiliary craft. In 1954, these vessels were reported to be organized into six small surface fleets and a submarine fleet; the latter was in the process of being formed. The Navy also had acquired small marine type and air components. The Navy's combat potential today depends upon the use of these small craft together with large numbers of armed, but crude, wooden vessels instead of modern naval craft. The Chinese Communists lack the facilities to produce modern naval vessels in significant numbers, and must depend upon the Soviet Union for any large-scale modernization of their Navy.

b. The Navy, however, is a growing organization whose commanders have already demonstrated their ability to employ limited and obsolescent equipment in successful amphibious assaults and coastal patrols. With additional Soviet equipment, technical assistance, and improved ship building facilities, continued growth and greater effectiveness can be anticipated.

359. MISSION

a. The mission of the Chinese Communist Navy is primarily a defensive one; its main responsibility is the defense of the coastline of China. However, it also must be prepared to conduct amphibious operations against offshore islands.

b. The Chinese Communist Navy is able to maintain limited coastal patrols, and it can conduct reconnaissance by utilizing both its air arm and junks and sampans disguised as fishing vessels. The Navy is capable of small-scale mine-laying operations, using crude, handmade mines as well as those of modern design supplied by the Soviets. Because of the lack of a sufficient number of suitable, modern combat ships, however, the Chinese Communist

Navy is not believed capable of repulsing a modern amphibious assault. Therefore the Chinese Communists rely, for the most part, on static coastal defense installations and ground forces.

c. Offensively, the Navy has demonstrated effective techniques in staging limited amphibious operations on offshore islands. Stopping the flow of a vast flotilla of improvised craft such as junks, sampans, and towed barges and rafts could present considerable difficulties, even to a modern navy. With the Communists' low regard for human life, such tactics could prove to be effective under certain circumstances. For a further discussion of amphibious tactics, see chapter 19.

360. ORGANIZATION

The Navy was organized by the Army, and many of its senior officers are ex-Army personnel. The headquarters of the Navy (fig. 11) is directly subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense; subordinate naval commands are departmentalized into several naval districts, each of which is responsible for coastal defense in its own area. Navy headquarters exercises command through naval command echelons established in each military area along China's seacoast. The various fleets, naval aviation units, marine-type units, naval bases, schools, and various naval stores and factories are administered to and controlled through these area naval commands. Each area naval headquarters exercises command primarily through one or more naval base commands. River defense commands are also a




Figure 191. Patrol craft of the People's Navy.

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Figure 192. Marine-type elements engaged in assault training.

part of the naval chain of command; they exist in each military district along the coast that contains navigable rivers.

a. Fleets. Each of the six fleets of surface craft, as well as the submarine fleet, is controlled by a naval base subordinate to one of the military area naval headquarters. These base commands extend from Port Arthur and Dairen in the north to Hainan Island in the south. The submarine fleet, for example, reportedly is based at Tsingtao; the Sixth (surface) Fleet is based at Shanghai. Each base command is charged with conduct of naval operations in a specific sea defense region. Defense regions are divided into defense patrol areas, the defense of which is the responsibility of the several squadrons in each fleet.

b. Naval Air Arm. The naval air arm was formed near the end of the Korean War after the People's Air Force was well established. The naval air arm is estimated to include fighter aircraft, both jet and piston, organized into air regiments. There are also numbers of light bombers, including

Beagles (IL-28) and Bats (TU-2). The Bats probably have been modified to carry torpedoes and mines. Although the number of naval aircraft is small, the ratio of aircraft to surface vessels is adequate; the aircraft can serve as a nucleus for future expansion. Naval air regiments are primarily defensive; they provide air support for the several fleets and for the defense of certain coastal areas and shipping. Naval fighter units probably are integrated functionally into the overall Chinese Communist air-defense system. Offensive missions are limited to those that can be performed from land bases, since the Navy possesses no carriers. These missions probably include tactical air support for amphibious assault on nearby land areas, offensive mining operations, and strikes against neighboring land and sea areas. The addition of organic aircraft increases the Navy's capability of protecting and supporting amphibious operations within the combat range of these shore-based planes and permits closer liaison between air and sea units in patrolling the offshore waters of the Chinese mainland.

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c. Marine-Type Units. Most of the personnel in the Navy are found in its shore component. The marine, or shore component of the Navy, was not formed until early 1950, when a cadre was drawn from the Chinese Communist Army to satisfy most of the officer and noncommissioned officer requirements. Most shore component personnel are organized into marine-type units which follow the general organization pattern of the Army's infantry units except for modifications imposed by anticipated tactical employment. Principal weapons found in marine-type units are of Soviet manufacture and include rifles, carbines, machineguns, rocket launchers, mortars, flame-throwers, and light antitank guns. The units do not have organic artillery, but are equipped with armored landing craft and motorized junks. In addition to these units, the shore component includes a few units equipped with amphibious tanks. These units have both amphibious medium tanks and supporting landing craft. Naval shore component units comprise the only true amphibious forces in the People's Liberation Army. Marine-type units are reported along the China coast from Hainan to Dairen. Each major unit is reported to have its own training center, and reports indicate that the component may be increased several fold in the future. The existence of this shore component gives the Navy well-trained, specially equipped units that can accomplish minor independent operations.

361. CAPABILITIES

a. General Lines of Development. So far as can be determined, a few destroyers, PT boats, and submarines have been the only recent significant additions to the fleet. It appears that the present mission of the People's Navy is confined to patrolling

Chinese coastal waters, escorting Communist coastal shipping, supporting the Army in amphibious operations, and conducting training exercises to develop an efficient nucleus of officer and enlisted personnel and to maintain a high state of combat readiness. It is not likely that a concept of independent naval operations will evolve from any expansion of the Navy; rather, the concept of coastal defense and support of the ground forces will be continued. If the Soviet concept of naval warfare is followed, the number of submarines and aircraft probably will be increased as the principal naval offensive weapons.

b. Present Capabilities. Although the present limitations of size, number, and type of ships and aircraft do not permit the employment of the Navy in normal, independent naval operations, the Chinese Communist Navy nevertheless is capable of performing several important functions. The Navy probably is capable of:

- (1) Meeting any but the major powers in naval combat in Chinese waters.
- (2) Maintaining widespread security and reconnaissance patrols in and over coastal waters and major navigable rivers.
- (3) Engaging in extensive offensive or defensive mine-laying activities along the China coast.
- (4) Performing nuisance raids employing PT boats, submarines, and marine-type elements.
- (5) Supporting major amphibious operations against Taiwan or the offshore islands against limited resistance.
- (6) Escorting shipping in coastal waters.
- (7) Employing submarines or disguised fishing junks to land agents or guerrillas along alien coasts, or to carry out limited mine-laying activities in enemy waters.

Section X. OTHER SPECIAL UNITS

362. GENERAL

Other special forces contained in the military establishment are of both a military and a quasi-military nature. Purely military forces consist of cavalry, railway engineer, signal, searchlight, and motor transport units. Quasi-military forces include agriculture, forestry engineer, and water-conservation units. Within China, these forces usually are subordinate to a military area headquarter

ters; in an active theater the purely military forces are utilized to reinforce major field commands.

363. MILITARY FORCES

Cavalry, railway engineer, signal, searchlight, and motor transport units all fulfill a necessary function in the Chinese Communist Army. These divisions and independent regiments provide the senior commander in the field with a means to give essential

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Figure 193. Camel cavalry is employed in China's desert areas.

support or reinforcements to major subordinate commands.

a. Cavalry Units. The Army's cavalry force consists of several divisions and independent regiments deployed in the open terrain of Northeast, North, and Northwest China. Cavalry divisions (fig. 194) contain conventional command and staff elements, essential service units, and three cavalry regiments. Each division contains approximately 6,000 officers and men and 6,000 horses; in the arid wastelands of the North and Northwest, camels are frequently substituted for horses. Armament is restricted to light infantry weapons suitable for reconnaissance and security missions; individual soldiers are also armed with sabers. The cavalry division is capable of executing battle-area reconnaissance over a wide front at a distance of 1½ days' march (75 to 100 kilometers) ahead of forward elements of a combat force; when the risk of strong enemy reaction is slight, the range may be extended. An independent cavalry regiment is organized in a manner similar

to the regiment found in the cavalry division; it is capable of limited independent operations.

b. Railway Engineer Units. Railway engineer divisions comprise the newly established railway corps in the Chinese Communist Army. Very little information is available concerning these divisions. Their primary mission appears to be the actual construction of roadbeds, tunnels, trestles, and bridges. They probably also supervise the work of large gangs of local labor recruited for particular tasks. In addition to conventional staff and service elements, each division consists of either three or four regiments of three battalions each. The division's equipment includes trucks, bulldozers, mobile machine shops, and other essential construction equipment. Heavy equipment is mounted on railway cars to permit rapid transit to work sites. Each division has an organic training battalion for training replacement personnel in the techniques of railway construction. These divisions appear to be a device both to increase the expansion of sorely needed rail

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



Figure 194. Organization of a cavalry division.

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NOTE: (1) SOME DIVISIONS HAVE ONLY THREE REGIMENTS.

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Figure 195. Organization of a railway engineer division.

lines in Communist China during time of peace and to provide skilled railway engineers for field commanders in time of war.

c. Signal Units. Independent signal regiments provide signal service for major field commands. Each regiment (fig. 196) consists of essential staff and service elements and three operating battalions. Each battalion contains three operating companies which are capable of installing, maintaining, and operating wire or radio systems and providing messenger service for a command. Since Chinese Communist doctrine teaches use of radio direction finding and radio intercept as reconnaissance techniques as well as the employment of signal technical intelligence personnel, these elements probably are included in independent signal regiments. Some regiments probably are equipped for telegraphy and teletype operations.

d. Searchlight Units. Although doctrine assigns the task of searchlight operations to illuminate the

battlefield to the engineers, the type of personnel in the independent searchlight regiments in the Chinese Communist Army is unknown. Searchlight regiments (fig. 197) are designed for employment with antiaircraft artillery and probably are subordinate to the Air Defense Headquarters. Each regiment contains essential staff and service elements and three searchlight battalions. A battalion contains three companies equipped with manually operated searchlights and a platoon of radar directed lights. The regiment is completely motorized; searchlights and associated equipment are transported on long-wheelbase trucks. It is highly improbable that the regiment is employed as a unit. The battalion (40 lights) is probably the basic tactical unit for defense of large city complexes.

e. Motor Transport Units. Independent truck regiments are the basic operating unit of the transportation service in the Chinese Communist Army. Each regiment (fig. 198) is organized around 3

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


Figure 196. Organization of a signal regiment.

battalions that contain a total of 417 cargo vehicles. Conventional staff and service elements, a maintenance company, and a security platoon complete the regiment. Truck regiments are employed to move supplies in rear areas and to reinforce major field commands in the combat zone.

364. QUASI-MILITARY FORCES

In addition to being the military arm of the Party, the Chinese Communist Army plays other roles strange to Western armies: those of agricultural production, land reclamation, and industrial production under the direction of the Communist Party. An early directive on the Army's participation in such work was based on Article 24 of the *Common Program*, adopted in September 1949. The Article stated:

The Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China shall, during peace time, systematically take part in agricultural and industrial production in order to assist in national construction work, provided their military duties are not thereby hampered.

In his implementing directive MAO stated that by assuming part of the burden of production the Army

would be helping the people surmount the difficulties left by the long war. The Party announced that the Army had reclaimed more than 442,000 acres of land and was operating more than 31,000 acres of farmland in North China by the close of the first 6 months of this program. Since that time, water conservation, fishery, animal husbandry, transportation, and handicraft work have been included in the Army's production activities. As profits go to the State, the program assists in paying the financial burden of the large armed forces China maintains. This procedure is an additional example of the Chinese Communist concept of the Army as an arm of the Party to be used to gain whatever ends are desired, regardless of their nature. Today, three general types of these units apparently are engaged in production and construction pursuits




Figure 197. Organization of a searchlight regiment.

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within China; they include agriculture divisions, forestry engineer divisions, and water conservation divisions.

a. *Agriculture Divisions.* An agriculture division (fig. 199) contains conventional staff elements, an engineer battalion, and three agriculture regiments. Each regiment contains four battalions of four companies each. These divisions are deployed




Figure 199. Organization of an agriculture division.

primarily in Sinkiang Province and are engaged in agricultural pursuits. One division reportedly has built a large collective farm.

b. *Forestry Engineer Divisions.* Little is known about the organization and size of these units. Reportedly, they are deployed in forested areas of China and are engaged in forestry activities. These units also may provide protection for large forested areas. The divisions probably are under the control of the Ministry of Forests.

c. *Water Conservation Divisions.* These divisions are employed on major irrigation and flood control projects within China. Their organization and strength are unknown.

Figure 198. Organization of a truck regiment.

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CHAPTER 22

GUERRILLA DOCTRINE

Section I. BACKGROUND

365. THE GUERRILLA'S ROLE

a. Many centuries ago some unknown and unsung commander forgot the rules. Instead of meeting enemy legions in ritualistic formation on the open battlefield, marching at the front of long unwavering columns of armor-clad troops, he deceived, surprised, and ambushed the foe—then ran. He was the father of what is known today as guerrilla warfare.

b. The word *guerrilla* is of Spanish derivation, meaning "little war"; the Chinese term for guerrilla is *Yu-chi*, derived from the character *Yu*, "To wander or travel," and *chi*, "to strike." In military terminology it has come to represent organized, or semioorganized, bands of fighters who conduct incessant surprise raids throughout the enemy's rear and occupied areas, concentrating upon the destruction of his communication, transport, and supply lines. Present-day guerrillas are professionals, specially trained, organized, and equipped to fight a hard, ruthless war of no fronts, behind enemy lines. In the Chinese Communist concept, guerrilla forces usually are supplied and directed by a higher headquarters and, in ideal situations, they act in coordination with the activities of regular forces at the front.

c. The guerrilla may fight after large-scale regular warfare has moved elsewhere. Operating in the vacuum left in the wake of an advancing army, he is a scourge to its rear and logistical elements. Strategically, the guerrilla can even affect the enemy's ability to conduct offensive operations at the front. The guerrilla also may function in the absence of organized warfare. Sometimes, even after a formal armistice has been negotiated, guerrillas continue a war under the direction of those who have just risen from the peace table.

d. In the last few years, guerrilla warfare has experienced a great resurgence, owing in no small measure to the emphasis given it by Communist military-political thinkers, in particular the Chinese Communists. Guerrilla warfare has played an im-

portant role in more than a few Communist-directed revolutions, wars, and aggressions throughout the world.

366. GUERRILLA FUNCTIONS

In Chinese Communist military doctrine, guerrilla operations have four important functions. Examples of all of these can be found in Chinese Communist activities over the last two decades. These functions are:

a. *Guerrilla Warfare Assisting in Defense of a Nation.* This was demonstrated in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression. In China, this form of opposition not only insured the operational existence of the Chinese Communists, but greatly facilitated their expansion and consolidation of rear areas behind Japanese lines, thus insuring them needed bases for the ensuing civil war against the Nationalist Government.

b. *As a Preliminary to Revolution or Aggression.* This function was best characterized by the recent conflict in Indochina, where the Vietminh Communist forces admittedly followed the Chinese Communist guerrilla procedure. Such an operation involves a war of three separate phases:

- (1) *The guerrilla phase* during which the overwhelming superiority of the enemy makes all operations extremely hazardous.
- (2) *The stalemate of attrition phase* during which opposing forces approach a balance of power and guerrilla forces are able to launch harassing and limited-objective attacks in relative security.
- (3) *The offensive phase* during which the balance of power shifts from the enemy to the guerrilla forces. Sufficient numerical superiority is built up by guerrilla forces to permit a large-scale orthodox military operation with the mission of annihilating the enemy.

In all three phases the gradual strengthening, expansion, and reorganization of guerrilla units into more regular, mobile, warfare forces is a decisive

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factor. As a prelude to their aggression in Korea, the Communists also organized and trained guerrilla detachments which were operating well below the 38th Parallel before the North Korean attack on the Republic of South Korea in 1950. The mission of these units was to pave the way for aggression by weakening the government, harassing the military, and propagandizing the people.

c. *As a Preliminary Phase to the Counteroffensive.* The Chinese Communists most effectively utilized this function in 1946 and 1947 when they organized and built regular divisions and armies around their old, loosely organized, guerrilla structure. These forces, after changing from guerrilla bands to mobile striking units within the space of a few months, proved to be a significant factor in the eventual Communist domination of China.

d. *As a Coordinated Auxiliary to Regular Armies.* Guerrilla operations in the enemy's rear are used to raise havoc with enemy supplies, communications, and assembly areas while the main elements of the regular forces are engaged in battle at the front. This last function was commonplace during the Chinese Revolutionary Civil Wars and again in Korea, where Korean Communist guerrillas were used subsequent to the Chinese intervention as well as before the North Korean attack.

367. BASIC CONCEPTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

Chinese Communist doctrine holds that successful guerrilla warfare is based upon a popular political goal, popular support, proper organization, and tactical resourcefulness. It is a phase of warfare that does not overlook a single opportunity to strike a blow at the enemy. The Chinese believe guerrilla warfare is a necessary complement to regular warfare; a strategic factor behind, as well as in front, of the enemy. It is an integral part of Chinese war strategy. MAO analyzes the four basic concepts of guerrilla warfare as follows:

a. *Guerrilla Warfare and Politics.* War is a continuation of politics and must possess a clearly defined political objective. This is especially true of guerrilla warfare; if this type of warfare is without a political objective, it will fail. Guerrilla warfare must inspire and unite the people of a country; consolidate the internal forces of a nation; and, in coordination with regular forces, destroy the enemy's



Figure 200. A Communist guerrilla unit.

political authority and establish favorable governments. Consideration of guerrilla warfare as a purely military problem will cause dissolution of popular support and the eventual defeat of such an effort.

b. *Guerrilla Warfare and Popular Support.* A corollary to the political objective is popular support of guerrilla warfare. If a political objective is maintained which is incompatible with the political bent of the people, this, too, will lead to failure. Because guerrilla warfare is basically organized and maintained by the people of the country, its survival and development are not possible if it fails to enlist their participation or is deprived of their cooperation. This concept underlies and explains the necessity of utilizing every possible propaganda device to gain and hold the people and convince them of diabolical designs and actions on the part of the opposition. No motive or action can be too base for the Chinese Communists to ascribe to an enemy.

c. *The Organized Character of Guerrilla Warfare.* A prerequisite for success in guerrilla warfare is organization. Self-activated guerrilla warfare, during its initial period, is marked by a sporadic and confused structure and must be organized as soon as possible. There must exist in all cases a firm

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political and military leadership whether guerrilla warfare is begun by local inhabitants, mixed units of regular forces and civilians, or detachments dispatched from regular forces.

d. Tactical Resourcefulness in Guerrilla Warfare. The tactics of guerrilla warfare are based on the exercise of initiative, resourcefulness, planning, and offensive maneuver, all adapted to existing conditions of the enemy, terrain, communications, and local population. Retaining freedom of maneuver, guerrilla forces carry out either independent operations or coordinated activities with regular forces according to the tenets of:

- When the enemy advances, we retreat.
- When he escapes, we harass.
- When he retreats, we pursue.
- When he is tired, we attack.

368. EVALUATION

a. Available writings on guerrilla warfare represent a broad cross section of Chinese Communist techniques in that field. Originally based on Soviet guerrilla texts, the Chinese Communists have since modified and altered much of the original Soviet doctrine to suit their own particular problems and conditions. The theories and practice advocated by the Chinese represent a culmination of some three decades of guerrilla experience. They have been made available to personnel at all echelons and serve as both political and military texts for the Chinese

Communist soldier. Communist guerrilla warfare is neither unscientific nor haphazard; it is a cold, hard medium of fighting, well-founded on recognized military principles.

b. Communist mastery of the art of guerrilla warfare has been amply and repeatedly demonstrated in areas such as China, Indonesia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Burma, Indochina, Korea, and Malaya. In advancing the strategy of Communism throughout the world, clandestine activity and guerrilla operations have been the handmaidens of much of the success the Communists have enjoyed. The Communists have shown themselves to be adroit at organizing guerrilla forces whose aim is to actuate the internal disintegration of a country. Recent Communist activities in Greece, Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines are examples of this technique. The most successful effort of all was in China, where the guerrilla forces eventually mustered enough strength to force the Nationalists to Formosa. Where there has been open warfare between regular Communist and non-Communist forces, such as was common in Korea, the Communists have shown themselves equally adept at organizing and employing guerrilla forces behind enemy lines. Skilled in the art of guerrilla warfare, the Chinese Communists have also been most successful in combating hostile guerrillas when they have met them. Thus it is appropriate also to include herein a discussion of Chinese Communist antiguerrilla strategy.

Section II. GUERRILLA STRATEGY

369. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

a. Political activity is generally regarded by the Chinese as the prime motivating force in guerrilla warfare. Doctrine cites three factors essential to effective employment of such forces:

- (1) Establishment of a clear and definite political objective.
- (2) A reliable populace.
- (3) Maintenance of organization and discipline.

These are achieved by intense propaganda and political activity. The political objective of a war must be firmly instilled in the minds of the people through the activities of the guerrilla forces themselves. By

this means, popular support, together with organization and discipline, is assured.

b. In addition to activities designed to promote widespread understanding of the political objective of a war, guerrilla warfare by its nature demands the support of a strong political-military effort. This effort has three aspects—its relation to guerrilla forces, to local inhabitants, and to the enemy. The objectives of each aspect of this effort are, respectively, unity among guerrilla personnel, unity of guerrillas and the people, and disintegration of the enemy.

- (1) With respect to unity among guerrilla personnel, the Communists contend that guerrillas are no exception to the rule establishing integral military discipline in an

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armed force. They hold, however, that such discipline cannot be compulsory (as in regular forces) but, to succeed, must be voluntary and based on open consciousness of the common political objective of the force. Through similar standards of living for leaders and men, equitable but harsh disciplinary treatment, and a certain freedom to deliberate and discuss activities, the Chinese Communists strive to develop a united guerrilla force. They do speak, however, against absolute equality between leaders and those led.

- (2) Chinese doctrine with respect to the guerrilla-populace relationship is one of fair treatment, by Communist standards, for the populace upon which guerrillas must depend for survival. Political indoctrination of both the troops and the people attempts to convince all concerned of an attitude of *laissez faire* on the part of the guerrillas, if not one of outright assistance to improve the conditions of the people and insure their support.
- (3) The principle of disintegration of the enemy is primarily manifested in propaganda to convince those forces of favorable treatment of prisoners and medical care for their wounded. The Communists contend that any other attitude leads to strengthening the enemy's internal unity and is contrary to the objective of destroying his forces.

370. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGULAR AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

a. MAO's writings point out several differences between regular and guerrilla warfare. These are primarily manifested in the number of units employed in an operation; their organization, equipment, and supply; tactics; command relationships; relations between front and rear; and combat duties. The following points illustrate basic differences in these types of warfare as viewed by the Chinese Communists:

- (1) *Tactics.* Guerrilla tactics are irregular, being based on freedom of maneuver, and generally devoid of decisive engagements. Guerrilla warfare does not contemplate the conduct of a war of position.

(2) *Command relationships.* In guerrilla warfare the criteria for effective command relationships are independent decisions and decentralized command. Guerrilla warfare requires only a small degree of coordination between units in battle, a general form of strategic cooperation between it and regular warfare, and tactical and campaign coordination between certain nearby regular forces and guerrilla units.

(3) *Combat duties.* Guerrilla forces, often operating from independent bases in the enemy's rear, engage in destruction of small enemy units, attrition and harassment of large enemy forces, surprise attacks on enemy communication lines, strategic delay of the enemy, and coordinated actions with regular forces in widely separated war areas.

b. Guerrilla warfare is not carried out solely by irregular units, however, but by regular units as well. Such assignments are usually caused by decentralization of the activities and command echelons of regular forces or altered relations between their front and rear. The operations of the Eighth Route Army in North China during the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression are an example of a regular force conducting guerrilla operations.

c. Guerrilla warfare can also evolve into regular warfare. The ultimate goal of all guerrilla forces organized under the aegis of the Chinese Communists is evolution into regular forces or a prime reserve source of trained manpower. Communist doctrine warns that it is wrong to consider regular and guerrilla warfare as distinct entities. Although guerrilla warfare may only occasionally become the chief means of conducting operations in a war, it remains a primary means of disturbing the enemy's rear. Regular warfare is the basic form of war because its strategic role is decisive; guerrilla warfare is its auxiliary.

371. GUERRILLA SOURCES

The Chinese Communists may draw guerrilla forces from a number of sources, the source being related to the mission the guerrillas are expected to perform. An occasion may arise wherein guerrilla units from all possible sources may be required to

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realize the strategic goal of a war. Examples of such units are:

a. A Guerrilla Force Created Directly From the Populace. In this case the inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist an invading force without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units. With forces of this nature it is essential that an organization be developed and firm political and military leadership be established at an early date.

b. A Provisional Guerrilla Force Formed From Elements of Regular Forces and Assigned Guerrilla Tasks. The mission of this force is to insure guerrilla coordination with regular forces in a war of maneuver. It also facilitates the development of guerrilla forces from among the populace in an area where such forces are not organized. Leaders of provisional units of this type are responsible for the development of local guerrillas from among the populace so that guerrilla warfare may be maintained after the departure of regular troops. Provisional forces may consist of detachments permanently assigned by the regular forces to guerrilla operations and dispatched to an area behind the enemy to become the leading force in guerrilla operations. Areas from which regular forces are likely to become isolated are considered appropriate for employment of this type force since such areas must not be neglected as a factor in the strategic plan for the defeat of the enemy. Regular units that, for one reason or another, are prevented from joining the main body of the army during retirement and are therefore left in the rear of the enemy also may revert to this type of guerrilla force.

c. A Guerrilla Force That Is an Admixture of a Small Regular Unit and a Local Guerrilla Force. This may be formed by implanting in the latter a regular unit (squad, platoon, or company) to accelerate the development of its fighting power. Again, the implanted body may be an experienced military-political cadre from regular forces which will assume leadership and become the backbone of the local guerrilla force.

d. A Guerrilla Force Formed From Existing Friendly Militia, Police, or Other Security Forces. Commanders of regular forces are cautioned, in this case, to avoid attempting to absorb such elements at the expense of local needs.

e. Guerrilla Forces Formed From Enemy Troops

Who Have Mutinied or From Reconstructed Bandit Groups. These types are the least desirable and most difficult to control. During the conduct of a war the Chinese Communists carry on active propaganda and contact work to promote mutinies among the enemy's forces. Indoctrination and organization of bandit groups that are active in areas of operations are also carried out so that such groups will not become tools of the enemy.

372. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

a. The Chinese Communists do not contemplate that the initial organization of guerrilla forces should be along the lines of regular forces. The primary factor in organization must be that of flexibility. The Communists consider three principles in forming guerrilla forces:

- (1) The need for political guidance through political commissars.
- (2) The necessity for strength in military command, even in the smallest units.
- (3) The requirements of unit self-reliance and self-subsistence.

Each combat unit must be capable of independent operations, and, within the general guerrilla structure, communication, medical, demolition, and reconnaissance units should have specific organizations and functions.

b. The Chinese visualize all types of guerrilla forces being based on, and supported primarily by, the Communist populace in an area of operations. For this reason, the basic organization of such a force is closely keyed to an existing governmental structure whenever possible. During the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and the Third Revolutionary Civil War, a rigid system of organization was established. The lowest level was based on town governments, each of which sponsored and controlled one or more guerrilla units of company size. At county level, guerrilla units of up to regimental size were formed and employed. Major guerrilla areas comprising a considerable number of counties were organized into army areas, with an army area commander and a political commissar as the leading authority on guerrilla warfare in the entire area. It was at the army area level that the maximum coordination with regular forces was effected. Each of these army areas was divided into army subareas which included two to six counties according to topography, the enemy situation, and

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Figure 201. A guerrilla sentry.

the size of available forces. When forces were sufficiently large, regiments and divisions were organized and placed directly under the jurisdiction of the army or subarea, depending on the local situation. This same pattern of organization has since been attempted in Communist-inspired guerrilla operations in both Korea and Indochina, although on a smaller scale.

373. STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

a. The Chinese-Communist concept of the functions of guerrilla warfare gives rise to a series of strategic problems encountered in the effective employment of such forces. Although much of the available guerrilla doctrine published by the Chinese relates to the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and the Chinese Revolutionary Civil Wars, these strategic problems, together with their solu-

tions, deserve careful attention for they are guiding principles in the employment of guerrillas.

b. The Chinese Communists contend that the basic principle of all wars is the preservation of one's own forces and the destruction of the enemy by all possible means. In applying this principle to guerrilla warfare, the Chinese argue that, since guerrilla forces are generally developed from small groups, the task of development of self-sustaining units from relatively defenseless bands must be considered. They prescribe six solutions to an equal number of strategic problems by which guerrilla forces can achieve the objective of self-preservation, self-development, and destruction of the enemy. These problems, Chinese solutions to which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs, are:

- (1) Execution of offensive operations in a defensive war.
- (2) Coordination with conventional warfare.

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- (3) Establishment of bases.
- (4) Strategic offense and strategic defense.
- (5) Development into regular forces.
- (6) Command.

374. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS DURING A DEFENSIVE WAR

a. Although the armed forces of a nation may be on the defensive, the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be offensive. Such forces, by maximum concentration of means, execute rapid, surprise assaults on the enemy, achieving quick, favorable decisions in each battle. Passive defense, delay, and dispersion of forces are to be avoided by guerrillas at all costs. The ability to maintain offensive operations during a defensive war is secured through retention of initiative, freedom of maneuver, and thorough planning.

- (1) *Initiative.* The power of the initiative on the battlefield, difficult to maintain but easy to lose, is the product of thorough study and accurate estimates of objective conditions, proper military leadership, and correct military dispositions. A guerrilla force seizes and retains the initiative by taking advantage of the enemy's weaknesses and his deficiency in forces at a given time and place. When faced with overwhelming odds the guerrilla force seeks to retain the initiative through dispersal and retreat.
- (2) *Freedom of maneuver.* Retention of the initiative leads to the ability skillfully to deploy guerrilla troops. Agile and resourceful concentration and dispersion of forces as the situation may require, together with the ability to effect rapid changes in the direction of action, insure the ability to continue offensive operations. Doctrine advocates maximum use of deception and feints to confuse and mislead the enemy. Loss of freedom of maneuver will result in inevitable defeat for a guerrilla force.
- (3) *Thorough planning.* Planning is indispensable to the offensive in guerrilla warfare. Whatever the size of an action, it must be preceded by the most detailed planning possible under the circumstances. The scheme of guerrilla planning is little

different from that of regular forces; it differs only in scope. Effective planning leads to retention of the initiative, freedom of maneuver, and continuation of offensive actions.

b. The Chinese Communists proclaim that guerrillas must execute offensive operations on their own initiative and permit no such operations to be forced upon them. The offensive is the sole means of destroying the enemy while preserving guerrilla forces. Pure defense, or retirement, is only a self-preservation measure and its utterly useless as a means of destroying the enemy.

375. COORDINATION WITH CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

There are three categories of coordination with conventional warfare. These are strategic, campaign, and tactical:

a. Strategic Coordination. Harassing the enemy and obstructing transportation and communications in his rear are examples of strategic coordination with regular warfare. Such coordination is effected on the highest military-political levels possible; in Korea, this coordination was carried out by headquarters, CPVA. Successful guerrilla activities raise the morale of the nation's regular forces and population, lower the morale of the enemy's forces and his people, and hasten the disintegration of his forces.

b. Campaign Coordination. Guerrilla bases and other forces in the rear of the enemy in a specific area within a theater are placed under the unified command of army group commanders. Each commander coordinates guerrilla operations with his plan of campaign.

c. Tactical Coordination. Coordination and cooperation in tactical operations are the tasks of army commanders and local guerrilla leaders. Guerrilla assignments in such operations may include containing a part of the enemy, harassing enemy transportation, provision of guides to assist regular forces, and reconnaissance.

376. ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES

a. The third of the strategic problems in guerrilla warfare is that of establishing base areas from which such forces may operate. Bases in guerrilla warfare are the means by which such a force insures self-

preservation and development. Within such areas, guerrilla forces are in complete control; they may establish local government to control the population.

b. The Chinese Communists advocate establishing bases in remote mountainous areas whenever possible, pointing out the ease with which such areas can be defended. As the areas become stabilized, guerrillas attempt to expand their territorial control. Bases may also be established in more readily accessible urban or rural areas, but are likely to be temporary or seasonal in nature.

c. Establishment of base areas in the enemy's rear and their eventual consolidation into a single area as guerrilla forces become more powerful in effect result in an encirclement of the enemy—on one side by regular forces and on the other by guerrilla forces.

377. STRATEGIC OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

a. The fourth problem confronting guerrilla forces is that of applying the principles of an offensive war regardless of the situation confronting the nation's armed forces. As the enemy comes to realize the extent of guerrilla development and its effect on his strategic goals, he will inevitably reach a point where attacks to eliminate such forces are essential to the success of his operations. Under such conditions, a guerrilla force assumes the strategic defense—a defense conducted in an aggressive manner, designed to foil encirclement and destruction through the employment of offensive maneuver.

b. Guerrillas must be alert to seize the opportunity for launching a strategic offensive. As guerrilla forces generally are not capable of attacking an enemy occupying a deliberate defensive position, doctrine teaches that the optimum time to initiate an offensive is immediately after frustration of an enemy attack. The guerrilla strategic offensive (or, more properly, counteroffensive) must hit the enemy while he is recovering from his failure and has not yet established his forces in a fortified defense area. Large-scale severance of enemy communication lines and sabotage of his transportation are also conducted at this time in coordination with the campaign of regular forces.

378. DEVELOPMENT INTO REGULAR FORCES

MAO contends that development of guerrilla bands into regular forces, conducting mobile warfare, is based on two criteria—numerical increment

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Figure 202. A guerrilla commander briefs his officers before the attack.

and qualitative improvement. The former may be achieved by direct recruiting of civilians or by combining small units formerly operating in separate areas; the latter depends on experience in battle and on the acquisition of adequate arms.

379. COMMAND

a. The sixth problem is that of command. The centralized command found in conventional warfare is, at the outset, inimical to guerrilla warfare, owing primarily to the scattered nature of such operations. This does not mean that guerrilla warfare cannot develop under an overall command at a strategic level. When regular warfare on a large scale and broadly developed guerrilla warfare exist side by side, it is necessary to coordinate the operations of the two, and a unified, coordinated command becomes imperative. Again, in a guerrilla base area there exist numerous detachments which make up a main force besides the armed populace pursuing normal social-economic activities. In such an area a centralized command is essential.

b. A strategic centralized command implements the directives of the Communist Government in regard to guerrilla warfare as a whole, coordinates operations of guerrilla and regular forces in each war area, and exercises command over all the armed forces in each guerrilla area or base. Subordinate units in such a command system accept strategic direction from above; top levels of command decen-

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tralize planning and conduct of campaigns and battles. This command system is, in effect, inde-

pendent autonomous guerrilla warfare under strategic unity.

Section III. CHINESE COMMUNIST ANTIGUERRILLA STRATEGY

380. BACKGROUND

a. The Communists have successfully employed antiguerrilla measures on the mainland of China. The retreat of the Nationalists to Formosa isolated bodies of Nationalist troops on the mainland; many of these chose to conduct guerrilla operations against the *de facto* Red Government. In addition to those militarily organized forces, other sizable partisan groups who regarded any established Chinese Government as a natural enemy also presented a threat.

b. At the outset, the Communists faced a country that for the most part was physically and politically suited to successful guerrilla operations. In addition to traditional anticentralism, there existed in China the three principal requirements for successful guerrilla operations against the newly formed Communist regime:

- (1) Police and military agencies that were inept, deenergized, and sympathetic to the guerrilla, thus allowing the guerrilla forces freedom of movement.
- (2) Support of anti-Communist guerrillas by at least a large minority of the people.
- (3) An area wherein the terrain permitted the characteristic guerrilla tactics of ambush, mobility, and evasion.

c. In a short period, the Chinese Communists have taken energetic action to provide the answers to this problem. They have organized a strong central government authority, with effective police, political, and military controls, in the areas previously overrun by guerrillas. Both economically and propaganda-wise, they have taken steps designed to turn the populace against the guerrillas; and, finally, they have done much to improve the old, crude transportation system which formerly, by restricting Communist troop movements, afforded the guerrillas wide latitude of movement.

d. Chinese Communist antiguerrilla strategy is based on a broad, realistic plan that coordinates the political, administrative, and military phases of antiguerrilla operations on a vast scale. The machinery for maintenance of internal security of the People's Republic is organized on a nationwide

basis; its avowed objective is to prevent the formation of a resistance movement, rather than to deal with one after it has formed. Through civil government, military, and Party controls, the Chinese Communist regime is prepared to deal harshly with anti-Communist guerrillas and their civilian supporters. The military and civil government systems show remarkable continuity of command; the Chinese Communist Party, through its ubiquitous organization, insures continuity of policy. The overall system works equally well to:

- (1) Continue the subjugation of dissident elements during time of peace, or
- (2) Suppress guerrilla activities within China during time of war.

A system similar to this internal organization is instituted by a theater commander during operations outside the borders of China.

381. CENTRAL AUTHORITY

a. When the Chinese Communists set up their central Government and consolidated its position, they established strong, centralized control over all of China. For centuries prior to this, no Chinese Government had effectively accomplished this task. Today China is governed from Peiping through 22 provinces, three autonomous regions, and three national administrative municipalities. Military control over China is maintained through the military areas. Initially, the military area commanders exercised a large degree of civil control over their areas, but today Peiping effectively governs through its civil and Party apparatus. The regular military forces are relatively free from civilian control problems. While the authority of the central Government was being stabilized, however, the military authorities insured that all directives from Peiping were carried out by local civil agencies.

b. At present, the central Government exercises control of internal security through two principal governmental agencies, both of which are found in, and coordinated by, the State Council under the Premier. These agencies are the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Public Security.

- (1) The Ministry of the National Defense,

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


Figure 203. Civil Party organization.

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which is the command organ for the Armed Forces of the People's Republic, is charged with carrying out the mission of the Armed Forces: "Defend the gains of the people's revolution and of national construction, and defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the country." No small portion of that mission is that part devoted to security of the State, namely, the Communist regime. The Ministry of National Defense retains direct control of a part of the security elements of the state primarily for defense of China's frontiers (par. 356). Other troops are allotted the Ministry of Forestry, but their functions are obscure.

(2) *The Ministry of Public Security* is the agency of civil government charged with the maintenance of public order and internal security. In its organization, the same geographical divisions are generally utilized at provincial level and below as in the civil establishment. The Ministry controls the so-called People's Armed Police; this force formerly consisted of Provincial Public Security Troops of the People's Liberation Army (par. 355).

c. The Chinese Communist Party complements central government control of internal security through its Party organization, which parallels that of civil government (fig. 203). Party committees at each level include Party members who serve in government, militia, military, economic, and educational institutions in the area. These people in effect supervise and direct daily governmental and civilian activities within their respective administrative divisions of the nation. For example, at provincial level the provincial Party committee, composed of key Party members in provincial government and civil affairs, supervises daily government activities. The military district Party committee is the military counterpart of the civil provincial Party committee. The civil and military Party committees act in close coordination at all times; in some cases, members of the military Party committee occupy positions on the local civil Party committee. Not content to control government and civil enterprises, these committees also carry out propaganda and organizational work among the masses to popularize and insure fulfillment of the

Party line, monitor the political faithfulness of the people, and enforce Party discipline among members and active followers. Auxiliary political organizations controlled by the basic Party branch committees form a tremendous source of information on the activities of the people, especially of dissident elements. This information is made available to the local military commander and public security official through the civil Party committee.

382. THE PEOPLE'S MILITIA

a. The People's Militia is not considered a formal part of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces or of the Public Security Ministry, but it does serve as a powerful auxiliary so far as security of the mainland of China is concerned. The Militia is believed to be organized only in the rural areas. Politically reliable personnel are given preference in recruiting programs. Normally the Militia is organized into company-size units in the rural districts, with detachments of platoon and squad size found in villages (fig. 204). It is believed that at county and district level there is a basic Militia regiment and one or more basic Militia battalions, respectively. These units become the control headquarters for the village units in the event the Militia is mobilized. In areas where there are neither civil police nor Public Security Forces, the Militia performs the duties of those organizations. The chief function of Militia, however, is to reinforce Public Security Forces and civil police by manning sentry posts and conducting patrols. It also acts as an agency for surveillance and gathering information for the Government and the Communist Party. The Militia is supervised by the county Military Affairs Committee, which is itself subordinate to a military subdistrict. Below the county is the district Military Affairs Committee. Below the county is the district Military Affairs Committee, headed by Regular Army officers—as command officers—and political commissars. These officers have no militia under their control, but are responsible for administration and training and for integration of Militia activities with those of the Armed Forces. They are provided with a small staff to accomplish this mission.

b. Militia training covers such political subjects as Communist internationalism and civilian mutual assistance and cooperation movements, as well as such military subjects as care and use of arms, combat techniques, and basic infantry maneuvers. Practice in capturing air-dropped personnel and in

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


Figure 204. Subordination of Chinese Communist People's Militia.

guerrilla tactics are also part of the Militia's military training. Field control over the Militia is exercised mainly by civil government, through the Party apparatus, since local Party leaders are often both officers in the Militia and minor government officials.

With Militia personnel familiar with the personnel and terrain of their territory any, sizable bandit or guerrilla force is almost certain of early detection. Suspected individuals are kept under surveillance by the Militia and any suspicious acts

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on their part will bring on prompt action by local security officials. With Militia personnel located in almost every village and hamlet throughout China the security forces are insured of early warning of suspected guerrilla activities.

383. ANTIGUERRILLA TACTICS

a. Tactics employed by Public Security, regular forces, and Militia to counter a guerrilla menace are similar, and consist basically of aggressive offensive actions by small, mobile forces. Commanders are enjoined to find the enemy, fix on him, and destroy him by continuous offensive action. Field operations are supplemented by intense political activities designed to weaken civilian support for the guerrillas and increase support for Chinese Communist forces.

b. Forms of offensive action against guerrillas fall into two broad categories—infiltration and ambush; and encirclement, attack, and mopping-up. Both are preceded by thorough reconnaissance and clandestine activities to determine areas likely to serve as hideouts, roads and trails approaching suspected or known guerrilla areas, the components of the guerrilla force, the characteristics of its leaders, and the sources of supply for the guerrilla force; and to detect proguerrilla groups among the civilian population. Special attention is paid to surveillance of known friends and relatives of members of the guerrilla group. All preliminary efforts are tempered with caution, and no effort is spared to achieve surprise in the attack. Once initiated, the attack is pressed vigorously until the guerrillas are brought to a decisive battle and destroyed.

c. Ambush techniques are most often employed against small, marauding bands of guerrillas. Encirclement tactics are normally employed in decisive operations against large, well-organized guerrilla groups. Experts at infiltration, the Chinese Communists teach a doctrine of establishing the encirclement by covert means whenever possible. Once the circle is closed, assault forces are passed through to execute a surprise attack. After the initial blow is struck by the assault forces, mopping-up action is conducted slowly and methodically. The encircling forces follow the progress of the assault forces, closing on the center of the area. Road blocks and ambush parties are left behind on roads and trails to prevent remnants of the guerrilla force from escaping. If the Chinese encounter a stubborn de-

fense, they will often break their circle and attempt to entice the guerrilla force to break out. Mobile reserves are positioned to intercept and destroy the fleeing force.

384. ANTIGUERRILLA MEASURES IN THE FIELD

a. Having had wide experience in conducting guerrilla campaigns in the past, the present senior Communist commanders recognize the effectiveness of that type of warfare against an untrained foe. Measures to combat this type of enemy are included in security measures taken by field commanders. A security unit exists at each headquarters, beginning with the regiment; its primary mission is the protection of rear installations and routes of supply. At regiment the security force consists of two platoons, while at field army level it may be as much as a full division. In Korea the Chinese Communists were known to have employed at least two security divisions in rear areas.

b. Routine antiguerrilla measures by field commanders are of two types—Extensive patrolling and screening actions; and local security operations. Reconnaissance units available to the commander are charged with preventing surprise by any hostile force. The reconnaissance forces range the flanks and forward areas of the unit being covered to accomplish this mission. Direct security measures instituted by each subordinate unit complete the command's activities to prevent surprise.

c. All Chinese Communist commanders are responsible for their own local security. In higher headquarters this function is carried out by the security unit organic to the organization, acting as the interior guard force. A series of sentry posts rings the headquarters and other important installations. These posts are in turn connected by roving patrols. A reserve force is kept on an alert status, giving the guard commander a mobile force to meet an attack in force by a guerrilla group. The Communists also still adhere to the old Chinese custom of furnishing bodyguards to important personnel; the guards accompany the individual at all times.

d. The commander relies on check points and roving patrols to check on the movements of personnel in rear areas. A curfew is normally imposed on the civil population, thus making the detection of dissident elements easier. Movements at night

are restricted to military personnel only. In critical areas the civil population may be evacuated entirely, as was done in some instances in Korea. Important communication facilities, such as bridges, tunnels, and railroad yards, all come under the attention of the area security force commander when the presence of guerrilla forces is suspected in the area.

e. When a Communist force is on the march, special precautions are taken to prevent the unit from being surprised. Small forces are stationed on the flanks of the march route to detect the presence of any hostile forces, even in rear areas. Combat troops are dispersed throughout the entire column to protect the trains in case of an attack by guerrilla elements. In addition, observers stationed to warn against air attack give the alarm on sighting any unidentified force.

f. In addition to normal security measures, each army group in the combat zone establishes what the Communists refer to as a "Bandit Annihilation Command" at each level of command down to battalion level. The command consists of selected staff officers whose duties consist of:

- (1) Planning antiguerrilla operations and execution of the directives of higher headquarters.
- (2) Conducting training in security and antiguerrilla tactics.
- (3) Conducting investigations among the

civilian population and maintaining liaison with local civil or military government.

- (4) Collecting and collating information on guerrilla activities and preparing and disseminating pertinent intelligence.
- (5) Directing operations against guerrilla forces.

The command at each level works closely with the unit Party committee and relies upon Party small group leaders and Youth Corps leaders at troop level for most of its surveillance activities, both among civilians and the personnel of the unit itself. These individuals are also the workers who conduct training classes for troops and spread propaganda designed to induce the civilian population to deny support to guerrilla bands.

g. The unit Party committee and unit political department are valuable auxiliaries to the field commander in combating guerrillas. One of the first actions by a Chinese Communist force on entering a new area is to engage in what the Communists refer to as "political reconnaissance." The purpose of this type of reconnaissance is to sound out the local populace and discover any persons who may be sympathetic to the cause of Communism. Once favorable contacts have been made, much information is channeled back to the headquarters through the various political apparatuses.

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APPENDIX I

CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

Section I. MILITARY ABBREVIATIONS

The Chinese Communist Army makes extensive use of Roman letters and Arabic numerals on maps and overlays accompanying operation orders to designate both individual units and tactical groupings. The same letters and numerals are frequently applied to military signs and symbols to indicate the size and numerical designation of a unit or the arm or service responsible for an installation. The abbreviations listed in this section illustrate many of the types likely to be encountered.

Infantry	I	Army Group.....	AC
Artillery	A	Army	A
Armor	TK	Division	D
Cavalry	K	Brigade	B
Antiaircraft artillery.....	AA	Regiment	R
Chemical	X	Battalion	b
Transportation	T	Company	P
		Platoon (3-platoon company).....	1/3
		Platoon (4-platoon company).....	1/4
		Squad (9-squad company).....	1/9
		Squad (12-squad company).....	1/12
Enemy unit.....	F		
Friendly unit.....	U		
Garrison	G		
Independent unit.....	S		
Reserve unit.....	R		
Security unit.....	J		
Training unit.....	GB		

Figure 205. Command echelons.

Figure 207. Miscellaneous units.

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4th Army Group.....	4AC	1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Garrison Regiment	1.2b G5R
Thirty-eighth Army.....	38A	1st Artillery Regiment attached to the 22d Division, Eighth Army.....	22D+AIR 8A
14th Infantry Division.....	I14D	One company, 2d Battalion attached to the 3d Battalion.....	3b+(1)P 2b
or.....	14D	1st Company, 2d Battalion attached to the 3d Battalion.....	3b+ 1P 2b
5th Artillery Division.....	A5D	5th Division less the 14th Regiment...	5D-14R
14th Transportation Battalion.....	T14b	Twenty-seventh Army less two regiments of the 81st Division.....	27A-(2)R 81D
72d Division, 24th Army.....	72D 24A	One platoon of the 9th Company....	1/3 9P
14th and 15th Regiments, 5th Division	14.15R 5D	One platoon of the Security Company	1/4 GP
12th Regiment, 4th Artillery Division..	12R A4D	Two squads of the 5th Company.....	2/9 5P

Figure 208. Examples of unit designations.

Section II. SYMBOLS INDICATING MILITARY UNITS

The symbols listed in this section illustrate many of the type applied to military units throughout the Chinese Communist Army. With the exception of the symbols used to designate unit command posts, there is little indication that the Communists have prescribed a standard system of basic symbols for armywide use. On the contrary, evaluation of cap-

tured maps, overlays, and sketches obtained in Korea indicates a lack of standardization and a practice of applying the immediate product of an author's imagination to a given situation displayed on a sketch. Symbols indicating military units are presented in the following figures in their most frequently encountered form.

Field army headquarters.....		Example: Air Defense Command...	
Army group headquarters.....		Political department (various levels)...	
Major command or army headquarters (designation of appropriate arm is placed in box).....		Division (brigade) headquarters.....	

Figure 209. Command echelons.

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Regimental headquarters.....		or	
Battalion headquarters.....		Observation and communications battery.....	
<i>Note.</i> Roman letter designating appropriate arm or service is placed within the flag at division, regimental, and battalion levels for units other than infantry. For example:		Survey battery.....	
Artillery regiment.....		Ammunition platoon.....	

Figure 209. Command echelons—Continued.

Symbols for infantry command echelons of battalion size and larger are presented in figure 208. Rifle companies, platoons, and squads are not designated by symbols but by combinations of Roman letters and Arabic numerals as shown in figures 208. The composition of larger infantry formations is also habitually designated by this method.

Figure 210. Infantry.

Antiaircraft artillery unit (medium or light).....		Figure 211. Artillery—Continued.	
Antiaircraft machinegun unit.....		Tank company.....	
Searchlight unit.....		Tank platoon.....	

Figure 211. Artillery.

Figure 212. Armor.

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Heavy tank.....		Mechanized engineer unit.....	
Medium tank.....		Bridge construction company.....	
Light tank.....		or.....	
Command tank.....		Depot company.....	
Amphibious tank.....		Equipment platoon.....	
Armored personnel carrier.....			

Figure 213. Engineer—Continued.

Figure 212. Armor—Continued.

Basic symbol designating engineer troops.....		Basic symbol designating signal troops.....	
Engineer unit.....		Signal unit.....	
or.....		Mechanized signal unit.....	
		Signal reconnaissance unit.....	

Figure 213. Engineer.

Figure 214. Signal.

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


Figure 214. Signal—Continued.

Figure 215. Chemical.

Figure 216. Rear Service.

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


Figure 216. Rear Service—Continued.

Section III. SYMBOLS FOR ACTIVITIES, WEAPONS, AND INSTALLATIONS

Map symbols employed to indicate activities, weapons, and installations vary widely. Some have undoubtedly been adopted from Soviet practices, some are similar to those employed by the Chinese Nationalists, while still others are again the product of an individual's imagination. The latter often are

standardized within armies through repeated use and reference to an accompanying legend. The symbols presented in this section are a compilation of those most frequently encountered on operation maps, overlays, and sketches and are not necessarily conventional throughout the entire Chinese Armed Forces.





Figure 217. Boundaries and delimited areas.

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Note. When depicting defensive situations the Chinese Communists frequently follow the practice of



delimiting and designating battalion, company, platoon, and squad areas as follows:





Figure 217. Boundaries and delimited areas—Continued.




① Infantry.

Figure 218. Tactical operations.

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① Infantry.

Figure 218. Tactical operations—Continued.

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



Figure 218. Tactical operations—Continued.



③ Armor.

Figure 218. Tactical operations—Continued.

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


Figure 219. Weapons—Continued.

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Light machinegun		Air strip	
or		Dummy air strip	
or		Bunkers (in a trench system)	
Recoilless rifle (57-mm.)		Artillery emplacement (in a trench system)	
or		Machinegun emplacement (in a trench system)	
Rocket launcher (90-mm.)		Dummy artillery position	
or		Supplementary artillery position	
Multiple rocket launcher		Primary artillery position	
Grenade discharger		Antiaircraft position, medium guns	
Flame thrower		Pillbox	
Note. The caliber and number of weapons are frequently specified in Arabic numerals beside the symbol thus—		Portable pillbox	
Two 76.2-mm. field guns		Underground pillbox complex	

Figure 219. Weapons—Continued.

① Field works.

Figure 220. Installations.

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Permanent pillbox		Abatis	
Semipermanent pillbox		Observation posts, infantry:	
Firing trench		Division (brigade)	
Connecting trench		Regiment	
Air defense trench		Battalion	
Antitank trench		Company	
Tunnel		Observation post	
Barbed wire		Sentinel	
Electrified barbed wire		Observation posts, artillery:	
Minefield		Division	
or		Regiment	
or		Battalion	

① Field works.

Figure 220. Installations—Continued.

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Observation posts, artillery—Continued.

Observation posts, artillery—Continued.

Primary forward observation post.....



Auxiliary forward observation post.....



① Field works.

Message relay post, foot.....



Radio intercept station.....



Message relay post, horse.....



Signal station, blinker.....



Courier relay station, bicycle.....



Telegraph station.....



Air-ground communications station.....



Radio direction finder station.....



Air-ground liaison station.....



Radar station.....



Radio station.....



Switchboard.....



② Signal Installations.

Main depot.....



Ordnance machine shop (sometimes arsenal).....



General depot.....



Ordnance warehouse.....



Branch depot.....



Weapons and ammunition breakdown point.....



③ Rear service installations.

Figure 220. Installations—Continued.

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or.....



Base hospital.....

Ration warehouse.....



Field hospital.....

Ration breakdown point.....



Collecting point.....

or.....



Aid station.....

Clothing warehouse.....



Rail transportation office.....

③ Rear service installations.

Figure 220. Installations—Continued.

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APPENDIX II

GRADE STRUCTURE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY

1. GENERAL

a. Despite propaganda to the effect that all members of the Armed Forces were equal, the Communists have long employed a grade structure, or system of rank, within the Armed Forces as a means of attaining centralized leadership. As in Western armies this system of rank fixes the character or quality of precedence bestowed on military persons. It marks their station and confers eligibility to exercise command or authority in the military service within the limits prescribed by regulations. In the Chinese Communist Army, strata of military precedence and authority determine the relative position or standing of each individual from the soldier to the commander-in-chief. In the past, the title applied to each rank in the grade structure was directly related to an echelon of command common to the Armed Forces. This procedure did not, however, limit use of the grade structure to command personnel. The Communists accorded to members of each personnel category a military rank commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of the position they occupied. Most ranks given to cadre varied from assistant platoon leader grade to army group grade; basic soldiers were referred to either as fighters or men.

b. Personnel holding a rank higher than that of army group grade, such as field army commanders and commanders of military areas and districts, were among the most trusted members of the Communist hierarchy. In dignifying their positions to the Western world the Communists usually applied to them the title of "General"; not, however, in the sense that a specific general officer rank was being implied, as in the U. S. Army. Ranks actually held by such individuals varied from Military District grade to Revolutionary Military Council Member grade, depending upon the highest position held by each individual.

c. In the Chinese Communist Army, cadre holding positions down to and including assistant platoon leader were considered officers. Personnel occupying positions of squad leader and assistant squad leader, or their equivalents, were considered

noncommissioned officers. The rank and file of the Army were limited to one grade in the system—that of fighter. Specialists in the Army were accorded recognition by assigning them a rank, though generally not above platoon grade.

d. In February 1955, the high command proposed, and the Standing Committee approved, a new officer services regulation for the People's Liberation Army. In effect, these regulations formally established an officer corps, announced a new system of rank, and provided for administration of the new officer corps. A companion regulation, the Military Service Act of the People's Republic of China, was approved in July 1955; this regulation, among other provisions, announced the introduction of noncommissioned officer grades into the service. Today the grade structure in the People's Liberation Army ranges from second class private through 17 intervening grades to that of *Supreme Marshal of the People's Republic of China*. The various ranks apply equally to personnel in all components of the Armed Forces. The adoption of these service regulations is further indication that the Armed Forces of Communist China are becoming a better organized, more efficiently administered force.

2. OFFICER RANKS

a. The officer service regulations of February 1955 established a series of 14 nominal ranks to be applied to officers of the People's Liberation Army. English equivalents of these ranks are shown in juxtaposition to those of the U. S. Army and the Soviet Army in figure 221. Although the illustration lists two sets of English equivalents—one for the Army, the Air Force, and the naval shore component; and one for the naval sea component—Chinese Communist service regulations employ a single set of characters to describe officer ranks (Romanization of these characters is shown in parentheses in fig. 221).

b. Application of these officer ranks varies according to an individual's branch and officer category. There are, for example, eight categories of personnel in the officer corps: Command, political,

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U. S. ARMY	PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY	UNCLASSIFIED SOVIET ARMY
	MARSHAL GRADE	
GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GENERAL OF THE ARMY	SUPREME MARSHAL (TA YUAN SHUI) MARSHAL (YUAN SHUI)	MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION MARSHAL OF ARM OR SERVICE
	ARMY, AIR FORCE, AND NAVAL SHORE COMPONENT	NAVY (SEA COMPONENT)
	GENERAL GRADE	
GENERAL LIEUTENANT GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL BRIGADIER GENERAL	GENERAL (TA CHIANG) COLONEL GENERAL (SHANG CHIANG) LIEUTENANT GENERAL (CHUNG CHIANG) MAJOR GENERAL (SHAO CHIANG)	GENERAL COLONEL GENERAL LIEUTENANT GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL
	FIELD GRADE	
COLONEL LIEUTENANT COLONEL MAJOR	SENIOR COLONEL (TA HSIAO) COLONEL (SHANG HSIAO) LIEUTENANT COLONEL (CHUNG HSIAO) MAJOR (SHAO HSIAO)	SENIOR CAPTAIN CAPTAIN LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE MAJOR
	COMPANY GRADE	
CAPTAIN 1ST LIEUTENANT 2ND LIEUTENANT	SENIOR CAPTAIN (TA WEI) CAPTAIN (SHANG WEI) 1ST LIEUTENANT (CHUNG WEI) 2ND LIEUTENANT (SHAO WEI)	SENIOR LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE ENSIGN CAPTAIN SENIOR 1ST LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT JUNIOR LIEUTENANT

Figure 221. Comparison of United States, Chinese Communist, and Soviet officer ranks.

technical, quartermaster, medical, veterinary, judge advocate, and administrative. Command and political officers are those individuals filling command, staff, and political positions in infantry, armored, cavalry, artillery, engineer, railway, signal, technical service, public security, air defense, air, and naval units. Of these individuals, all may reach the top general officer (admiral) grade except those in technical service and naval shore units; these officers are limited to the rank of colonel general. Officers in other categories, except administrative officers, are also limited to colonel general; administrative officers may be promoted above the grade of senior colonel only in special cases. The rank of supreme marshal is reserved for those high-ranking leaders who distinguished themselves in the civil war against the Nationalists. The rank of marshal may be conferred on a general (admiral) who had distinguished himself in organizing and training the Armed Forces or who has successfully led a large force in combat.

c. All general officers in the Army and Air Force except infantry generals have their arm of service as a prefix before their title such as: Cavalry major general, artillery lieutenant general, or air force general. Although naval ranks are the same as those for the Army and Air Force, all naval officers assigned to sea duty have the prefix *naval* before their grades; for example: Naval commander.

Naval officers assigned shore duty have no prefix before their title until they enter the general officer grades; at the time their title is modified by the prefix *shore*. Officers in service branches have their branch title prefixed as part of their rank title; this practice results in such titles as technical captain, quartermaster major, medical colonel general, veterinary colonel, judge advocate colonel general, and administrative second lieutenant.

d. Promotions of company-grade officers are effected by orders of the joint commanders of field armies or military areas for officers within the command, and by chiefs of branch directorates for officers not assigned to field armies or military areas. Promotions to and within field grade are made by the Ministry of National Defense. The State Council has the authority to promote officers to and within general officer grades. The Chairman of the People's Republic, with the approval of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, may confer the rank of marshal and supreme marshal. Promotions are normally made one grade at a time; the Ministry of National Defense, however, is authorized to permit a one-grade jump through the grade of lieutenant colonel; the State Council may authorize a similar action through the grades of colonel to colonel general. During peacetime, normal time in grade, through field grade, is as

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indicated in figure 222. Promotion to general-officer rank and above depends upon an individual's current responsibilities and military achievements. During time of war this schedule does not apply to officers in an active theater; time in grade may also be waived at any time for:

- (1) Officers credited with special achievements.
- (2) Officers assigned to a position calling for a rank three or more grades higher than their present grade.
- (3) Fighter and bomber pilots and navigators capable of all-weather operations who have carried out air missions with distinction.
- (4) Commanders and navigators of submarines and surface craft who have carried out naval missions with the distinction.

Personnel who have served their time in grade but have not qualified for promotion may have their promotion deferred for six months to two years. If, at the end of this period, they still do not qualify, they are reclassified or placed in the inactive reserve. Agencies that have the authority to promote may also demote within their scope of authority for promotions. One-grade demotions may be applied as punishment to all ranks except second lieutenants.

e. During peacetime, officers are posted through the same channels that handle their promotion, demotions, and relief. Figure 223 correlates ranks with probable positions in the Army. Senior officers are assigned to staff and command positions by central government agencies in Peiping. The Commander-in-Chief appoints and relieves the Chief of the General Staff, the directors of departments of the General Staff, and the director of the Inspectorate of the Armed Forces. The Premier of the State Council is empowered to appoint and relieve division and higher commanders and political commissars, and all other marshals and generals occupying equivalent positions. The Ministry of National Defense appoints and relieves assistant division commanders, assistant division political commissars, heads of division staff departments, regimental commanders, and other officers occupying positions of equivalent stature. Appointment and relief of commanders and staff officers at lower levels are the prerogative of the commander

UNCLASSIFIED	
PROMOTION TO	AFTER
1ST LIEUTENANT	2 YEARS
CAPTAIN	2 YEARS
SENIOR CAPTAIN	3 YEARS
MAJOR	3 YEARS
LIEUTENANT COLONEL	3 YEARS
COLONEL	3 YEARS
SENIOR COLONEL	4 YEARS

Figure 222. Normal time in grade requirements for officer promotions.

two echelons up the chain of command. During time of war, theater and field army commanders are appointed in the same manner as in peacetime. Appointment of other commanders and staff officers, however, is decentralized to senior field commanders; the high command retains confirmation prerogatives. Commanders of theaters, field armies, army groups, and armies may appoint and relieve key staff officers at the next lower echelon; they have similar authority over commanders two echelons down the chain of command. Officers may not be divested of their rank by virtue of being reassigned; an officer may, however, be forced to serve under an officer to whom he is senior. In an emergency, a senior officer has the authority to relieve a subordinate whom he believes to be unfit, but the senior must immediately seek approval from higher headquarters.

3. ENLISTED RANKS

The establishment of the officer corps in the People's Liberation Army in effect placed large numbers of former cadre in an enlisted category, reportedly at some sacrifice of morale. Former assistant platoon leaders and others with an equivalent assistant platoon grade no longer were accorded officer status. To restore their prestige, the high command adopted three noncommissioned officer ranks: Corporal, sergeant, and senior sergeant. In time of peace, noncommissioned officers who graduate from appropriate military schools or attend other training courses sponsored by the Ministry of National Defense may be commissioned second lieutenants. In time of war, those who attend appropriate troop schools or distinguish themselves on the battlefield may also be commissioned. The rank and file of the Army is accorded the grade of second class private or first class private.

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RANK	TYPICAL ASSIGNMENTS
SUPREME MARSHAL	COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
MARSHAL	MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, VICE CHAIRMEN AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL COMMISSARS, THEATER OF OPERATIONS, FIELD ARMIES, OR MILITARY AREAS. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.
GENERAL	COMMANDER AND POLITICAL COMMISSARS, ARMY GROUPS OR MILITARY DISTRICTS ASSISTANT OR DEPUTY COMMANDER FIELD ARMY OR MILITARY AREA CHIEF OF STAFF, FIELD ARMY OR MILITARY AREA DIRECTOR, GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT COMMANDER, BRANCH DIRECTORATE.
COLONEL GENERAL	COMMANDER OR POLITICAL COMMISSARS, ARMY ASSISTANT COMMANDER, ARMY GROUP OR MILITARY DISTRICT CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY GROUP OR MILITARY DISTRICT. DIRECTOR, GENERAL STAFF SECTIONS DIRECTOR, THEATER, FIELD ARMY, AND MILITARY AREA STAFF DEPARTMENTS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL	COMMANDER OR POLITICAL COMMISSAR, DIVISION ASSISTANT COMMANDER OR POLITICAL COMMISSAR, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY DIRECTOR OF STAFF DEPARTMENT, ARMY GROUP OR MILITARY DISTRICT. CHIEF, THEATER, FIELD ARMY, AND MILITARY AREA STAFF SECTION
MAJOR GENERAL	ASSISTANT COMMANDER OR POLITICAL COMMISSAR, DIVISION DIRECTOR, ARMY STAFF DEPARTMENT CHIEF, ARMY GROUP AND MILITARY DISTRICT STAFF SECTION.
SENIOR COLONEL	COMMANDER, SEPARATE REGIMENT CHIEF OF STAFF, DIVISION CHIEF, ARMY STAFF SECTION
COLONEL	COMMANDER OR POLITICAL COMMISSAR, REGIMENT DIRECTOR, DIVISION STAFF DEPARTMENT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COMMANDER, SEPARATE BATTALION CHIEF OF STAFF, REGIMENT DIRECTOR, REGIMENTAL STAFF DEPARTMENT. CHIEF, DIVISION STAFF SECTION
MAJOR	COMMANDER, BATTALION POLITICAL INSTRUCTOR, BATTALION CHIEF, REGIMENTAL STAFF SECTION
SENIOR CAPTAIN	COMMANDER, SEPARATE COMPANY. ASSISTANT COMMANDER, BATTALION CHIEF OF STAFF, BATTALION
CAPTAIN	COMMANDER, OR POLITICAL DIRECTOR, COMPANY BATTALION STAFF OFFICER
FIRST LIEUTENANT	ASSISTANT COMMANDER OR POLITICAL DIRECTOR, COMPANY JUNIOR STAFF OFFICER PLATOON LEADER
SECOND LIEUTENANT	ASSISTANT PLATOON LEADER JUNIOR STAFF OFFICER

Figure 223. Correlation of positions and ranks in the Chinese Communist Army.

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COMBAT PLANS AND ORDERS

APPENDIX III

Section I. GENERAL

1. COMBAT PLANS

Three levels of planning are practiced in the Chinese Communist Army: strategic, campaign, and tactical. (See chapter 5.) Planning at each level is accomplished by the highest authority possible consistent with the overall mission. Subordinate commanders follow faithfully the intentions of their superiors in formulating their own plans.

a. Strategic policies are developed and announced by the Council of National Defense. The General Staff, the operating agency of the Ministry of National Defense, translates overall policies of the Council of National Defense into strategic plans.

b. Campaign planning consists of the implementation of strategy that applies to specific theaters or large areas of operations. This type of planning is normally accomplished by a theater, field army, or army group headquarters. In Korea, campaign planning was accomplished by Headquarters, Chinese People's Volunteer Army (which served in effect as a theater headquarters) and, in some cases, by army groups. The Communists did not employ the field army in Korea.

c. Tactical planning is the lowest level of military planning; it consists of the preparation and direction of local combat operations. The tactical commander in charge of an operation is responsible for tactical planning. He may be an army group or a regimental commander, depending upon the size of the operation. Detailed tactical plans are distributed to subordinate commanders who follow them faithfully in evolving their own local tactical plans. At tactical levels, the Communists issue amended plans whenever the situation changes sufficiently to warrant such action.

d. Strategic, campaign, and tactical plans may cover either combat operations or administrative activities. Campaign and tactical plans are usually distributed to higher and adjacent headquarters and within a given unit, two echelons down the chain of command (through rifle company in the case of regimental plans), to permit concurrent planning. Section II of this appendix contains an example of

a tactical plan which was issued by a Chinese Communist large unit in Korea. Tactical plans pertaining to small unit actions may be found in DA Pam 30-87.

2. ORDERS

The Chinese Communists place all orders in one of two categories—administrative and combat.

a. Administrative orders pertain to all activities except actual combat operations in the field. Appropriate subjects for administrative orders are rear service activities, training matters, promotion or transfer of personnel, military court findings, and matters involving unit standing operating procedure. Administrative orders dealing with military matters are normally authenticated by the chief of staff and the staff department director or section chief concerned; those dealing with political matters are authenticated by the political commissar and the director of the political department.

b. Combat orders deal with tactical operations in the field and related supporting activities. The Chinese Communists apply the term combat orders to orders that control such activities as offensive or defensive operations, reconnaissance activities, communication, air defense measures, and troop movements. Combat orders are normally distributed two echelons below the issuing headquarters to acquaint subordinate commanders with the over-all operation. Combat orders usually are authenticated by the commander, the political commissar, the deputy commander, and the chief of staff. The complete combat order is usually preceded by a warning order; the combat order is often accompanied by liaison officers from the issuing headquarters to insure that all portions of the order are fully understood. Combat instructions are frequently used in lieu of complete orders; these instructions are similar to the U. S. Army's fragmentary order and apply to the part which a specific unit is to play in an operation.

c. From a study of combat orders captured in Korea, it is clear that no standardized form was

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followed by the Chinese Communists. On the whole, defensive orders were much broader in scope owing primarily to an attempt to list countermeasures to all enemy capabilities. Both offensive and defensive orders tended to be specific and detailed as to the actions of small units. All combat orders normally contain varying amounts of information dealing with conventional topics such as the enemy situation, the unit's mission(s), task organizations and missions for subordinate units, detailed information for offensive actions or defensive dispositions,

and general information relating to the entire command. Communist slogans or clichés are often found scattered throughout the order to stimulate *esprit de corps*.

d. Sections III and IV of this appendix present examples of orders, instructions, and SOP issued by Chinese Communist large units in Korea. Maps or sketches have been reproduced from actual maps or overlays that accompanied the original orders. Orders pertaining to regiments and divisions may be found in Department of the Army Pamphlets 30-87.

Section II. ARMY COMBAT PLANS

3. ARMY COMBAT PLAN

The following order is a good example of standard Communist practice in Korea—that of extracting from and expanding on the combat plan of a higher headquarters. In this instance the Sixtieth Army expanded the plans of the army group commander and transmitted them to its organic divisions. The

order also focuses on another feature of published Communist plans—alternate plans to be implemented during the course of an action depending upon the reactions of the enemy. Training directives for small units and administrative details are included along with the combat plan. The plan covers a wide span, ranging from the army group to small patrol actions.

Example 1

Combat plan, Sixtieth Army, CPVA,
16 April 1951

Top Secret Order No. 3.

Combat plan, Sixtieth Army Headquarters, Chinese People's Volunteer Army.

16 April 1951, at Kokcho-dong

The following plan is issued by Headquarters, XVIII Army Group, Chinese People's Volunteer Army:

I. The enemy has crossed the 38th parallel and seems to have the intention of resuming further attacks after a short period of rest and regrouping following the occupation of Hwach'on and Yonch'on.

II. If the enemy does not continue his attack after occupying Hwach'on and Yonch'on, we then will spend sufficient time to recover from fatigue and make preparations for resuming our attack. The attack is tentatively set during the first 10 days of May. The assembly areas of our troops are as follows:


The present position of the Twelfth Army and the Fifteenth Army will remain unchanged. The Sixtieth Army will use two to three regiments' strength to control the line from Sakcho, Kamsubong, Ch'on-dok San, to Yawol San as a final interception line; its

main body will be assembled under concealment and engage in combat preparations. If the enemy continues to advance northward, our original plan to launch an attack on a campaign scale on or about April 20 will be carried out. All army assembly areas and their scheduled attack directions are as follows. [See fig. 224.]

To the east, the Sixtieth Army is separated from the Twenty-sixth Army by the combat boundary from Kalma-dong, Uma-dong, Soyujong, Pongnae San, to Kyesong-dong (the line itself excluded). To the west, it is separated from the Twelfth Army by the combat boundary from Sakcho, Songhyon, Odong-ni, Chik-dong, Wonun-dong, Pansok-ni, Kalchon-ni, Ch'on-dok San and Yawol San remains unchanged. The Sixtieth Army's scheduled attack directions are as follows: On the right, from Songhyon, through Ch'on-dok San and Yulchon-dong, to Taegwang-ni; and on the left, from Kalma-dong in the direction of Taegwang-ni, and Wacho-ni, in order first to divide the 3d Division and the 25th Division of the U. S.

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area of Odong-ni, Och'ong-dong, Wonum-dong, Pansong-ni (all exclusive); Oewon-ni, Naewon-ni, Sosup'o, Bokmong-ni (all inclusive); Hyoe-yong-dong, Sangkatan-dong, Katan-ni (all exclusive); and Tokkom-ni (inclusive). After the offensive action starts, the 180th Division will advance behind the 181st Division and will be prepared at all times to support the 181st Division or to destroy the divided enemy in coordination with the 179th Division.

4. The 46th Artillery Regiment will construct fire positions in the vicinity of Ch'ondok San and Yawol San and repair roads of advance to support the forthcoming attack. This regiment will be attached to the 179th Division as soon as the 179th Division takes over the defensive mission at Ch'ondok San and Yawol San from the 181st Division. Its primary mission is to cover our infantry to penetrate when the attack starts. It will carry out the mission of interdiction only when necessary.

5. This army's headquarters troops will be stationed in the area north of Pansok-ni, Oewon-ni,

Naewon-ni, Sanma-dong (all exclusive) and south of Pyongam-ch'on. The army forward command post will be located at Sangmyong-ni.

The time for all divisions to reach their assembly areas will be announced later.

IV. Either the Ich'on-Anhyop highway or the P'yongyang-Chowon highway will be used as our supply line, depending upon the situation.

This is the basic plan. Should the situation change in the future, combat orders will be issued.

WEI Chieh

Army Commander

YUAN Tze-ch'in

Political Commissar

CH'A Yu-sheng

Deputy Army Commander

TENG Shih-chun

Chief of Staff

There are eight copies of this order. This is the 4th copy; it is issued to the 180th Division. Annex 1—sketch map [fig. 224.]

Section III. COMBAT ORDERS**4. ARMY MARCH ORDER**

The following order is an example of an order governing the movement of a large body of troops, in this instance the Chinese Communist Sixtieth Army. In compliance with this order, elements of

the Sixtieth Army moved from Antung on the Yalu River to Ich'on, Korea, a distance of approximately 460 kilometers. The march was accomplished during hours of darkness, and the troops covered approximately 32 kilometers each night, exclusive of the distances to and from off-route bivouac areas.

Example 2

March Order, Sixtieth Army, CPVF

17 March 1951

Sixtieth Army, Chinese Communist Forces

17 Mar 51,
at ANTUNG Hq

1. By order of army group, upon arriving at the north bank of the Yalu River each army will rest for two days before crossing the river. The Sixtieth Army will assemble in the vicinity of Ich'on, the Twelfth Army will assemble in the vicinity of Koksan, and the Fifteenth Army will assemble in the vicinity of Sok-chong-dong, Koksan, Yul-ri, and Sinke.

2. Our army will commence its march today (the 17th) and proceed from the present base in the following order: The 181st Division, the 179th Division, Army troops, and the 180th Division. The Army will pass through Sinuiju, Sonchon, Chongju, Anju, Maenam-ni, Chasan, Kangdong, Samdung, and Suan and

will assemble in the vicinity of Ich'on before 4 April. The departure time, march routes, and assembly areas of each unit are as follows:

First: The 181st Division will depart the present base today (17 March) and advance along the route given above. The division will assemble before 1 April between (not including) Ich'on and Umi-ri east of the Imjin River in the area bounded by Anhyop, Hoengp'o-dong, Hasikchom, and Oktong-ni.

Second: The 179th Division will depart from its present base today (17 March) and will march behind the 181st Division. The division will assemble between (not including) Ich'on and Umi-ri, with the Imjin River as a boundary, in the area bounded by Songjan-ni, Songjong-ni (about 20 li northeast of Ich'on) [One li=0.5 km.], Tongjom-ni, Naerak-ni,

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



Figure 225. Route of march of the Sixtieth Army.

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B. Voice and CW sets are to be centrally controlled and allotted by divisions; SCR-300 type sets are to be controlled and allotted by regiments.

C. Commanders should adhere to the "code system" in drafting messages as much as possible to avoid making it difficult for operators to encode.

D. The use of radios should be kept to a minimum whenever telephone communication can be utilized to insure security and to maintain radio sets in serviceable condition except in special cases. Random calling is not permitted; however, operators must maintain a listening watch on army communication systems, so radio contact can be immediately established if telephone communication is disrupted.

E. Principles of communication:

1. Higher echelons will be given priority over lower echelons, and urgent messages will be given priority over those of minor importance.

2. When two or more stations attempt to communicate with a station at the same time, each emphasizing the importance of its message, the operator of the voice or CW set or walkie-talkie will ask the commander of his unit to determine priority according to the actual situation. The operator must first try to determine the priority himself. The station designated lower priority will not cause further traffic interference with the other station.

F. Special voice or CW stations will be established by divisions to maintain prompt contact with their higher echelon (army command system). Regiments and battalions will also maintain constant contact with their higher echelon.

G. Frequency band allocation of the BC-1000 radio set:

79th Division: 1—10 M

80th Division: 11—20 M

81st Division: 21—30 M

Training Regiment: 31—35 M

(Same band for the Reconnaissance Battalion)

16th Artillery Regiment: 36—40 M

H. Call signs for the BC-1000 radio set will be designated by the various divisions based on the following designations:

79th Division: No. 1—19

80th Division: No. 20—39

81st Division: No. 40—59

Training Regiment: No. 60—69

16th Artillery Regiment: No. 70—89

Reconnaissance Battalion: No. 90—95

When establishing contact, call sign numbers are used, such as "No. 1" or "No. 29".

I. Call signs for the SCR-300 type radio sets will be designated by each of the divisions and will be reported to army headquarters.

II. Regulations for installing radio sets.

A. If the antenna is urgently needed for a station or a radio set before the completion of air raid shelters, delay in setting up the antenna is not permitted on the excuse that shelter or housing is lacking.

B. Under normal conditions, radio stations will start setting up the antennas not later than one hour after arrival in new defense areas; as for portable radios, antennas should be mounted immediately after arrival regardless of the situation.

III. Maintenance, transport, and care of radio equipment.

A. The radio operator will constantly instruct the generator man on the method and items to be noted in cranking the generator. The generator man reports promptly to the radio operator any trouble that occurs in the generator during operation, and must not try to repair it himself, thereby interrupting the operation.

B. Personnel on duty with a station, voice or CW unit, or walkie-talkie will not leave their equipment without permission no matter how dangerous and urgent the situation may be.

C. Operating procedure should be as simple as possible. Avoid long and unnecessary calls so as not to cause damage to the generator and the radio set.

D. Operators will constantly inspect and clean radio equipment and generators; give aid and assistance to the personnel who carry this equipment during march; and if necessary, help the generator man carry the generator so it will not be damaged by falling due to bad conditions of the road or fatigue of the generator man.

E. When working in an air raid shelter, the ceiling and the walls shall be covered with mats or rain-proof cloth to prevent dirt from falling into the radio and generator.

F. On rainy days, radio sets and generators shall be well covered with rainproof cloth to protect them from moisture. If operated in a cave or out in the field, place the radio set on a table or a piece of board.

IV. Operators must observe the following rules:

A. More listening and less calling will avoid delay, disclosure of secrets, and interference with the traffic of other stations.

B. Be alert to take advantage of the intervals between the transmission of other stations and locate the desired station and communicate to accomplish the mission.

C. In critical situations when radio traffic is heavy, a new operator should willingly accept the request of the other station for a change of operator if he has difficulty in managing the work himself. However, the other station should not request a change of operator without good reason.

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D. Keep various sorts of detailed records to serve as evidence when responsibility is sought.

E. Duty, relief, and security regulations should be strictly observed.

F. Priority of a message will be determined according to its nature and number. Change of priority should be avoided.

G. Messages received and transmitted should be reported on time to the unit commander, signal section (or subsection), and security section (or team).

H. When difficulty occurs in communications work or trouble with a radio set or generator occurs during operation, try to take positive action, and at the same time report it to the unit commander and the signal section (or subsection).

I. Adhere strictly to the unified frequency band

assigned by higher echelons. No unscheduled calls will be permitted.

J. Be familiar with the radio equipment or generator in the station which one is operating to develop the highest efficiency.

K. Antennas are to be erected on appropriate terrain, with proper height, and will be well-camouflaged.

L. Operating discipline will be strictly observed; there will be no disorderly chattering, no dozing, no listening to unauthorized broadcasts, and no leaving one's post without proper authority.

The foregoing instructions will be thoroughly studied and enforced by all units.

Chief of Staff, Twenty-seventh Army

Section IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS**6. ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER**

Most administrative orders dealing with rear service activities contain portions of the order that refer to combat operations. From the following order, issued by the Rear Service Department, Twenty-seventh Army, some knowledge is gained of Chinese Communist supply procedures during a road

march. One interesting feature of the order is that division, rather than army, engineers were placed in support of the Army Rear Service Department. It should be noted that the divisions in the Twenty-seventh Army had organic engineer battalions rather than companies as presently accepted. The last sentence of the order, with its political reference, is found in many Communist orders.

Example 4

Administrative Order, Twenty-seventh Army, CPVF

18 March 1951

Top Secret

Copy—No. 8

Time Issued—1620 hours

Received by—CHIANG, LIANG, LI

Rear Service Department, Twenty-seventh Army, Chinese People's Volunteer Forces.

Order

No. 1

Dated: 18 March 1951

Place of Issuance: Sonhung-ni

In compliance with army directives and in accordance with our missions, our various supply depots must move out with the engineer battalions of the 80th and 81st Divisions before the entire body of our Army starts off to complete our transportation operation in advance.

I. The starting time and bivouac areas for the 1st, 2d, and 3d Depots, and this department's transporta-

tion section (the Convalescent Unit of the 1st depot will move with this section) are fixed as follows:

A. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Depots will simultaneously start after dark on 18 March (throughout the march, departure must begin after dark). The 1st Depot must reach Kalhwa-ni within 6 days; the 2d Depot must reach Sangsinhung-ni within 4 days; the 3d Depot must reach West Tangam-ni within 8 days. Each unit will establish defenses and execute its duties upon reaching its march objective.

B. Routes of march and daily bivouac areas:

18 March: Start from present location, move through Changdong-ni, Ch'owan, and Yongjung following the highway and bivouac at Hungnam-ni.

19 March: Move through Kowon, Chigong-ni, and Munch'ang-ni to Suyon-ni and bivouac at Kiyomong-ni.

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20 March: Move through Munp'yong-ni Song-bung-ni, Wonsan, Wonsan-ni, to Songmu-dong and bivouac at Hao-dong.

21 March: Move through Yongwon-ni and Namsan station and bivouac at Sangsinhung-ni. Upon reaching this place, the 2d Depot will establish defenses and execute its duties.

22 March: The 1st and 3d Depots will continue to move through Kubangjiwon-ni and Kalsan-ni and bivouac at Sangsejuwon.

23 March: Move through Hup'yong-ni, Upnae-ni, Oekangdon-ni, and Ahyon-ni and bivouac at Kalhwa-ni. Upon reaching here, the 1st Depot will construct defenses and execute its duties.

24 March: The 3d Depot will continue to move through Sinan station and Simp'o-ni to Songp'o-ni and bivouac at T'angam-ni.

25 March: Move through Ch'angdong-ni to occupy west T'angam-ni. Upon reaching here, the 3d Depot will establish defenses and execute its duties.

C. The mission of each depot upon arrival at its destination: Before the march begins on 14 March, the 2d and 3d Depots, in addition to executing their rear service work, will also guard the provisions procured locally by the provisions procuring teams. The issuing of provisions will be supervised by personnel from the food and forage section to insure adequate food supply for the passing troops. The primary mission of the 1st Depot is to supervise the provisions procuring team and guard and issue provisions that it has procured from Kangwo-do. Furthermore, the 1st Depot is temporarily freed from its duty of safeguarding materiel, evacuating the wounded, and providing concealment for vehicles until all units have passed and the situation permits resuming those duties.

II. Missions of the engineer battalions of the 80th and 81st Divisions:

A. The engineer battalion of the 80th Division is responsible for the construction of air raid shelters for the truck liaison point at Hoedong-ni and for the trucks of the 3d Depot at west T'angam-ni. This battalion moved out from its original location on 15 March. It will reach Hoedong-ni (which is 10 li from Wonnam) [1 li=0.5 km.] within 2 days. Upon arrival at this place, the battalion will immediately construct 20 trucks shelters. After the 3d Depot has also arrived at this place, one battalion officer should be assigned to lead the battalion, leaving behind a company of troops, and advance with the 3d Depot to west T'angam-ni (location of the 3d Depot). They must arrive there within 6 days. Upon arrival, they are to construct 81 truck shelters. Meanwhile, the engineer company that has fulfilled its mission at Hoedong-ni should immediately advance to west

T'angam-ni, following the march route and bivouac areas of the 3d Depot and establish contact with battalion headquarters to complete jointly the above mentioned mission. After its mission has been fulfilled, the engineer battalion will immediately rejoin its division.

B. The engineer battalion of the 81st Division has been ordered to advance to Sangsinhung-ni and wait for the 2d Depot to arrive. As soon as it has arrived the engineer battalion is to cooperate in constructing 30 truck shelters. After its mission has been fulfilled, the engineer battalion should immediately return to its division.

III. Missions and march routes of the guard battalion:

A. Missions:

1. Within four days the guard battalion must reach Yongjiwon-ni. Upon arrival, the battalion commander must contact LIU, Assistant Chief of the Food and Forage Section. Assistant chief LIU will organize this battalion and his own provisions personnel into a provisions procuring unit, and assume overall control of it. If contact cannot be established at this place, the battalion should continue to advance to Kalhwa-ni (1st Depot location) in order to establish contact there. However, if contact is still impossible, then it should move to west T'angam-ni (3d Depot location) and wait there for further orders.

2. When the guard battalion moves out on 20 March, it must coordinate with officers from the various depots and the transportation section in delivering porters of the porter company, transportation regiment, to the various depots. (The porter company is divided among the three depots. The 1st platoon is assigned to the 1st Depot; 2d platoon, 2d Depot; 3d platoon, 3d Depot. For convenient control, all senior officers will take up their quarters with the 1st Depot while the other officers will take up their quarters with the 2d and 3d Depots.)

B. March routes:

- 20 March: Start at dusk, move through Yong-hung and bivouac at Hasach'ang-ni.

- 21 March: Move through Kowon and Chig-yong-ni to occupy Pomokchong-ni and bivouac at Yongjon-ni (5 li to the northeast of Munch'ang-ni).

- 22 March: Move through Munch'on, Munp'yong-ni, and Songbuk-ni to occupy Ch'ungsong-ni and bivouac at Unha-ni (10 li to the south of Songbuk-ni).

- 23 March: Move through Wonsan, Kyonsan-ni, and Yongwon-ni to occupy P'angsang-ni and bivouac at Pungsam-ni.

- 24 March: Move through Namsan station and Sangsinhung-ni and bivouac at Yongjiwon-ni (upon

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reaching here, contact assistant section chief LIU. If contact is impossible, continue to advance).

25 March: Move through Kosang-ni, Sangsejuwon, and Hasejuwon and bivouac at Tok-tong.

26 March: Move through Hup'yong-ni, Unnae-ni, Oekangdon-ni, and Ahyon-ni and bivouac at Kalhwa-ni (location of 1st Depot).

27 March: Move through Sinan station and Simp'o-ni to occupy Yonp'o-ni and bivouac at T'anyon-ni.

28 March: Move through Ch'angdong-ni to occupy T'angam-ni (location of 3d Depot).

IV. Precautions while on the march:

A. In order to prevent unexpected losses, all units should exercise strict control over their troops to avoid enemy air raids. In constructing truck shelters, engineer battalions of the two divisions must work at night.

B. When constructing truck shelters, engineer battalions of the two divisions must select their sites to conform with local terrain features. The minimum thickness of the cover must be 1 meter. The shelters must be so constructed that they are firm, suitable, well concealed, and not crowded.

C. All units must observe strict security discipline, be aware of spying, assassination, and all sorts of low tricks of the enemy's secret agents. Learn the movement pattern of the enemy secret agents and inform the troops of the same.

D. The transportation regiment's porter company and the guard battalion will start off simultaneously on 20 March. The guard battalion will temporarily assume control of the porter company, lead and assign it to various depots to perform duties. (Each depot will assign an officer to assist the guard battalion in supervising the porters.)

E. The 3d Depot should take the initiative to

move to Hoedong-ni and contact one of the companies of the 80th Division's engineer battalion and then advance with it simultaneously to west T'angam-ni to construct truck shelters. The 2d Depot, upon reaching Sangsinhung-ni, will also contact the engineer battalion of the 81st Division and jointly construct truck shelters.

F. Observe strictly mass discipline in order to extend the political influence of our Army.

By order of:

HOU Ching-chiu
Director, Rear Service Department
SUN Ying
Political Commissar
WANG Te-sheng
Deputy Director, Rear Service Department
CHAO Shu
Deputy Political Commissar

7. ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE SOP

At the time of its entry into Korea, the Chinese Communist Army had few field manuals or service regulations that applied armywide. The high command attempted to correct this deficiency when its effects became apparent during combat. Standing operating procedures covering many features of operations—both tactical and administrative—that commanders desired to make routine, were developed and issued at all levels of command. The sample SOP presented here was the result of instructions published by Headquarters Chinese People's Volunteer Army, Korea, with additions by the Sixtieth Army. The instructions cover a wide span of administrative procedures that range from combat reports to radio procedure.

Example 5.

Administrative SOP, Sixtieth Army, CCF

14 March 1951

Headquarters Sixtieth Army
Chinese People's Volunteer Forces

Order: No. 1

Subject: Important Wartime SOP

Dated: 14 March 1951

Issued at Antung

The following SOP is prescribed to meet future combat requirements in accordance with instructions

from the Volunteer Forces Headquarters and the actual situation of our army.

1. Reporting troop positions: After all subordinate units have arrived at their positions each division will report the general positions of its units to army within 1 hour; within 6 hours, army will make a comprehensive report to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army. Later, if there is any change in positions, a timely report should be made regarding start off time, time and

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place of arrival, situation encountered enroute, and preparations for the next move.

2. Reporting the combat situation: After combat begins, the enemy's situation, our intentions, and our troops' progress should be reported to the army headquarters at all times.

3. Brief combat reports: Within 3 hours after a battle or a phase of an operation has been concluded each division will make a report regarding the time and location of the fighting to the army, the identity of the enemy and our own units involved, the special characteristics of the enemy and our troops, a brief account of the battle, enemy casualties, our casualties, important combat results, materiel expended, and experiences obtained. Within 4 hours the army will make a report to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army and the army group.

4. Complete combat report: Within 3 days after each campaign (or battle) each division will submit to the army a complete written combat report which must include a summary of all combined arms operations and detailed combat statistics.

5. Information reports and intelligence bulletins: Any information relevant to the campaign plans of the headquarters of the Volunteer Army should be first reported to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army; any information pertaining to the scope of the army group's campaign operations should be first reported to the army group and then to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army. Any information concerning the army and the army group should be collated and reported to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army by the army group. In addition to analyzing and reporting combat situations and information obtained, a summarized intelligence bulletin should be published periodically. The contents of this bulletin should include enemy troop dispositions; actual strength, branch of arms, and designation of enemy units; and information on local terrain features and roads. The bulletin should explain in detail the sources of information contained therein and the methods through which it has been obtained.

6. Reporting of important matters:

a. Matters such as enemy surprise attacks, air raids, and vehicle accidents should be reported immediately. Every 10 days each division will make a comprehensive summary report to the army; every 15 days the army will make a similar report to the army group.

b. Rear service departments should report once a day to the various regimental and higher command posts on the situation regarding materiel, ammunition,

transportation, supply, evacuation of the wounded, and rations.

c. Within 2 days after each important engagement each division will submit a report regarding its troop strength (including a detailed account of the rifles, troops, and major weapons it has left).

7. Strict duty officer system:

Each command level must, from its command personnel, operations staff section personnel, and other staff section personnel, appoint a duty officer to receive information at all times.

8. Conference system:

If there is any change in a situation or mission, a conference should be held to study how it should be handled; all comrades concerned will be encouraged to attend to achieve uniform action. In addition to holding such conferences, smaller meetings will also be held frequently to study the situation.

9. Registration system:

Establish a registration system for recording the general situation, the combat situation, outgoing and incoming telegrams and documents, and orders and instructions. Each unit will also keep a battle diary.

10. Inspection system:

Every time an order is issued or a task is being carried out, inspection and supervision will be conducted to insure that it is properly executed. Commanders will discover mistakes and correct them. When a task is completed, a general discussion meeting will be held to critique it.

11. Other items:

a. When questioned by your superiors or subordinates all personnel must answer promptly. All commanders will prepare and submit to higher headquarters a summary of their actions regarding how they have carried out the orders, instructions, and intentions of higher headquarters. These summaries enable the higher headquarters to understand whether or not the actions that have been taken are in compliance with its intentions.

b. Radio stations of all levels must operate day and night so that messages can be sent and received at all times. In order to facilitate communication, a thorough understanding of all prearranged message codes and other codes is demanded of all personnel concerned. This is an effective method to exploit radio stations in transmitting messages. After the battle has begun, the use of walkie-talkies in reporting is very important. In using walkie-talkies, it is very important that the prescribed prearranged message code and coordinates are used.

c. A critique summary:

This summary should include exaltation of

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merits, criticism of misdeeds, discussion of fulfillment of orders, a review of the report system, preparation of the periodical summary, and details of the execution of the inspection system.

All units will comply strictly with this order.

By Order of:

WEI Chieh
Commander of Sixtieth Army
YUAN Tze-chin
Political Commissar
TENG Shih-chun
Chief of Staff

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APPENDIX IV

SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITIES

This appendix presents the student of Communist China's Armed Forces with brief sketches of 30 contemporary Chinese Communist military leaders who have been influential in shaping recent developments in the People's Liberation Army. These individuals are the brutal Communist opportunists who have been fighting and killing men for a fixed purpose and endured combat for over 25 years. Today they are spreading their theories to armed millions. These militarists are the strategists who will implement Communism's strategic plans in Asia; they also are the men who dominate the Communist rule in China and dictate Chinese foreign policy.

Military commanders, and others in control, have often been given very careful training. MAO Tse-tung is the son of a peasant who was wealthy enough to permit his son to attend a university. CHOU En-lai is the son of a rich mandarin; his education was obtained in Chinese universities, in Japan, and in Europe, where he traveled in France, Germany, and England organizing small Chinese Communist groups. Among the 30 of the most important military personages of the regime, 3 others are sons of landed property owners, and 1 the son of a factory manager; 4 have taken university courses in China, 2 in Japan; 4 studied in Europe; and 7 in the Moscow Asiatic Academy. Of the members of the high command, 4 followed the courses of military schools in China or Japan, 7 attended 2 of the military academies in Moscow, and 20 participated in the "Long March," which, in 1939 and the years following, carried the Chinese Communist Army from southern to northern China where it seized control of several provinces. All of them have been engaged in war for years. MAO Tse-tung, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, has been connected with operations ever since the "Long March." This is also the case with his comrade at arms, CHU Teh. CHOU En-lai, the foreign affairs specialist, was the political commissar at the Military Academy of Whampoa before the break between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Subsequent to learning of MAO's thoughts and concepts of war, it is well to examine the men under

MAO. The sketches that follow are not biographies in the conventional sense, but each is an index to an important military leader in Communist China today.

1. MAO TSE-TUNG

MAO was born of a fairly well-to-do family in Hunan Province in 1893. By Chinese standards MAO received a good education and was able to further his knowledge while holding a position in the library at Peiping University in 1918. In 1920, MAO joined a Communist cell in his native province and in the following year participated in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. From then until 1927, he devoted much of his time to organizing peasants; this activity was not in line with the thinking of Party leaders of the time, and MAO was more than once rebuked by the Party. During this period, MAO worked in loose coordination with factions of the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party founded by SUN Yat-sen which eventu-



Figure 227. MAO Tse-tung.

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ally came under the control of CHIANG Kai-shek. In 1927, MAO instigated a peasant revolt that, in Communist terminology, is known as the Autumn Crop Uprising. Shortly after this, he and CHU Te formed the cadre of the Red Army which soon took up guerrilla activities against the Kuomintang government. For some years this force was known as the CHU-MAO Army. It managed to survive four "annihilation" campaigns directed by the Kuomintang. In 1934, however, the fifth Kuomintang campaign drove the Communists from their mountain stronghold and started them on their famous Long March, a forced march of a year's duration that eventually ended in the city of Yanan in northern China, where the Communists formed a new base of operations.

In the interim, MAO had issued an appeal to the nation to resist Japanese aggression in northeastern China, a move that brought him (and the Communist movement) much needed support from elements of the intelligentsia, peasants, and industrial laborers. By 1937, MAO had eliminated the principal opposition to his leadership within the Party, and by 1942 his position was unchallenged.

In early 1937, MAO led the Party into a coalition with the Kuomintang on the pretext of fighting the common enemy, Japan. This coalition was highly rewarding to MAO's forces, for it brought them more arms, greater prestige with the people, time to organize the northwest and sections of north and northeast China along Soviet lines, and finally, a base of operations for war against the Kuomintang. In reality, MAO's forces spent only a small portion of their time and energy fighting the Japanese; probably as much or more effort was exerted in undermining the Kuomintang position.

In 1945, at the Kuomintang capital of Chungking, MAO and Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek signed a joint declaration announcing that an agreement had been reached and that unsolved problems were to be handed over to a conference. By October, however, fighting broke out between the forces of MAO and CHIANG and, except for short truce periods, lasted until early 1950 and Communist victory.

MAO's position in Communist China is fully insured by virtue of the fact that he is Chairman of the People's Republic of China, of the Chinese Communist Party, and of the National Defense Council. Through these positions, MAO directs and guides

the Chinese Communist regime. He has studied and written at length on military subjects and has a very positive grasp of military strategy and military operations. Furthermore, MAO has surrounded himself with an "inner elite" of militaristic men who are known to be personally loyal to him. Most members of this elite group share several common characteristics—long and intimate association with MAO, participation in the Long March, and top-level leadership positions in the Red Army.

2. CHU TE

Marshal CHU Te, MAO's principal lieutenant for nearly 30 years, was born in 1886 in Szechwan Province. The son of a landlord, CHU graduated from Yunnan Military Academy in 1911 and subsequently took part in the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty as a career officer in the warlord service of the Yunnan Army. In 1921, CHU Te was rewarded for his services with the profitable post of commissioner of police for Yunnan Province. With



Figure 228. CHU Te (wearing his new marshal's insignia).

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his fortunes seemingly made, CHU moved his retainers, concubines, and automobiles to a mansion in Kunming and prepared to enjoy his prosperity while decrying the affluence of anyone else.

His role as a pillar of the community was short-lived; caught flat-footed by a former provincial governor and war lord, CHU fled Kunming at the head of a bare company of garrison troops in a 600-mile trek that was a one-act rehearsal for the Long March. Shortly thereafter, CHU found himself general of a guerrilla band. In 1922, he went to Berlin to study and, ultimately to join the Berlin branch of the Chinese Communist Party (with CHOU En-lai). In 1923, he was expelled from Germany for subversive activities; he returned to China in 1926 via Moscow after studying at the Sun Yat-sen University in that city.

Upon his return, CHU reported to the Party in China to receive orders sending him to his native Szechwan Province. Guarding the secret of his Party membership, CHU applied for and received command of a Nationalist regiment during the period of the Kuomintang-Communist coalition. In 1927, he was appointed commandant of the Nanchang branch of the Nationalists' Whampoa Military Academy. After the Communists and the Kuomintang split in 1927, CHU revealed himself as a Communist and was one of the leaders of the Nanchang uprising.

Following this abortive revolt, he withdrew to a mountain stronghold in Hunan Province where, for nearly a year, he collaborated with local warlords and peasants and built an army. In May 1928, he joined forces with MAO Tse-tung in Kiangsi Province; there he formed the close alliance with MAO that has lasted to the present. As Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, CHU set about to develop the Communists' military arm. In 1934, CHIANG Kai-shek's armies forced the Communists to leave Kiangsi. It was on this occasion that CHU Te probably performed his greatest feat for the Communists: as one of the two leaders (the other being MAO) of the Long March to Shensi Province in north China, he was instrumental in holding together the nucleus of the present Chinese Communist Army.

When the Communists joined forces with CHIANG Kai-shek in 1937 to resist the Japanese, CHU was appointed military commander in the northern sector. He proved to be an active and

able commander in the early part of the Sino-Japanese War; during its latter stages, however, CHU increasingly devoted his time to staff work in the Communist capital of Yen-an. CHU retained his position as Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army until September 1954, when the Government was reorganized and MAO Tse-tung became Commander-in-Chief under the new Constitution.

CHU continues to hold highly important posts in government, Party, and military affairs. He is Vice Chairman of the People's Republic, is reportedly Chairman of the Military Bureau of the Party Central Committee, and is a Vice Chairman of the Council of National Defense. CHU is also a Marshal of the People's Republic of China. Constitutionally speaking, of course, CHU, in his position of Vice Chairman of the People's Republic of China, would theoretically succeed Chairman MAO Tse-tung in the event of the latter's death. Although his age would seem to rule out CHU as the possible successor to MAO, so long as the latter is alive there seems little doubt that CHU will continue to hold a place of at least high nominal esteem in Communist affairs. CHU is a very popular figure in the Army and in peasant circles, a factor that the Communists will continue to exploit for propaganda and morale purposes.

3. LIU SHAO-CH'U

LIU Shao-ch'ü, a Hunanese, was born of "rich peasant" parents in the vicinity of Changsha, the revolutionists' incubator, probably about 1898. Upon graduation from middle school he entered Changsha Normal School at a time when MAO Tse-tung was an upperclassman in the same institution. After receiving his normal school diploma, LIU went to Shanghai; there he joined the Socialist Youth Group which had been founded in 1919 at the request of the Comintern. This association was LIU's first link with the Communist Party. During the period 1920 to 1922 LIU and two companions went to the USSR to study economic and international labor problems.

Unlike most Chinese Communist leaders who are specialists in one area—the army, civil, or foreign affairs—LIU Shao-ch'ü, like Soviet Politburo members, has played every position in the field. During the period 1920–1927, he broke in as a labor leader. LIU lived with and organized coal miners

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Figure 229. LIU Shao-ch'ü.

in the Wuhan district until 1923, at which time he was transferred to the Party's Labor Secretariat. For a time thereafter he was a professional trouble-shooter among the labor unions in the coastal cities of Shanghai and Canton and in the Wuhan industrial area. By 1925 he had been made vice president of the All-China Labor Federation. Reportedly, in 1927, after an abortive attempt (with CHOU En-lai) to organize the unions of Shanghai and arm them for military action, LIU went underground. From 1927 to 1931 he is believed to have been organizing various labor groups in China.

LIU was elected a member of the Politburo of the Party in 1931 and joined other Chinese Communists, in 1932 in the Kiangsi Soviet area where he was made commissioner of labor in the provisional government. By 1934, LIU had been appointed a delegate from Kiangsi to the Party's Second Congress of Soviet Representatives; MAO was also a delegate. When Chiang's military pressure forced the Communists to embark on the Long March in the fall of 1934, LIU, just beginning to break into the Party's front rank, was too valuable to leave behind with those who were considered expendable; his role during the March is obscure, but he probably functioned as a senior political officer. From

1935 to 1937 he served as Secretary of the North China Bureau of the Communist Party and worked in the Party underground in Peiping. In 1937, shortly after the Sian incident, LIU returned to Yen-an. After the Nationalist-Communist split in 1941, LIU returned to Communist areas. As partisan activities enlarged Soviet regions to take in semiindustrial areas nominally under Japanese control, his position in the Party became more enhanced. By 1943, LIU was elevated to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the tight innermost circle that conducts the business of the Party; LIU had finally arrived in the front rank. In early 1945, LIU had turned his hand to the Army and served as political commissar of the New Fourth Army.

Party organization and government affairs have claimed LIU's attention since 1945. His was the chief hand in drawing up the Party constitution, promulgated in 1945. LIU also was instrumental in drafting the Common Program (1949) and the present Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1954). By controlling preparation of these documents within the Central Secretariat, LIU has perpetuated Party control over Communist China's civil government. Today, LIU Shao-ch'ü is recognized within the Party as its principal theoretician and is Secretary of the Central Secretariat, a position second only to that of MAO. He also reportedly is the Party's purge specialist. In government, he is Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. LIU is in an excellent position to assume *de facto* control of both Party and Government in the event of MAO's demise.

4. CHOU EN-LAI

Although at some time during his career he was accorded the title of General, CHOU En-lai makes no pretense of being a militarist and has confined his activities largely to the political field.

CHOU's family were officials of the governing class of China and were able to provide their son a middle school and college education. His first known contact with Communism was during his college years when he was arrested for his part in a student demonstration. He had begun his career as an agitator and attained the higher status of organizer when he returned from a year's study at Waseda University in Japan in 1919 to form a student club. It was in this student group that

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Figure 230. CHOU En-lai.

CHOU met the woman he later married, TENG Ying-chao, a 20-year-old student whose political ardor had been stimulated by a term in the Tientsin municipal jail.

In late 1920, CHOU joined a radical Chinese student group that was on its way to France; he spent the next four years in Europe, on funds believed to have been supplied by the Comintern, studying in France and Germany, and traveling in England. While in Europe, CHOU led in organizing the Paris branch of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 along with CH'EN I and NIEH Jung-chen (pars. 9 and 13 of this app.). With CHU Te he also created the Berlin branch of the Party; he returned to China in 1924 to become Chairman of the Political Training Department at the Whampoa Military Academy. LIN Piao and CH'EN I were among CHOU's students at the Academy.

When the Kuomintang armies marched out of Canton in 1926 on the Northern Expedition to destroy the power of the warlords, CHOU En-lai was commissar of the elite 1st Division of the First Army which was directly under CHIANG Kai-shek's command. CHOU was soon detached from the First Army, however, for the Party had a better job for him. Under orders of the Central Committee,

CHOU was assigned the task of organizing terrorist bands and militia elements among the workers of Shanghai in preparation for the 1927 Communist uprising. In the ensuing fight with CHIANG's armies to control the city, CHOU was taken prisoner by Kuomintang elements.

He escaped, however, and next appeared in Nanchang as a member of the Communist Revolutionary Committee which directed the military revolt that occurred in that city on 1 August 1927 (the birth date of the PLA). During December of the same year he participated in the abortive Canton Commune, Communism's last stand in China's cities for several years. Exiled to Hong Kong by the Kuomintang, CHOU was posted to Moscow in 1928 as a member of the Chinese delegation to the Comintern. Upon his return from Moscow in 1929, CHOU was appointed Chairman of the Organization Bureau of the Politburo, an agency that had become the steering organ of the Chinese Communist Party after the debacles of 1927.

Since his appointment to the Politburo in 1928, CHOU En-lai has continuously held major posts in both the Communist Party and the Government. CHOU is a master at one accomplishment essential to Communist bosses: He has learned how to fall from grace. For example, when relieved of his post in the Organization Bureau as a result of the Li Li-san purge in 1931, he reappeared as Chairman of the Military Affairs Bureau, which was to become the most active Party organ in the years to come. As an adviser to CHU Te, CHOU helped train the Red armies in the Kiangsi Soviet in political techniques.

CHOU has been prominent as a negotiator since 1936, when he was senior Communist representative to the parity for the release of Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek after the latter's capture at SIAN. Between 1937 and 1946 he participated in all negotiations between CHIANG's Government and the Chinese Communist Party. With the formation of the Communist Government in 1949, CHOU became Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs; in the latter capacity he went again to Moscow, this time to negotiate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and to secure military aid for the Party's Army. In his roles as government administrator and member of the Politburo, CHOU probably participated in the secret meetings that

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discussed and decided upon China's entry into Korea.

In Communist China today, CHOU serves totalitarianism, which he is ready to enforce with all the devices of modern psychology and technology. As Premier of the State Council he exercises control over the central Government's operating agencies, Communist China's police, and the Armed Forces. As Foreign Minister he is the spokesman for MAO's (and the Party's) policies toward Asia and the Western world. In his positions on the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Central Secretariat he is in a position to help shape Party policy.

5. PENG TE-HUAI

The current Minister of National Defense, Marshal PENG Te-huai, personifies the Chinese Communist military leader. In his long career, PENG has turned his hand to every form of violence, including assassination, to achieve his ends. A harsh disciplinarian and confirmed Communist, he places great emphasis on political education of soldiers. PENG is hot tempered, athletically inclined, hard-working, and reportedly a very difficult person to negotiate with. He probably is the best strategist and logistician in the PLA today.

PENG Te-huai was born of well-to-do peasants in 1901 in MAO Tse-tung's native province of Hunan. His stepmother reportedly drove him away from home before he was 10 years old and, as with many other Chinese youths of the time, a warlord army carried PENG into its ranks. Somehow the youth gained entrance into the Hunan Military Academy and emerged as an officer in the Kuomintang army. He took part in the Northern Expedition led by CHIANG Kai-shek in 1926-1927 and rose to the rank of brigade commander in CHIANG's forces. PENG joined the Chinese Communist Party when the split between the Communists and the Nationalists occurred in 1927. In the following year he played a leading role in the Pingchiang uprising in Hunan; helped found the Red Fifth Army; and, as army commander, occupied the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi. In the late fall of 1928 he led his soldiers to Kangshan to join forces with MAO Tse-tung and CHU Te.

PENG led the field forces (III Army Corps) that captured and briefly held the city of Changsha in 1930. In 1934-1935, his III Army Corps was



Figure 231. PENG Te-huai (in a marshal's uniform).

the vanguard of the Long March to the northwest. PENG served briefly in 1935-1936 as commander of all Communist forces in the northwest. He relinquished this command to CHU Te upon the latter's arrival in Yen-an, but remained as CHU's deputy in the famous Eighth Route Army in North China. PENG was one of the most important army leaders in the Civil War, particularly in the northwestern area. Following the defeat of the Nationalists in 1949, he held concurrent command of the Northwest Military Area and the First Field Army where he remained until called upon to command Chinese forces in Korea in 1950. PENG served in Korea both as a field commander and as the chief negotiator for the Communists at Panmunjom. From the close of the Chinese Civil Wars to the fall of 1954, PENG also held the post of Deputy Commander of the PLA.

PENG "resigned" from his position of leadership in Korea in early September 1954, when TENG Hua (par. 22 of this app.) became commander. Subsequent to the governmental reorganization in

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Red China in the same month, P'ENG was designated Defense Minister and a Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council. As a minister he is a Vice Premier and member of the State Council. Earlier in the year he had been identified as a new member of the Politburo of the Party.

In late 1955 he was appointed a Marshal of the People's Republic of China.

P'ENG is believed to have exercised more influence on the modernization of the PLA than any other one military leader. In Korea he required constant critiques of U. N. C. tactics and Chinese shortcomings from his senior commanders. These same commanders were admonished by him to devote themselves to diligent study of available Soviet texts on employment of large units. As Minister of Defense, P'ENG is in a position to continue these practices Armywide; he has firm control of the Armed Forces.

P'ENG is rated as one of China's top tacticians and military strategists. His recognized ability, relative youth, long and close association with MAO, and his background as a member of the "inner elite" of the Long March tend to make P'ENG one of the most important potential leaders of Communist China in the years to come. This will be particularly the case if the Army plays an active and victorious role in future years.

6. LIN PIAO

Marshal LIN Piao was born in Hupeh Province about 1908, the son of the owner of a textile mill. As a youth he was inclined toward practical politics in their most concrete aspect—the military one. After graduation from middle school in 1924, he gained admission to the Whampoa Military Academy. By this time he was already a member of the Communist Youth League. Upon graduation, LIN was commissioned in the Kuomintang Army and, despite his extreme youth, rose to command a battalion—this at the age of 19. LIN abandoned his career with the Nationalists in August 1927, when he led his troops to join the Communist insurgents at Nanchang. By 1930, he was commander of the Red Fourth Army and in 1934–1935 took part in the Long March as commander of the I Army Corps. In 1937 he commanded the Communist forces fighting the Japanese at the battle of P'ing-hsing-ruan. Later in the Sino-Japanese War, he was wounded and sent to Moscow for hos-



Figure 232. LIN Piao.

pitalization. Reportedly, he returned to China in 1942, and by 1945 was the commander of PLA forces in the northeast. After consolidating his strength, LIN led the field army that broke out of Manchuria and eventually drove the last Nationalist out of the stronghold on Hainan Island.

Following the Nationalist defeat, LIN became the chief administrative and military official in the South-Central Military Administrative Area.

Little was heard about LIN other than reports of illness for approximately four years. Seemingly he reemerged in the fall of 1954 as a significant figure when he was designated a Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council and a vice premier. By virtue of the latter position, he is also a member of the State Council. In the spring of 1955, LIN's position in the Party was strengthened when he was elected to a seat on the Party's Politburo; in the fall of the same year, MAO appointed him a Marshal.

LIN is recognized by many non-Communist sources as one of the outstanding strategists of Communist China. Assuming that CHU Te is rela-

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tively inactive in military affairs, it would appear that LIN is second only to Defense Minister P'ENG Te-huai in the active military hierarchy. Despite his youthfulness (he is the youngest member of the Politburo) LIN's future is an uncertain factor owing to his poor state of health. His failure to make an important speech at the Party Congress of March 1955 (whereas every other Politburo member did), plus lack of any Communist reference to him at the summer session (1955) of the National People's Congress, adds evidence to the possibility that illness has severely incapacitated LIN. Assuming that he returns to good health, LIN's future importance may rest upon the role that the Army will play in the years to come.

7. LIU PO-CH'ENG

Marshal LIU Po-ch'eng was born in Szechwan Province in 1892. His military career predates his entry into the Communist Party by some 15 years; he had been a soldier since leaving the home of his musician father in his early youth. He joined the Party in 1926 and was posted to the Twentieth National Revolutionary Army (Kuomintang) in which CHU Te was a division commander. Within 2 years LIU had played a major role in the Nanchang uprising. Subsequent to the Nanchang incident LIU fled to Moscow to enter the Red Army Academy where he existed for 3 years on a stipend from the Comintern while studying tactics and Far East politics. Upon his return to China he was appointed Chief of Staff to CHU Te; LIU Po-ch'eng, P'ENG Te-huai, and LIN Piao made up CHU's first team of that day. LIU took an active part in the Long March of 1934–1935, and, when the Nationalist and Communists ostensibly joined forces to fight the Japanese in 1937, LIU was given the command of a division in the famous Eighth Route Army. During the final phase of the Chinese Civil War he particularly distinguished himself in the area around the Yangtze River and in the drive to the south and southwest. Following the Nationalist defeat, LIU assumed administrative and military command of the Southwest Military Area in 1949.

Elements of LIU's field army "liberated" Tibet in 1951. In 1954, LIU was designated as a Vice Chairman of the Council of National Defense. In Party affairs, he is a member of the Central Com-



Figure 233. LIU Po-ch'eng.

mittee; in the military high command, Chief of the General Training Department. In 1955, LIU attained the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China.

LIU is very highly rated as both a tactician and a strategist. He is known as the "One-Eyed Dragon" and as the "Ever Victorious General." The one-eyed LIU is said frequently to commit his thoughts on strategy to poetry; a piece of poetry attributed to him reveals one of his basic concepts, remarkably in keeping with MAO's own teachings:

When you keep men and lose land,

The land can be retaken.

If you keep land and lose soldiers,

You lose both.

In recent years his name has been linked with aid to the Communist forces in Indochina. There also are suggestions that he might lead Communist efforts in other parts of Southeast Asia. While his rating in military affairs is quite high, this is dimmed somewhat in view of his lack of active participation in Party affairs.

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8. HO LUNG

"HO Lung emerged from banditry", according to a Chinese saying which is borne out by the man's record. Marshal HO began as a common Chinese bandit, sometime after he was 15 years old, under his father's sponsorship. He has been either shooting at people, or directing other men to do so, ever since. A successful bandit, HO was commissioned in the Hunan provincial army sometime in the mid-1920's. He and his bandits subsequently were incorporated in the Nationalist Army; HO later rose to command the Twentieth Army at Nanchang and was the leader of the Nanchang revolt. HO joined the Communist Party in 1927.

HO Lung was born around 1895 (some reports say 1887) in MAO's native province of Hunan. He has less formal education than any of the other prominent Chinese Communist leaders. Reportedly, he did not participate directly in the Long March of 1934-1935 but remained behind as a rearguard element. In late 1936, however, he



Figure 234. HO Lung.

joined the main Communist element in the northwest. During the Sino-Japanese War he commanded a division in the Eighth Route Army and later commanded the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region. HO served primarily in the Southwest Military area following the overthrow of the Nationalists in command of troops under LIU Po-cheng, and at one time he was reported as commander of that area.

HO has been described as a vicious man, but one capable of leadership in guerrilla units. In Party affairs, HO derives strength from his membership in the Party Central Committee. As a Vice Premier of the State Council, a Vice Chairman of the Council of National Defense, and head of the central Government's Culture and Sports Commission, HO is firmly entrenched in the civil bureaucracy. On the basis of the military reorganization of late 1954, it now appears that HO is less active in the daily activities of the Army; he is, however, a Marshal and in a position to influence long-range military policies.

9. CH'EN I

Marshal CH'EN I was born of wealthy parents in Szechwan in 1898. He is one of the most highly educated of the prominent Communist leaders. As a member of a Chinese student group, CH'EN attended several schools in France, including the University of Grenoble. Together with CHOU En-lai, CH'EN helped found the Chinese Communist Party branch in France while he was studying chemistry. He was expelled from France in 1921 for his political activities as a student. Following his return to China, he joined forces with a Szechwan warlord as a political worker and subsequently became an instructor at the Whampoa Military Academy. CH'EN later took part in the punitive Northern Expedition against the warlords under CHIANG Kai-shek. At the time of the Communist-Nationalist split, CH'EN threw his lot in with the Communists and was active as both a military and political figure. CH'EN did not participate in the Long March for a good reason; he was delegated the task of remaining in south-central China to lead guerrilla forces in that area. His were the troops around which the new Fourth Army was built in 1937-1938.

During the Sino-Japanese War, CH'EN commanded the important new Fourth Red Army for a long period against both the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists. By the end of the war against

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Figure 235. CH'EN I.

Japan, he had established sufficient prestige to be selected as a member of the Central Committee of the Party and to be appointed later commander of the new Third Field Army. CH'EN played an important role as a military commander in the war against the Nationalists. His Third Field Army crossed the Yangtze and captured Shanghai; CH'EN subsequently was made mayor of this important industrial city. In the period following the Nationalist defeat, CH'EN held the posts of Commander of the Third Field Army and Commander of the East China Military Area. His record as a general shows that he is tactically aggressive but strategically cautious. He is not a risk-taker, but a conservative, well-grounded officer.

In addition to important posts held in East China, CH'EN is also a Vice Premier of the State Council and a Vice Chairman of the Council of National Defense. Indications are that CH'EN was one of the principal beneficiaries of the recent purge of KAO Kang and JAO Shu-shih; allegedly, CH'EN had been at odds with both these men, particularly

JAO, who formerly was one of the leading figures of the East China Military Area. In 1955, CH'EN was appointed a Marshal of the People's Republic of China.

10. TENG HSIAO-P'ING

TENG Hsiao-p'ing was born in 1900 in Szechwan Province. Like several prominent Party members, he studied in France and joined the Chinese Communist Party there. On his return to China, TENG, like other Communist opportunists, joined the Nationalist forces and participated in the Northern Expedition. He became an overt Communist subsequent to the Nationalist-Communist split and worked in the Communist "Soviet" in south-central China. In 1934-1935, he joined in the Long March to the northwest.

During the Sino-Japanese War, TENG was an important political commissar in the famous Red Eighth Route Army. Following the defeat of the Nationalists he became the Government's leading political figure in the Southwest Military Area and the political commissar of LIU Po-cheng's Field Army which was stationed in that area. For a long period he was also the secretary of the Central Committee's Southwest Bureau. Today TENG's position in the Government is clearly an important one. He is a Vice Premier of the State Council and a Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council. His position in Party affairs rose markedly at the March 1955 Party Congress; not only was TENG elected to the elite Politburo, but he delivered the address announcing the purge of KAO Kang and JAO Shu-shih.

11. LO JUNG-HUAN

Marshal LO Jung-huan was born in Hunan in southern China in 1902. He reportedly attended Canton College. After graduating, LO joined the Communist Party and took part in several unsuccessful Communist uprisings. He joined MAO Tse-tung and CHU Te in 1928 during the days of guerrilla warfare in south-central China.

In addition to a history of long association with MAO, LO has a well-established friendship with Politburo member LIN Piao; as far back as 1930, he served as LIN's principal staff officer. LO presumably participated in the Long March, and during the Sino-Japanese War he spent much time in

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Figure 236. LO Jung-huen.

military and political organizational work in Shantung Province. He rejoined LIN's forces in northeast China in 1946 and, by 1949, was the political commissar of all the forces under LIN. Subsequent to the defeat of the Nationalists, LO was made Procurator General of the new Communist Government.

Today LO holds numerous important positions in government, military, and Party affairs. He is a member of the Central Committee of the Party, a Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and a Vice Chairman of the Council of National Defense. LO's influence is probably felt most in the political and personnel management affairs of the People's Liberation Army. He is director of both the General Political Department and the General Personnel Department of the PLA. LO's continuous rise in the Armed Forces, the Government, and the Party, combined with his long association with MAO Tse-tung and LIN Piao, mark him as a man whose influence can be expected to grow.

12. HSU HSIANG-CH'EN

Marshal HSU Hsiang-ch'ien, long known as one of the more brilliant military figures among the Chinese Communists, belongs to a small group of men known among the other officers as the "Whampoa Cadets." HSU Hsiang-ch'ien was born in Shansi Province around 1902; his father was a school teacher and a small landlord. HSU was one of the first graduates of Whampoa Military Academy. He joined the Kuomintang after graduation in 1924 and became a member of the Communist Party in 1926. As a covert Communist he served first as political director of a student regiment at a branch of the Whampoa academy and later on the general staff of a Nationalist army. Fearing detection, HSU deserted and fled to the Communists in Shanghai. He was appointed by the Party to teach military tactics to Canton workers, and he later participated in Canton Commune. Following this abortive action, he reported to the Hailu Feng Soviet in central China. There he served as Deputy Commander of the 31st Division. In 1931, HSU became commander of the Fourth Front Army, and a year later he transferred the army's base from central China to Szechwan, where for three years he was in charge of military activities in the Szechwan Soviet. When the Long March forces under MAO and CHU Te reached Szechwan, HSU's forces joined them. Reportedly, HSU was one of the principal advocates of halting the Long March in Szechwan (in opposition to MAO and CHU who wanted to continue to north China). When CHIANG Kai-shek's forces entered Szechwan, however, the conflict was resolved, and the march to the north was resumed.

After 1937, HSU became deputy commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the fighting against the Japanese. He subsequently was appointed commander and political commissar of the XVIII Army Group. In the spring of 1949 he took command of the Taiyuan military district in Shansi, his home province. In 1949 he was one of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council and Chief of the General Staff, PLA. He was also a member of the central Government Council.

Currently, HSU is a member of the Central Committee of the Party, a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and a Vice Chairman of the Council of National De-

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Figure 237. HSU Hsiang-ch'ien.

fense. He is also a Marshal of the People's Republic of China. Although detailed information is not available, his position may have been permanently weakened by his past close association with CHANG Kuo-tao in the Szechwan Soviet. CHANG, a former rival of MAO, was purged in the late 1930's.

13. NIEH JUNG-CHEN

Marshal NIEH Jung-chen, who was born in 1899 in Szechwan, is another of the more highly educated of the Communist leaders. He studied chemical engineering in France and Belgium and political and military science in the U. S. S. R. NIEH joined the Communist Party in 1923. He excels in the Russian and French languages. He returned to China in the mid-1920's and became secretary of the political department of Whampoa Military Academy under CHOU En-lai.

NIEH took part in the early stages of the Nationalists' Northern Expedition in 1926-1927. He helped to set up an early "Soviet" in Kwangtung Province. In late 1927, following the abortive

Communist attack on Canton, NIEH fled China for the Soviet Union. By 1932 he had returned to China where he served as LIN Piao's political commissar. He remained in this position throughout the Long March. Subsequently, NIEH became deputy commander in the Red Eighth Route Army under LIN Piao.

During the Sino-Japanese War, NIEH was active as a commander in the Inner Mongolia area, where he based his troops in the mountains of Shansi and conducted large-scale guerrilla operations against the Japanese. Here he earned a military reputation for sudden attack and elusiveness. In 1946, in one of the early Nationalist-Communist battles, NIEH's forces were defeated at Kalgan. By 1948 he had become commander of the North China Field Army. Following the occupation of Peiping he became the city's garrison commander and later mayor (a position he no longer holds).

In the early 1950's, NIEH was reported as acting Chief of the General Staff. He was later appointed Vice Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Academy.

In governmental and Party Councils he currently holds several key positions. He is a member of the Central Committee of the Party, a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and a Vice Chairman of the Council of National Defense. He is 1 of the 10 individuals on whom MAO has conferred the rank of Marshal.

14. YEH CHIEN-YING

Marshal YEH Chien-ying, born in Kwangtung Province in 1897 the son of a rich Cantonese merchant, graduated from Yunnan Military Academy and received further schooling in both Germany and Moscow. Before the formation of the Communist Party in China he was closely associated with SUN Yat-sen as a staff officer. During the early 1920's he served as an instructor at Whampoa Military Academy; he joined the Party there in 1926. When the Communists and Nationalists split in 1927, YEH openly joined forces with the Communists; later that year he became chief of staff of the Fourth Army. Following the Canton uprising, he was forced to flee to the Soviet Union. Following his return to China in 1931, YEH worked in the Kiangsi Soviet where he and LIU Po-cheng served alternately as Chief of Staff and head of the Red Army Military Academy. During the Long March,

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238. YEH Chien-ying.

YEH and LIU alternated as commander and chief of staff of the vanguard element. When CHIANG Kai-shek was kidnapped in late 1936, YEH was one of the principal negotiators for the Communists. In the following year he was Chief of Staff of the Red Army and also a delegate to Chungking during the period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation. YEH received further experience in military diplomacy when he served as the chief delegate to the Peiping Executive Headquarters during the Marshall Mission in 1946-1947. In 1947 he was Chief of Staff of the PLA.

Following the Nationalists' defeat, YEH served for a time as Mayor of Peiping. By 1950, he had been shifted to southern China where he has served concurrently as Mayor of Canton and Governor of Kwangtung Province. He reportedly has played an active role in liaison with Viet Minh forces from this position in Kwangtung.

YEH currently holds several important positions in the Communist Party hierarchy, in governmental affairs, and in the military high command. He is

a member of the Central Committee of the Party, a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, a Vice Chairman of the important Council of National Defense, and the Director of the Inspectorate of the Armed Forces. He is also a Marshal of the People's Republic of China.

YEH is rated as an excellent organizer and guerrilla warfare expert. United States officials in contact with him during the Marshall Mission rated him as a straightforward man, yet a persistent negotiator. Some Chinese Nationalists consider him Communist China's ablest military leader.

15. T'AN CHENG

General T'AN Cheng was born in 1903 in Hunan Province. Following a middle school education, he joined the Nationalist Army and took part in the Northern Expedition against the warlords. T'AN joined the Communist Party in 1927 and in the same year served as MAO Tse-tung's private secretary in the Communist stronghold in Kiangsi Province.

T'AN's service in his early days with the Party was mainly in the political departments. In 1930 he was chief of the political department of an army; by 1934 he was chief of the political department of an army group. By the early forties, he had become Vice Director of the Political Department of the famous Eighth Route Army. During the Civil War period he worked principally in police and political positions in North China. T'AN was director of the political department on LIN Piao's staff when the forces that later formed the Fourth Field Army broke out of Manchuria. In February 1949 he developed harsh but efficient plans to incorporate Nationalist units that surrendered near Peiping into LIN's field army.

By 1952, T'AN was Deputy Political Commissar of the South-Central Military Area. In this capacity he showed his ability as a logistician and an educator. When the Fourth Field Army encountered financial difficulties in 1950, T'AN developed plans to put the troops to work building collective farms and producing food; he also directed the troops to conserve on rations by skipping a meal or two for the good of the Party. In the field of troop education, T'AN is a capable organizer and manager of programs to promote literacy training and study of Soviet military science.

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In the national Government and in Party affairs, T'AN is a member of the Council of National Defense, an alternate member of the important Central Committee of the Party, a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and a Vice Minister of Defense. He is also a Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the PLA.

16. HSIAO CHING-KUANG

Senior Admiral HSIAO Ching-kuang, a Hunanese, was born in 1901 of a military family. He studied in the Soviet Union in 1919 and in the following year participated in the first Far Eastern Labor Conference. Returning to China, HSIAO continued his military studies at Whampoa and joined CHIANG Kai-shek's forces subsequent to graduation. HSIAO joined the Communists in 1927. At that time he returned to the U. S. S. R. for a four-year period which he devoted to study at the Red Army Academy. Upon his second return to China, he was selected to command an army group. HSIAO later became superintendent of the Military Academy at Juichin, Kiangsi, where the Communists had established one of their first Soviets.

HSIAO participated in the Long March and had an active career in the war against Japan. Following the Japanese surrender he joined LIN Piao's forces in the northeast as Deputy Commander, a position he retained for three years.

HSIAO was appointed Commander of the Navy in 1950, a position he still holds.

In Party and Government affairs, HSIAO is an alternate member of the important Central Committee of the Party, a Vice Minister of Defense, and a member of the National Defense Council. He is a fluent Russian linguist and has a Russian wife.

17. WANG SHU-SHENG

General WANG Shu-sheng was born of a peasant family in Hupeh Province in 1903; he is a middle school graduate. In his early days as a Communist he participated in military activities in the "Soviet" districts in eastern China. At one time he is believed to have been a division commander in a Hupeh partisan army. Although definite details are lacking, it is believed that he participated in the Long March. After several years in the Commu-

nist capital of Yenan as a staff officer, WANG returned to eastern China to command anti-Japanese guerrilla forces.

In the early 1950's, WANG was appointed commander of the Hupeh Military District, where he reportedly engaged in "antiguerrilla" activities.

A Communist Party member, WANG is a Vice Minister of Defense and a member of the National Defense Council. He has also been reported as being deputy commander of the South-Central Military Area.

18. HSIAO K'O

Colonel General HSIAO K'o, one of the younger of the Communist military leaders, is a native of Hunan Province. He was born in 1909, the son of a Confucian scholar. Although he did not finish high school, he is a graduate of the well-known Whampoa Military Academy. His active military career began with the Nationalist forces in 1926; by the following year he defected to the Communist cause and shortly thereafter participated in the abortive Nanchang Revolt. In 1928, HSIAO went to the mountain headquarters of MAO Tse-tung and CHU Teh in Kiangsi Province, where he became a leading guerrilla fighter.

Owing to his outstanding command ability, HSIAO rose rapidly in the Red Army. In 1932 he was appointed commander of the Sixth Red Army; during 1933 and 1934 he led operations against five divisions of the Nationalists' Hunan Provincial Army. In 1934 he was ordered by MAO to join forces with HO Lung and his Second Front Army in Hunan-Hupeh. In this perpetually mobile army, HSIAO's was the most mobile single unit. In November 1935, the Second Front Army began a long march of its own, covering approximately 10,000 li (about 5,300 kilometers) in 7 months to join the Fourth Front Red Army in Sikkang. Some three months later, HSIAO marched his army north under PENG Te-huai.

HSIAO has held numerous positions at almost every level of command from the period prior to the Long March through the long war with the Nationalists. One of his earliest commands was as a political director in a rifle company. Following the defeat of the Nationalists, HSIAO was active in military affairs in the South-Central Military Area. At one time he served as Chief of Staff of the Fourth Field Army. For several years he has been men-

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tioned frequently as having a leading role in the "Aid to Viet Minh" program.

HSIAO K'o, a Communist Party member since 1927, currently holds the positions of Vice Minister of Defense, member of National Defense Council, and once was, and may still be, Assistant Chief of the Training Department, General Staff.

19. LI TA

Colonel General LI Ta, a native of Shensi Province, reportedly was born in 1903.

During the Sino-Japanese War, he served as chief of staff of an infantry division and later as chief of staff of a "border region" in northern China. Since the defeat of the Nationalists, LI has been most active in the Southwest Military Area; in 1949 he held the position of Chief of Staff of the Second Field Army and later was reported as Deputy Commander of the Southwest Military Area and as a committee member of the Southwest Military Administrative Committee (now defunct).

According to Communist sources, LI served as Chief of Staff of the "Chinese People's Volunteer Army" in the Korean War in 1953. On the national scene, LI appears to have some influence by virtue of his position as Vice Minister of National Defense.

20. SU YU

General SU Yu, who was born in Hunan Province in 1905, is another of the younger outstanding Communist leaders. He joined the Communist Party and the Red Army at a very early age and has come up through the ranks. He joined the Student Corps of an independent regiment of the Fourth Army in 1927 and later served as a company commander and a deputy column commander. In 1930 he was given command of a division, which he led under CHEN I and LIN Piao.

When the Long March began in 1934, SU Yu remained behind in Kiangsi Province to conduct guerrilla warfare. Following the guerrilla campaigns and through the end of the Sino-Japanese War, SU held important command positions in East China including those of column commander, military district commander, and deputy commander of the New Fourth Army. This command experience provided valuable training for him. From a given bolt of military manpower, SU learned to cut, trim, fit, and sew together an excellent battle



Figure 239. SU YU.

garment with a minimum of waste. Organizationally he learned to achieve the maximum combat effectiveness with a given number of men. Tactically, he became a chance-taker. In the Battle of the Mengliangko in May 1947, after his troops had been included in the newly formed East China Field Army, SU was outflanked and hard pressed. During this combat—in the mountains of Shantung—he daringly used a portion of his force to screen his activities and intentions, and swung the remainder of his men into an attack against the Nationalist Seventy-fourth Army. Amid this barren, waterless place, SU drove his troops to a victory that led his opponent, General CHANG Ling, to pull the pin of a closely clutched hand grenade, killing himself and several of his staff.

Certain of the Chinese militarists regard SU Yu as their most skillful field commander. Lacking any formal military education, SU can skillfully handle large bodies of troops in combat. SU commanded the forces that took the strongly fortified and pillbox-

studded city of Tsinan (Chinan) in eight days during September 1948, after the Communists had long hesitated to try to capture the fortified city, with its reported garrison of 100,000.

An ardent exponent of the value of propaganda, General SU sent his battalions into the Tsinan battle with posters and paste pots. Within each captured city block SU's infantrymen had orders to paste up bulletins and posters. "Paste-shoot, shoot-paste," was the order of the day.

Following the Nationalists' defeat, SU became deputy commander of the East China Military Area under CHEN I. Concurrently, he held administrative posts in the same area. In 1952, SU was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff and accompanied the important Chinese delegation to Moscow. During the governmental reorganization of 1954, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff over a number of senior commanders. In Party affairs, SU is listed as an alternate member of the Central Committee. He is also a Member of the National Defense Council.

Although SU holds a very high position (as Chief of the General Staff) in military affairs, he has not participated in combat against a modern army. Neither was he among the first 10 of Communist China's military leaders to be appointed Marshals. He has, however, probably kept abreast of modern developments and no doubt will carry on established trends in the modernization of Communist China's Armed Forces. He has belonged to the proper MAO Tse-tung group for many years and appears to be on the rise in the Communist regime.

21. LO JUI-CH'ING

General LO Jui-ch'ing, a native of Szechwan Province, was born about 1901. He graduated from Hankow Military Academy in the late 1920's and in about the same period became a member of the Communist Party and joined MAO Tse-tung and CHU Te in Kiangsi Province. LO participated in the Long March, serving as chief of the political department of the I Red Army Corps.

In 1936 he was in the first graduating class of the Red Army University and later served as a vice president of that institution. LO is credited with having set up the intelligence organs of Communist China at about this time, although this is open to doubt. In 1940 he became chief of the political department of the famed Eighth Route Army.

LO served as the Communist Chief of Staff at the Communist's Peiping Executive Headquarters during the Marshall Mission (1946-1947). Throughout the rest of the war with the Nationalists, LO held numerous high political positions in the Army. At one time he was commissar of the 2d Army Group. Subsequent to 1950 LO occupied high-level positions in Army public security activities; he was once reported as Public Security director for Peiping.

In national affairs, LO holds the position of Minister of Public Security. He is also a member of the National Defense Council; a member of the Executive Board of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; and, in Party affairs, is an alternate member of the Central Committee. One reliable source rates LO as a man of mediocre ability who owes his present high position to his connections with MAO Tse-tung and CHU Te. The recent purges in Communist China do not appear to have damaged LO's position and, in fact, may even have enhanced it; as recently as June 1955, LO published an article in a leading Communist organ calling for increased security in both Party and Government affairs. In July 1955, complete control of all local Public Security troops was transferred to the Ministry of Public Security and converted to "People's Armed Police."

22. TENG HUA

Colonel-General TENG Hua was born in Hunan in either 1900 or 1910. His schooling reportedly includes training at a Peiping university, where he is said to have studied English, Russian, and Japanese; at the Local Cadres Institute at Jui-chin, Kwangsi; and at the anti-Japanese University at Yen-an. He took part in the Autumn Crop Uprising in 1927 and joined the Communist Party in 1929. He is a veteran of the Long March and of guerrilla warfare in central and north China.

Subsequent to the Sino-Japanese War, TENG played an active role as a military commander in the north against the Nationalists and, later, as commander of the forces (at least two armies) that took Hainan Island in early 1950. He then assumed military and administrative duties in the Kwangtung Province area. When the Chinese entered the Korean War, TENG led some of the first elements. Beginning in 1951, he served as deputy commander of the "volunteer" force in Korea and also, for a

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time, as the Chinese representative at the Korean truce talks. In September 1954, TENG replaced P'ENG Te-huai as commander of Chinese troops in Korea, a post that he held for approximately one month, when he was relieved by YANG Te-chih. TENG is believed to have become military commander of the Northeast China Military Area at that time and still holds that post. TENG is a member of the Council of National Defense, and in 1955 the central Government appointed him Chief of Chinese Military Representatives to coordinate the Soviet evacuation of Port Arthur.

23. YANG YUNG

YANG Yung was born in Hunan Province about 1905. After university training, he reportedly joined the Communist forces in south China as a guerrilla. He is said to have studied at a Communist Army academy in 1933.

During the Sino-Japanese War, YANG took an active part as a troop commander of guerrilla forces, for the most part in Shantung Province.

In 1946-47 he served as commander of the 7th Column of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Region; in 1947-48 as Commander of the 1st Column in Central China; in 1950-51 as Commander of the 5th Army Group in China; and in 1952-53 as Commander of the Kweichow Military District. In June 1954 he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea. By the spring of the next year YANG had succeeded to the post of Commander of Chinese Forces in Korea, a post he still holds.

In national affairs, YANG is listed as a member of the Council of National Defense.

24. LIU YA-LOU

Colonel-General LIU Ya-lou was born in Fukien Province in 1911. In 1929 he joined the Communists and took part in guerrilla fighting under CHU Te in Fukien. Most of his early experience was as a political officer. LIU made the Long March, and in 1936-37 attended the Red Army Academy in Yenan. In 1938 he went to the Soviet Union for advanced training; judging from his later career, at least part of this training was probably with the Soviet Air Force. The date of his return from the U. S. S. R. is uncertain, but by 1946 LIU was serving under LIN Piao in Manchuria as chief of staff.

In 1949 he was appointed the first Commander in Chief of the People's Air Force, a position that he still holds. LIU and CHOU En-lai journeyed to Moscow in 1952, presumably to solicit increased aid for the People's Air Force.

LIU is also a member of the Council of National Defense, but holds no other important position in either the Party or the Government. The fact that he is the only man who has ever commanded the Air Force, however, indicates that the Communists have considerable confidence in his ability.

25. HSIAO HUA

Colonel-General HSIAO Hua was reportedly born in Hunan about 1915. He appears to be one of the outstanding of the younger members of the Communist hierarchy. He initially established himself in the Army as LIU Po-cheng's lieutenant and chronicler during the Long March. In 1935, as LIU's army began to enter the mountainous regions of southwestern Szechwan, HSIAO was instrumental in negotiating safe passage for the force through territory controlled by aboriginal tribes unfriendly to all Chinese. Throughout the early forties he was in command of Communist troops in Shantung and from at least 1945 until 1946 served as Political Commissar of the Shantung Military District. HSIAO was sent to Manchuria in 1946. There he was appointed commander of a column under LIN Piao. As a column commander he participated in the siege of Szepingkai in May of 1946 where some 65,000 Communist troops, in one of the Communist's first experiences at position warfare, slugged it out with a comparable combat grouping of 5 Nationalist armies. After several weeks of stalemate, the Communists evacuated the battlefield overnight in one of the biggest tactical surprises ever perpetrated on the Nationalists in Manchuria. HSIAO also served in Manchuria as Commander of the Antung Military District and, later, as Commander of the Liaotung Military Region. He may have received military training in the U. S. S. R. in 1948; during that year he toured Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the U. S. S. R.

Until the fall of the Nationalists, HSIAO was active primarily in military affairs. Beginning in 1949, however, he became a leading Communist figure in mass youth organizations. In 1949 he was a member of the executive committees of the World Federation of Democratic Youth; from 1949-53

the National Committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth; and from 1951-53 the Standing Committee of the China New Democratic Youth Corps. HSIAO also holds an important position in the People's Liberation Army, as a Deputy Director of the General Political Department, General Staff.

26. YANG CHENG-WU

Colonel-General YANG Cheng-wu, a native of Hunan, was born in 1903. He is a graduate of middle school and the Communist Army Academy. YANG apparently entered the Communist Party about 1927, around the time the Communists and the Nationalists split. According to Communist sources he played a very active part in the Long March of 1934-35. From this period until the late 1940's, YANG commanded various regiments and divisions in north-central China.

Following the end of the mainland fighting, YANG was appointed Commander of the XX Army Group under LIN Piao. Elements of YANG's armies took part in the Korean War.

YANG is highly rated as a military commander and organizer. His influence on the national level is unknown, but he is a member of the Council of National Defense. His prime value to the Communists stems from his wide military background.

27. CH'EN KENG

General CH'EN Keng, a native Hunanese, was born in 1904 of a landlord family. He graduated from both the Kwangtung Military School and Whampoa Military Academy. In 1926 he spent a year in a military school in Moscow. At a later period he participated in both the Nanchang Uprising and the Canton Commune. After these failures he joined the Communist Party, which assigned him to underground activity in the Shanghai area. About 1930 he was active in a Soviet in central China and by 1933 was director of the Red Army School in Juichin, Kiangsi Province.

CH'EN took part in the Long March as a division commander. In 1937 he was assigned to a division under the command of LIU Po-ch'eng; CH'EN has been closely associated with LIU since that time.

During the Sino-Japanese War, CH'EN served in central and south China. Since the summer of 1950 his name has been linked with the "Aid to Viet Minh" movement, a likely possibility in view of the

fact that he has been governor of Yunnan Province and deputy commander of the field army in that area.

On the national scene, CH'EN is an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Council of National Defense. He is also a Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA.

28. WANG CHEN

Colonel-General WANG Chen, born in 1907, is also a Hunanese. In his early days he was active in Communist labor and youth groups as an organizer. He was also a railway worker, a job which apparently provided him with valuable background for his future assignments with the Communists. By 1927 he had joined the Communists and was an active labor (railway) organizer for underground Communist groups in east China. In 1929 he joined Communist guerrilla troops and participated in operations in the Hunan-Kiangsi border region. Before the Long March, WANG served as a brigade commander and political commissar with the Red Army. He participated in the Long March and served as a brigade commander in the Sino-Japanese War. Following the defeat of the Japanese, WANG served as Chief of Staff of the forces opposing the Nationalists in central Hupeh Province. At a later date he commanded the I Army Group of the First Field Army in operations against the Nationalists. WANG has long been an exponent of mobile warfare.

Since the Communist conquest of the mainland, WANG has been especially active in western China, particularly in Sinkiang, where he reportedly is in charge of the Secretariat of the Party. In the same region he also held important administrative positions and was commander of Sinkiang Military District.

The most recent reports place WANG as commander of the Army's Railway Corps, which would be a logical result of his earlier railway experience. With China in the midst of an active railway construction program, WANG may be in a good position to boost his standing with the Peiping regime.

In national affairs he is an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Party, a member of the Council of National Defense, and a member of the National Committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth.

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29. CH'EN HSI-LIEN

CH'EN Hsi-lien was born in Hupei about 1907. He rose from a very humble beginning which at one time included duty as a cowherd and later as an orderly.

He joined the Communist movement in 1927 and rose from the ranks of the Red Army to command a battalion by the end of the Long March. He attended the Communist Army University in Yenai in 1936-1937. In 1938 he was appointed commander of a regiment in the 129th Division, Eighth Route Army. In 1945 he became a brigade commander, and in 1947-48 commanded a column and concurrently served as commander of the West Anhui Military District. In 1949-1950, he commanded the Eleventh Army and concurrently the 3d Army Group.

In 1951, CH'EN was in Korea as commander of the 3d Army Group. In the same year, following his Korean duty, he was appointed the commander of artillery forces in the PLA.

CH'EN is a member of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Council of National Defense.

30. CHOU SHIH-TI

CHOU Shih-ti, a native of Kwangtung Province, reportedly was born in 1902. He is a graduate of the first class of Whampoa Military Academy in the mid-1920's. CHOU actively participated in the Nationalists' punitive Northern Expedition as chief of staff of an independent regiment. In 1927 he

defected to the Communists and participated in the Nanchang Revolt. For a period he was associated with CHU Te in Kwangtung and Kiangsi Provinces.

CHOU reportedly severed relations with the Communists some time in the late 1920's and did not rejoin them until 1932. If this is true, it would probably place CHOU in a highly questionable position with the Communist hierarchy. In 1934 he served as an instructor in the Red Army and in the same year participated in the Long March. During the Sino-Japanese War and the final civil war with the Nationalists he served in various high positions, usually as a chief of staff of a division or higher echelon. In 1950 he commanded an army group under LIU Po-cheng.

Just before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Chinese Communist regime presumptuously selected CHOU as the Chinese delegate to the Allied Council for Japan, the organization originally intended to control the occupation of Japan. (The Chinese Communists, of course, were never represented on the Council at any time.)

In the period following the defeat of the Nationalists, CHOU was associated with government and military forces in the Southwest Military Area. By 1952, Communist sources listed him as the Commander of the Air Defense Corps, a position that he still holds. CHOU's name has also been linked with paratroop training.

In national affairs, CHOU Shih-ti is a member of the Council of National Defense.

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Glossary of Terms (Unclassified)

Section I. English—Chinese (Unclassified)

English and Romanization	Characters
Active Defense—CHÍ CHÍ FÁNG YÜ	積極防禦
Adjutant—FÜ KÜAN	副官
Administrative Area—HSÍNG CHÈNG CH'Ü	行政區
Administrative Services—HSÍNG CHÈNG CH'IN WÜ	行政勤務
Advance—CH'ÍEN CH'IN	前進
Advanced Party—CHIÊN PING LIÊN	尖兵連
Advance Guard—CH'ÍEN WÈI	前衛
Aerial Photography—K'ÜNG CHÜNG SHÈ YING	空中攝影
Agent—T'È WÜ	特務
Agricultural—NÜNG YEH TE	農業的
Air Attack—K'ÜNG HSI	空襲
Airborne Attack—K'ÜNG CHIANG KÜNG CHÍ	空降攻擊
Airborne Forces—K'ÜNG CHIANG PÜ TUI	空降部隊
Airfield—FÈI CHÍ CH'ANG	飛機場
Air Force—K'ÜNG CHÜN	空軍
Airplane, Plane—FÈI CHÍ	飛機
Air Reconnaissance—K'ÜNG CHÜNG SÖU SÖ	空中搜索
Alarm, Warning Signal—CHING PAO	警報
Alliance—T'ÜNG MÉNG	同盟
Ally—MÉNG KÜO	盟國
Alternate Position—YÜ PÈI CHÈN TÍ	預備陣地
Ambulance—CHIÜ HÜ CH'È	救護車
Ambush—MÁI FÜ	埋伏
Ammunition—TÀN YAO	彈藥
Ammunition Depot—TÀN YAO K'Ü	彈藥庫

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English and Romanization

Characters

Amphibious—SHŪI LŪ LIǎNG YŪNG TE	水陸兩用的
Annihilation—CH'ÏEN MIĒH	殲滅
Antiaircraft Artillery—KǎO SHĒ P'ÀO PING	高射炮兵
Antiguerrilla—FǎN YŪ CH'Ī	反游擊
Antitank Defense—CHǎN CH'Ē FǎNG YŪ	戰車防禦
Antitank Guns—CHǎN CH'Ē FǎNG YŪ P'ÀO	戰車防禦炮
Antitank Mines—FǎNG CHǎN CH'Ē TÌ LĒI	防戰車地雷
Antitank Obstacle—FǎNG CHǎN CH'Ē CHǎNG ÀI WŪ	防戰車障礙物
Antitank Weapons—FǎNG CHǎN CH'Ē WŪ CH'Ī	防戰車武器
Arctic—HǎN TÀI	寒帶
Armament—CHŪN PĒI	軍備
Armistice—T'ING CHǎN	停戰
Armored Car—CHUǎNG CHIǎ CH'Ē	裝甲車
Armored Division—CHUǎNG CHIǎ SHĪH	裝甲師
Armored Force—CHUǎNG CHIǎ PŪ TŪI	裝甲部隊
Arms—WŪ CH'Ī	武器
Army (General Sense)—LŪ CHŪN	陸軍
Army (Unit)—CHŪN	軍
Army Group—PING T'UǎN	兵團
Arsenal—PING KUNG CHǎNG	兵工廠
Artillery—P'ÀO PING	炮兵
Artillery Observation Post—P'ÀO PING KUǎN TS'Ē SŌ	炮兵觀測所
Artillery Observer—P'ÀO PING KUǎN TS'Ē YŪǎN	炮兵觀測員
Assault, Rush—CH'UNG FENG	衝鋒
Assemblies—CH'Ī CHUNG	集中
Assignment—CH'ĪH TSĒ	職責
Attack—KUNG CH'Ī	攻擊
Attrition—HSIǎO HǎO	消耗
Authorities—CH'ĪH CH'UǎN	職權
Automatic Rifle—TZŪ TUNG PŪ CH'ǎNG	自動步鎗

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English and Romanization

Characters

Auxiliary—PŪ CHŪ TE	補助的
Awards—CHIǎNG SHǎNG	獎賞
Axis of Attack—KUNG CH'Ī CHOU HSIĒN	攻擊軸線
Bandage—PENG TAI	繃帶
Barbed Wire—T'ĪEH SZŪ WǎNG	鐵絲網
Barracks—YING FǎNG	營房
Barrage Fire—TǎN MŪ	彈幕
Barricade—TǎO LŪ TSŪ CHŪEH	道路阻絕
Battalion—YING	營
Battle—CHǎN TŌU	戰鬥
Battle Area Reconnaissance CHǎN CH'ANG CHĒN CH'ǎ	戰場偵察
Battlefield—CHǎN CH'ANG	戰場
Battleground Reconnaissance—CHǎN TÌ CHĒN CH'ǎ	戰地偵察
Bayonet—TZ'Ū TǎO	刺刀
Billet—YING SHE	營舍
Biological Warfare—HSI CHŪN CHǎN	細菌戰
Bivouac—SŪ YING	宿營
Blanket—CHŪN TǎN	軍毯
Boat—CH'UǎN	船
Bomb (Noun)—CHǎ TǎN	炸彈
Bomb (Verb)—HUNG CHǎ	轟炸
Bomber—HUNG CHǎ CH'Ī	轟炸機
Bridge—CH'ǎO LIǎNG	橋樑
Brigade—LŪ	旅
Brigadier General—SHǎO CHIǎNG	少將
Budget—YŪ SUǎN	預算
Bullet—TZŪ TǎN	子彈
Camouflage—WEI CH'UǎNG	偽裝
Camp—PING YING	兵營

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English and Romanization

English and Romanization	Characters
Campaign—CH'AN I	戰役
Cannon—P'AO	炮
Cannoner—P'AO SHOU	炮手
Captain—SHANG WEI	上尉
Capture—FU HUI	俘獲
Cart—TA CHE	大車
Casualty—SHANG WANG	傷亡
Cavalry—CH'YI PING	騎兵
Cease Fire—T'ING FANG	停放
Censorship—CH'EN CH'IA CH'UAN	檢查權
Central Committee—CHUNG YANG WEI YUAN HUI	中央委員會
Central People's Government CHUNG YANG JEN MIN CHENG FU WEI YUAN HUI	中央人民政府
Central People's Government Council CHUNG YANG JEN MIN CHENG FU WEI YUAN HUI	中央人民政府委員會
Central Secretariat—CHUNG YANG MI SHU CH'U	中央秘書處
Chain of Command—CHIH HUI HSU T'UNG	指揮系統
Chairman—CHU HSI	主席
Chairman of the Central People's Government CHUNG YANG JEN MIN CHENG FU WEI YUAN HUI	中央人民政府主席
Chemical Warfare—HUA HSUEH CHAN	化學戰
Chevrons—PEI CHANG	臂章
Chief of Staff—TS'AN MOU CHANG	參謀長
China—CHUNG KUO	中國
Chinese Communist Party CHUNG KUO KUNG CHAN TANG	中國共產黨
Civil War—NEI CHAN	內戰
Close Distance Reconnaissance CHIN CHU LI CHEN CH'IA	近距離偵察
Coast Guard—HAI FANG CHUN	海防軍

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English and Romanization

English and Romanization	Characters
Coaxial Machine Gun (Tank) P'ING HSING CHOU HSIEN CHI KUAN CH'IAN (T'AN K'E CH'E)	平行軸線機關鎗 (坦克車)
Cold War—LENG CHAN	冷戰
Collective Leadership—CHI TI LING TAO	集體領導
Colonel—SHANG HSIAO	上校
Column—TSUNG TUI	縱隊
Combat—CHAN TOU	戰鬥
Combat Arms—CHAN TOU PING CHUNG	戰鬥兵種
Combat Intelligence—CHAN TOU CHING PAO	戰鬥情報
Combat Unit—CHAN TOU TAN WEI	戰鬥單位
Command—CHIH HUI PU	指揮部
Commander—CHIH HUI YUAN	指揮員
Commander in Chief—TSUNG SZU LING	總司令
Command officers—CHIH HUI KUAN	指揮官
Command Post—CHIH HUI SO	指揮所
Committee—WEI YUAN HUI	委員會
Committee Secretary—WEI YUAN HUI SHU CH'U	委員會書記
Communication Centers—T'UNG HSIN CHUNG HSIN	通信中心
Communications—T'UNG HSIN	通信
Communism—KUNG CH'AN CHU I	共產主義
Communist Party Central Committee's Politburo CHUNG YANG CHENG CHIH CHU	中央政治局
Company—LIEN	連
Company Grade Officers—WEI KUAN	尉官
Concealment and Cover—YIN PI HE YEN PI	蔭蔽和掩蔽
Concentration Area—CHI CHUNG TI CH'U	集中地區
Congress—TAI PIAO TA HUI	代表大會
Constitution—HSIEN FA	憲法
Contact—CHIEH CH'U	接觸
Containment—CH'EN CHIH	牽制

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English and Romanization

Contaminated Area—SHOÙ TÚ TÌ CH'Ū

Cook—CH'ŪI SHIH PING

Coordination—HSIEH T'UNG

Corridors—TS'OU LÁNG

Council of National Defense

K'UO FANG WEI YUAN HUI

Counterattack—FAN KUNG

Counterbattery Fire—P'AO CHAN

Counterespionage—FAN CHIEN TIEH

Counterintelligence—FAN CH'ING PAO

Counteroffensive—FAN KUNG

Counterpsychological Warfare—FAN HSIN LI CHAN

Countersign—FU SHU

Countersubversive—TSÉ FAN FANG CHIH

Counties—HSIEN

Court-martial—CHUN FA TS'AI PAN

Covering Fire—YEN HU SHE CHI

Covering Forces—YEN HU PU TUI

Dam—SHUI PA

Data—CHU YUAN, TZU LIAO

Decentralization Tactics—FEN KE CHAN SHU

Deception—CH'U PIEN

Decision—CHUEH TING

Decoration—HSUN CHIANG

Defeat (Verb)—TA PAI

Defeat (Noun)—SHIH PAI

Defend (Verb)—FANG SHOU

Defense—FANG YU

Defense Position—FANG YU CHEN TI

Defense Zone—FANG YU TI CH'U

Characters

受毒地區

炊事兵

協同

走廊

國防委員會

反攻

炮戰

反間諜

反情報

反攻

反心理戰

副署

策反防止

縣

軍法裁判

掩護射擊

掩護部隊

水壩

諸元, 資料

分割戰術

欺騙

決定

勳獎

打敗

失敗

防守

防禦

防禦陣地

防禦地區

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English and Romanization

Defile—AI LU

Delegates—TAI PIAO

Democratic Centralism—MIN CHU CHI CH'UAN CHIH

Demolition Fire—P'Ö HUAI SHE CHI

Demolitions—PAO P'Ö

Deployment—CHAN K'AI

Depot, Dump, Warehouse—TS'ANG K'U

Depth—TSUNG SHEN

Deputy—FU CHIH

Deserter—TAO PING

Detachment—PAI CH'IENT TUI

Direct Contact Reconnaissance

YU TI JEN CHIH CHIEH CHIEH CH'U TE CHEN CH'A

Direct Security—CHIH CHIEH CHING CHIEH

Directives—CHIH SHIH

Disciplinary—CHI LU TE

Discipline—CHI LU

Dispersion—FEN SAN

Dispositions—P'EI PEI

Dive Bomber—FU CH'UNG HUNG CHA CHI

Division—SHIH

Doctor, Surgeon—WAI K'E I SHENG

Doctrine—SZU HSIANG

Document—WEN CHIEN

Double Envelopment—LIANG I PAO WEI

Dummy Target—CHIA MU PIAO

Earthworks—TU KUNG TSO YEH

East—TUNG

Echelon—TI TUI

Economic—CHING CHI TE

Characters

隘路

代表

民主集權制

破壞射擊

爆破

展開

倉庫

縱深

副職

逃兵

派遣隊

與敵人直接接觸的偵察

直接警戒

指示

紀律的

紀律

分散

配備

俯衝轟炸機

師

外科醫生

思想

文件

兩翼包圍

假目標

土工作業

東

梯隊

經濟的

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English and Romanization

Characters

Economic Intelligence—CHING CHÌ CH'ING PÁO	經濟情報
Effective Range (Of Fire) YÜ HSIAO SHE CH'ENG	有效射程
Election—HSUAN CHÜ	選舉
Emplacement—YÉN T'Í	掩体
Encirclement—PAO WÉI	包圍
Enemy—TÍ JÉN	敵人
Enfilade Fire—TSUNG SHE	縱射
Engine—YIN CH'ING	引擎
Engineer—KUNG PING	工兵
Enlisted Personnel—SHIH PING	士兵
Equipment—CHUANG PEI	裝備
Espionage—CHIEN TIEN HUO TUNG	間諜活動
Esprit de Corps—TÍ HSI TU'UNG CH'OU	敵愾同仇
Essential Elements of Information HSIAO HSI TE CHÜ YAO CH'ENG FEN	消息的主要成份
Evacuation—HOÜ SÜNG	後送
Explosive—CHÀ YAO	炸藥
Exterior Lines—WAI HSIEN	外線
Factory—KUNG CHANG	工廠
Feints—YANG TUNG	佯動
Female—NÜ HSING	女性
Field—YEH WAI	野外
Field Army—YEH CHAN CHÜN	野戰軍
Field of Fire—SHE CHIEH	射界
Field Fortification—YEH CHAN CHÜ CH'ENG	野戰築城
Field Grade Officers—HSIAO KUAN	校官
Field Hospital—YEH CHAN I YUAN	野戰醫院
Fighter Airplane—CHAN TOU CHI	戰鬥機
Finance Department—TS'AI WÜ PÜ	財務部

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English and Romanization

Characters

Fire, Fires, Firepower—HUO LI	火力
Fire (Verb)—SHE CHI	射擊
Fire Discipline—SHE CHI CHÜN CHI	射擊軍紀
First Aid Station—CHIÜ CHÍ CHAN	救急站
First Lieutenant—CHUNG WEI	中尉
Fiscal—TS'AI CHENG	財政
Flame Thrower—P'EN HUO CH'Í	噴火器
Flank (Noun)—TS'É MIEN	側面
Flank Attack Forces—TS'É MIEN KUNG CHI PÜ TUI	側面攻擊部隊
Flank Guard—TS'É WEI	側衛
Flanking Fire—TS'É SHE	側射
Flanking Forces—TS'É CHI PÜ TUI	側擊部隊
Fog—WÜ	霧
Food—LIANG SHIH	糧食
Force (Noun, General Term)—LI LIANG	力量
Foreign Affairs—WAI CHIAO	外交
Forest—SHÜ LIN	樹林
Formations—TUI HSING	隊形
Fort—YAO SAI	要塞
Fortification—FANG YÜ KUNG SHIH	防禦工事
Fortified Area—SHE FANG TÍ CH'Ü	設防地區
Fortified Positions—CHEN TI	陣地
Fortify (verb)—KOU CHU FANG YÜ KUNG SHIH	構築防禦工事
Forward Positions—CH'IEH CHIN CHEN TI	前進陣地
Frontal Attack Force CHENG MIEN KUNG CHI PÜ TUI	正面攻擊部隊
Frontier—PIEN CHIANG	邊疆
Fuel—JAN LIAO	燃料
Functions—TSÖ YUNG	作用
Furlough—CHIA CH'Í	假期

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English and Romanization

Characters

Garrison Command Public Security	公安警備司令部
KÜNG AN CHING PÉI SZÜ LING PÜ	
Gas Mask—FÁNG TÚ MIEN CHÜ	防毒面具
General—TÀ CHIANG	大將
General Officers—CHIANG KÜAN	將官
General Personnel Department	總幹部管理部
TSUNG KAN PÜ KUÁN LI PÜ	
General Rear Service Department	總後方勤務部
TSUNG HOÜ FANG CH'IN WÜ PÜ	
General Staff—TSUNG TS'AN MÖU PÜ	總參謀部
Geographical—TÌ Lǐ TE	地理的
Geography—TÌ Lǐ	地理
Glider—HÜA HSIANG CHĪ	滑翔機
Gorge—HSIA	峽
Government—CHENG FÜ	政府
Grade—CHĪEH CHĪ	階級
Grazing Fire—TS'Ä SHÈ	擦射
Grenade Launcher—CHĪH TAN T'ÜNG	擲彈筒
Grenades—SHÖU LÍU TAN	手榴彈
Ground Reconnaissance—TÌ MIEN CHEN CH'Ä	地面偵察
Guard (Noun)—WÈI PING	衛兵
Guerrilla Unit—YÜ CHĪ TUI	游擊隊
Guerrilla Warfare—YÜ CHĪ CHAN	游擊戰
GUN—P'AO	炮
Harbor—HÁI KANG	海港
Headquarters—SZÜ LING PÜ	司令部
Heavy Industry—CHUNG KUNG YEH	重工業
Heavy Tank—CHUNG HSING TAN K'È CH'E	重型坦克車
Heavy Weapons—CHUNG WÜ CH'Ä	重武器
Helmet—KANG K'UEI	鋼盔
Highway—KUNG LÜ	公路

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English and Romanization

Characters

Hill—KAO TÌ	高地
Horse—MÄ	馬
Horse-drawn Vehicle—MÄ CH'E	馬車
Hospital—I YÜAN	醫院
Hostile—TÍ TUI	敵對
Hostilities—TÍ TUI HSING WÈI	敵對行為
Howitzer—LÍU TAN P'AO	榴彈炮
Identity Card—SHEN FEN CHENG	身份證
Ideology—SZÜ HSÍANG	思想
Impedimenta—TZÜ CHUNG	輜重
Impetus—TS'È TUNG LI	策動力
Impulses—CH'UNG TUNG	衝動
Indoctrination—SZÜ HSIANG KÄ TSAO	思想改造
Infantry—PÜ PING	步兵
Infiltration—SHEN T'OU	滲透
Information—HSIAO HSI	消息
Inhabited Area—CHÜ MIN TÍ	住民地
Initial Objective—CH'Ü PÜ MÜ PIAO	初步目標
Initiative—CHÜ TUNG	主動
Insignia—FÜ HAÖ	符號
Inspectorate of the Armed Forces	軍事監察部
CHÜN SHIH CHIEN CH'Ä PÜ	
Intelligence—CH'ING PAÖ	情報
Interdiction Fire—TSÜ CHIH SHE CHĪ	阻止射擊
Interior Lines—NÈI HSIEN	內線
International Border—KUÖ CHIEH	國界
Interpreter—FAN I YÜAN	翻譯員
Interrogator—SHEN WEN YÜAN	審問員
Jail—CHIEN YÜ	監獄
Japan—JÌ PÈN	日本

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English and Romanization

Characters

Judicial—SZŪ FĀ	司法
Jungle—SHĒN LÍN	森林
Kill—SHĀ	殺
Kilometer—KŪNG Lĭ	公里
Kitchen (Field)—HSÍNG CHŪN KŪO TSÀO	行軍鍋竈
Korea—CH'ÁO HSIĒN	朝鮮
Kuomintang—KŪO MÍN TĀNG	國民黨
Lakes—HŪ P'Ò	湖泊
Landlord—TÌ CHŪ	地主
Landmark—TÌ PIĀO	地標
Law—FĀ LŪ	法律
Leader—SHÓU CHANG	首長
Legislative—LÌ FĀ	立法
Legislature—LÌ FĀ CHĪ KUĀN	立法機關
Liaison—LIÉN LÒ	聯絡
Lieutenant Colonel—CHŪNG HSIAO	中校
Lieutenant General—CHŪNG CHIANG	中將
Light Machine Gun—CH'ING CHĪ KUĀN CH'ANG	輕機關鎗
Lighting Flare—HUÓ KUANG CHÀO MÍNG TÀN	火光照明彈
Lines of Communication—CHIAO T'UNG HSIĒN	交通綫
Logistics—HOŪ CH'IN	後勤
Machine Gun—CHĪ KUĀN CH'ANG	機關鎗
Main Attack—CHŪ KŪNG	主攻
Main Body—PEN TUÌ	本隊
Main Forces—CHŪ Lì	主力
Major—SHAÒ HSIÀO	少校
Major General—SHAÒ CHIANG	少將
Male—NÁN HSING	男性
Maneuver—YĒN HSI	演習
Manpower—JÉN Lì	人力

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English and Romanization

Characters

Map—TÌ T'U	地圖
March Discipline—HSING CHŪN CHĪ LŪ	行軍紀律
Marine—HAI CHŪN LŪ CHAN TUÌ	海軍陸戰隊
Marshal—YŪAN SHUAI	元帥
Marshes—CHAO TSÉ	沼澤
Marital Law—CHŪN FĀ	軍法
Materiel—WŪ TZŪ	物資
Meeting Engagement—TSAO YŪ CHAN	遭遇戰
Message—HSŪN HSI	訊息
Message Center—SHŌU FĀ CH'U	收發處
Messenger—CH'UAN LING PING	傳令兵
Military Bureau—CHŪN SHIH CHŪ	軍事局
Military Decoration—CHŪN SHIH HSŪN CHIANG	軍事勳獎
Military Doctrine—CHŪN SHIH SZŪ HSIANG	軍事思想
Military Establishment—CHŪN SHIH CHĪ KOŪ	軍事機構
Military Training Department CHŪN SHIH HSŪN LIEN PŪ	軍事訓練部
Mine—TÌ LEI	地雷
Minefield—TÌ LEI CH'U	地雷區
Minister of National Defense KUÓ FANG PŪ PŪ CHANG	國防部部長
Ministers—PŪ CHANG	部長
Ministry of National Defense—KUÓ FANG PŪ	國防部
Mission—JĒN WŪ	任務
Mobile—CHĪ TUNG	機動
Mobilization—TUNG YŪAN	動員
Momentum—CH'UNG Lì	衝力
Morale—SHIH CH'ì	士氣
Mortar—P'Ò CHĪ P'AO	迫擊炮
Mountain—SHAN	山

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English and Romanization

Characters

National Budget—KÚO CHIA YŮ SUAN	國家預算
National People's Congress CH'UAN KÚO JÉN MÍN TAI PIAO TÀ HUI	全國人民代表大會
National Public Security Division KÚO CHIA KUNG AN SHIH	國家公安師
National War Plan—KÚO CHIA TSÒ CHAN CHÌ HUÀ	國家作戰計劃
Naval Public Security Forces HAI SHANG KUNG AN PÙ TUI	海上公安部隊
Navy—HAI CHŪN	海軍
New Democratic Youth Corps HSIN MÍN CHŪ CHŪ I CH'ING NIEN T'UAN	新民主主義青年團
Noncommissioned Officers—CHŪN SHIH	軍士
North—PEI	北
Objective—MŪ PIÃO	目標
Observed Fire—KUÂN TS'È SHÈ CHÌ	觀測射擊
Obsolete—CH'ÉN CHIÙ	陳舊
Obstacle—CHANG AÌ WŪ	障礙物
Offensive—KUNG SHIH	攻勢
Officer—CHŪN KUÂN	軍官
Officials—KUÂN YŪAN	官員
Operating Radius—HUO TUNG PAN CHING	活動半徑
Operations—TSÒ CHAN	作戰
Order—MING LING	命令
Order of Battle—CHAN TOU HSŪ LIÈH	戰鬥序列
Ordnance—PING KUNG	兵工
Outpost—CH'ÉN SHAO	前哨
Outpost Positions—CH'ÉN SHAO CHEN TÌ	前哨陣地
Paratroops—CHANG LÒ SAN PÙ TUI	降落傘部隊
Partisan—PIEH TUNG TUI	別動隊
Party Branch Committee TANG CHIH PŪ WĒI YŪAN HUI	黨支部委員會

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English and Romanization

Characters

Party Central Committee TANG CHUNG YANG WĒI YŪAN HUI	黨中央委員會
Party Conference—TANG HUI I	黨會議
Party Congress—TANG TAI PIAO TÀ HUI	黨代表大會
Party Discipline—TANG CHÌ	黨紀
Party Line—TANG TE LŪ HSIEN	黨的路綫
Passive Defense—HSIAO CHÍ FANG YŮ	消極防禦
Password—K'ŌU LING	口令
Patrols—HSŪN LÓ	巡邏
Peace—HÓ PING	和平
Penetration—TŪ P'Ò	突破
People's Liberation Army JÉN MÍN CHIEH FANG CHŪN	人民解放軍
People's Militia—MÍN PING	民兵
People's Procurator General's Office TSUI KAO JÉN MÍN CHIH CH'À SHŪ	最高人民檢察署
People's Republic of China CHUNG HUA JÉN MÍN KUNG HÉ KÚO	中華人民共和國
People's Revolutionary Military Council JÉN MÍN KÉ MING CHUN SHIH WĒI YŪAN HUI	人民革命軍事委員會
Perimeter Defense—WAI WĒI FANG WĒI	外圍防衛
Perimeter Security—WAI WĒI CHING CHIEH	外圍警戒
Permanent Fortification YUNG CHIU HSING FANG YŮ KUNG SHIH	永久性防禦工事
Personnel—JÉN YŪAN	人員
Photo Interpretation—CHAO PIEN P'AN TŪ	照片判讀
Pillbox—TÌ PAŌ	地堡
Pilot—FĒI HSING YŪAN	飛行員
Pipeline—YŪ KUÂN	油管
Pistol—SHOU CH'ING	手鎗
Plan—CHÌ HUA	計劃
Platoon—P'AI	排

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English and Romanization

Characters

Police—CHING CH'Á	警察
Policy—CHENG TS'È	政策
Political Affairs—CHENG CHIH KUNG TSÒ	政治工作
Political Commissars—CHENG CHIH WEI YUAN	政治委員
Political Indoctrination—CHENG CHIH HSUN LIEN	政治訓練
Political Intelligence—CHENG CHIH CH'ING PAO	政治情報
Political Officers—CHENG CHIH CHUN KUAN	政治軍官
Political Personnel—CHENG CHIH JEN YUAN	政治人員
Pontoon Bridge—FOU CH'IAO	浮橋
Position—CHEN TI	陣地
Premier—TSUNG LI	總理
Prisoner of War—CHAN FU	戰俘
Prisoner of War Camp—CHAN FU YING	戰俘營
Procurement—CH'OU KOÜ	籌購
Production and Construction Forces SHENG CH'AN CHIEN SHE PU TUI	生產建設部隊
Projectile, Missile—TAN T'OU	彈頭
Promotion—CHIN CHI	晉級
Propaganda—HSUAN CHUAN	宣傳
Province—SHENG	省
Provincial Public Security Regiments SHENG KUNG AN T'UAN	省公安團
Provisions—CHI YANG	給養
Psychological Warfare—HSIN LI CHAN	心理戰
Public Security Forces—KUNG AN PU TUI	公安部隊
Punishment—CHU FA	處罰
Pursuit—CHUI CHI	追擊
Pursuit Phase—CHUI CHI CHIEH TUAN	追擊階段
Quartermaster—CHUN HSÜ	軍需
Radar—LEI TA	雷達

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English and Romanization

Characters

Radio—WU HSIEN TIEN	無線電
Radioactive—FANG SHE HSING TE	放射性的
Radio Communication—WU HSIEN TIEN T'UNG HSIN	無線電通信
Radiochemical Warfare SHIH YUNG FANG SHE HSING WU CH'U TE CHAN CHENG	使用放射性武器的戰爭
Radio Station—WU HSIEN TIEN T'AI	無線電台
Raid—HSI CHI	襲擊
Railroad—T'IEH LU	鐵路
Railway Public Security Divisions T'IEH LU KUNG AN SHIH	鐵路公安師
Rain—YÜ	雨
Rank—CHIEH CHI	階級
Rate of Fire—FA SHE SU TU	發射速度
Rations—CHUN LIANG	軍糧
Rear Area—HOÜ FANG	後方
Rear Guard—HOÜ WEI	後衛
Rear Guard Position—HOÜ WEI CHEN TI	後衛陣地
Reconnaissance in Force—WEI LI CHEN CH'Á	威力偵察
Reconnaissance Patrol—CHEN CH'Á HSUN LO	偵察巡邏
Reconnaissance Plane—CHEN CH'Á CHI	偵察機
Reconnoiter—CHEN CH'Á	偵察
Recruit—HSIN PING	新兵
Regiment—T'UAN	團
Regulations—KUEI TING	規定
Reinforce—CHIA CH'ANG	加強
Repatriates—CH'EN FAN JEN YUAN	遣返人員
Replacement—PU CH'UNG	補充
Report—PAO KAO	報告
Reserve—YÜ PEI TUI	預備隊
Resources—TZU YUAN	資源

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English and Romanization

Characters

Responsibility—TSÉ JÈN	責任
Rest—HSIU HSI	休息
Retreat—T'UI CH'ÜEH	退却
Retrograde—CH'È T'UI	撤退
Revolt—P'AN PIEN	叛變
Revolution—KÉ MING	革命
Rifle—PÜ CH'ÄNG	步槍
Rifle Company—PÜ FING LIEN	步兵連
Rifleman—PÜ FING	步兵
River—HÉ LIU	河流
Road—TAO LÜ	道路
Road Block—TAO LÜ TSÜ CHÜEH	道路阻絕
Rocket Launcher—HUO CHIEN P'AO	火箭炮
Rolling Fire—Í TUNG TAN MÜ	移動彈幕
Route—LÜ HSIEN	路線
Rumor—YAO YEN	謠言
Sabotage—YIN MÓU P'Ò HUAI	陰謀破壞
Safeguard (Noun)—PAO CHANG	保障
Safeguard (Verb)—PAO HU	保護
Salary—HSIN SHÜ	薪水
Salient—T'Ü CH'Ü PÜ	突出部
Satellite—FÜ YUNG KÜO	附庸國
Screening Forces—YEN HÜ PÜ TUI	掩護部隊
Sea—HAI	海
Seacoast—HAI AN	海岸
Searchlight—T'AN CHAO TENG	探照燈
Secondary Attack—CHÜ KUNG	助攻
Second Lieutenant—SHAO WEI	少尉
Secret—PI MI	秘密
Section—TSÜ	組

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English and Romanization

Characters

Security—CHING CHIEH	警戒
Security Forces—CHING CHIEH PÜ TUI	警戒部隊
Self-propelled Gun—TZÜ TUNG T'UI CHIN P'AO	自動推進炮
Senior Captain—TÀ WEI	大尉
Senior Colonel—TÀ HSIÄO	大校
Sentinel—SHAO PING	哨兵
Separate Regiment—TÜ LI T'UAN	獨立團
Shelter—YEN PI PÜ	掩蔽部
Shock Action—CH'Í HSI	奇襲
Sick—PING	病
Siege Warfare—KUNG CHENG CHAN	攻城戰
Signal Equipment—T'UNG HSIN CHUANG PEI	通信裝備
Signal Flare—HSIN HAÖ TAN	信號彈
Single Envelopment—Í I PAO WEI	一翼包圍
Size—TÀ HSIÄO	大小
Sketch—YAO T'Ü	要圖
Smoke Screen—YEN MÜ	烟幕
Social Intelligence—SHÉ HUI CHING PAO	社會情報
Soldier—SHIH PING	士兵
South—NAN	南
Soviet (Adjective)—SÜ SHIH TE	蘇式的
Soviet Union—SÜ LIEN	蘇聯
Spare Parts—LING CHIEN	零件
Spy—CHIEN TIÉH	間諜
Squad—PAN	班
Staff—TS'AN MÓU	參謀
Stalemate—TUI CHIH	對峙

Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
CH'UAN KÜO JEN MIN TAI PIAO TÄ HUI CH'ANG 全國人民代表大會常務委員會
WU WEI YUAN HUI

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English and Romanization

State—K'UO CHIA
 State Council—KUO WU YUAN
 Stockpile (Noun)—CH'U TS'ANG LIANG
 Stockpile (Verb)—TU' CH'I
 Storage—CH'U TS'ANG
 Storehouse—TS'ANG K'U
 Strafe—SAO SHE
 Straggler—TIAO TUI CHE
 Strategic—CHAN LUEH TE
 Strategic Reconnaissance—CHAN LUEH CHEN CH'A
 Strategy—CHAN LUEH
 Stream—HSI LIAU
 Strength—PING LI
 Subarctic—YA HAN TAI
 Subversives—T'SE FAN
 Sunrise—JIH CH'U
 Sunset—JIH LO
 Supply—PU CH'I
 Supply Dump—PU CH' CHAN
 Support—CHIH YUAN
 Supreme Command—TSUI KAO CHIH HUI PU
 Supreme Marshal—TA YUAN SHUAI
 Supreme People's Court
 TSUI KAO JEN MIN FA YUAN
 Supreme State Conference
 TSUI KAO KUO CHIA HUI I
 Surprise—CH'Y HSI
 Surveillance—CH'EN SHIH
 Survey—TS'E LIANG
 Tables of Organization—PIEN CHIH PIAO

國家
 國務院
 儲藏量
 堆積
 貯藏
 倉庫
 掃射
 掉隊者
 戰略的
 戰略偵察
 戰略
 溪流
 兵力
 亞寒帶
 策反
 日出
 日落
 補給
 補給站
 支援
 最高指揮部
 大元帥
 最高人民法院
 最高國家會議
 奇襲
 監視
 測量
 編制表

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English and Romanization

Characters

Tactical—CHAN SHU TE
 Tactical Techniques—CHAN SHU CH' CH'IAO
 Tactical Unit—CHAN SHU TAN WEI
 Tactics—CHAN SHU
 Tank—TAN K'E CH'E
 Task Force—CH'LA CH'EN TUI
 Technical—CH' SHU TE
 Technical Intelligence—CH' SHU CH'ING PAO
 Technical Services—CH' SHU CH'IN WU
 Techniques—CH' SHU
 Telegram—TIEN PAO
 Telephone—TIEN HUA
 Terrain—TI HSING
 Theater of Operations—CHAN CH'U
 Topography—TI MAO
 Total Strength—TSUNG PING LI
 Training—HSUN LIEN
 Training Cycle—HSUN LIEN CHOU CH'I
 Traitor—HAN CHIEN
 Transfer—TIAO TUNG
 Transport—YUN SHU
 Transportation Corps—YUN SHU PING
 Travel Pass (For Restricted Areas)
 (CHIN CH'U CH'IH) T'UNG HSING CHENG
 Treason—PA'N KUO
 Trench—CHAN HAO
 Trench Mortar—P'O CH' P'AO
 Troop Carrier Units
 YUN SUNG CHUN YUAN FEI HSING PU TUI
 Troop Carrying Aircraft—K'UNG YUN PU TUI FEI CH' I

戰術的
 戰術技巧
 戰術單位
 戰術
 坦克車
 差遣隊
 技術的
 技術情報
 技術勤務
 技術
 電報
 電話
 地形
 戰區
 地貌
 總兵力
 訓練
 訓練週期
 漢奸
 調動
 運輸
 運輸兵
 (禁區之) 通行證
 叛國
 戰壕
 迫擊炮
 運送軍員飛行部隊
 空運部隊飛機

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English and Romanization

Characters

Troops—PÙ TÙI
 Truce—HSIŪ CHÂN
 Truck—K'Ä CH'Ē, TSAI CHUNG CH'Ī CH'Ē
 Turning Movement—YŪ HUI
 Turret—CHUAN T'Ä
 Unit—PÙ TUI
 Unit Boundary—TAN WEI TÌ CHING
 Valley—SHAN KU
 Vehicle—CH'Ē LIANG
 Veterinarian—SHOU I
 Veterinary Corps—SHOU I CH'U
 Vice Chairman—FÜ CHŪ HSI
 Vice Premier—FÜ TSUNG LI
 Victory—SHENG LI
 Village—TS'UN LO
 Visibility—NENG CHIEN TŪ
 Volunteer—CHIŪ YUAN PING
 Wagon—MA CH'Ē
 War—CHAN CHENG
 War Area—CHIAO CHAN CH'Ü
 Weapon—WŪ CH'Ī
 Weather—T'ĪEN HOÜ
 West—HSI
 Width—K'UAN TŪ
 Wind—FENG
 Wire (Electric)—TIEN HSIEN
 Withdrawal—CH'Ē T'UI
 Wound—SHANG
 Wounded—FÜ SHANG
 Zone of Action—TSO CHAN TÌ CH'Ü

部隊
 休戰
 卡車載重汽車
 迂迴
 轉塔
 部隊
 單位地境
 山谷
 車輛
 獸醫
 獸醫處
 副主席
 副總理
 勝利
 村落
 能見度
 志願兵
 馬車
 戰爭
 交戰區
 武器
 天候
 西
 寬度
 風
 電線
 撤退
 傷
 負傷
 作戰地區

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 Section II. CHINESE—ENGLISH (Unclassified)

Romanization and English

Characters

AI LÜ—Defile
 CHA TAN—Bomb (Noun)
 CHA YAO—Explosive
 CHA CH'EN TUI—Task Force
 CHAN CH'ANG—Battlefield
 CHAN CH'ANG CHEN CH'Ä—
 Battle Area Reconnaissance
 CHAN CH'Ē FANG YÜ—Antitank Defense
 CHAN CH'Ē FANG YÜ P'AO—Antitank Guns
 CHAN CHENG—War
 CHAN CH'Ü—Theater of Operations
 CHAN FÜ—Prisoner of War
 CHAN FÜ YING—Prisoner of War Camp
 CHAN HAO—Trench
 CHAN I—Campaign
 CHAN K'ÄI—Deployment
 CHAN LÜEH—Strategy
 CHAN LÜEH CHEN CH'Ä—
 Strategic Reconnaissance
 CHAN LÜEH TE—Strategic
 CHAN SHÜ—Tactics
 CHAN SHÜ CH'ÄO—Tactical Techniques
 CHAN SHÜ TAN WEI—Tactical Unit
 CHAN SHÜ TE—Tactical
 CHAN TÌ CHEN CH'Ä—Battleground Reconnaissance
 CHAN TÖU—Combat
 CHAN TOÜ—Battle
 CHAN TÖU CH'Ī—Fighter Airplane
 CHAN TÖU CH'ING PÄO—Combat Intelligence

隘路
 炸彈
 炸藥
 差遣隊
 戰場
 戰場偵察
 戰車防禦
 戰車防禦炮
 戰爭
 戰區
 戰俘
 戰俘營
 戰壕
 戰役
 展開
 戰略
 戰略偵察
 戰略的
 戰術
 戰術技巧
 戰術單位
 戰術的
 戰地偵察
 戰鬥
 戰鬥機
 戰鬥情報

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Romanization and English

CHÀN TÒU HSÜ LIÈH—Order of Battle
 CHÀN TÒU PING CHUNG—Combat Arms
 CHÀN TÒU TÂN WÊI—Combat Unit
 CHANG AI WÜ—Obstacle
 CHIANG SHANG—Awards
 CHAO PIEN P'AN TÚ—Photo Interpretation
 CH'AO TSÉ—Marshes
 CH'AO HSIEN—Korea
 CH'É LIANG—Vehicle
 CH'È T'UI—Retrograde
 CH'É T'UI—Withdrawal
 CHÈN CH'Á—Reconnoiter
 CHÈN CH'Á CH'Í—Reconnaissance Plane
 CHÈN CH'Á HSÜN LÓ—Reconnaissance Patrol
 CHÈN TÍ—Fortified Positions
 CHÈN TÍ—Position
 CH'ÉN CH'U—Obsolete
 CHÈNG CHIH CH'ING P'AO—Political Intelligence
 CHÈNG CHIH CHÜN KUÂN—Political Officers
 CHÈNG FÜ—Government
 CHÈNG CHIH HSÜN LIEN
 Political Indoctrination
 CHÈNG CHIH JÉN YÜAN—Political Personnel
 CHÈNG CHIH KUNG TSO—Political Affairs
 CHÈNG CHIH WÊI YÜAN—Political Commissars
 CHÈNG MIEN KUNG CHI P'U TUI
 Frontal Attack Force
 CHÈNG TS'È—Policy
 CH'Í CHÍ FANG YÜ—Active Defense
 CH'Í CHUNG—Assemblies

Characters

戰鬥序列
 戰鬥兵種
 戰鬥單位
 障礙物
 獎賞
 照片判讀
 沼澤
 朝鮮
 車輛
 撤退
 撤退
 偵察
 偵察機
 偵察巡邏
 陣地
 陣地
 陳舊
 政治情報
 政治軍官
 政府
 政治訓練
 政治人員
 政治工作
 政治委員
 正面攻擊部隊
 政策
 積極防禦
 集中

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Romanization and English

CH'Í CHUNG TÍ CH'Ü—Concentration Area
 CH'Í HUÀ—Plan
 CH'Í KUÂN CH'ÍANG—Machine Gun
 CH'Í LÜ—Discipline
 CH'Í LÜ TE—Disciplinary
 CH'Í SHÜ—Techniques
 CH'Í SHÜ CH'IN WÜ—Technical Services
 CH'Í SHÜ CH'ING P'AO—Technical Intelligence
 CH'Í SHÜ TE—Technical
 CH'Í T'Y LING T'AO—Collective Leadership
 CH'Í TUNG—Mobile
 CH'Í YANG—Provisions
 CH'Í HSI—Shock Action
 CH'Í HSI—Surprise
 CH'Í PIEN—Deception
 CH'Í PING—Cavalry
 CH'IA CH'Í—Furlough
 CH'IA CH'ANG—Reinforce
 CH'IA MÜ P'IAO—Dummy Target
 CHIANG KUÂN—General Officers
 CHIANG LÖ SAN P'U TUI—Paratroops
 CH'IAO CHAN CH'Ü—War Area
 CH'IAO TUNG HSIEN—Lines of Communication
 CH'IAO LIANG—Bridge
 CHIÈH CH'Í—Grade
 CHIÈH CH'Í—Rank
 CHIÈH CH'Ü—Contact
 CHIÈN CH'Á CH'ÜAN—Censorship
 CHIÈN PING LIEN—Advanced Party
 CHIÈN SHIH—Surveillance

Characters

集中地區
 計劃
 機關鎗
 紀律
 紀律的
 技術
 技術勤務
 技術情報
 技術的
 集体領導
 機動
 給養
 奇襲
 奇襲
 欺騙
 騎兵
 假期
 加強
 假目標
 將官
 降落傘部隊
 交戰區
 交通綫
 橋樑
 階級
 階級
 接觸
 檢查權
 尖兵連
 監視

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Romanization and English

CHIÊN TIÉH—Spy
 CHIÊN TIÉH HUÓ TUNG—Espionage
 CHIÊN YÜ—Jail
 CHIÊN CHIH—Containment
 CHIÊN CHIN—Advance
 CHIÊN CHIN CHEN TÌ—Forward Positions
 CHIÊN FAN JEN YÜAN—Repatriates
 CHIÊN MIÉH—Annihilation
 CHIÊN SHAÖ—Outpost
 CHIÊN SHAÖ CHEN TÌ—Outpost Positions
 CHIÊN WEI—Advance Guard
 CHIH CHIEH CHING CHIEH—Direct Security
 CHIH CH'UAN—Authorities
 CHIH HUI HSÜ T'UNG—Chain of Command
 CHIH HUI KUAN—Command Officers
 CHIH HUI—Command
 CHIH HUI SÖ—Command Post
 CHIH HUI YÜAN—Commander
 CHIH SHIH—Directives
 CHIH TAN T'UNG—Grenade Launcher
 CHIH TSÉ—Assignment
 CHIH YÜAN—Support
 CHIH YÜAN PING—Volunteer
 CHIN CHÍ—Promotion
 CHIN CHÜ LÜ CHEN CH'Á
 Close Distance Reconnaissance
 (CHIN CH'Ü CHIH) T'UNG HSING CHENG
 Travel Pass (For Restricted Areas)
 CHING CH'Á—Police
 CHING CHI CH'ING PAO—Economic Intelligence

間諜
 間諜活動
 監獄
 牽制
 前進
 前進陣地
 遣返人員
 殲滅
 前哨
 前哨陣地
 前衛
 直接警戒
 職權
 指揮系統
 指揮官
 指揮
 指揮所
 指揮員
 指示
 擲彈筒
 職責
 支援
 志願兵
 晉級
 近距離偵察
 (禁區之) 通行證
 警察
 經濟情報

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Romanization and English

Characters

CHING CHI TE—Economic
 CHING CHIEH—Security
 CHING CHIEH PÜ TUI—Security Forces
 CHING PAÖ—Alarm, Warning Signal
 CH'ING CHI KUAN CH'ANG—Light Machine Gun
 CH'ING PAÖ—Intelligence
 CHIU CHI CHAN—First Aid Station
 CHIU HÜ CH'E—Ambulance
 CH'OU KÖU—Procurement
 CHÜ HSÍ—Chairman
 CHÜ KUNG—Main Attack
 CHÜ KUNG—Secondary Attack
 CHÜ LI—Main Forces
 CHÜ MIN TÌ—Inhabited Area
 CHÜ TUNG—Initiative
 CHÜ YÜAN, TZÜ LIÄO—Data
 CH'Ü FÁ—Punishment
 CH'Ü PÜ MÜ PIAO—Initial Objective
 CH'Ü TS'ANG—Storage
 CH'Ü TS'ANG LIANG—Stockpile (Noun)
 CHUAN T'Ä—Turret
 CH'UAN—Boat
 CH'UAN KÜO JEN MIN TAI PIAO TÄ HUI
 National People's Congress
 CHUANG CHIA CH'E—Armored Car
 CHUANG CHIA PÜ TUI—Armored Force
 CHUANG CHIA SHIH—Armored Division
 CHUANG PEI—Equipment
 CHUI CHI—Pursuit
 CHUI CHI CHIEH TUAN—Pursuit Phase

經濟的
 警戒
 警戒部隊
 警報
 輕機關鎗
 情報
 救急站
 救護車
 籌購
 主席
 主攻
 助攻
 主力
 住民地
 主動
 諸元, 資料
 處罰
 初步目標
 貯藏
 儲藏量
 轉塔
 船
 全國人民代表大會
 裝甲車
 裝甲部隊
 裝甲師
 裝備
 追擊
 追擊階段

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Romanization and English

CH'UI SHIH PING—Cook
 CHUNG CHIANG—Major General
 CHUNG HSIAO—Lieutenant Colonel
 CHUNG HUA JEN MIN KUNG HE KUO
 People's Republic of China
 CHUNG KUNG YEH—Heavy Industry
 CHUNG KUO—China
 CHUNG KUO KUNG CH'AN TANG
 Chinese Communist Party
 CHUNG HSING T'AN K'E CH'E—Heavy Tank
 CHUNG WEI—First Lieutenant
 CHUNG WU CH'I—Heavy Weapons
 CHUNG YANG CHENG CHIH CHU
 Communist Party Central Committee's Politburo
 CHUNG YANG JEN MIN CHENG FU
 Central People's Government
 CHUNG YANG JEN MIN CHENG FU CHU HSI
 Chairman of the Central People's Government
 CHUNG YANG JEN MIN CHENG FU WEI YUAN HUI
 Central People's Government Council
 CHUNG YANG PI SHU CH'U—Central Secretariat
 CHUNG YANG WEI YUAN HUI—Central Committee
 CH'UNG FENG—Assault, Rush
 CH'UNG LI—Momentum
 CH'UNG TUNG—Impulses
 CH'UAN KUO JEN MIN TAI PIAO TA HUI CH'ANG
 WU WEI YUAN HUI
 Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
 CH'UAN LING PING—Messenger
 CHUEH TING—Decision
 CHUN—Army (Unit)
 CHUN FA—Martial Law
 CHUN FA TS'AI PAN—Court-martial

Characters

炊事兵
 中將
 中校
 中華人民共和國
 重工業
 中國
 中國共產黨
 重型坦克車
 中尉
 重武器
 中央政治局
 中央人民政府
 中央人民政府主席
 中央人民政府委員會
 中央秘書處
 中央委員會
 衝鋒
 衝力
 衝動
 全國人民代表大會常務委員會
 傳令兵
 決定
 軍
 軍法
 軍法裁判

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Romanization and English

Characters

CHUN HSU—Quartermaster
 CHUN KUAN—Officer
 CHUN LIANG—Rations
 CHUN PEI—Armament
 CHUN SHIH—Noncommissioned Officers
 CHUN SHIH CHI KOU—Military Establishment
 CHUN SHIH CHIEN CH'APU
 Inspectorate of the Armed Forces
 CHUN SHIH CHU—Military Bureau
 CHUN SHIH HSUN CHIANG—Military Decoration
 CHUN SHIH HSUN LIEN PU
 Military Training Department
 CHUN SHIH SZU HSIANG—Military Doctrine
 CHUN T'AN—Blanket
 FA LU—Law
 FA SHE SU TU—Rate of Fire
 FAN CHIEN TIEN—Counterespionage
 FAN CH'ING PAO—Counterintelligence
 FAN HSIN LI CHAN—
 Counterpsychological Warfare
 FAN I YUAN—Interpreter
 FAN KUNG—Counterattack
 FAN KUNG—Counteroffensive
 FAN YU CHI—Antiguerrilla
 FANG CHAN CHE CHANG AI WU
 Antitank Obstacle
 FANG CHAN CHE TI LEI—Antitank Mines
 FANG CHAN CHE WU CH'I—Antitank Weapons
 FANG SHE HSING TE—Radioactive
 FANG SHOU—Defend (Verb)
 FANG TU MIEN CHU—Gas Mask

軍需
 軍官
 軍糧
 軍備
 軍士
 軍事機構
 軍事監察部
 軍事局
 軍事勳獎
 軍事訓練部
 軍事思想
 軍毯
 法律
 發射速度
 反間諜
 反情報
 反心理戰
 翻譯員
 反攻
 反攻
 反游擊
 防戰車障礙物
 防戰車地雷
 防戰車武器
 放射性的
 防守
 防毒面具

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Romanization and English

FÁNG YÙ—Defense
FÁNG YÙ CHÈN TÌ—Defense Position
FÁNG YÙ KŪNG SHĪH—Fortification
FÁNG YÙ TÌ CHŪ—Defense Zone
FĒI CHĪ—Airplane, Plane
FĒI CHĪ CH'ĀNG—Airfield
FĒI HSÍNG YŪÁN—Pilot
FĒN KĒ CHÀN SHŪ—Decentralization Tactics
FĒN SǎN—Dispersion
FĒNG—Wind
FÓU CH'IAO—Pontoon Bridge
FŪ CHĪH—Deputy
FŪ CHŪ HSÍ—Vice Chairman
FŪ CH'ŪNG HŪNG CHÀ CHĪ—Dive Bomber
FÚ HAÒ—Insignia
FÚ HUÒ—Capture
FŪ KUĀN—Adjutant
FŪ SHĀNG—Wounded
FŪ SHŪ—Countersign
FŪ TSŪNG Lǐ—Vice Premier
FŪ YŪNG KÚO—Satellite
HǎI—Sea
HǎI ĀN—Seacoast
HǎI CHŪN—Navy
HǎI CHŪN LŪ CHÀN TUÌ—Marine
HǎI FANG CHŪN—Coast Guard
HǎI KǎNG—Harbor
HǎI SHANG KŪNG ĀN PŪ TŪI—
Naval Public Security Forces
HÀN CHIĒN—Traitor

Characters

防禦
防禦陣地
防禦工事
防禦地區
飛機
飛機場
飛行員
分割戰術
分散
風
浮橋
副職
副主席
俯衝轟炸機
符號
俘獲
副官
負傷
副署
副總理
附庸國
海
海岸
海軍
海軍陸戰隊
海防軍
海港
海上公安部隊
漢奸

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Romanization and English

HÁN TÀI—Arctic
HÉ LIÚ—River
HÓ P'ING—Peace
HŪA HSÍANG CHĪ—Glider
HOŪ CH'IN—Logistics
HOŪ FANG—Rear Area
HOŪ SUNG—Evacuation
HOŪ WEI—Rear Guard
HOŪ WEI CHÈN TÌ—Rear Guard Position
HÚ P'Ò—Lakes
HUÀ HSŪEH CHÀN—Chemical Warfare
HUNG CHÀ—Bomb (Verb)
HUNG CHÀ CHĪ—Bomber
HUŌ CHIĒN P'AO—Rocket Launcher
HUŌ KUANG CHÀO MING TÀN—Lighting Flare
HUŌ Lǐ—Fire, Fires, Firepower
HÚO TUNG PĀN CHING—Operating Radius
HSĪ—West
HSĪ CHĪ—Raid
HSĪ CHŪN CHÀN—Biological Warfare
HSĪ LIÚ—Stream
HSĪA—Gorge
HSĪAO CHÍ FANG YŪ—Passive Defense
HSĪAO HAO—Attrition
HSĪAO HSÍ—Information
HSĪAO HSÍ TE CHŪ YAO CH'ENG FÈN—
Essential Elements of Information
HSĪAO KUĀN—Field Grade Officers
HSĪEH T'UNG—Coordination
HSIEN—Counties

Characters

寒帶
河流
和平
滑翔機
後勤
後方
後送
後衛
後衛陣地
湖泊
化學戰
轟炸
轟炸機
火箭炮
火光照明彈
火力
活動半徑
西
襲擊
細菌戰
溪流
峽
消極防禦
消耗
消息
消息的主要成份
校官
協同
縣

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Romanization and English

HSIEN FÄ—Constitution
 HSIN HAÒ TÄN—Signal Flare
 HSIN LÏ CHÄN—Psychological Warfare
 HSIN MÍN CHÜ CHÜ Ì CH'ING NIÉN T'UÄN—
 New Democratic Youth Corps
 HSIN PING—Recruit
 HSIN SHÜ—Salary
 HSING CHENG CH'IN WÜ—Administrative Services
 HSING CHENG CH'Ü—Administrative Area
 HSING CHÜN CHÌ LÜ—March Discipline
 HSING CHÜN KUO TSÄO—Kitchen (Field)
 HSIÜ CHÄN—Truce
 HSIÜ HSÍ—Rest
 HSÜÄN CHÜ—Election
 HSÜÄN CH'ÜÄN—Propaganda
 HSÜN CHIÄNG—Decoration
 HSÜN LIEN—Training
 HSÜN LIEN CHÖU CH'Ï—Training Cycle
 HSÜN HSÍ—Message
 HSÜN LÖ—Patrols
 Í Ì PÄO WÉI—Single Envelopment
 Í TUNG TÄN MÜ—Rolling Fire
 T'YÜÄN—Hospital
 JÄN LIÄO—Fuel
 JÉN LÏ—Manpower
 JÉN MÍN CHIÉH FÄNG CHÜN—
 People's Liberation Army
 JÉN MÍN KÉ MING CHÜN SHIH WEI YÜÄN HÜI
 People's Revolutionary Military Council
 JIH PEN—Japan
 JEN WÜ—Mission

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Characters

憲法
 信號彈
 心理戰
 新民主主義青年團
 新兵
 薪水
 行政勤務
 行政區
 行軍紀律
 行軍鍋竈
 休戰
 休息
 選舉
 宣傳
 勳獎
 訓練
 訓練週期
 訊息
 巡邏
 一翼包圍
 移動彈幕
 醫院
 燃料
 人力
 人民解放軍
 人民革命軍事委員會
 日本
 任務

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Romanization and English

JÉN YÜÄN—Personnel
 JIH CH'Ü—Sunrise
 JIH LÖ—Sunset
 KÄNG K'UÉI—Helmet
 KÄO SHÈ P'ÄO PING—Antiaircraft Artillery
 KÄO TÏ—Hill
 KÉ MING—Revolution
 KUÄN TS'È SHÈ CH'Ï—Observed Fire
 KUÄN YÜÄN—Officials
 KUÉI TING—Regulations
 KÜNG ÄN CHING PÈI SÜ LING PÜ—
 Garrison Command Public Security
 KÜNG ÄN PÜ TUI—Public Security Forces
 KÜNG CH'ÄN CHÜ Ì—Communism
 KÜNG CH'ÄNG—Factory
 KÜNG CH'ENG CHÄN—Siege Warfare
 KÜNG CH'Ï—Attack
 KÜNG CH'Ï CHOÜ HSIEN—Axis of Attack
 KÜNG LÏ—Kilometer
 KÜNG LÜ—Highway
 KÜNG PING—Engineer
 KÜNG SHIH—Offensive
 KUO CHÜ FÄNG YÜ KÜNG SHIH—Fortify (Verb)
 KUO CH'Ä—State
 KUO CH'Ä KÜNG ÄN SHIH—
 National Public Security Division
 KUO CH'Ä TSÖ CHÄN CH'Ï HUÄ
 National War Plan
 KUO CH'Ä YÜ SUÄN—National Budget
 KUO CH'Ä—International Border
 KUO FÄNG PÜ—Ministry of National Defense

Characters

人員
 日出
 日落
 鋼盔
 高射炮兵
 高地
 革命
 觀測射擊
 官員
 規定
 公安警備司令部
 公安部隊
 共產主義
 工廠
 攻城戰
 攻擊
 攻擊軸線
 公里
 公路
 工兵
 攻勢
 構築防禦工事
 國家
 國家公安師
 國家作戰計劃
 國家預算
 國界
 國防部

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Romanization and English

Characters

KUO FANG PÜ PÜ CHANG—Minister of National Defense	國防部部長
KUO FANG WEI YUAN HUI Council of National Defense	國防委員會
KUO MIN TANG—Kuomintang	國民黨
KUO WU YUAN—State Council	國務院
K'Ä CH'Ë, TSÄI CHUNG CH'Ä CH'Ë—Truck	卡車, 載重汽車
K'OU LING—Password	口令
K'UAN TU—Width	寬度
K'UNG CHIANG KUNG CHI—Airborne Attack	空降攻擊
K'UNG CHIANG PÜ TUI—Airborne Forces	空降部隊
K'UNG CHUNG SÖU SÖ—Air Reconnaissance	空中搜索
K'UNG CHUNG SHE YING—Aerial Photography	空中攝影
K'UNG CHUN—Air Force	空軍
K'UNG HSI—Air Attack	空襲
K'UNG YUN PÜ TUI FEI CHI Troop Carrying Aircraft	空運部隊飛機
LEI TA—Radar	雷達
LENG CHAN—Cold War	冷戰
LI FA—Legislative	立法
LI FA CHI KUAN—Legislature	立法機關
LI LIANG—Force (Noun, General Term)	力量
LIANG I PAO WEI—Double Envelopment	兩翼包圍
LIANG SHIH—Food	糧食
LIEN—Company	連
LIEN LO—Liaison	聯絡
LING CHIEN—Spare Parts	零件
LIU TAN PAO—Howitzer	榴彈炮
LÜ CHUN—Army (General Sense)	陸軍
LÜ HSIEN—Route	路線
LÜ—Brigade	旅

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Romanization and English

Characters

MA—Horse	馬
MA CH'Ë—Horse-drawn Vehicle	馬車
MA CH'Ë—Wagon	馬車
MAI FU—Ambush	埋伏
MENG KUO—Ally	盟國
MIN CHÜ CHÍ CH'UAN CHIH Democratic Centralism	民主集權制
MIN PING—People's Militia	民兵
MING LING—Order	命令
MÜ PIAO—Objective	目標
NAN—South	南
NAN HSING—Male	男性
NEI CHAN—Civil War	內戰
NEI HSIEN—Interior Lines	內線
NENG CHIEN TU—Visibility	能見度
NUNG YEH TE—Agricultural	農業的
NÜ HSING—Female	女性
PAN—Squad	班
PAO CHANG—Safeguard (Noun)	保障
PAO HU—Safeguard (Verb)	保護
PAO KAÖ—Report	報告
PAO P'Ö—Demolitions	爆破
PAO WEI—Encirclement	包圍
PEI—North	北
PEI CHANG—Chevrons	臂章
PEN TUI—Main Body	本隊
PENG TA—Bandage	繃帶
PI MI—Secret	秘密
PIEH TUNG TU—Partisan	別動隊
PIEN CHIANG—Frontier	邊疆

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Romanization and English

PIEN CHIH PIAO—Tables of Organization
 PING—Sick
 PING KUNG—Ordnance
 PING KUNG CH'ANG—Arsenal
 PING LI—Strength
 PING T'UAN—Army Group
 PING YING—Camp
 PU CHANG—Ministers
 PU CHI—Supply
 PU CHI CHAN—Supply Dump
 PU CH'ANG—Rifle
 PU CHU TE—Auxiliary
 PU CH'UNG—Replacement
 PU PING—Infantry
 PU PING—Rifleman
 PU PING LIEN—Rifle Company
 PU TUI—Troops
 PU TUI—Unit
 P'AI—Platoon
 P'AI CH'EN TUI—Detachment
 P'AN KUO—Treason
 P'AN P'IEH—Revolt
 P'AO—Cannon
 P'AO—Gun
 P'AO CHAN—Counterbattery Fire
 P'AO PING—Artillery
 P'AO PING KUAN TS'Ë SŌ
 Artillery Observation Post
 P'AO PING KUAN TS'Ë YUAN—Artillery Observer
 P'AO SHOU—Cannoneer

Characters

編制表
 病
 兵工
 兵工廠
 兵力
 兵團
 兵營
 部長
 補給
 補給站
 步槍
 補助的
 補充
 步兵
 步兵
 步兵連
 部隊
 部隊
 排
 派遣隊
 叛國
 叛變
 炮
 炮
 炮戰
 炮兵
 炮兵觀測所
 炮兵觀測員
 炮手

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Romanization and English

P'EI PEI—Dispositions
 P'EN HUO CH'I—Flame Thrower
 P'ING HSING CH'OU HSIEN CH' KUAN CH' IANG
 (T'AN K'Ë CH'Ë)
 Coaxial Machine Gun (Tank)
 P'Ò CH' P'ÀÒ—Mortar
 P'Ò CH' P'ÀÒ—Trench Mortar
 P'Ò HUAI SH' CH'—Demolition Fire
 SAO SH'—Strafe
 SŪ LIEN—Soviet Union
 SŪ SH' TE—Soviet (Adjective)
 SŪ YING—Bivouac
 SZŪ FA—Judicial
 SZŪ HSIANG—Doctrine
 SZŪ HSIANG—Ideology
 SZŪ HSIANG KAI TS'AO—Indoctrination
 SZŪ LING P'—Headquarters
 SH'—Kill
 SHAN—Mountain
 SHAN KU—Valley
 SHANG—Wound
 SHANG CHIANG—Lieutenant General
 SHANG HSIAO—Colonel
 SHANG WANG—Casualty
 SHANG WEI—Captain
 SHAO CHIANG—Brigadier General
 SHAO HSIAO—Major
 SHAO PING—Sentinel
 SHAO WEI—Second Lieutenant
 SH' CH'—Fire (Verb)

Characters

配備
 噴火器
 平行軸線機關鎗 (坦克車)
 迫擊炮
 迫擊炮
 破壞射擊
 掃射
 蘇聯
 蘇式的
 宿營
 司法
 思想
 思想
 思想改造
 司令部
 殺
 山
 山谷
 傷
 上將
 上校
 傷亡
 上尉
 少將
 少校
 哨兵
 少尉
 射擊

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Romanization and English

Characters

SHÈ CHǐ CHŪN CHǐ—Fire Discipline	射擊軍紀
SHÈ CHIÈH—Field of Fire	射界
SHÈ FÁNG Tǐ CH'Ū—Fortified Area	設防地區
SHÈ HUI CH'ING PAO—Social Intelligence	社會情報
SHÈN FÈN CHÈNG—Identity Card	身份證
SHÈN LÍN—Jungle	森林
SHÈN T'OU—Infiltration	滲透
SHÈN WÈN YÜAN—Interrogator	審問員
SHÈNG—Province	省
SHÈNG CH'AN CHIEN SHÈ P'U TUI— Production and Construction Forces	生產建設部隊
SHÈNG KUANG AN T'UAN— Provincial Public Security Regiments	省公安團
SHÈNG Lǐ—Victory	勝利
SHĪH—Division	師
SHĪH CH'ǐ—Morale	士氣
SHĪH PAǐ—Defeat (Noun)	失敗
SHĪH PING—Enlisted Personnel	士兵
SHĪH PING—Soldier	士兵
SHĪH YUNG FANG SHÈ HSING WU CH'ǐ TE CH'AN CHÈNG—Radiological Warfare	使用放射性武器的戰爭
SHOU CH'IAN—Pistol	手鎗
SHOU CHANG—Leader	首長
SHOU FA CH'U—Message Center	收發處
SHOU T—Veterinarian	獸醫
SHOU T CH'U—Veterinary Corps	獸醫處
SHOU LIU TAN—Grenades	手榴彈
SHOU TU Tǐ CH'U—Contaminated Area	受毒地區
SHU LÍN—Forest	樹林
SHU Lǐ LIANG YUNG TE—Amphibious	水陸兩用的

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Romanization and English

Characters

SHUI PA—Dam	水壩
TÀ CH'È—Cart	大車
TÀ CHIANG—General	大將
TÀ HSIÀO—Senior Colonel	大校
TÀ HSIÀO—Size	大小
Tǎ PAI—Defeat (Verb)	打敗
TÀ WEI—Senior Captain	大尉
TÀ YÜAN SHUAI—Supreme Marshal	大元帥
TÀI PIAO—Delegates	代表
TÀI PIAO TÀ HUI—Congress	代表大會
TAN MÜ—Barrage Fire	彈幕
TAN T'OU—Projectile, Missile	彈頭
TAN WEI Tǐ CHING—Unit Boundary	單位地境
TAN YAÖ—Ammunition	彈藥
TAN YAO K'U—Ammunition Depot	彈藥庫
TAN CHAO TENG—Searchlight	探照燈
T'AN K'È CH'È—Tank	坦克車
TANG CHǐ—Party Discipline	黨紀
TANG CH'ǐ P'U WEI YÜAN HUI	黨支部委員會
Party Branch Committee	
TANG CHUNG YANG WEI YÜAN HUI	黨中央委員會
Party Central Committee	
TANG HUI I—Party Conference	黨會議
TANG TAI PIAO TÀ HUI—Party Congress	黨代表大會
TANG TE LÜ HSIEN—Party Line	黨的路綫
TAÖ LÜ—Road	道路
TAÖ LÜ TSÜ CHÜEH—Barricade	道路阻絕
TAÖ LÜ TSÜ CHÜEH—Road Block	道路阻絕
T'AO PING—Deserter	逃兵
T'È WÜ—Agent	特務

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Romanization and English

Characters

TÌ CHŪ—Landlord	地主
TÍ HSĪ T'ÚNG CH'ÓU—Espirt de Corps	敵愾同仇
TÌ HSÍNG—Terrain	地形
TÌ JÉN—Enemy	敵人
TÌ LÉI—Mine	地雷
TÌ LÉI CH'Ū—Minefield	地雷區
TÌ LĪ—Geography	地理
TÌ LĪ TE—Geographical	地理的
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 作用
 走廊
 組
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 最高指揮部
 最高人民檢察署
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 外圍警戒
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 偽裝
 尉官
 威力偵察
 衛兵
 委員會
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By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

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